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Abstract
Unemployment has a strong influence on the economic prospects of the UK
economy as a whole. The effect of unemployment can be long-lasting, and
as an experience can imply lasting effects on future employment outcomes.
In order to avoid unemployment, individuals may decide take jobs they are
overqualified for as a stepping stone to a better match when such positions be-
come available. If over-qualification is a negative productivity signal, then this
could reduce future career mobility. This thesis aimed to gain some insights
into the impact of where individuals live, within the UK, on their unemploy-
ment and employment experiences. With that in mind, detailed data sets were
constructed in order to answer the questions of interest. Moreover, flexible
econometric techniques were employed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Unemployment is a key policy measure of the health of the economy. In an
age of austerity, coupled with post recessionary pressures and the looming
threat of a “double dip”, high levels of unemployment are even more likely
to be a public “litmus test” for the perceived operational efficiency of gov-
ernment policies. Efficient management of unemployment levels is a must in
order to credibly manage public perceptions, both in the short- and long-term.
High aggregate unemployment is generally considered a sign of low levels eco-
nomic activity, provoking demand-side intervention with expansionary policies
to stimulate aggregate demand and thus increase employment (expansionary
fiscal policies: lowering tax rates or increasing government spending in order
to boost aggregate demand (job creation), or expansionary monetary policies:
lowering interest rates or expanding the money supply in order to increase the
incentive to spend and thus boosting aggregate demand). As section 3.1 high-
lights, it is likely that expansionary fiscal policies are only complementary to
targetted individual-level supply-side side interventions, Active Labour Market
Policies (ALMP), aimed at ‘reactivating’ the workforce through education and
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training schemes1. Moreover, fiscal policy is unlikely to be able to target the
re-employment prospects of the long-term unemployed.
Unemployment is persistent, in that unemployment today makes unemploy-
ment tomorrow more likely (Arulampalam et al. 2000). Furthermore, unem-
ployment carries implications into future employment. Human capital depre-
ciation, ‘hysterisis’ (as skills and re-employment prospects dwindle), and the
stigma of being unemployed are likely to lead to lower wage offers, lower wage
bargaining power and thus lower starting wages. Unless wage growth is sig-
nificantly faster than growth of equivalent non-displaced workers, a permanent
wage penalty will persist when compared to a situation where no unemployment
had occurred.
Human capital depreciates whilst unemployed. Moreover, skill mismatch
and over-qualification leads to further depreciation in jobs where human capital
is underutilised. What is important, from a policy point of view, is whether
this mismatch is temporary or of a permanent nature. Are mismatched jobs
stepping stones to better matches?
1.2 The Economics of Unemployment
Types of unemployment Frictional unemployment, the focus of chapter 4,
is a result of imperfect information leading to unemployment inflow/outflow
imbalance, as it takes time to match workers and firms. This implies the
simultaneous presence of unemployed persons and vacant jobs. On the demand-
side, the rate of job creation and job destruction affects the level of frictional
unemployment, which is affected by firms’ hiring and firing costs . These costs
1Other supply-side policies include benefit or income tax reform in order to provide incen-
tives to work, as well as trade union reform. Since minimum wages introduce wage rigidities,
implying that the unemployed cannot lower their reservation wages in order to get into the
job market, reforming minimum wage laws might help the least skilled that are priced out
of the labour market. Labour market frictions could be decreased by introducing centralised
vacancy posting where this did not formerly exist, e.g. Job Centre Plus.
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are in turn affected by strong Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) laws
(Marinescu 2009). On the supply-side a key driver of this type of unemployment
is the reservation wage, which is generally determined by the generosity of
unemployment benefits as well as eligibility constraints (Lancaster 1979). The
reservation wage is a crucial concept as it interacts with other features of the
welfare system, e.g. Working Families Tax Credit (UK), by changing marginal
tax rates and thus the incentive to work an extra hour. This has direct impacts
on the labour supply decision, which may not be captured in an unemployment
duration study. Whilst the term “frictional unemployment” is fairly negative,
unemployment can be a productive experience for some. Job search can be
viewed as an investment in information, improving subsequent job matches
(Lippman & McCall 1976). However, there is limited empirical evidence of
this.
Other important types of unemployment is real wage/classic unemployment.
This is caused when wages are above perfectly competitive market equilibrium
levels, which prices some people out of the labour market. A common cited ex-
ample is the effect of the minimum wage on labour demand. Demand-deficient
unemployment usually results from fluctuations in aggregate demand, e.g. the
business cycle. If wages are rigid, in that wages don’t adjust downwards equally
due to demand decreases, then this type of unemployment will occur. Unionised
wage bargaining is an important example of a wage rigidity driver, and is one
reason for large scale UK Public sector job cuts in 2011/2012.
Given the recent recession caused by the collapse of the Sub-Prime Mort-
gage industry, there is currently a vibrant debate in the US about whether the
current problem of persistently high levels of unemployment and low economic
growth are due to cyclical demand-deficiencies or due to structural misalloca-
tion of resources in the economy. Structural unemployment results due to a
mismatch between skills demanded and supplied, and implies substantial costs
1. Introduction 4
to both occupational and regional mobility. Structural unemployment can also
results from Technological Change and International Trade, which reallocate re-
sources in the economy resulting in winners and losers. An often cited example
is the decline of the UK’s shipping, mining and manufacturing base. Given that
these industries tended to be geographically concentrated, this drove persistent
regional differences in unemployment outcomes. Structural unemployment may
also arise from firms’ profit maximising behaviour. Monitoring is costly. Firms
have an incentive to pay above market (efficiency) wages in order to decrease
the incentive to shirk on the job/“Moral hazard” (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984).
However, if all employers did this then supply would exceed demand, leading
to structural unemployment2.
Voluntary and involuntary unemployment result from layoffs and quits, each
of which have different implications for future wage trajectories. However,
seasonal unemployment is more predictable as it results from systematic, pre-
dictable fluctuations in labour demand. Since these fluctuations are known in
advance, compensation for periods of unemployment is usually build into the
remuneration structure.
Until recently, for decades the US has always had lower levels of unem-
ployment than Europe. Machin & Manning (1999) attribute this to generous
unemployment benefits as well as higher levels of long-term unemployment in
Europe. Whilst ALMP are more pervasive and in Europe, they are almost
non-existent in the US. Unemployment benefits are less generous in the US,
not linked to past earnings, as well as being time limited. Although in Europe
time-limited unemployment insurance coexists with means tested unemploy-
ment assurance, the latter implies a higher likelihood of exposure to “hystere-
2Since higher unemployment rates decrease the outside option and decrease the incentive
to pay efficiency wages, this leads to a well established inverse relationship between the
unemployment rate and the wage level across a country called the Wage Curve (Blanchflower
& Oswald 1990; 1995).
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sis” due to lower work incentives. However, the main difference is in the cost
of job creation and job destruction. Strong EPL laws in Europe increase firing
costs, making firms more selective about who they hire. This in turn leads to
higher levels of unemployment (Borjas 2010.).
Measures of Unemployment A major difficulty in measuring the unemploy-
ment rate is how to define the unemployed. The two main measures of unem-
ployment employed in the UK are:
International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition: This definition is em-
ployed in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). By this definition, an individual
is unemployed if they have been actively searching for a job in the last 4 weeks
and are ready to work in the next two.
Claimant Count: The first requirement is to be claiming unemployment ben-
efits (Jobseekers’ Allowance, JSA), which implies that this definition is more
restrictive. However, an individual can still claim JSA if they are working up
to 16 hours a week (which would disqualify them from the ILO-based series).
Whereas the UK government once calculated unemployment rates using the
Claimant Count series, since JSA was introduced in 1996 the two series have
diverged considerably (Machin & Manning 1999). Individuals can be ILO un-
employed but not appear in the Claimant Count series, and vice versa. More-
over, the phenomenon of ‘hidden unemployment’ suggests that even the ILO
series may not capture everyone.
Consequences of Unemployment Governments have an incentive to credi-
bly manage the unemployment level due to the impact on public opinion as
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well as the long-run implication for the economy. Unemployment has both
negative and positive consequences, however the former tend to far outweigh
the latter and get wider public attention. Unemployment can lead to market
failure as well as lower Economic Growth. Consumer confidence and spending
can be reduced by higher unemployment levels, and Government revenues are
likely to be reduced due to lower tax revenues and higher benefit expenditure.
High levels of unemployment may induce a “Hysterisis Effect” as the skills and
employability of the long-run unemployment deteriorate. It may also increase
Social Deprivation and crime. From a more social point of view, unemploy-
ment has been shown to lower health levels, increase divorce rates and reduce
life expectancy.
On a slightly more positive note, higher levels of unemployment can lead to
lower and more stable inflation rates. They can also increase industry compet-
itiveness by lowering the bargaining power of workers over wages. Moreover,
higher levels of unemployment could imply an Environmental gain, due to lower
levels of Economic Growth.
Due to the impact on reelection prospects, Government policy is more likely
to be geared towards reducing unemployment rates. But, there is a tradeoff
between low unemployment rates and high inflation. Price inflation will feed
into wage inflation, increasing costs to employers and reducing their competi-
tiveness. Thus maintaining a credible policy of low unemployment is difficult.
Expectations need to be managed. However, short-term party politics can get
in the way of the economy’s long-term economic needs. Excess volatility of in-
flation between 1970 and 1990 affected consumer and investor confidence. Since
the mid 1990s, Bank of England (BoE) independence has meant a separation
of monetary and fiscal policy, with the BoE targetting inflation by setting the
former and government using the latter. This has helped to curb inflation ex-
pectations as well as increasing confidence in the UK economy. Price stability
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also helps the UK achieve its long-term targets of high and sustainable levels
of economic growth and employment.
1.3 Features of the UK unemployment benefits
system
The UK welfare system is complex, and it is beyond the scope of this study
to incorporate these inherent complexities into a unified framework. As with
most studies investigating the operationalisation of the welfare system at the
individual level, focus is limited to Job Seekers’ Allowance claimants.
Job Seekers’ Allowance (JSA) replace unemployment benefit & income sup-
port for unemployed people from October 1996. There are two main types of
JSA:
1. Contributions-based JSA: Paid to those who have satisfied the national
insurance (NIC) contributions criteria (referred to as Unemployment In-
surance, UI).
2. Income-based JSA: Paid to claimants who satisfy a family income-based
means test (referred to as Unemployment Assurance, UA)3.
JSA tightened work search requirements, increasing monitoring restrictions rel-
ative to the previous system. To qualify individuals must (be):
• Under 60 years old and not receiving Income Support.
• Working less than 16 hours a week.
• Capable of starting work immediately.
3The complexity of the system means that it is possible to receive means-tested JSA with
an income-based top-up.
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• Actively taking steps to find a job, e.g. attending interviews, writing
applications or seeking job information.
• Have a current “job seeker’s agreement” with Jobcentre Plus, including
information like: hours available for work; desired job; any steps the
claimant is willing to take to find work.
• Prepared to work 40 hours a week.
• Cannot place too many restrictions on the type of work that they are
willing to take. Refusal to take up a job offer without good reason may
result in loss of benefit eligibility (the “Work Test”).
In general UI is linked to the wage earned in the previous job, however in the
case of the UK this is paid at a flat rate. Eligibility for UI receipt is restricted
to 6 months from sign-on, however UA eligibility is not restricted in the same
way. UA functions through the social security system and is unlimited in du-
ration.
A major limitation of studies based on the UK Claimant Count is that they pool
both UI and UA claimants. This ignores substantial compositional differences
between these two groups, both in their work incentives and the interactions
with other elements of the welfare system. For instance, UA claimants are more
likely to be eligible for other benefits targetted at those on lower incomes. By
employing a definition that restricts the data to UI recipients with adequate
NIC contributions, we side step these issues in the first chapter. This definition
of unemployment is based on work by Wilke (2009). This paper provides an
important contribution to the unemployment duration literature, developing
empirical bounds for the true unemployment rate using UK administrative
data.
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1.4 Statement of the research problem
This thesis sets out to answer the following questions. What drives individuals’
unemployment experiences? The composition of individuals in a region, or
regional characteristics that drive that composition? What impact do career
interruptions have on individuals’ earnings prospects? Do earnings recover, and
is there a permanent “wage scar” carried into future employment (relative to
the counterfactual, individuals whose wages were growing continually). Human
capital depreciates whilst in unemployment. Moreover, human capital also
depreciates if underutilised in jobs one is overqualified for. What impact does
over-education have on the persistence of low-skilled employment? Are low-
skilled jobs a stepping stone to better matches for the overqualified? How does
this vary by local labour market characteristics and over the local business
cycle?
1.5 Outline of thesis
The thesis is comprised of three main chapters and is outlined as follows. Chap-
ter 2 details and justifies the main methodological approach adopted, as well
as inherent limitations and ways in which this could be extended given the
resources. Chapter 3, Sections 3.1, 3.2. and 3.3, cover the contributions to
the literature directly relevant to the three main chapters. The first chapter of
the thesis, chapter 4, draws on a novel data set linking individual Job Seekers’
Allowance (JSA) claimants to the regions in which they reside in order to ask
whether it is the composition of individuals in a region, or regional character-
istics that drive that composition which determines observed unemployment
durations. Flexible econometric techniques are employed. The key result be-
ing that regional characteristics were only found to impact on unemployment
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durations up to 150 days. In all cases, data set construction was a non-trivial
task. Appendix chapters C and D describe how the regional data set used in
the first chapter was constructed, as well as how the individual level was linked
to the regional level.
Wage Scarring refers to the long-term impact of individual unemployment
experience(s), hypothesised to increase the likelihood of future unemployment
and decreasing future earnings potential. However, economic theory does not
provide clear cut predictions of the impact of unemployment on future earnings.
The main hypothesis under test in Chapter 5 is that proposed and tested
by van Dijk & Folmer (1999) with cross-sectional data for the Netherlands:
Unemployment experienced in high unemployment regions is seen as more of a
characteristic of the region in which that unemployment was experienced, and
less of a negative productivity signal. What implications does this have for
the UK and for Wage Scarring? This chapter finds robust long-run evidence is
found supporting the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis, on average and for
over 45s made redundant in their previous jobs. Moreover, important sources
of regional variation in Wage Scarring are found. Being made redundant and
then experiencing unemployment in areas of high economic activity is equally
damaging for future earnings potential, independent of age. This chapter draws
on Continuous Work-life Histories, the construction of which is detailed and
justified in the Appendix, Section E.
The Overeducation literature is motivated by the observation of an increas-
ing proportion of highly skilled workings in jobs that were once low-skilled
(Borghans & de Grip 2000). Chapter 6 asks whether low-skilled jobs are step-
ping stones to better matches for the overqualified, how this varies by local
labour market characteristics and over the business cycle. Much of the existing
literature assumes that over-qualification has the same impact, independent
of the skill-composition of tasks performed on the job. Is over-qualification is
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worse for those in skilled or low-skilled employment? A dynamic discrete-choice
Multinomial Logit model (MNL) is employed. This chapter finds robust evi-
dence to suggest that over-qualification is more damaging for career mobility
if experienced in low-skilled employment. Low-skilled employment is more of
a Stepping Stone to skilled employment for females than males, independent
of over-qualification. However, conditional on being overqualified, only women
in low-skilled employment are more upwardly mobile than men. Important
variation is evident, both in terms of previous industry and firm characteris-
tics. The effect of being over-qualified is not invariant to the business cycle.
Moreover, when contrasting results from a 1988 and 2008 based classification
of occupational skill, estimates suggest that upward career mobility may have
increased (decreased) between 1988 and 2008 for overqualified females (males)
in general.
Finally, chapter 7 concludes, suggesting how the chapters in this thesis could
be extended in the future.
Chapter 2
Methodology
This section introduces the theoretical framework as well as the econometric
methods used to assess the re-employment prospects, the costs of unemploy-
ment and the implications of over-qualification for career mobility in the sub-
sequent thesis chapters.
2.1 Theoretical Motivation
2.1.1 Chapter 4: Modelling Unemployment: Search & Match-
ing
Job search theory describes the process in which individuals match with va-
cancies in the labour market. Seminal jobsearch papers include McCall (1970)
and Mortensen (1970).
The Job Search Model The standard job search model assumes that the dis-
tribution of wages offers is exogenous/ determined outside the system (Atkinson
& Micklewright 1991). An unemployed worker’s strategy can be described by a
reservation wage, above which wage offers result in job acceptance. Reservation
wages increase with benefit levels, resulting in the prediction that increases in
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unemployment benefit generosity lead to lower employment transitions for the
unemployed.
The standard model makes various restrictive assumptions. An individual
is concerned with the present value of their future income stream (over an
infinite horizon), discounted at a constant rate, δ. Once accepted, jobs are
assumed to last forever, at a constant wage w. Job offers are assumed to arrive
at a constant rate, α, per unit of time (which implies that the probability of
a job’s wage offer, w, exceeding the reservation wage, w∗, is 1− F (w) at each
point in time (where F (.) is the cumulative distribution function of all possible
wage offers, assumed known). Moreover, the job search intensity is assumed
fixed. Past job offers cannot be recalled. When out of work, an individual has
a value of leisure v. Furthermore, the level of unemployment compensation, b,
is assumed constant over time (Atkinson & Micklewright 1991). Under these
assumptions, there is a stationary reservation wage, w∗, which must satisfy:
w∗ − (b+ v) = α(1− F (w∗))[w∗∗ − w∗]/δ (2.1)
where w∗ is the expected wage, conditional on w ≥ w∗. Choice of reservation
wage boils down to a balance between increasing income by accepting w∗ today,
versus the expected improvement over w∗ as a result of waiting for a better offer.
In the limit (n→∞), the hazard rate, or the exit rate from unemployment, is
α(1− F (w∗)). Thus the average duration of unemployment is Tu = 1α(1−F (w∗))
which is an increasing function of the reservation wage w∗.
w∗ =f(z, α, r, q, w) (2.2)
=x− z − λ
r + q
∫ +∞
x
(w − x)dH(w)
(Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004)
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where z is the unemployment benefit rate, α is the wage offer arrival rate,
r is the rate of interest, q the job loss rate, and w the real wage. Average
duration of unemployment, Tu, is an increasing function of the benefit rate.
However, it is a decreasing function of the interest rate and the job loss rate. A
higher interest rate implies that future values are discounted more, lowering the
reservation rate and the average time looking for work. A higher job loss rate
implies lower demands of job seekers (decreased “pickiness”), thus decreasing
average unemployment durations. A higher arrival rate of job offers implies
an ambiguous effect on average unemployment durations. It may increase the
reservation wage, leading to a decrease in the probability of accepting wage
offers, thus the overall effect is an empirical question (Cameron & Trivedi 2005).
The first issue that could be raised about the theoretical model is that reser-
vation wages are unobservable1. Moreover the overall distribution of wages is
unknown. We only observe wages that exceeded reservation wages. These lim-
itations have meant that the literature has adopted a reduced form approach,
focussing on the probability distribution driving unemployment durations. In
this context, the hazard function can be represented as φ(t).dt = f(t)
S(t)
where
S(t) = 1 − F (t) (see Methodology for more information, Section 2). φ(t) > 0
implies positive duration dependence (re-employment probabilities increase as
unemployment duration increases), whilst φ(t) < 0 implies negative duration
dependence (re-employment probabilities decrease as unemployment duration
increases).
The assumption of an unlimited benefit duration is inappropriate, as in re-
ality the time to expiry of benefit entitlement (eligibility constraints) matter.
In reality, Unemployment Insurance (UI) is paid for a fixed period, t. The
reservation wage of UI recipients falls with length of unemployment spell until
1Where reservation wages are observable, these are almost invariantly self-reported and
subject to serious measurement error.
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time t (Mortensen 1977, pp. 511). If this is the case then post UI benefit ex-
haustion, the level of benefits will have no impact on re-employment probability.
Studies evaluating the effects of unemployment benefits are faced with numer-
ous challenges, including poor data, the complexity of the system (confounding
factors) and lack of true exogenous variation. In Germany, as in many other
European countries, unemployment benefits are tied to previous earnings. For
very low-income earners, income replacement rates (the rate at which unem-
ployment benefits replace former income) can be up to 100%. This effectively
eliminates any work incentive. Recent Hartz-IV reforms have aimed to reduce
this issue, however means testing still implies this issue affects a sub-section of
society. Even though in the UK UI is not tied to previous earnings, the effect of
UI benefits on labour supply decisions is. Moreover, work incentives are likely
to be impacted by other features of the welfare system, e.g. housing benefits,
child benefits and working family tax credits (WFTC). Many studies find ev-
idence of negative duration dependence (re-employment probabilities decrease
as unemployment durations increase). However, Meyer (1995; 1996) draws on
data from a natural experiment in the US, finding evidence of positive duration
dependence during benefit eligibility: individuals are more likely to exit unem-
ployment as unemployment duration increases. Evidence of both negative and
positive duration dependence has also been found in Europe. So conclusions
are not always clear cut as one may think.
There are definite problems regarding the assumptions of the basic model when
applied to real world Unemployment benefit systems. Centralised vacancy post-
ing, e.g. Job Centre Plus, lower the costs of job search by decreasing the level
of imperfect information in the market. Alternative formal and informal search
methods also exist on both sides of the market, and in some occupations may
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account for the bulk of recruitment. Job seekers may exploit alternative job
advertisement channels such as local newspapers. Moreover, employers may
recruit internally (internal labour markets) before looking to specialist recruit-
ment agencies and centralised vacancy postings for prospective talent. In 1996,
the arrival of JSA introduced stronger monitoring restrictions and eligibility
constraints for job seekers. Monitoring restrictions & eligibility constraints af-
fect job search intensity, resulting in a spike in exit rates just before benefit
exhaustion (Meyer 1990). This suggests that parametric specifications of the
reduced form hazard rate are likely to be inappropriate for capturing such non-
linearities. Mortensen (1977) also suggests an indirect effect of the prospect
of future eligibility, resulting in the increased attractiveness of employment
as a substitute for uninsured unemployment. Moreover, there are generally
restrictions on job offer acceptance, e.g. the “Work Test” in the UK.
This prediction, that increases in unemployment benefit generosity lead to
lower employment transitions for the unemployed, is sensitive to personal & de-
mographic characteristics, elapsed unemployment duration and the prevailing
labour market characteristics. Moreover, there is a possible role for individ-
ual heterogeneity in driving unemployment outcomes. Distinguishing between
true versus spurious state dependence is an important challenge. Genuine state
dependence can explain the presence of negative duration dependence in the
data, however unobserved heterogeneity will bias estimates towards spurious
negative duration dependence. True negative duration dependence suggests
that if we randomly select two people, we would expect the individual with the
shorter unemployment duration to leave unemployment more quickly (Machin
& Manning 1999). However, there is another possible explanation for this phe-
nomenon. Individuals with higher re-employment probabilities will leave the
sample first, resulting in the remaining pool of unemployed being dominated
by jobseekers with low re-employment prospects (Machin & Manning 1999).
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True and spurious state dependence carry different policy implications, and
distinguishing between the two is key for Government policy. True state de-
pendence suggests that policies should target the re-employment prospects of
all jobseekers, whereas spurious state dependence suggests intervention to tar-
get those with the lowest re-employment prospects (Collier 2005). However, it
is difficult to disentangle the two phenomena:
It does not really seem possible to identify separately the effect of
heterogeneity from that of duration dependence without making
some strong functional form assumptions which have no foundation
in economic theory (Machin & Manning 1999, pp. 3111).
The standard job search model has been extended to incorporate alternative
destination states, such as inactivity, on-the-job search, and to endogenise firm
behaviour, equilibrium jobsearch models for a detailed exposition see Rogerson
et al. (2005) and/or Eckstein & van den Berg (2007).
The Matching Model So far we have concentrate on partial equilibrium job
search theory. The matching model is an equilibrium model, which summarises,
at the aggregate level, the process in which firms with vacancies and jobseekers
meet. The matching model is a macroeconomic model with microeconomic
foundations. Unlike classical macroeconomic models, this approach adds more
institutional realism by incorporating labour market frictions.
Various formulations of the matching process exist. The “Balls and Urns”
model assumes that job matches are random, with no possibility of strategic
jobsearch behaviour (Pissarides 1979). Ranking models explicitly model firm
behaviour, under the assumption that job applicants are ranked in terms of
unemployment duration with those with the lowest durations having being the
most attractive (Blanchard & Diamond 1994). Stock-flow matching models
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explicitly model heterogeneity between stocks and flows of jobseekers and va-
cancies, suggesting that what matters for the re-employment prospects of the
long-term unemployed is the flow of new vacancies and not the stock of exist-
ing vacancies (Coles & Smith 1998). However, alternative mechanisms could
explain some empirical observations. Blanchard & Diamond (1994) explain neg-
ative duration dependence as a demand-side phenomenon, however, this could
equally be explained by lower levels of job search intensity as unemployment
duration increases (Petrongolo & Pissarides 2001)2.
Standard approaches assume job search intensity is constant. Moreover,
the “Balls and Urns” model is a constant returns to scale matching function.
However, the validity of this assumption has been called into question in the
literature (Petrongolo 2001) when investigating matching across UK regional
Jobcentres. This also ignores on-the-job search by assuming that only the un-
employed are jobseekers.The empirical matching literature finds that incidence
of unemployment, spatial allocation of vacancies and job seekers, as well as
the demographical characteristics of the labour force matter in the matching
process. However unemployment benefits are no found to be as important a
determinant (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). As noted by Petrongolo & Pissarides
(2001), the unemployment benefits indicator is likely to suffer from substan-
tial measurement error due to data limitations and the difficulty of accurately
capturing the complexity of the welfare system. However, these general find-
ings are also consistent with the result that incidence rather than duration of
unemployment matters most for employment outcomes (Kalwij 2004).
The matching process can be summarised by the ratio of vacant jobs to
2A recent contribution to the theoretical matching literature is that of “island matching”
(see Mortensen 2009)
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unemployed (job seekers) in the labour force.
θ =
V
U
(2.3)
(Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004)
Where V represents the stock of vacancies and U the stock of unemployed. θ is
an indicator of “labour market tightness”. Analysing the general implications
of a change in θ is not so straightforward as firms and job seekers are affected
differently. Firms will find it harder to fill vacancies the higher the number of
vacancies for a given level of unemployed job seekers. However, job seekers will
find that this same scenario increases their chances of finding a suitable job
match. Chapter 4 focusses on the supply-side, unemployment duration, with
job seekers’ unemployment experiences being of direct interest.
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2.1.2 Chapter 6: Human Capital Theory, The Mincerian
Earnings Function & its Estimation.
The study of the distribution of earnings in the economy stretches back to
Classical Economists including Adam Smith who considered the distribution
of wealth between capital and labour (Polachek 2007). Later interest changed
from the notion of homogenous labour inputs, to the distribution of income
across heterogenous labour types. Earlier macroeconomic enquiries into the
distribution of earnings across workers include Leontief 1946 and Schultz 1967.
The Mincerian earnings function formalises the relationship between life cycle
earnings and human capital accumulation with important policy and welfare
implications (Mincer 1958; Mincer & Polachek 1974).
Mincer treats schooling and occupation as investments and that individuals
invest up to a point where investment cost is just equal to present value of
schooling gains, i.e. the point at which one is indifferent between the cost of
investing more and the increased lifetime earnings. This was motivated by the
empirical evidence of a non-uniform distribution of income across the popula-
tion. Becker (1962) later extended this work, formalising the theory of Human
Capital.
The basic Mincerian earnings function can be represented in its short-hand
form:
lnYi(t) =a0 + a1SCHOOLINGi + a2EXPERIENCEi (2.4)
+ a3EXPERIENCE
2
i + εi
where a1 and a2 are rates of return to schooling and post-schooling human
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capital investment (Mincer 1958)
In light of Human Capital theory’s predictions about general and specific train-
ing, equation 2.4 has been augmented to include a quadratic in job tenure
(where post-schooling human capital investment is divided into general - experience-
and specific -job tenure- human capital):
lnYi(t) =a0 + a1SCHOOLING+a2EXPERIENCEi (2.5)
+ a3EXPERIENCE
2
i + a4TENUREi
+ a5TENURE
2
i + εi
(Mincer & Polachek 1974)
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2.2 Econometric Methodology
2.2.1 Chapter 4: Unemployment Duration Models
The decision of how to model the transition process should be directed by the
nature of the underlying data (Jenkins 2004). The Joint Unemployment &
Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) contains data on the number of days an
individual was claiming Jobseekers’ Allowance. Individual-level characteristics
refer to the beginning of the spell in question. These characteristics are matched
to regional-level information relevant to the month in which the claimant spell
began. The data is arranged into single spell format, in order to aid comparison
to the Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) estimator which cannot take into
account time varying covariates (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4 for a motivation of
the use of CQR for duration analysis). Since in chapter 4 the dependent vari-
able retains its daily survival time structure, it seemed appropriate to pursue
a continuous-time estimation strategy in this case. In the context of duration
models, reformatting the data into a discrete-time format would imply making
further assumptions about the nature of transitions at the boundary of each
time interval and thus is not pursued in this chapter. The following describes
methodological considerations.
Continuous-time Duration Models
If we let unemployment duration equal a nonnegative random variable, T,
then the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) F (t) = Pr(T ≥ t) = ∫ t
0
f(s).ds
where f(s) = dF (t)/dt = F ′(s) is the Probability Density Function (PDF),
the instantaneous probability that unemployment duration equals t, Pr(T =
t). Following the methodology in Cameron & Trivedi (2005), the Survivor
Function, S(t) represents the probability that an unemployment spell last until
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time t: S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t). The probability that a spell of length t
ends in the next time period t+ ∆t, given that it has lasted up until time t, is
Pr(t ≤ T < t+ ∆t | T ≥ t). Thus the hazard rate, λ(t), is defined as:
λ(t) =
lim
∆t→∞ .
P r(t ≤ T < t+ ∆t | T ≥ t)
∆t
=
f(t)
1− F (t) =
f(t)
S(t)
(2.6)
The hazard rate, λ(t), is the instantaneous probability of leaving a state, con-
ditional on survival until time t. Equation 2.6 highlights that the hazard rate
is the ratio of the distribution function and the survival function of duration
times. The hazard rate can be shown to be the change in the log-survivor
function.
λ(t) =
1
S(t)
.
dF (t)
dt
=
1
S(t)
.
d(1− S(t))
dt
=
1
S(t)
.(−d(S(t))
dt
) = − 1
S(t)
.
dS(t)
dt
= −d ln(S(t))
dt
(2.7)
The integrated hazard function, Λt, has computational advantages over the
hazard, λ(t). This function can be determined by summing all hazards until
period t.
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(v).dv = lnS(t) (2.8)
Taking exponents, the survivor function can be represented:
S(t) = exp(−Λ(t)) (2.9)
Typically, an assumption is made about the form of the distribution function
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Λ(t), then its parameters are estimated. Common parametric functions used
to model the hazard rate include the Exponential distribution, Λ(t) = γ, γ > 0.
In this case the hazard is constant and independent of time. The Exponen-
tial survivor function is S(t) = exp(−γ.t). The Weibull distribution func-
tion is represented λ(t) = γ.α.tα−1, γ, α > 0. Unlike the exponential case,
this hazard function depends on time. The Weibull survivor function is thus
S(t) = exp(−γ.tα).
Non-linearities cannot be accounted for using the exponential and Weibull
approaches. The Log-Normal, Log-Logistic, and Generalised Gamma distribu-
tions are more flexible and allow for these non-linearities to be explicitly mod-
elled, albeit under some assumptions. The main issue when estimating para-
metric models is misspecification. Consistency of parameter estimates requires
a correctly specified model. The general approach is to adopt a non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier approach to assess the distribution of duration dependence be-
fore deciding on the parametric form of this. This amounts to imposing a non-
testable assumption for statistical convenience, as economic theory generally
does not have anything to say about the exact shape of duration dependence.
Censoring & Estimation
Censoring is a major challenge when dealing with time to event data, requir-
ing special methods which explicitly take into account this censoring when
formulating the likelihood function. The Joint Unemployment & Vacancies
Operating System (JUVOS) data used in this study contains an inflow of reg-
istered unemployment spells (claimants), up until a fixed point (end of sample
window). This introduces the problem of right censoring, as some of the spells
in the data are incompletely observed. Given n observations, t1, t2, ..., tn, some
of which are censored, the indicator function δi = 1[T
∗
i < C
∗
i ], equals one if
a complete spell is observed (no censoring) and zero if a spell is right cen-
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sored. Ti = min(T
∗
i , C
∗
i ) is observed in the data. Estimation is carried out via
Censored Maximum Likelihood. The common approach is to assume indepen-
dent/random censoring, implying that the censoring mechanism δi is exogenous
and can be ignored. Under independent censoring a closed form solution to the
likelihood function exists.
The log-likelihood function is the logarithmic product of the joint density
function of complete and incomplete spells, and can be represented as the
weighted sum of the hazard and integrated hazard functions. As long as this
density function is correctly specified, which relies on the hazard function be-
ing correctly specified, then the Maximum Likelihood Estimates achieve the
Cramer-Rao lower-bound (asymptotic consistency). Misspecification implies a
lack of robustness. The underlying identification assumption is that the same
process is driving the observed and unobserved observations.
Sample attrition in survey data is an example of potentially non-random
(endogenous) censoring, however this assumption is maintained given its widespread
application, lack of identification results, and the lack of a Censored Quantile
Regression estimator consistent under random censoring (Koenker 2008).
To be able to assess how particular variables impact on duration levels,
as is convention in the Labour Economics literature, a Proportional Hazard
approach is adopted. This breaks the conditional hazard rate into two compo-
nents, a baseline hazard λ0(t, α) (a function of time) and a vector of estimates,
φ(x, β) = exp(x′β) which is a function of the included covariates.
Λ(t) = λ0(t, α).φ(x, β) (2.10)
The class of Proportional Hazard (PH) models includes the Exponential and
Weibull approaches. These hazard functions are proportional to the baseline
hazard and covariates (x) increase or decrease the hazard function by a constant
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proportion relative to the baseline hazard (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). Another
PH example includes the semi-parametric Piecewise-Constant Hazard, which
makes very few assumptions about the distribution of duration times. This
divides the exponential function into k segments within which the hazard of ex-
iting unemployment is constant. λ0(t, α) = exp(αj), cj−1 ≤ t < c, j = 1, . . . , k.
The parameters α1, . . . , αk are estimated to uncover the baseline hazard. Once
the baseline probability of exiting unemployment in any period is estimated,
the impact of covariates would be to shift baselines up or down proportionally.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
As is the case for OLS, measurement error and omitted variable bias (OVB) are
important in survival analysis. Lack of control for unobserved ability bias may
lead to incorrect inferences. Moreover, measurement errors in survival times
(most likely due to time interval aggregation) and in regressors will also impart
important biases on results if not controlled for.
Consequences of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity include:
• Over-estimating negative duration dependence.
• The effect of a change in a variable on the hazard rate is no longer con-
stant, but declines over time. The proportional hazards assumption im-
poses the restriction that covariates impact on the hazard rate by shifting
it up or down at a constant rate (Cameron & Trivedi 2005).
• Under-estimating the effect of a change in a covariate on the re-employment
hazard.
(Jenkins 2004)
A full-flexible non-parametric baseline hazard lends credence to the Cox
model. However, penalized likelihood estimation restricts the researcher to
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controlling for shared frailty in the Cox PH model. Research looking at sin-
gle spell data suggests that failing to take unobserved heterogeneity into ac-
count does not seriously bias results given a fully baseline hazard specification
(see Meyer 1990, Narendranathan & Stewart 1993, Cameron & Trivedi 2005).
Duration analysis techniques are restricted in the way the unobserved hetero-
geneity can enter the specification: “[A]llowing for a random disturbance term
in each of the cause-specific hazards requires an additional assumption that
imposes the independence of these disturbance terms across the cause-specific
hazards (Petrongolo 2001, pp.728).” Unobserved heterogeneity can be incor-
porated into most continuous-time models using standard techniques in Stata.
However more flexibility is available in the discrete-time setting. This can be
done by modelling the destination-specific intercepts as normally or discrete
mass point distributed using techniques such as HSHAZ and PGMHAZ8 in
Stata (Jenkins 2004), GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008) or the Hal-
ton draws based procedure whilst imposing normality of the residuals (Haan &
Uhlendorff 2006). Whilst flexible, the discrete-time approach requires imposing
assumptions about the nature of transitions at the boundaries of time intervals.
Moreover, the choice of how to define an interval can be arbitrary.
Competing Risks, Time-Varying Covariates & Multiple Spells
It is common for studies using survival analysis techniques to treat transitions
to inactivity as right censored or to drop them completely. This assumption
implies that the partial likelihood can be considered the sum of the destination-
specific hazards, without having to explicitly model the censoring mechanism
as one would in a correlated risks setting (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). In the du-
ration context, treating inactivity as a censored destination state, may lead to
inconsistent estimates of the parameters determining the transitions of interest
as this assumes away unobserved characteristics affecting both transitions of
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interest and those to censored states (van den Berg & van Ours 1994; van den
Berg & Lindeboom 1998). Conditional on the validity of the independent risks
assumption, the empirical strategy pursued in Chapter4 is consistent and takes
into account the competing risks structure of the JUVOS. However, as far as
I am aware to date identification has only been proved in the competing risks
duration setting under independent risks. The independence assumption im-
poses restrictions on the nature of the error structure between competing risks.
IF this restriction does not hold then relaxing it is likely to have a large impact
on estimates. The multiple spell nature of the JUVOS could be exploited for
identification purposes (Abbring & Berg 2000; Van den Berg 2001). The ad-
vantage of controlling for multiple spells is that identification in multiple spell
context achieved under much weaker assumptions than in the single spell case
(Honore 1993). Omitting time-varying covariates leads to an OVB problem, es-
pecially if these variables are correlated over time. Time-varying covariates can
be incorporated using “episode splitting”, aiding identification of individual-
and regional-level effects, however this can lead to very large data sets (Jenkins
2004).
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2.2.2 Chapter 5: Econometric Issues of Estimating the Min-
cerian Earnings Function.
The estimation strategy pursued in Chapter 5 is informed by lessons drawn
from the literature estimating the Mincerian earnings function.
Omitted Variable Bias
The original Mincerian earnings function excluded controls for experience, es-
timating ln yt = a0 + a1St + εt (Mincer 1958). This produced an estimate
of the return to an extra year of schooling of 7%, in a regression with an
R2 of 7%. Mincer (1974) augmented the original regression with a quadratic
in experience, increasing the estimated rate of return to schooling to roughly
11%, ceteris paribus, and the R2 to 29% (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). This
highlights the important impact of Omitted Variable Bias (OVB). By omitting
post-schooling experience, human capital accumulated after full-time education
will be captured by the error term, thus imparting bias on regression estimates.
Since schooling and experience are negatively correlated, excluding experience
from the regression will mean that the returns to schooling are underestimated
(Card 1999). OVB biased estimates and decreases the overall performance of
the model.
To illustrate the problem, one can draw on the standard OLS estimator in
matrix notation.
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Y =X ′β + z′α︸︷︷︸+u
ˆβOLS =β + (N
−1X ′X)−1(N−1X ′z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
α + (N−1X ′X)−1(N−1X ′u)
If Cov(Xk, z) =0 then OLS is consistent as δ → 0
If Cov(Xk, z) 6=0 then :
βˆ = β + δα (2.11)
(Cameron & Trivedi 2005)
Specification 2.11 represents the Omitted Variable Bias (OVB) formula. The
term δ determines the direction of the bias due to the omitted variable under
consideration, which depends on the correlation Cov(Xk, z).
If not adequately controlled for, time out of the labour force can lead to an
overestimate of the returns to experience, furthermore, aggregate economic con-
ditions, like local unemployment rates and local labour market tightness, have
been shown to impact on returns to schooling (Polachek 2007). Union member-
ship (Kuhn & Sweetman 1998), race, gender3, marital status and ethnicity are
other examples of potential ‘exogenous’4 confounders. Crucially, measurement
error in variables will also impart a form of OVB on estimates.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Selection on unobservables is caused by endogeneity which cannot be controlled
for due to lack of data, or poorly measured proxies. To illustrate this point,
3Investigating the labour supply decisions of women is only slightly complicated by the
fact that womens’ labour supply function tends to be discontinuous (Polachek 2007).
4“Fixed at the time the regressor of interest was determined (Angrist & Pischke 2009, pp.
64)”.
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schooling is considered to be endogenous to ability in an earnings regression as
investing in higher levels of schooling is less costly for individuals with higher
levels of ability (Spence 1973). Instrumental Variables (IV) and twin studies
are potential options for dealing with this issue in the context of cross-section
data, however they are not without their limitations. The main difficulty when
implementing IV is finding valid instruments. A valid instrument for schooling
would be correlated with schooling but not directly with earnings (Polachek
2007). Difference-in-difference approaches, e.g. Addison & Portugal (1987),
have been implemented in the cross-section context, however in the absence
of an adequate control group strong identifying assumptions imply that these
estimates should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, if earnings drop
before displacement (“Ashenfelter’s dip,” Ashenfelter 1978) then estimates will
be sensitive to the time period chosen. Even if a control group is available,
some identifying assumptions may be invalidated, e.g. the common trends as-
sumption.
Given the availability of panel data, the fixed-effects (within-groups) es-
timator can be used to control for time-invariant sources of endogeneity, e.g.
the time-invariant component of ability bias. The within-groups estimator, a
generalisation of the fixed-effects estimator (Arulampalam 2001), is attractive
in the context of an earnings regression as whilst it does require at least two
observations per individual, it does not require these observations to be con-
secutive as the first-differences estimator does.
To demonstrate the operation of the within-groups estimator, suppose we
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had the following regression:
Yit = αi +X
′
itβ + εit (2.12)
In equation 2.12, Xit represents a matrix of regressors, αi a random individual-
specific effect, and εit a random error term. Allowing time-invariant αi to be
correlated with Xit, the error term can be written as uit = αi + εit. Thus
uit contains a time-invariant and time-varying component. The fixed-effect αi
can be eliminated be the within-groups estimator through de-meaning. By
construction εit is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, Xit.
(Yit − Yi) =(Xit −Xi)′β + (εit − εi) (2.13)
Where:
Yi =T
−1
I
Ti∑
t=1
Yit; Xi = T
−1
I
Ti∑
t=1
Xit; etc...
OLS on equation 2.13 yields consistent estimates of β, the standard errors of
which must be suitably adjusted for loss of degrees of freedom.
The drawback of this approach is the inability to estimate the effect of time-
invariant regressors. Furthermore, if there is little variation in a regressor of
interest, its fixed-effects estimates will no be precisely measured (Cameron &
Trivedi 2005). Fixed effects estimates are susceptible to attenuation bias due to
measurement error, whilst measurement error and ability bias work in different
directions in terms of their impact on estimated returns to schooling. If a vari-
able is persistent - incidence this year makes incidence next year more likely -,
and changes from year-to-year are misreported/miscoded, although there may
be measurement error in a sub-sample of the population in each year observed
year-to-year changes in the variable will be mostly noise (Angrist & Pischke
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2009, pp. 335). This implies more measurement error in differenced estimates
than in their levels, explaining one reason why fixed effects estimates are gen-
erally smaller than their OLS counterparts (Angrist & Krueger 1999).
Whilst fixed-effects may eliminate time-invariant sources of endogeneity,
this estimator is based on the identifying assumption of strict exogeneity of the
explanatory variables conditional on αi: E(uit|Xi, αi) = 0 ∀t, where αi is the
unobserved individual effect (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). This implies that OLS
estimates of 2.13 will still yield inconsistent estimates of β if this identifying
assumption is not satisfied. Sample selection bias is another important sources
of endogeneity in this context.
In the context of this study, the dependent variable, the real wage, is likely
to be impacted by measurement error. Usual hours worked is likely to be quite
stable over time in full time jobs, as individuals develop regular work patterns.
Sample Selection
When a random sub-sample of the population of the population of interest is
not available, one needs to worry about the representativeness of the data at
hand. Since earnings are only observed for those that work this implies that
the sample of wage earners is not a random sub-sample of the working popu-
lation as whether one works is determined by the participation decision. This
phenomenon is commonly termed incidental truncation. Survey design, sample
attrition and survey non-response are other examples of reasons why the the
data may not be representative.
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Gronau (1974) provided an early contribution to the issue of incidental
truncation, in the context of labour supply. The problem can be laid out as
follows. Suppose we want to estimate E(W 0i |xi), where W 0i represents the
hourly wage offer of individual i. Since W 0i is only observed for those that
work, the participation decision can be represented as the point on a labour
supply schedule where an individual is indifferent between working and not
working. The weekly labour supply model can be represented as a utility max-
imisation problem: maxh utili(W
0
i h+ ai, h) subject to 0 ≤ h ≥ 168(24 ∗ 7),
where h represents the hours worked per week and ai the non-wage income of
individual i (Wooldridge 2001). Individual i will be indifferent between working
and not working at the point where the marginal utility of income equals the
marginal disutility of working. Gronau (1974) refers to this as the reservation
wage (W ri ). Thus we will only observe a positive wage for individuals if they
received a wage offer that is bigger than their reservation wage (W 0i ≥ W ri ).
Under certain parametric assumptions5, it can be shown that the W 0i will
only be observed when:
lnW 0i − lnW ri = Xi1β2 −Xi2β2 − γ2ai + ui1 − ui2 = Xiδ2 + vi2 > 0 (2.14)
Dropping i subscripts, letting Y1 = lnW
0, and Y2 the participation indicator
function, gives:
Y1 = X1β1 + u1 Y2 = 1[Xδ2 + v2 > 0] (2.15)
The sample selection model is estimable under the following assumptions: exo-
geneity of X, v2 ∼ N(0, 1) and E(u1|v2) = γ1v2 + ε where ε ∼ I.I.D.(0, σ2),
5That (W 0i ) and (W
r
i ) are exponentially distributed.
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i.e. The error in the second stage is a linear function (γ1) of the error in the
first stage, plus some noise. Under these assumptions,
E(Y1|X, Y2 = 1) = X1β1 + γ1E(v2|v2 > −Xδ2) = X1β1 + γ1λ(Xδ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗
(2.16)
Equation 2.16 introduces the inverse Mills ratio λ(Xδ2) = φ(Xδ2)/Φ(Xδ2).
If sample selection is not a problem then γ1 = 0, u1 and v2 are uncorre-
lated, and OLS will produce consistent results since equation 2.16 reduces to
E(Y1|X, Y2 = 1) = X1β1. However, if γ1 6= 1 then OLS of Y1 on X1, omitting *
will lead to inconsistent estimates of β1 in the same manner as OVB (Heckman
1979).
Heckman (1979) proposed a two-step procedure to correct for sample selec-
tion bias. The first stage participation decision is estimated as the Probit
P (Yi2 = 1|Xi) = Φ(Xiδ2) on the all available observations including non-
participants in the labour force. The δˆ2 estimates are then used to obtain
the inverse Mills ratio λˆi2 ≡ λ(Xiδˆ2) ∀i. In the second stage, equation 2.16
can be consistently estimated using λˆi2 estimated from the first stage. The
resulting estimates are
√
N -asymptotically normal (Wooldridge 2001).
A t-test for the null hypothesis H0 : γ1 = 0 serves as a test for the pres-
ence of sample selection. Identification is secured by exclusion restrictions in
the first stage participation decision. Valid exclusion restrictions are factors
which impact on the participation decision but not on the wage offer (essen-
tially instruments in the IV sense). Finding valid exclusion restrictions is a
major challenge for most studies adopting this technique. In the absence of ex-
clusion restrictions, β1 is only identified due to nonlinearity in the inverse Mills
ratio (Puhani 2000). However, the two-step Limited Information Maximum
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Likelihood (LIML) procedure imposes less distributional assumptions than the
bivariate sample selection model which requires the additional assumptions of
joint normality and homoskedasticity of u1 and v2 (Cameron & Trivedi 2005).
The assumption of joint normality of the residuals is unlikely to hold in small
samples, which could be a problem in the context of longitudinal survey data
(Newey et al. 1990).
Attrition
The BHPS is not available continuously from wave 1 for all interviewees aged 16
to 58. This is mostly due to individuals entering the sample at later interviews
once they turn 16, but also due to individuals exiting and then re-entering the
sample due to attrition. If this attrition is assumed random and not system-
atically related to individual characteristics, then dropping individuals whom
attrition affects will not have an impact on the representativeness of the result-
ing sub-sample. This strategy has been adopted by numerous studies using the
BHPS, including Halpin (1997) and Dustmann & Pereira (2008). Although less
restrictive than the aforementioned approach, the sample selection rule used
in this study is likely to introduce bias in to estimates if attrition is system-
atically related to Xit in the population regression. This introduces a form of
selection bias, the time-invariant component of which can be eliminated using
fixed effects techniques. However, if there are time-varying factors influencing
attrition then this will impart bias on the estimated results.
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2.2.3 Chapter 5: Applications of the Mincerian Earnings
Function to Job Displacement & Wage Scarring - Method-
ological Considerations.
The estimation strategy pursued in Chapter 5 is informed by lessons drawn
from the literature estimating the Mincerian earnings function. The following
outlines key methodological considerations based on the existing literature.
Cross-section studies: Short-run effects
Interest in the earnings effects of job displacement provided a natural learning
ground for the application of the Mincerian earnings function to this important
policy question. Early papers investigating this issue adopted the Mincerian
earnings function to compare earnings in the pre- and post-displacement jobs,
focussing their attention on layoffs and plant closures that can reasonably be
assumed to be exogenous to individual characteristics (a ‘natural experiment’).
The following is adopted from Addison & Portugal (1987).
Equation 2.17 lays out the familiar equation of interest (individual and time
subscripts are ignored in the interest of brevity).
lnWj =α1EXPERIENCE + (αj + βj − α1)TENUREj (2.17)
+ uj
However, the reduced form equation 2.17 compounds the effect of previous job
and unemployment durations into one coefficient6. To see this let TENUREs
and TENUREj represent completed job duration on job s and current tenure
respectively; DURs, α and β represent unemployment duration before job s,
6The tenure coefficient captures the effect of tenure over and above the effect of experience
(Addison & Portugal 1987)
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transferable (general-training) and non-transferable (specific-training) compo-
nents of the return to tenure; and u the idiosyncratic error term. This gives a
more flexible representation of the Mincerian earnings function.
lnWj =
j−1∑
s=1
αsTENUREs + (αj + βj)TENUREj (2.18)
+
j∑
s=1
γsDURs + uj
If investments in general-training vary from job-to-job, α1 6= α2... 6= αj, then
equation 2.18 can be rewritten:
lnWj =
j∑
s=1
αsTENUREs +
j−1∑
s=1
(αs − α1)TENUREs (2.19)
+ (αj + βj − α1)TENUREj +
j∑
s=1
γsDURs
+ uj
If investments in general-training are not allowed to vary from job-to-job, and
γs is restricted to zero, then we arrive at equation 2.17. Equation 2.19 illustrates
that the return to specific-training, βj, is only identified under the assumption
that αj = α1. Furthermore, the interpretation of the coefficient on tenure is
sensitive to errors in the experience variable. If experience is measured with
error, then since previous unemployment durations are not directly controlled
for in the estimation, αˆ1 will be biased downwards, and thus the tenure coeffi-
cient in equation 2.17 will be biased upwards (Addison & Portugal 1987).
Equation 2.17 also ignores unobserved job match and individual heterogene-
ity. In an attempt to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, Addison
& Portugal (1987) using the US Displaced Workers’ Survey (DWS), as well as
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others using similar data, have restricted their attention to the pre- and post-
displacement job. By ignoring the effects of earlier unemployment durations,
this technique increases sensitivity to measurement error in the experience vari-
able. However, this approach is generally motivated by data availability con-
siderations. The DWS, a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS),
contains a cross-section of individuals that were displaced from their jobs in
the last 5 years. This allows researchers to compare pre- and post-displacement
jobs under some strong assumptions 7.
Letting Wi,j−1 and Wij represent wages on the pre- and post-displacement jobs,
and Xi a matrix of individual and demographic characteristics:
lnWi,j−1 =α1EXPERIENCEi,j−1 + (αj−1 + βj − 1− α1)TENUREi,j−1
(2.20)
+Xi,j−1Ω + ui,j−1;
lnWij =α1EXPERIENCEi,j + (αj−1 − α1)TENUREi,j−1 (2.21)
+ (αj + βj − α1)TENUREij + γjDURij
+Xi,jΩ + ui,j;
Combining equations 2.20 and 2.21 (taking ‘quasi first-differences’):
7In the context of the DWS, which has a five year retrospective window, previous job
information may be subject to systematic measurement error due to recall bias (see section
Z for more information).
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lnWij =δlnWi,j−1 + (1− δ)α1EXPERIENCEi,j (2.22)
+ [(1− δ)(αj−1 − α1)− δβj−1]TENUREi,j−1
+ [αj + βj − α1(1− δ)]TENUREij + γjDURij
+ (Xi,j − δXi,j−1)Ω + (ui,j − δui,j−1);
Equation 2.22 reduces to 2.23 when δ = 1.
lnWij = lnWi,j−1 + (αj + βj)TENUREij − βj−1TENUREi,j−1 (2.23)
+ γjDURij + (Xi,j −Xi,j−1)Ω + (ui,j − ui,j−1);
Equation 2.20 provides the return to tenure over and above experience, (αj−1 +
βj − 1− α1), equation 2.21 isolates the transferable component of this return,
(αj−1−α1), and equation 2.23 isolates the loss in specific-training investments,
−βj−1.
In the absence of a direct measure of experience, age (EXPERIENCE + SCHOOL-
ING + 5/6) is generally used, where 5 or 6 is the school starting age. Potential
experience (age - SCHOOLING - 5/6) is also another proxy widely used in the
literature, however, this requires knowledge of school leaving age. Both of these
measures imply measurement error in the analysis, as experience and schooling
are negatively related whilst both being positively related to earnings (Card
1999). Moreover, returns to potential experience will likely be overstated for
women who take time out of work during child birth (Chiswick 2003). Us-
ing age in an earnings regression without adequately controlling for previous
unemployment duration could also lead to simultaneity problems (Addison &
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Portugal 1987).
“If the unexplained part of the pre-displacement wage is fully trans-
ferred to the new job, i.e. δ = 1, then all individual characteristics
of equal value to the two jobs should have no explanatory power. If,
however, this restriction is improperly introduced, some unchanged
individual characteristics will appear to valued differently across
jobs, while they actually shouldn’t.... [P]re-displacement tenure can
appear in the equation with a negative sign, especially if δ is large
and pre-displacement tenure poorly valued in the new job (Houle
& van Audenrode 1995, pp. 82).”
However, this will depend crucially on whether the only difference between
pre- and post-displacement wages is the “random” treatment (being laid off).
If being laid off is truly exogenous to individual characteristics, then the value
of the ‘time-invariant’ pre-displacement characteristics will be the same in the
post-displacement job. If this is not the case, then the estimates will be biased
upwards in general. Since the ‘quasi first-differences’ approach is essentially
differences-in-differences, identification relies on exogeneity of the treatment.
Moreover, lack of a comparison group implies that wage losses due to displace-
ment are likely to be underestimated, as this ignores the fact that earnings of
the non-displaced are growing (Arulampalam 2001). In an attempt to address
this issue, Farber et al. (1993) estimated equation 2.23 using the DWS and a
synthetic control group of non-displaced constructed from the CPS data. The
common trends assumption assumes that the composition of the treated and
untreated group are the same before and after treatment. This assumption is
unlikely to be valid if the treatment, job displacement, is not truly exogenous
as would be the case in a controlled experiment. Sample selection is an issue
in the DWS, generally addressed using the Heckman (1979) procedure as the
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sample of individuals re-employed by survey date are unlikely to be a random
sample of the displaced. In addition there may be non-random selection into
treatment, however, given that the focus is usually on layoffs/plant closures
this is less of an issue. Chapter 5, table 5.16 highlights selected contributions
using cross-sectional data.
Panel data studies: Long-run effects
The availability of detailed panel data allows researchers to use more sophisti-
cated methods to address both the short- and long-run economic consequences
of job displacement in an integrated framework. Jacobson et al. (1993), a pio-
neering study in the field, used quarterly merged Pennsylvanian administrative
panel data to consider whether the earnings losses of high tenure workers were
permanent and thus a major policy concern given that these workers had the
most to lose. Similar to the approach adopted in cross-sectional studies like
Addison & Portugal (1989), this study focussed on a single displacement.
Yit = αi + γt +Xitβ +
24∑
k≤−20
Dkitδk + εit (2.24)
αi captures the individual-specific fixed effect, whilst γt is a set of quarterly
dummies capturing aggregate earnings growth. Xit is a matrix of observed
time-varying characteristics (in the case of Jacobson et al. (1993) this was re-
stricted to age (EXPERIENCE + SCHOOLING + 5/6), age2 and sex) and
Dkit is a dummy variable that equals one if an individual has been displaced k
quarters earlier (or later in the case of the pre-displacement period). Jacobson
et al. (1993) allow earnings to vary with displacement status up to 20 quarters
before displacement, tracking this growth for up to 24 quarters after.
2. Methodology 43
Equation 2.24 is estimated via the within-groups estimator, relative to a con-
trol group of individuals who were never displaced over the observation period.
This allows them to isolate the cost of displacement, relative to wage growth
that would have occurred had the individual in question not been displaced.
Since administrative data is generally hampered by a limited covariate set,
Jacobson et al. (1993) adopt alternative strategies to control for unobserved
heterogeneity and thus test the robustness of specification 2.24. As previously
noted, sample selection is an issue when considering the earnings outcomes of
the displaced. Due to lack of information about separation types (in admin-
istrative data in general), the authors are unable to accurately identify the
impact of involuntary displacements. However, they limit their sample to in-
dividuals displaced from ‘distressed’ firms (that experience large employment
changes/ mass layoffs) arguing that these individuals are at the highest risk
of being laid off. This argument is likely to be weakened due to the potential
endogeneity between individual productivity and firm productivity. The au-
thors acknowledge that their approach is likely to be biased if firms selectively
layoff individuals that have under-performed around the separation date (Ja-
cobson et al. 1993). Moreover, the wider the window around a plant closure
the more likely one is to capture early separators/voluntary quits (Kunze 2002).
A worker-specific time-trend is introduced in order to capture different
trends in wage growth which may impact on the likelihood of job displace-
ment (Jacobson et al. 1993). Trends in individual-specific wage growth are
likely to be related to individual productivity. Thus low wage growth is likely
to be indicative of low productivity. Equation 2.24 can also be extended to con-
trol for heterogeneity within observational groups by interacting whether they
were displaced (Dkitδk) with the observed characteristics of interest. However,
in the interest of a parsimonious specification, the authors introduce individual-
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time-specific dummy variables to summarize the impact of possible confounders
before, during and after the displacement period.
Unlike previous studies in more flexible economies, Kunze (2002) finds little
evidence of persistent wage penalties due to job displacement in Germany.
More recent contributions to the debate have replicated the approach of Ja-
cobson et al. (1993), implementing newly developed econometric techniques
(propensity-score matching) to extend the analysis, using administrative data
for the United Kingdom (Hijzen et al. 2010), Sweden (Eliason & Storrie 2006)
and the US state of Connecticut (Couch & Placzek 2010). Eliason & Storrie
(2006) highlight the increased sensitivity of displaced workers’ earnings losses to
recessionary pressures. Furthermore, Couch & Placzek (2010) cast doubt over
the generalisability of JLS’s results for the US, given changes in State and time
period. Chapter 5, table 5.16 highlights selected contributions using panel data.
Longitudinal studies: Wage scarring
In addition to the question of the persistence of wage losses due to job displace-
ment, longitudinal panel data also allows one to address the impact of multiple
interruptions on wage growth as well as whether the incidence or duration of
unemployment/non-employment matters more for re-entry wages. Longitudi-
nal survey data usually forms the basis of such studies, e.g. the US Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP). These studies are motivated by
previous research’s conclusions that in order to examine the impact of unem-
ployment on wages, accurate information on pre- and post-displacement wages
and job characteristics before and after unemployment as well as the duration
of unemployment are necessary. Furthermore, the exact timing of displace-
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ment as well as the number of previous displacements needs to be controlled
for. Finally, a control group of non-displaced workers are needed in order to
make inferences about the counterfactual : what would have happened to wage
growth if the workers in question had not been displaced? All this requires
large scale longitudinal datasets, allowing a large cross-section of individuals
to be followed across an extended period of time.
Given a representative sample, the major challenge faced when using lon-
gitudinal data sources is controlling for unobserved heterogeneity8. The fixed
effects estimator allows one to control for permanent ability differences between
workers both on and off the job that may impact on promotion prospects, earn-
ings, tenure and thus wage losses on displacement. If human capital depreciates
with time out of the workforce, then since more experienced workers have ac-
cumulated more human capital they have more time to find a good worker-firm
match. Good matches tend to last longer than bad matches (Farber 1999). Job
tenure and experience are functions of past quit/layoff decisions and thus are
correlated with unobserved job-/match-specific factors (Arulampalam 2001).
Since OLS estimates of a standard earnings function using cross-section have
been shown to produce biased estimates due to assuming that E(uit|Xit) = 0,
unobserved heterogeneity needs to be accounted for. Equation 2.24 shows a typ-
ical specification estimated in these approaches. This base equation is usually
augmented to control for whether an individual entered their current employ-
ment via a spell of unemployment, quadratics or linear splines in current tenure
and experience, and both a time-invariant individual-specific residual (αi) and
idiosyncratic error term (ε). Furthermore, the individual-specific time-trend
and
∑24
k≤−20D
k
itδk unobserved heterogeneity controls are dropped in favour of
8If the sample cannot be considered representative then sample selection techniques will
need to be pursued as a first step.
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a rich covariate set. The within-groups estimator is typically used to eliminate
the time-invariant fixed effect (αi).
Panel data provides many advantages over cross-sectional data sets. Transitions
rather than rates can be examined, thus allowing one to identify the persistence
of labour market states. Detailed information on observable characteristics of
individuals is generally available (not always the case with administrative panel
data), and these individual characteristics can be tracked over time. Panel data
techniques allow for the control of observable and unobservable heterogeneity.
Most panel data sets provide information on the precise timing of events, al-
lowing for the ordering of events to be taken into account as well as to establish
causality. Furthermore, since individuals can be tracked over an extended pe-
riod of time, this allows one to gauge the long-term impact of job displaced and
the subsequent unemployment period on individuals’ career outcomes. Despite
these advantages, estimates are still susceptible to the limitations of Fixed Ef-
fects estimation. Chapter 5, table 5.16 highlights selection contributions using
longitudinal data.
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2.2.4 Chapter 6: Pooled & Dynamic Multivariate Discrete-
Choice Models
This refers to a class of approaches to model decision making given multiple
alternatives, where no natural ordering of possible choices exists. These mod-
els are also referred to as Random Utility Models, as outcomes are partially
determined by factors and partially determined randomly. Unlike the Ordered
Logit the Multinomial Logit (MNL) suffers from the Independence of Irrele-
vant Alternatives (IIA) problem (detailed later in this chapter). The decision
to implement a Multinomial Logit (MNL) based estimation strat-
egy over the Ordered Logit was influenced by ambiguities in the ordering
of the considered labour market states. The dual labour market model by
Evans (1999) assumes that only skilled workers can do a skilled job, imposing
an ordering of less-skilled and skilled jobs that could be exploited by treat-
ing the outcome variable as ordinal. Ignoring ordinality would imply a loss of
efficiency, increasing the risk of insignificant results (although parameter esti-
mates will be unbiased). However, Le´ne´ (2011) extends this model, by relaxing
this restriction which the author argues is inconsistent with recent empirical
observations. Crucially, this study considers non-employment as a separate
labour market state. Since transitions out of non-employment can be into less-
skilled or skilled jobs, imposing this restriction would imply a significant loss of
information and not be characteristic of individuals’ contemporaneous choice
set. Thus a Multinomial Logit (MNL) strategy is pursued in Chapter 6. The
following outlines the MNL and key methodological considerations.
Structure
There exists an unordered discrete dependent variable yi which takes an integer
value in the set m = 1 . . .M . We assume that there exists a set of latent
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propensities y∗im for each discrete state, each assumed independent of exogenous
characteristics. Moreover, all propensities depend linearly on a single common
set of characteristics xi, such that:
y∗im =x
′
iβm + uim , for m = 1 . . .M (2.25)
βm is a vector of parameters specific to state m, and uim are state-specific
random disturbances, with are potentially jointly distributed. These latent
propensities are fundamentally unobservable. Granted, we observe outcomes
which are related to the underlying propensities through observability criterion:
yi = m if y
∗
im = maxj=1...my
∗
ij (2.26)
Given a set of parameters, and a distribution of the disturbance term, the
observability criterion can be used to define a set of conditional probabilities
Pr(yi = m|xi) = Pr(y∗im = maxj=1...my∗ij|xi). However, there are limitations on
the number of parameters that can be identified (only M-1).
To illustrate this, a 3-state model is drawn on:
y∗i1 =x
′
iβi + ui1
y∗i2 =x
′
iβi + ui2
y∗i3 =x
′
iβi + ui3
From 2.26:
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yi =1 if y
∗
i1 > y
∗
i2 and y
∗
i1 > y
∗
i3
yi =2 if y
∗
i2 > y
∗
i1 and y
∗
i2 > y
∗
i3
yi =3 if y
∗
i3 > y
∗
i1 and y
∗
i3 > y
∗
i2
To see the problem of identification, consider probability of observing yi = 1:
Pr(yi = 1|xi) =Pr(y∗i1 > y∗i2 and y∗i1 > y∗i3|xi)
=Pr
x′iβ1 + ui1 > x′iβ2 + ui2
x′iβ1 + ui1 > x
′
iβ3 + ui3

=Pr
 ui2 − ui1 < −x
′
i(β2 − β1)
ui3 − ui1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random Component
< −x′i(β3 − β1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deterministic Component
 (2.27)
This shows that for whatever distribution of (ui1, ui2, u13), the probability
Pr(yi = 1|xi) depends only on differenced parameter vectors (β2 − β1) and
(β3 − β1). Analogously, it can be shown that Pr(yi = 2|xi) and Pr(yi = 3|xi)
also depend on the same terms.
Pr(yi = 2|xi) =Pr
 ui1 − ui2 < −x
′
i(β2 − β1)
ui3 − ui2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random Component
< x′i(β2 − β1)− x′i(β3 − β1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deterministic Component
 (2.28)
Pr(yi = 3|xi) =Pr
 ui1 − ui3 < −x
′
i(β3 − β1)
ui2 − ui3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random Component
< x′i(β3 − β1)− x′i(β2 − β1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deterministic Component
 (2.29)
This illustrates the inherent problem of identification. Since β2 and β3 are only
found in diffenced form, relative to β1, we can no longer separately identify the
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parameters of interest. One possibility is to estimate the differences or choice
normalisation.
The Multinomial Logit Model (MNL)
The MNL is preferable over estimating separate Logits, as this approach is
more efficient, resulting in lower standard errors, due to the use of all observa-
tions in the sample. The IIA assumption can easily be relaxed, in a dynamic
panel data context. Furthermore, this specification is more flexible, allowing
for correlation between competing risks to be incorporated. In order to esti-
mate a multivariate discrete choice model, additional assumptions are required
about the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. If we specify the individual
disturbance term uim as type-I extreme value, this implies a combined logistic
distribution for the set of disturbances (uim, m = 1 . . .M) and the Multino-
mial Logit Model (MNL). The probabilities Pr(yi = m|xi) take the form:
Pr(yi = m|xi) = exp(x
′βm)∑m
j=1 exp(x
′βj)
=
exp(x′βm)
1 +
∑m
j=2 exp(x
′βj)
(2.30)
Where β1 is normalised to 0, exp(x
′0) = 1. This implies M-1 parameters to
estimate, and estimation is conducted via Maximum Likelihood. The likelihood
is the product of the probabilities of each observation, conditional on the data,
the parameters of the model, and the assumed distribution of the disturbance
term. For the ith observation, the likelihood contribution is:
li =
M∏
m=1
Pr(yi = m|xi)zim
=
M∏
m=1
P zimim , (2.31)
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where zim = 1(yi = m) for m = 1...M, and where Pim represents the probability
Pr(yi = m|xi). For the parameter vector Θ = (β2, ..., βM−1)′, the full sample
likelihood is:
l(Θ) =
n∏
i=1
M∏
m=1
P zimim (2.32)
Whilst the Multinomial Logit generally has nice computation properties, and
marginal effects of a change in a regressor on different state probabilities can
be easily calculated, a potential drawback of this model is the relationship be-
tween probabilities: the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
Extending the Standard Multinomial Logit Model (MNL)
The standard, pooled, model can be extended incorporating individual-specific
random effects to take into account the dynamic nature of the underlying data.
In extensions, these random effects are allowed to be correlated across alter-
natives. This strategy has the added advantage of relaxing the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, formal tests of which are viewed with
caution (Train 2009).
Equation 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the assumptions required for identification of
the parameters in the standard dynamic MNL. Whilst the MNL is more flexible
than the standard Logit model, it places restrictions on the underlying choice
structure. For instance, the MNL only captures variables that are constant
across alternatives, e.g. race (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). The MNL also suffers
from the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) restriction. Since the
MNL coefficients are relative to a normalised base category, “discrimination
amongst the m alternatives reduces to a series of pairwise comparisons that
are unaffected by the characteristics of alternatives other than the pair under
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consideration (Cameron & Trivedi 2005, p. 593).” In other words, the ratio of
probabilities of any two alternatives is independent of the probability of any
other outcome. Thus adding an extra alternative to the range of outcomes
has no impact on this ratio, an unrealistic feature of the model for describing
most real world decision making processes. A natural alternative, if the IIA
assumption is problematic, is to jointly model alternatives in order to break
this restriction. The basic setup models outcomes as described in equation 6.2.
yijt = xitβj + yit−1γj + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φj + εijt (2.33)
Thus, the instantaneous probability can be represented as:
Pr(yijt|xit, yit−1) = exp(xitβj + yit−1γj + (d
′
it−1yit−1)
′φj)∑m
k=1 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk)
(2.34)
Where:
yijt = Individual i’s labour market status (j) at time t.
m  1 . . .M (Potential labour market states).
xit = Matrix of covariates.
yit−1 = Previous labour market status (t-1), interacted with pre-
vious industry and workplace characteristics.
dit−1 = Indicator variable interacted with previous labour mar-
ket status.
εi = Idiosyncratic error component.
Initial estimates estimate a pooled dynamic MNL, under the assumption that
the error term is independent of the xit. If the model is not fully specified then
this assumption is unlikely to hold, and it will be impossible to distinguish
between true and spurious state dependence. In order to disentangle true from
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spurious state dependence, a random individual-alternative-specific intercept
term (αij) is introduced to control for time-invariant factors influencing an
individual’s probability of choosing a particular outcome, which varies across
alternatives (random taste variation).
yijt = xitβj + yit−1γj + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φj + αij + εijt (2.35)
Thus, the instantaneous probability can be represented as:
Pr(yijt|xit, yit−1, αij) = exp(xitβj + yit−1γj + (d
′
it−1yit−1)
′φj + αij)∑m
k=1 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + αik)
(2.36)
The contribution of each alternative labour market state is gauged relative to
the normalised category (J = 1). The log-likelihood contribution of individual
i can thus be represented (where dijt = 1 if individual i is in labour market
state J at time t):
Li =
T∏
t=2
m∏
j=2
Pr(yijt|xit, yit−1, (d′it−1yit−1), αij)dijt
=
T∏
t=2
m∏
J=2
[
exp(xitβJ + yit−1γJ + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ + αiJ)
1 +
∑m
k=2 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + αik)
]diJt
(2.37)
Individual i’s contribution to the Log-Likelihood function can thus be repre-
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sented as:
logLi =
T∑
t=2
m∑
j=2
dijt log[Pr(yijt|xit, yit−1, (d′it−1yit−1), αij)] (2.38)
=
T∑
t=2
m∑
J=2
diJt log (2.39)
exp(xitβJ + yit−1γJ + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ + αiJ)
1 +
∑m
k=2 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + αik)
The overall log likelihood is just the integral of the individual-specific likelihood
function, logLi, over all i, w.r.t. αiJ (equation 2.40).
logL =∫
i
T∑
t=2
m∑
J=2
diJt log
[
exp(xitβJ + yit−1γJ + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ + αiJ)
1 +
∑m
k=2 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + αik)
]
f(αiJ)d(αiJ) (2.40)
In the empirical application, the alternative-specific intercepts, αij’s, are al-
lowed to be potentially correlated by modelling their joint distribution as bi-
variate normal.
αi1 ∼
{
a2
a3
,
var2 cov23
cov23 var2
} (2.41)
This strategy allows for correlation with individual-specific unobservables, po-
tentially correlated across the alternative states. The standard random effects
estimator is a special case, where cov23 = 0. Equation 2.40 assumes that the
random effects are uncorrelated with observed characteristics xi. “Correlated”
random effects can be introduced by specifying the individual-alternative-specific
intercept as αij = x¯iψj + νij, following Mundlak (1978). A key advantage of
allowing “correlated” (Mundlak 1978 corrected) random effects approach is
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that since this analysis conditions on the state of the local labour markets, this
strategy will also capture the endogenous role of time-varying observed and un-
observed regional heterogeneity in driving individual outcomes9, without the
need for Instrumental Variables (see for example Cockx & Picchio 2009b, for a
similar argument). By specifying αij as a linear function of the average observed
individual characteristics, this allows these characteristics to be correlated with
unobservables over time, thus approximating “fixed” taste variation or a fixed
effect. By modelling the alternative-specific intercepts as bivariate normal we
allow alternative states to be correlated in unobservable characteristics, thus si-
multaneity between skilled and unskilled labour market transitions is controlled
for instead of assuming that these transitions are independent. νij maintains
the IID assumption throughout.
According to Mundlak (1978), if νij is a composite asymmetric matrix,
then heterogeneity bias will be minimal, given that the correlation between
the individual effects and the explanatory variables is partly captured in the
model. However, if νij is symmetric, GLS estimators of the full model will
be similar to fixed effects (“within”) estimators and thus unbiased. Granted
that the empirical strategy employs the non-linear MNL, estimated via MLE,
since these conclusions were reached in the linear panel case then the former
conclusion is unlikely to apply. However, heterogeneity bias will still be min-
imal, as the correlations between individual effects and explanatory variables
are controlled for. Moreover, this approach has the added advantage of allowing
time-invariant variables to be included.
9Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified and Omitted Variable Bias
is not an issue
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MNL Marginal Effects
The formula for the marginal effect of a change in a regressor in a Multinomial
Logit with alternative invariant regressors is:
1
N
∑
i
∂pijt
∂xjt
=
1
N
∑
i
pijt(βj − β¯i) (2.42)
where β¯i is the probability weighted average of βi (β¯i =
∑
j pijtβj) and pijt =
exp(x′itβi)∑
j exp(x
′
itβj)
=
exp(xitβJ+yit−1γJ+(d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ+αiJ )∑3
k=1 exp(xitβk+yit−1γk+(d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk+αik)
(Cameron & Trivedi 2005).
This highlights the impact of all covariates on the reliability of the estimated
marginal effects. Estimation of marginal effects and the associated standard
errors is implemented using the delta method.
In this analysis the marginal effects were evaluated at the sample means of
the independent variables. Recent work criticizes the use of the marginal effect
evaluated at the sample means (MEM) as an approximation of the average
partial effect, especially when contrasting the marginal effects of two differing
sub-samples (in this case males and females). As the sample means of the male
and female sub-samples will differ, this renders the MEM’s of the two sub-
samples incomparable. A better approach is to calculate the average marginal
effects (AME). This argument is developed in Bartus (2005).
Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem.
Given the dynamic context, the Initial Conditions Problem arises and needs
to be accounted for (Hsiao 2003). Since with most labour market data an
individual’s complete labour market history is not observed, the initial state
cannot be treated as exogenous: it is a product of an individual’s previous
labour market history. This initial state may either be determined by state
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dependence, or unobserved heterogeneity and can be considered as an endoge-
nous selection problem (Mosthaf et al. 2009). In other words: we cannot draw
inference about the causal effect of unemployment at time t-1 on the proba-
bility of being in low-skilled employment at time t if we don’t control for why
the individual was in unemployment at time t-1 in the first place. If unac-
counted for, an estimation strategy is likely to result in inaccurate inferences
about the degree of true versus spurious state dependence. Various methods
have been proposed to deal with this issue, each with their relative merits. In
this study I initially intended to implement the Wooldridge (2005) correction
(specifying αij = x¯iψj + x0 + νij where x0 is a vector of initial values, and x¯i is
a vector of Mundlak (1978) terms.) which has shown, through extensive Monte
Carlo Experiments, to have favourable finite sample properties (Akay 2009).
This approach has the additional advantage of being easier to implement than
Heckman’s reduced-form solution to approximating the conditional probability
of these initial values (Heckman 1981). Moreover, the relative performance of
these estimators has been shown to be satisfactory permitted the number of
time periods in the sample is not small (Akay 2009; Arulampalam & Stewart
2009). Unfortunately, the structure of the data (allowing individuals to enter
the sample at any point in time) made controlling for initial conditions diffi-
cult, relative to a cohort followed from one point in time. Thus in section 6 I
do not control for initial conditions, a caveat to be taken into account when
interpreting the results.
Estimation Technique
The basic Multinomial Logit model can be estimated using the delta method,
via standard in-built Stata routines, as a numerical solution exists for the ML
function. The Multinomial Logit with Random Effects can be estimated using
GLAMM, with appropriate adjustments. Random effects are initially assumed
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to be uncorrelated, in the standard fashion. In extensions correlation between
these random effects is allowed for by specifying the alternative-specific error
components to be distributed bivariate normal. Moreover, a Mundlak (1978)
approach is adopted to capture endogeneity between observed characteristics
and observed outcomes. Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2008) provides details, as
well as an excellent exposition of data preparation steps in a dichotomous set-
ting. This approach uses Gauss-Hermite or Adaptive Quadrature methods to
solve integration of the likelihood function, due to lack of a closed form solu-
tion. Hole (2007) provides a routine for estimating this model using a Mixed
Logit approach, however, extracting standard errors for the marginal effects
proved problematic. An alternative approach to estimate the MNL with unob-
served heterogeneity controls is suggested by Haan & Uhlendorff (2006). This
Simulated Maximum Likelihood procedure constructs the likelihood function
based on the method of pseudo-random Halton Draws (Cappellari & Jenk-
ins 2006; Train 2009), and has computational advantages when attempting
to solve higher dimensional integrals, notably once the number of alternative
labour market states exceeds three (see Mosthaf et al. 2009, for an application).
The simulated likelihood, see Eqn. 2.43, approximates that actual likelihood
over R draws from the unobserved heterogeneity distribution (Haan & Uhlen-
dorff 2006). However, extracting the marginal effects and standard errors can
be tricky. I chose the number of Halton draws in the estimation according to
the accepted rule of thumb: “The MSL estimator is consistent, asymptotically
normal and efficient, and equivalent to ML if the number of draws tends to
infinity faster than the square root of the number of observations does (Train
2009, pp. 259).”
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SL =
N∏
n=1
1
R
R∑
r=1
T∏
t=2
3∏
J=2
(2.43)[
exp(xitβJ + yit−1γJ + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ + αiJ)
1 +
∑3
k=2 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + αik)
]diJt
=
N∏
n=1
1
R
R∑
r=1
T∏
t=2
3∏
J=2
(2.44)[
exp(xitβJ + yit−1γJ + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φJ + x¯iψJ + νiJ)
1 +
∑3
k=2 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk + x¯iψk + νik)
]diJt
where αij are jointly distributed bivariate normal
10 and β1 and αi1 are nor-
malised to 0. This can be approach can be easily modified to include any
individual-specific error distribution (equation 2.44 specifies substitutes in αij =
x¯iψj + νij where x¯i are Mundlak (1978) terms), and implemented using Stata’s
Maximum Likelihood programming routines (d0 method) detailed in (Gould
et al. 2010). Due to convergence problems, the Multinomial Logit with ran-
dom effects could not be estimated. In Chapter 6, the standard pooled MNL
with and AR(1) lag structure is estimated including Mundlak (1978) terms to
approximate the fixed effects specification. This caveat should be taken into
account when interpreting the results presented.
10Originally this was specified as multivariate normal, and self-employment was included
as a separate labour market state. However, computational considerations meant that the
dimensions of the integral to be solved had to be reduced.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 Regional heterogeneity and Unemployment Du-
ration
3.1.1 Introduction
The empirical jobsearch literature is vast, having being extensively reviewed in
Devine & Kiefer (1993), Rogerson et al. (2005) and Eckstein & van den Berg
(2007). A major challenge is picking out the main contributions. However, the
foundations of the literature, are two fold: job search theory and the matching
model (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 for a discussion of the theory, and 2.2.1 for
a methodological discussion of the econometric challenges).
Early unemployment duration studies found, on average, a stronger impact
of the duration than the level of unemployment benefits, e.g. Moffitt (1985),
Meyer (1990), with re-employment probabilities spiking near benefit exhaus-
tion. Since the probability of accepting first job offers is almost one, this
suggests that average unemployment durations depend crucially on job offer
arrival rates (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). Job offer arrival rates will in turn
depend on the search efforts of the unemployed. Improving job arrival rates
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has been a strong driver of the many UK and international Welfare Reforms
over the last 30 years. There is a well developed economic literature on Welfare
reforms and the effects of jobsearch assistance, monitoring, sanctions and el-
igibility constraints (conditionality) on individuals’ re-employment prospects,
e.g. Dolton & ONeill (1996) who found a positive effect of RESTART in the
1980s on re-employment prospects in the UK. Manning (2009) and Petron-
golo (2009) studied the 1996 introduction of Jobseekers’ Allowance in the UK.
Whilst Manning (2009) did not find a strong short-term effect of JSA on re-
employment prospects, in the longer-run Petrongolo (2009) found a significant
increase in transitions onto incapacity benefits of 2.5-3%, ceteris parisbus. Ex-
tending this theme, other studies have considered the impact of training and
work experience schemes provided through Active Labour Market Programmes
(ALMP), e.g. Adda et al. (2007) who find a positive effect of Swedish ALMP
work experience schemes, and van Ours (2004) who finds a lock-in effect of
Slovakian subsidised jobs. These mixed results highlight the importance of
context in driving unemployment experiences, as well as the importance of
individual-level heterogeneity.
Whilst this study primarily focuses on JSA recipients, job search is not
exclusive to those who are outside employment. Job-search practices of non-
working and working job seekers are likely to differ, in part due to differing
compositions of these two groups (Green et al. 2011). Changing policy, eco-
nomic and technological context have a crucial influence on jobseekers, e.g.
recessionary pressures have an impact on the composition of jobseekers (Darby
et al. 1986; Elsby et al. 2009; Shimer 2012). Technological advances have im-
pacted on job search methods, and opened up alternative recruitment channels
with varying effectiveness.
Regional variation in job offer arrival rates may help to explain regional vari-
ation in unemployment durations (Petrongolo 2001). This is typically proxied
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by single measures like local labour market tightness, which summarise the job
matching process (Kalwij 2010). However, substantial measurement challenges
as well as unsystematic variation in the efficiency in which Jobcentres collect
and post vacancy data raise significant identification challenges when proxying
regional variation in job offer arrival rates via a single measure.
Whilst an analysis of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this the-
sis, the importance of Social Interactions, Social Networks and Neighbourhood
Effects in jobsearch has been highlighted in the literature, e.g. Lavezzi & Mec-
cheri (2011) for the impact of social connections; Ioannides & Loury (2004)
for job information networks and neighbourhood effects (physical and social
proximity); Bauer et al. (2011) for the negative effect of neighbourhood un-
employment on individual re-employment prospects; Topa et al. (2005) for the
impact of informal hiring networks and Dustmann et al. (2011) for the impact
of job referrals.
A recent contribution to the Spatial Jobsearch literature suggests that the
cost of distance is relatively high, with utility of being offered a job declining
dramatically with distance to the job (Manning & Petrongolo 2011). Moreover,
this study finds that jobseekers are discouraged from applying for jobs in areas
where they know they will face stiff competition. The focus of this literature is
on frictional unemployment. The composition of the short-term and long-term
unemployed is likely to diverge considerably, with different strategies required
to active these sub-groups (Machin & Manning 1999).
Some Identification Considerations Relating to estimating Local Labour
Market Effects (relevant to the thesis as a whole) This thesis approximates
self-contained labour markets at the NUTS3 level in Chapter 4 and at the
Travel-To-Work-Area level (1998 classification method) in Chapters 5 and 6. As
long as individuals do not search across NUTS3/ TTWAs then this will provide
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exogenous variation which will allow for the identification of NUTS3 /TTWA
effects. The larger these areas the more likely this is to hold, however this is
less likely for skilled workers who have a higher propensity to commute and less
likely given online recruitment channels. The NUTS3 area classification whilst
large, was not explicitly designed to capture self-contained labour markets.
The TTWA classification has gone through numerous revisions over time and is
exogenous to the composition of the local labour force due to being determined
by their propensity to commute (>75% of individuals that live in a TTWA
also work in a TTWA). However a time-constant classification gets around
this issue, albeit under some strong assumptions. Despite these limitations,
the TTWA classification is widely used in UK studies of local labour markets.
Lack of controls at the TTWA level meant that some indicators in this thesis
were defined at the Local Authority (LAUA) level, which are less likely to be
self-contained.
Even given exogenous variation in regional entities, it is still necessary to
control for selection into regional location as this is unlikely to be an exoge-
nous outcome. Studies investigating the impact of Neighbourhood Effects have
resorted to differing techniques, including identifying treatment effects via nat-
ural experiments, instrumental variables (IV) or via aggregation to identify the
average neighbourhood effect within a higher level area.
I exploit an aggregation strategy. A one-to-one link between the NUTS3/
TTWA and LAUA levels is defined to minimise aggregation bias. However, the
Local Authority effect is unlikely to be well identified as individuals may live in
an LAUA but work in neighbouring LAUA. Clearly if we aim to capture Local
Authority effects then the current empirical strategy is unlikely to be robust to
correlation across these sub-regional entities. In empirical applications I allow
for arbitrary correlation across Local Authorities within a NUTS3/ TTWA in
the regional effects. However the issues raised above suggest that this is unlikely
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to be satisfactory for identifying the true Local Authority effect. At most this
captures an average Local Authority effect through the aggregation. The effects
identified through aggregation, however, include not only the average Local
Authorities effects in a NUTS3/TTWA but also any higher-level consequences
of living in a particular NUTS3/ TTWA. Thus, to be able to interpret the
estimated effects as Local Authority effects requires the assumption that the
NUTS3/ TTWA level does not directly affect outcomes (Topa et al. 2005).
In the empirical applications I control for the fixed effect of living in a
NUTS3/ TTWA, to capture correlation in unobservables amongst individuals
living in the same NUTS3/ TTWA, e.g. due to positive sorting into local labour
markets (individuals with similar characteristics gravitating to the same areas,
O¨berg & Oscarsson 1979). Strict identification of the Local Authority effect ex-
ists only under the assumption of no correlation in unobservables across Local
Authorities within NUTS3/ TTWA groups (Chapter 4, Section 4.3 highlights
the correlations amongst regional-level indicators which are measured at the
LAUA and NUTS3 level of aggregation). Moreover, at the individual level
this approach rules out correlation in unobservables between individuals across
Local Authority boundaries as well as ruling out correlation in unobservables
affecting the outcome variable of interest amongst residents within a Local Au-
thority as key identifying assumptions (Topa et al. 2005). How reasonable the
latter assumption is debatable as high pre-existing Local Authority unemploy-
ment levels are likely to influence an individual’s likelihood of choosing to live
in an area. On average this assumption may hold better at very low levels
of aggregation, e.g. neighbourhoods, if these characteristics are not systemic
of the Local Authority in question. Formal tests of these assumptions can be
carried out, however this is left to future implementations of the study.
These considerations suggest that future extensions of this work need to take
an alternative approach to strengthen identification if the issues of Spatial Job-
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search, Social Networks and Neighbourhood Effects are to be fully accounted
for in the research design.
Whilst not exhaustive, the following reviews selected contributions to the
literate directly related to Chapter 4. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 details method-
ological challenges to empirical applications.
3.1.2 Regional variation in job arrival rates: Related Unem-
ployment Duration Literature:
Brown & Sessions (1997) use the British Social Attitudes survey to investigate
the impact of region and individual composition on unemployment risk across
the UK over the 1985-91 period. This provides a sample of 15,519 individuals,
of which 1,224 experienced unemployment. The unemployment definition used
in this study classifies the following individuals as unemployed: those who were
unemployed and registered at a benefit office; those who were unemployed, not
registered, but actively looking for a job; and those who were waiting to take
up a paid job already accepted. Whilst limited by the lack of individual-level
unobserved heterogeneity controls, the study finds that regional differences in
unemployment risk remain even after controlling for a detailed set of individ-
ual characteristics (notably for men). Individual heterogeneity and variation in
job offer arrivals rates are at least as important as reservation wages in driving
individual unemployment experiences (van den Berg 1990). Contemporaneous
local labour market conditions may impact on job opportunities and thus job
offer arrival rates. Moreover, the incidence and duration of unemployment is
not evenly distributed across the UK (Collier 2005). Significant differences in
job search behaviour amongst observationally equivalent individuals suggests
that unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role in driving individuals’
unemployment experiences. Restrictions on job offer rejection (“Work Test”)
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suggests that (regional) variation in job offer arrival rates may be a key fac-
tor in explaining the observed variation in unemployment experiences (Collier
2005).
Collier (2005) draws on a unique representative cross-sectional survey con-
ducted drawn from Employment Services records (survey of individuals ap-
pearing in administrative unemployment/claimant count data) for the county
of Kent in 1992. The sample used in the analysis covered 4,872 unemployed
individuals, providing direct information on reservation wages and jobsearch
activity. This data was used in order to distinguish whether individual hetero-
geneity or intra-regional variation (within the county) in employment oppor-
tunities are more important in driving observed unemployment durations.
Whilst the econometric strategy adopted does not account for competing
risks, potentially biasing results if alternative destination states are poten-
tially correlated. A standard competing risks model would not account for this
as even if alternative destination states are accounted for, destination-specific
hazards are still assumed independent (the proportional hazards assumption).
Standard survival models assume independent censoring, however if this is not
the case (if the determinants of censoring are correlated with the determinants
of unemployment duration) then the processes must be modelled jointly. A
structural model (jointly modelling reservation wage and unemployment du-
ration determination) and reduced form 2-stage IV are employed, where the
2-stage IV tests for the importance of unobserved heterogeneity (selection on
unobservables). However, formal Hausman (Hausman, 1978) tests for omitted
variable bias could not reject the null that the IV and structural estimates did
not suffer from measurement error. This finding was interpreted as suggest-
ing that the reservation wage was insignificant, and that variation in job offer
arrival rates was a more important driver of unemployment durations.
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2-stage IV estimates suggest that regional location has a significant impact
on reservation wages, in the region of 3%-10% across districts, within the county
of Kent. Second stage unemployment duration estimates highlight the impor-
tance of demographic, personal characteristics (notably gender, with females
experiencing significantly shorter durations), and previous occupation in deter-
mining durations. Mobility constraints play an important role in determining
re-employability of the unemployed. Individuals willing to travel more than 1
hour to work experience durations that are on average 14% shorter than those
of people only willing to travel 15 minutes. Moreover, have one’s own transport
significantly reduces unemployment length, regardless of travel time. Regional
variation in labour market opportunities has a very strong and significant im-
pact on unemployment experiences. This varies from average unemployment
spells that are between 11% and 56% higher, and up to 42% lower than the
reference district. However, Collier (2005) finds that districts within Kent with
the shortest unemployment durations were also those districts with the highest
incidence of unemployment, the lowest proportion of long-term unemployment,
and the highest proportion of unskilled. He interpreted this as suggesting a high
degree of labour market “churning” (job creation & job destruction) in these
regions, implying poor long-term employment prospects. Whilst the reserva-
tion wage data in the survey is likely to suffer from substantial measurement
error, encouragingly these results were robust to stratification of the sample by
gender.
Folmer & van Dijk (1988) investigates the relative importance of personal char-
acteristics and regional demand for individuals’ unemployment durations, using
cross-sectional data from the 1979 Dutch Labour Force Survey. The data is
stratified into frictional unemployment (<4 months), medium-term unemployed
(4-11 months), and long-term unemployed (≥12 months). The definition of
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unemployment used includes everyone looking for a job (independent of hours
willing to work). The empirical approach controls for regional dummies, inter-
acting these with personal characteristics, however, computational constraints
restrict the econometric strategy to estimating a sequence of binary logits (pair-
wise comparisons) to approximate a multinomial logit specification. The key
result of the study is that differences in unemployment durations are found
to be mainly caused by personal characteristics, rather than regional variation
in the demand for labour. This result is at odds with that of Collier (2005),
however the two study differ in country as well as definition of unemployment
(The eligibility threshold for unemployment benefits in the UK is 16 working
hours, and not zero). Folmer & van Dijk (1988) find important differences
across strata, with respect of personal characteristics. Older workers are over-
represented amongst the long-term unemployed, moreover, most of the highly
educated fall into the frictional unemployment group.
Arntz & Wilke (2009) investigates individual, regional and institutional char-
acteristics jointly influencing Germans’ unemployment durations in a compet-
ing risks framework (semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards model). The
study draws on a sample of single males and females, and married males, using
the German Integrated Employment Biographies (IEBS) (matched employer-
employee administrative data) over the period 2000-2002 (pre-Hartz reforms
period). Motivation came in the form of recent Government reforms geared
towards reducing unemployment levels, by re-activating the unemployment
through Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP). The aim of the exercise was
to shed light on the effectiveness of ALMP versus Passive labour market mea-
sures (unemployment benefits and the welfare state) in driving re-employment
probabilities. Theoretical foundations of the approach: The empirical strat-
egy is based on a job search model which allows for simultaneous search in
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multiple local labour markets (see Arntz 2005, for more details). In this frame-
work, probability of accepting a job offer depends on both the reservation wage
and search intensity. Jobseekers set local labour market-specific reservation
wages such that the marginal cost of continued search equates the marginal
value of accepting a job offer. Moreover, jobsearch effort is allocated across
labour markets such a way that the marginal value of search a labour mar-
ket equals the marginal cost of searching (individuals search where they deem
themselves most likely to get a satisfactory job offer). Effectively this model
endogenizes job search strategy. Possible exit states considered include: local
regular employment, non-local regular employment (migration), and subsidised
employment. In this empirical set up, individuals are simultaneously searching
for these three possibilities. The unemployment definition used, unemployment
with permanent income transfers, excludes all unemployment spells without un-
employment benefit receipt (UI/UA). However, like the UK Claimant Count,
it under-represents the true unemployment level as it excludes the hidden un-
employed, not registered at jobcentres.
Key results suggest that individual work history is the driving force behind
unemployment durations in the sample, and that regional factors are not as
significant. In general, older unemployed workers (56+) are less-likely to take
up regular local employment (22% (22%) and 12% (21%) less likely for low and
high wage singles (married men), respectively.), less likely to migrate (5% (6%)
less likely for high wage singles (married men).) and more likely to end up in
subsidised employment (1.7% (2.2%) less likely for low wage singles (married
men). 1.2% less likely for high wage married men). Out of these, individuals
with higher earnings capacities are also 5% more likely to migrate. In terms
of work history variables, long unemployment benefit entitlement periods and
previous employment in state-subsidised work both strongly decrease the like-
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lihood of local regular employment. The latter increases subsequent subsidised
employment probability in the range of 7% (7%) to 13% (15%), for low and
high wage singles (married men). Unemployment spells >24 months reduce all
exit hazards, with this effect being strongest for high earners. Arntz & Wilke
(2009) interpret this as evidence that individuals are using the unemployment
benefit system as a form of early retirement. However, employment in low-wage
employment (<400 Euros per month) significantly increases local job finding
and decreases migration probability, suggesting stronger local labour market
attachment. Less support is found supporting the commonly purported posi-
tive effects of active labour market policies on reemployment hazards. Passive
labour market measures seem to more significant in this context. Moreover, rel-
ative to a priori intuition, East and West German unemployment experiences
seem to have converged over the observation period. Arntz & Wilke (2009)
come to the damning, yet poignant, conclusion that since individuals with the
lowest pre-unemployment earnings, and thus highest income replacement rates,
have the lowest exit rates to non-subsidised employment, a reduction in unem-
ployment benefits is likely to achieve Governmental objectives by substantially
reducing unemployment durations. This accords well with the 2005 Hartz IV
reforms, targeting the long term unemployed and welfare benefits recipients.
However, it is unclear whether in general these individuals would actually enter
employment, or end up squeezed out of the labour market all together.
The ranking model of Blanchard & Diamond (1994) predicts that the proba-
bility of exiting unemployment decreases with length of time unemployed (neg-
ative duration dependence), and increases with economic growth. Moreover,
since employers will rank prospective job applicants by unemployment dura-
tion and average unemployment durations increase during recessionary periods,
it also predicts that negative duration dependence will be stronger when the
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labour market is in a slump. Kalwij (2001) sets out to test these predictions,
drawing on a sample of male unemployment benefit claimants (JUVOS) aged
18-59, over the period 1982q4-1998q1. A continuous-time Mixed Proportional
Hazard model is employed, with Heckman & Singer (1984) discrete mass point
distributed heterogeneity. Business cycle effects are controlled for using a quar-
terly GDP series. This allows Kalwij (2001) to separately identify the impact
of ranking (unemployment duration effect, a la Blanchard & Diamond (1994)),
sorting (individual heterogeneity effects) and the business cycle in order to as-
sess which drives the aggregate observation of negative duration dependence.
Key results suggest that both ranking and sorting effects explain the decrease
the exit rate from unemployment with duration. On average, the likelihood of
leaving unemployment within one quarter is 64% lower when economic growth
is low than when high. Moreover, higher average individual unemployment du-
rations during recessions seems to explain most of the increase in the national
unemployment rate during these periods. However, the pattern of genuine neg-
ative duration dependence does not change over the business cycle as predicted
by (Blanchard & Diamond 1994). In fact, entering unemployment during times
of low economic growth implies, on average, a higher probability of leaving un-
employment than those becoming unemployed in good times, all else equal.
Kalwij (2001) draws the policy conclusion that unless this difference in compo-
sition of unemployment inflows over the business cycle is taken into account,
active labour market policies will be biased towards success in periods of high-
and failure in periods of low economic growth. What is not explained is whether
during recessionary periods, these exits are actually exits into employment or
inactivity. This criticism highlights a key limitation of the estimation tech-
nique, in that it does not separate out reason for leaving unemployment, by
treating other exits as censored or in a competing risks framework. However,
this artefact (lack of destination information) is a data limitation of the pre-
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1996q4 JUVOS data collection strategy.
Drawing on a male sample from the JUVOS over the 1982q4-1998q1 period,
Kalwij (2004) investigates whether male youth unemployment is a result of
job search behaviour, due to structural employment instability experienced by
certain socioeconomic groups, or a result of a combination of the two possible
divers. This study is motivated by a high incidence of repeat unemployment
within the UK, the job quality literature (getting the unemployed into stable
jobs and avoiding repeat unemployment), as well as the youth unemployment
experience. (Kalwij 2004) follows individuals on a quarterly basis, using both
time on the claimant count, as a proxy for unemployment, and time in non-
employment to assess the hazard of becoming unemployed for the first time
(following individuals from their 18th birthday), the hazard of leaving unem-
ployment, and the hazard of re-entering “unemployment”. Men claiming unem-
ployment benefits are defined as unemployed in this study. The study covers
the pre- and post-JSA period. After the introduction of JSA, the ILO and
claimant count based unemployment series have been shown to diverge consid-
erably. Thus the composition of unemployment inflows post JSA is likely to
differ substantially from that before. However, since this study follows individ-
uals since 18, this is less of an issue as the pre-1996 inflows will dominate the
sample.
A continuous-time multiple-spell mixed proportional hazard model is em-
ployed. Initial conditions are controlled for be modelling the hazard of en-
tering unemployment for the first time using the strategy mentioned above.
Lack of a detailed covariate set meant that time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity was controlled for using the approach of Heckman & Singer (1984).
The multiple-spell structure of the JUVOS is exploited for identification pur-
poses (Van den Berg 2001). Which has been shown to achieve identification
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under much weaker assumptions than in the single spell case (Honore 1993).
However, identification still requires unobserved heterogeneity to be modelled
as a random effect, retaining the proportionality assumption (Van den Berg
2001). In other words, this model does not incorporate dependent risks. Con-
trols include a time-varying Government Office Region (GOR) Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) matched to the region of claim, previous unemployment dura-
tion dummies (assumed independent of re-employment probability), region of
claim dummies, as well as quarterly duration dependence dummies (grouping
spells greater than 31 quarters). Due to data limitations this study implicitly
assumes non-unemployment is employment.
Key results suggests strong evidence of negative duration dependence. More-
over, the hazard of re-entering unemployment decreases very quickly with time
in non-unemployment, suggesting evidence of structural employment instabil-
ity resulting in repeated unemployment. Contrary to conventional wisdom at
the time, that incidence and not duration of unemployment is insensitive to
business cycle fluctuations (Layard et al. 1991), Kalwij (2004) finds evidence
that unemployment inflows and outflows respond to changes in the GDP series
for the youth sample considered.
Repeat unemployment is found to be very common in the UK labour mar-
ket. Moreover, Kalwij (2004) interprets the finding that individual heterogene-
ity affects the hazard of re-entering unemployment more than that of leaving as
evidence that incidence rather than duration of unemployment is most impor-
tant (this suggests that regional heterogeneity may have more impact on the
probability of unemployment than on the probability of re-employment1.). Sta-
ble unemployment is defined as being out of the claimant count for more than 2
years. 73% of young men find stable employment by 35, however the rest expe-
1I thank an anonymous referee for stressing this point. Given the data limitations at
hand, an accurate assessment of this was not possible using Administrative data.
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rience repeat frequent unemployment. Kalwij (2004) draws the conclusion that
Active Labour Market Policies like the New Deal for Young People (NDYP),
targeting youth long-term unemployment, would lead long-run benefits for the
economy by getting these individuals out of unemployment and promoting job-
retention. The robustness of these results to limiting the sample to a period
when destination state is known was not tested in the study. Moreover, the im-
plicit assumption that non-employment periods equate to employment spells is
likely to be problematic when forming policies based on the study’s conclusions.
Kalwij (2010) revisits the questions addressed in Kalwij (2001), using a monthly
series of the Government Office Region TTWA Vacancies/Unemployment (V/U)
rate in order to control for the Business Cycle. The main research question is
whether individual duration dependence varies over the business cycle. By in-
cluding regional dummies as well, the author argues that fixed differences in
the effectiveness of jobcenter operation will be captured. This also implies that
time-series variation is used to identify business cycle effects. Since multiple
jobcenters exist in each GOR, with differing levels of effectiveness, this argu-
ment is likely to be subject to state aggregation bias. As with the previous
papers by the same author, given the data limitations over the observation
period considered, reason for leaving the claimant count cannot be controlled
for. Thus, this study does not take into account the competing risks structure
of the JUVOS. However, individual-level unobserved heterogeneity is directly
controlled for using a support point approach (Heckman & Singer 1984). In
this study a labour market is considered tight (slack) if the V/U ratio is greater
(less) than or equal to the 90th (10th) percentile of the V/U distribution. This
is contrasted with the baseline, being at the median of the V/U distribution.
Key results suggest that, on average, the likelihood of re-employment de-
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creases by 65% in the first 2 years of unemployment. Sorting effects explain a
third of this, whilst negative duration dependence explains two thirds of this ef-
fect. However, strong variation over the business cycle is found. Males entering
unemployment in tight labour markets are estimated to be 21% less likely to
leave unemployment than those becoming unemployed in slack labour markets.
The unemployed are more likely to be re-employed when the labour market is
tight (as there are more jobs than the stock of unemployed job seekers), and
less likely to be when the labour market is slack. However, the composition
of unemployment inflows depicted above suggests that a counteracting effect is
also present. The former effect is found to dominate the later when the labour
market is slack: longer aggregate unemployment durations when the labour
market is loose are mostly driven by the business cycle and not changes in
the composition of inflows into unemployment (Kalwij 2010). The counteract-
ing effects imply that when the labour market is tight, leaving unemployment
is 35% more likely than when slack. Moreover, inconsistent with the predic-
tions of the Blanchard & Diamond (1994) model, changes in the composition
of unemployment inflows over the business cycle, and not individual duration
dependence, is found to be the main determinant of the systematic variation
in average duration dependence (Kalwij 2010).
3.1.3 Conclusion
This section reviewed selected contributions relevant to the research questions
in Chapter 4. One conclusion can be drawn from the selected literature, that
there is no consistency in results across countries relating to the relative im-
portance of individual and regional heterogeneity. UK studies, Brown & Ses-
sions (1997) and Collier (2005), find that regional variation in job offer arrival
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rates is the main driver of average unemployment experiences. However, for
the Netherlands, Folmer & van Dijk (1988) find that individual characteristics
and not regional variation in labour demand to be the main driver of aggre-
gate unemployment durations. This result is concurred by Arntz & Wilke
(2009) for Germany. Differences in methods of controlling for the regional level
may explain some of the differences in results. However, using UK Claimant
Count data, Kalwij (2001; 2010) both find evidence suggesting that observed
aggregate pattern of duration dependence over the business cycle is mostly
driven by changes in the composition of unemployment inflows and not due
to stronger negative duration dependence at the individual level (as would be
predicted by the Blanchard & Diamond 1994 model). Kalwij (2001) draws
on aggregate GDP, however, Kalwij (2010) uses a quarterly regional Vacan-
cies/Unemployment series controlling for the fixed effect of living in a region.
Consistency of this result across the two papers suggests an important role for
time-varying regional heterogeneity in driving average unemployment outcomes
in the UK, not adequately captured by regional fixed effects alone. This also
lends support to the importance of regional variation in job offer arrival rates
(Collier 2005). However, restricting this same sample to under 30 year old men,
Kalwij (2004) finds less of a role for regional heterogeneity. Incidence, rather
than duration of unemployment is found to be most important for young male
career outcomes. This result is interpreted as suggesting that Active Labour
Market Policies designed to encourage employment retention will have long-run
benefits for the economy.
Although many existing UK studies suggest less of a role when compared to
individual-level characteristics, regional variation in average unemployment ex-
periences suggests that geography is may be more important than the existing
studies have acknowledged. Disentangling its effect is of key interest from a pol-
icy perspective. Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 points to the importance of job arrival
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rates. Regional variation in job offer arrival rates may help to explain regional
variation in unemployment durations (Petrongolo 2001). This is typically prox-
ied by single measures like labour market tightness (vacancies/unemployment,
V/U, rates), which summarise the job matching process (Kalwij 2010). How-
ever, substantial measurement challenges, on-the-job search, and unsystematic
variation in the efficiency in which Jobcentres collect and post vacancy data
raise significant challenges when proxying the regional context via a single
measure. These issues, further developed in Chapter 4, motivate the detailed
approach to modelling the regional context adopted therein.
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3.2 Wage Scarring Background
This section reviews main contributions to the Wage Scarring literature, as well
as identifying gaps in the literature that raise interesting follow on questions.
These questions provide a basis for the research questions in Chapter 5. The
foundation of this literature is the Mincerian earnings function (see Chapter 2,
Section 2.1.2). Earlier studies, mostly in the US, focussed on estimating the
short-run impact of involuntary job displacement using cross-sectional data like
the Displaced Workers’ Survey (e.g. Addison & Portugal (1987), Topel (1990),
Carrington (1993), Houle & van Audenrode (1995) and Seninger (1997)). The
lack of longitudinal data on both displaced and non-displaced individuals is
likely to be an important limitation. Arulampalam (2001) argues that longi-
tudinal data on both pre- and post-displacement wages, as well as the timing
of these displacements, is necessary to ensure that the impact of job loss on
subsequent wages is not underestimated. This point is also raised in Gregory &
Jukes (2001): Concentrating solely on displaced workers ignores the fact that
non-displaced workers’ wages may be growing whilst an individual is unem-
ployed. Thus the wage the individual was earning when they were displaced
may be less than the wage of an equivalent non-displaced individual at the
time of re-employment. Taking into account the experiences of non-displaced
workers allows one to address the counterfactual: What would have happened
to an individual’s wage if they had not been displaced?.
Panel studies investigating the long-run impact of involuntary job displace-
ment in the US include Ruhm (1991), Jacobson et al. (1993), Neal (1995) for
the impact of industry specific human capital, Stevens (1997) for the impact
of multiple displacements, and Kuhn & Sweetman (1998) for the impact of
union status in a time of declining unionisation. European studies include
Borland et al. (2002) for the UK, Burda & Mertens (2001) and Kunze (2002)
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for Germany. Key contributions to the Job Displacement literature are briefly
covered in the introduction to Chapter 5 whilst Table 5.16 in the same chap-
ter summarises the methodology and key findings of selected contributions.
Methodological issues around estimating Wage Equations in the context of Job
Displacement and Wage Scarring are detailed in Chapter 2 , Sections 2.1.2,
2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
3.2.1 Wage Scarring:
’Wage scarring’ refers to the long-term impact of individual unemployment ex-
perience(s), hypothesised to increase the likelihood of future unemployment and
decreasing future earnings potential. In combination with the persistent na-
ture of unemployment experiences2, if unemployment experiences impact on the
slope of future wage-tenure profiles (earnings growth) then by implication Gov-
ernment Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) targeting the re-employment
prospects of the unemployed are paramount. A common identification strategy
has been to focus on the earnings outcomes of individuals displaced due to
reasons one can reasonably assume are unrelated to their individual character-
istics. The strategy of focussing on involuntary separations is also motivated
by the finding that the majority of earnings losses due to displacement can be
attributed to these separation types. Relative to separations in general, there
is a wider literature looking at the earnings losses associated with involuntary
unemployment, e.g. see Fallick (1993), Kletzer (1998), & Farber (1999) for
detailed surveys. Fewer papers have explicitly addressed the impact of un-
employment incidence and duration on subsequent wage growth. Some recent
papers looking at the impact of unemployment incidence and duration on sub-
sequent wages are: Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory & Jukes (2001) for the
UK, van Dijk & Folmer (1999) for the Netherlands, Lippi & Ordine (2002) for
2Arulampalam et al. (2000).
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Italy and Fares & Tiongson (2007) for Bosnia & Herzigovina.
3.2.2 Longitudinal studies & fixed effects
Using the first seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
1991 to 1997, and focussing on a sub-sample of 3516 males directly interviewed
in 1991 who followed over subsequent waves3, Arulampalam (2001) estimates
the effects of interruption on re-employment wages. Controls were made for
changes over time, sample selection via the Heckman selection model (Heckman
1979)4, and time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity via the within-
groups estimator5. Self-employment is excluded from the definition of current
3This excludes individuals who entered the sample after 1991 and remained in the sample
continuously from then onwards, severely limiting the sample size. Focussing on individuals
directly interviewed at Wave 1 and following their career trajectories introduces a sampling
bias as at that point in time the sample will be dominated by individuals with long employ-
ment tenure (Farber 1999). This issue is compounded by the fact that new labour market
entrants are only allowed to enter the sample in the first Wave, 1991 and not later. The
fact, highlighted in Farber (1999), that most new jobs end early is likely to imply that this
sampling framework is likely not to capture much of these short-run dynamics.
4Given the fixed effects estimator requires at least 2 outcome variable observations per
individual, this implies some sample selection in the data construction. Arulampalam (2001)
controls for this selection by modelling the first selection equation as a dichotomous variable,
taking the value ”1” if an individual has 2 wage observations in the data and ”0” otherwise.
In other words the study is not modelling selection into employment but selection into em-
ployment of more than one period. Individuals employed for only one period, and otherwise
continually in the survey will be coded as ”0” along with individuals that remain unemployed
over the 7 waves. The problem is that wages are not randomly assigned, as they are only
observed for the employed implying that the observed wage distribution will be incidentally
truncated at zero due to the underlying participation decision. This may not be the best
econometric strategy, as it requires first that an individual be employed, and then that they
work for more than one period. It is likely to underestimate the impact of transitions from
unemployment to employment, and especially inactivity to employment, if these individuals
are over represented in the pool of unstable, short duration jobs. These estimates are also
likely to be imprecise due to small cell sizes.
5The within-groups estimator -deviations from the mean- is analytically equivalent to the
fixed effects estimator (Angrist & Pischke 2009). For unbiased results, one must assume
common stochastic shocks and that all observed and unobserved confounding factors are
controlled for Arulampalam (2001). In other words, this approach parameterises the nature
of unobserved heterogeneity. However, since the Within-Groups estimator only controls for
time-invariant individual-level fixed effects, time-varying factors not controlled for in the
regressions could imply Omitted Variable Bias. This point is raised by Gregory & Jukes
(2001), who admit that their specification cannot control for time-varying demographic and
local labour market changes.
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labour market status. However, the author groups previous employment and
self-employment, stating that this is not possible using the retrospective job
history information, as self employment is grouped with a change of employer
(see Taylor et al. 2010, 13th wave Questionnaire, pp. 80). With regards to the
current job status, it is unclear whether self-employed individuals are dropped
from the sample or included in the control group. This is relevant for indi-
viduals that move between employment and self-employment over the period
and were in employment enough times to appear in the wage equation. The
advantage of the BHPS over data sources used in previous studies is the ability
to distinguish between displacement types, construct a control group of non-
displaced, as well as to control for the exact timing of displacement. Earlier
literature almost exclusively focussed on involuntary job separations. The other
main advantage is the ability to better control for general experience. Full em-
ployment histories are available - albeit with some inconsistencies due to the
retrospective nature of this data (see Section E for details of how these incon-
sistencies can be minimised)- from the time an individual first left full-time
education. This allows the researcher to calculate general experience by cumu-
lating full-time employment experience rather than proxying this using age or
potential experience (age - schooling). The study aims to address a number
of research questions: the effect of job interruption on re-employment wages;
the effect of type of interruption; the effect of the duration versus incidence of
interruption; and the effect of multiple unemployment spells on re-employment
wages.
Arulampalam (2001) adopts a ‘flexible’ Mincerian earnings function as the
baseline specification, which controls for personal and job characteristics as well
as regional and industry fixed effects. Specification 3.1 illustrates the flexible
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formulation of equation 2.5 used in Chapter 5.
lnWit = X
′
itβ + (d
′
itZit)
′γ + αi + εit (3.1)
where Wit represents to natural logarithm of individual i’s real hourly wage at
time t6, Xit is a matrix of observed individual and firm characteristics includ-
ing schooling, current tenure and experience, dit equals one if the individual
in question came into the current employment spell via a non-employment, Zit
is a matrix of observable individual characteristics (current tenure/ reason for
leaving previous job/ non-employment duration/ unemployment incidence), αi
a time-invariant individual-specific error and εit an idiosyncratic error term.
This specification also allows for constant individual-specific effects not cap-
tured by observed factors included in the model7. Equation 3.1 is estimated
via the within-groups estimator.
The dependent variable in the outcome -wage- equation is likely to suffer
from measurement error as self-reported usual hours worked, collected once a
year in the BHPS, are likely to adjust more slowly than usual gross weekly pay
which can be gleaned from individuals’ pay slips (Taylor et al. 2010). In the
BHPS, usual hours worked are collected once a year, in the individual response
file pertaining to the current job at interview. In the case of an individual who
has worked in two separate jobs over the past year, their pay information will
be collected twice: once in the current response file and once in the work history
file. The author’s justification for using this variable is that scarring may not
just be limited to weekly wage changes, as weekly wages may stay constant but
hours may be doubled, a real wage scar not captured when analysing weekly
wages (Arulampalam 2001).
6Usual gross weekly pay/Usual weekly hours worked, deflated by the Retail Price Index
and measured in 1991 prices.
7An attempt to control for time-varying selection effects is made, by interacting the Inverse
Mills ratio with a linear time trend, this is generally not significant (Arulampalam 2001).
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Job-to-job transitions dominate the sample, with low labour market attach-
ment found for individuals transitioning from unemployment or inactivity to
employment (employment tenure is low for the majority of these sub-samples).
This observation supports the suggestion, by Arulampalam (2001), that the
impact of these transitions on subsequent wages is likely to be underestimated.
The base specification, which controls for previous labour market state,
suggests that an individual entering employment from unemployment will on
average suffer a 7% wage penalty, ceteris paribus. This figure is larger for
individuals coming from ”Outside of the Labour Force”(OLF), at 11%. When
the effect of displacement is allowed to vary with type of displacement as well
as time since interruption, the initial wage scar associated with unemployment
to employment transition is initially 6%. Thus figure rises to 14% during the
first 4 years, and subsequently levels off at 11%. Estimates for the penalty
to previous OLF suggest very high initial penalties (8.6% to 13.6% 3 years
later), however this is insignificant in the long-run. The author suggests that
this could be due to small cell size with respect to this interruption type and
thus creates a combined non-employment category for further analysis. The
combined effect of unemployment and OLF on wage growth is 6.4% in the first
year of employment, with a long run penalty of 10.5%.
The author finds a permanent re-employment wage penalty for individuals
moving from unemployment to employment with previous employment history,
with the first spell of unemployment carrying the highest penalty of roughly
22%. In contrast, the average penalty for non-first timers is 10%, decreasing
to 9% in subsequent periods. Evidence of persistent scarring is also found,
with penalties being carried into subsequent periods. However, the nature of
job interruptions is found to be significant with involuntary unemployment (re-
dundancies) carrying the lowest future penalty (a significant 3.5% average wage
growth is found). This suggests that involuntary unemployment carries the low-
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est ‘stigma’ relative to other separation types, and that distinguishing between
these exit reasons is likely to be important. This conclusion is strengthened by
the observation that over 80% of individuals displaced from their former jobs by
redundancy don’t experience an intervening non-employment spell. However,
the inability to separate plant closures from layoffs using the BHPS suggests
that heterogeneity within the ‘redundancy’ category may exist, if the US evi-
dence is anything to go by. Arulampalam (2001) finds unemployment duration
to be insignificant, attributing the entire wage penalty effect to incidence. This
result does not change for individuals who were previously inactive. However,
Arulampalam (2001) uses an indicator of spell length provided in the BHPS
that contains a significant proportion of missing date ( 50% missing over the
period), and it is not clear whether this factor is driving the results. Aru-
lampalam (2001) attributes the difference between her results and the ones of
Gregory & Jukes (2001) to the fact that the former study considers all types of
unemployment -registered and non-registered-, whereas the latter only consid-
ers registered unemployment. This result is corroborated in recent work that
develops ’bounds’ for the true rate of unemployment, using the Joint Unem-
ployment & Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS). Whereas the definition in
the BHPS is closer to the ILO definition, registered unemployment from the
JUVOS claimant count is likely to be a ’lower bound’ to the true unemploy-
ment rate (Wilke 2009). Arulampalam (2001) results rely on the identifying
assumption that the Travel-To-Work-Area unemployment rate at the first in-
terview - 1991 - has a direct impact on individuals propensity to experience
unemployment for more than two periods, whilst being independent of offered
wages. Furthermore, lack of continuous monthly data implies that (Arulam-
palam 2001) cannot directly control for wage observations at the date of job
offer acceptance or track wage growth. Wage observations at survey inter-
view date are controlled for, but these are subject to similar criticisms raised
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by Houle & van Audenrode (1995) in relation to Addison & Portugal (1989).
Survey date job does not necessarily refer to the first job offer accepted after a
spell of non-employment. Controls for experience and tenure indirectly capture
these between survey date dynamics, however they require the assumption that
measures for tenure and experience accurately capture accumulation of general
and firm-specific human capital and do not merely index them (Farber 1999).
Using a detailed linked British administrative dataset8, covering the pe-
riod 1984 to 1994 and focussing on a sub-sample of 150,000 males, Gregory
& Jukes (2001) investigate the impact of registered unemployment experiences
on subsequent earnings of British men. A 2-step Heckman procedure and the
within-groups estimator are used to control for individual-level heterogeneity
as well as sample-selection. Research questions addressed include: the impact
of unemployment experience on subsequent earnings growth, relative to experi-
ences of similar individuals without this experience; whether the wage penalty
is temporary or permanent; whether incidence or duration of unemployment
is more important for the penalty; and heterogeneity across groups (age and
occupation) in terms of propensity to be unemployed.
The authors’ only find a temporary wage penalty of incidence ( 10% in the
first year, 7% in the second, and a long-run penalty of 2%) whereas duration
is found to inflict a permanent wage penalty that is increasing with length of
unemployment (from 5% for a 6-month spell to 11% for a 12-month period of
unemployment). The large sample size allows the authors to stratified their
data by age group. No penalty is found to exist for the initial job interruptions
of younger workers, however, a penalty is found to exist for longer durations
regardless of age profile. Additionally, the wage penalty is found to rise expo-
nentially for prime-aged workers, peaking at mid-age (49) and then flattening
8The New Earnings Survey Panel linked to the JUVOS creating a 1% representative
sample of all adults within the U.K.
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out until retirement age (measured as 64 in the study). This negative wage
effect is found to be a particular curse of the ”well-off”, being highest amongst
individuals with higher incomes and those in higher occupational groups.
A representative sample, and large sample size lend credence to the results
of Gregory & Jukes (2001). However, given that the treatment being looked
at is via a selection on observables this could imply possible omitted variable
bias due to the lack of control for time varying covariates in the model. The
estimation technique only captures time-invariant factors not captured by the
variables included in the model. The administrative data used in the study
lacks data on demographic and local labour market conditions. Furthermore,
due to the lack of detailed retrospective information, Gregory & Jukes (2001)
restrict registered unemployment to have an effect up to two years after inci-
dence (Arulampalam 2001). The results in Gregory & Jukes (2001) highlight
that long-term unemployment always carries a wage penalty, regardless of age.
Granted, it would be of interest to gauge how relevant the relative age, occu-
pational, and industrial structures of regions is in this regard. The observation
that individuals with similar characteristics tend to gravitate to the same areas,
(O¨berg & Oscarsson 1979), would further motivate this enquiry.
None of these papers explicitly consider the regional context in which indi-
viduals’ experience their unemployment spells. Gregory & Jukes (2001) include
as one of their controls region of work, however they do not mention the sign or
significance of this indicator in the paper. The regional controls in this paper
enter in the first stage regression and not the second stage, suggesting that
the regional context has an impact on re-employment probability but not on
subsequent wage outcomes.
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3.2.3 Cross-national studies:
Whilst consistent evidence of large and persistent earnings losses due to in-
voluntary job separations has been found in the United States (Ruhm 1991;
Jacobson et al. 1993; Farber et al. 1993; Seninger 1997), these results have
not been corroborated in Europe as a whole. As highlighted in section 3.2.2,
the findings for the UK are generally consistent with those of the US (Aru-
lampalam 2001; Gregory & Jukes 2001). However, the lack of evidence of a
persistent wage scarring effect of job disruptions in the rest of Europe (Kunze
2002; Burda & Mertens 2001) acted as a motivation for the study into cross-
national differences in wage scarring by Gangl (2006). Focussing on the impact
of unemployment on future wage prospects, Gangl (2006) develops and tests
an “institutional hypothesis” wherein the consequences of unemployment are
treated as endogenous to the institutional environment in which unemployment
is experienced. Two major sources of cross-national differences in institutional
context are taken into account: Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and
Unemployment Insurance (UI including Active Labour Market Programmes).
EPL (for example severance pay and advance notice, which alter the overall
wage structure in the economy) is argued to have negative implications for wage
scarring, if it limits workers’ mobility. The likely impact of UI is positive, how-
ever Gangl (2006) stresses a negative interaction of EPL and UI that implies
that the overall effect of these institutional factors is an empirical question.
Strict EPL may limit the positive effect of unemployment insurance systems
(Gangl 2006).
In order to address the hypothesis, Gangl (2006) draws on the US Survey of
Income & Program Participation (SIPP) and the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP), covering the 1995-1999 and 1994-2001 periods respectively.
Although the two data sources are modified to reflect each others design, the
3. Literature Review 88
incidence of recall bias is likely to be higher in the ECHP given that the SIPP
is conducted on a 4 monthly basis. The definition of unemployment used in
the analysis is restricted to individuals without work and searching for a job at
the time of interview. The sample is further restricted to all workers, male and
female, aged between 25 and 54. A serious limitation of the study is that it
doesn’t control for heterogeneity across separation types. Whilst Gangl (2006)
argues that lack of comparability between the SIPP and the ECHP motivated
this, this limiting assumption implies that the empirical strategy adopted in
the study is unlikely to be appropriate. A stratified difference-in-difference ker-
nel matching estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
is implemented. However, since the treatment is cannot reasonably considered
as exogenous, this selection on unobservables cannot be accounted for in the
implemented framework. A better strategy would have been to isolate the im-
pact of involuntary layoffs. Given these problems, the estimation results are
likely to suffer from what Rosenbaum refers to as “hidden bias” or selection
bias (Rosenbaum 2002).
Significant cross-national differences in the persistence of wage scarring are
found, with the biggest losses accruing in the first year of re-employment. No-
tably, the quickest recovery is found in the most flexible labour markets. The
largest initial wage penalties are found in the US. The average wage penalty in
the US is 15% in the first year, dropping to 6% in the second, and remaining
at 5% 3 years later. This compares with a figure roughly 10% 3 years later in
Belgium, and United Kingdom who share a similar wage recovery pattern to
the US. The penalty is 3% to 4% 3 years later in Germany, Ireland, Austria
and Finland however the displaced in these countries don’t experience similarly
large initial wage losses. Gangl (2006) argues that these contrasting results are
likely driven by differences in the flexibility in working arrangements, allow-
ing individuals to easily adjust their hours of work in countries like the US.
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Controlling for EPL strictness, strength of the UI system and the interaction,
Gangl (2006) finds evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of an UI regimes
is highly contingent on the flexibility of the labour market, i.e. low EPL levels.
The prospects of workers losing their jobs in highly institutionalised labour
markets are found to be relatively worse off, even after controlling for job his-
tory and worker characteristics (composition of the workforce). Gangl (2006)
finds that the most important factor dictating cross-national differences in wage
recovery is the ability to adjust hours of work. Whilst intuitive, it is unclear
to what extent this result is driven by omitted variable bias, given the possible
inappropriateness of the research design and the fact that the study also comes
to conclusions that are inconsistent with its priors. Another possible explana-
tion for the quick recovery of wages in the US is that individuals may be able to
lower their reservation wages more easily than in less flexible European labour
markets with more centralised wage bargaining systems (Abbring et al. 2002).
3.2.4 Wage Scarring and Youth Unemployment:
The best predictor of future unemployment, research shows, is pre-
vious unemployment. In Britain a young person who spends just
three months out of work before the age of 23 will on average spend
an additional 1.3 months in unemployment between the ages of 28
and 33 compared with someone without the spell of youth jobless-
ness. A second stint of joblessness makes things worse (Economist
2011).
Since this study does not focus solely on high tenure, prime age workers, the
age-profile of the displaced is likely to be important. Youth unemployment is
traditionally seen to be less of an issue for subsequent wage growth, relative to
the unemployment experiences of the high tenure prime age workforce. This
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position is likely motivated by the predictions of human capital theory, given
that young workers have less specific human capital accumulated and thus less
to lose. A common strategy in the literature is to focus solely on high tenure
individuals, as exemplified in Jacobson et al. (1993), who exclude low tenure
workers entirely from their sample. Furthermore, since the PSID oversamples
household heads, the results from studies like Stevens (1997) using this resource
are not likely to be representative for this age group. A further limitation of
these studies is the use of a comparison group constructed over the entire age
profile of the sample population. Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) argue that the main
driver of young displaced workers’ earnings losses is the rapid early career wage
growth forgone as a result of not being in work. Using a counterfactual that
includes all age groups will likely underestimate the earnings losses for young
workers, given that average wage growth profiles are flatter than those spe-
cific to this age group. Employing the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), they find substantial and persistent earnings losses for young displaced
workers in the US, circa 10% five years following job displacement (Kletzer &
Fairlie 2003). The nature of unemployment experiences tend to differ by age
group, with younger workers experiencing higher incidence and shorter dura-
tions relative to their more experienced counterparts (Nordstrom Skans 2004).
This is reflected in statistics presented by Gregg & Tominey (2005) for the UK:
roughly 60% of their sample experienced no youth unemployment, whilst 22%
experienced 1.5 months. However, a small % of their sample, the top 8%,
experienced 26 months of youth unemployment. On the face of it youth un-
employment seems transitory, however, the experience may have far reaching
consequences for individuals’ future wage growth.
Fares & Tiongson (2007) use the longitudinal 2001, Bosnia & Herzegovina Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Survey, and its subsequent 2002 to 2004 waves, to
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address the topical issue of youth unemployment experiences and its long-term
effects within a transition economy. The authors’ estimate separate equations
for unemployment and joblessness scarring, as well as for the wage effect, al-
lowing for the effect of previous unemployment spells on subsequent wages to
vary by skill level. Youth are found to be more likely to move into inactivity or
unemployment and less likely to be able to move out of inactivity. In line with
Gregory & Jukes (2001), Fares & Tiongson (2007) do not find any significant
impact of initial interruption on the youth, relative to older workers. However,
contrary to the previous literature the authors do not find evidence that the
wage penalty is higher for more educated workers. The very short panel and
the lack of control for neither selection nor unobserved heterogeneity raises
questions about the validity of the empirical predictions. Regional boundaries
are less clear-cut than those of nations, however, heterogeneity across regions
could exist due to their differing levels of economic development, as well as
industrial- and individual-level compositional effects.
Investigating the long-term costs of job-displacement for younger workers Klet-
zer & Fairlie (2003) present evidence challenging the notion that youth unem-
ployment is purely frictional. A representative sample of 12,686 men & women,
aged 14 to 22, and first interviewed in 1979 is selected from the US National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to cover the 1984 to 1993 period (the
maximum age in their sample is 30). The sample is restricted to exclude mil-
itary enrollments, those attending school in any year, zero earnings observa-
tions, and individuals without 3 years of continuous pre-displacement tenure
(to exclude recent school leavers). Individuals displaced and then reemployed
by their previous employer within a year, recalls, are also dropped from the
analysis. Due to data limitations, layoffs and plant closures are grouped.
A similar estimation strategy to that implemented in Jacobson et al. (1993)
3. Literature Review 92
is followed, including pre-displacement and post-displacement year dummies
in a fixed effects Mincerian earnings equation controlling for quadratics in age
and cumulative experience. In all specifications, no evidence of an initial dip of
earnings is found for this age group. Displaced men face a 5.7% wage penalty
in the year of displacement, increasing to 17.9% in the next year, and 9% four
years after initial displacement. Larger wage losses are found, with a significant
7.8% penalty in the year of displacement rising to 10% the year after. Five years
after wage losses are still 19.9%, relative to the counterfactual. Controlling for
differences in experience reduces the estimated coefficients significantly in the
case of earnings losses. Whilst no earnings losses are apparent in the post-
displacement year, earnings are 16.9% relative to the counterfactual. After 5
years, relative earnings losses are just 3.3%, suggesting strong wage recovery,
whilst relative wage losses are 16%. Larger earnings losses are found for women,
which Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) argue are mostly driven by hours of work reduc-
tions. Controlling for experience, women face a 35% earnings penalty during the
post-displacement year, lowering to 21% in the next. Significant wage penalties
are found in the second year after displacement, where wage are estimated to
be 6.8% less than the counterfactual. Five years after displacement, wages are
found to be 7.1% lower that expected levels. Introducing experience controls
renders the wage penalty insignificant. Displaced women are estimated to face
a 35% earnings penalty in the first post-displacement year, dropping to 21% in
the second.
Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) stratify the analysis into skill groups, in order to
investigate whether the earnings losses vary with the underlying average wage
growth rate of that specific demographic. For the male sample (Results are
similar for females), they find earnings losses in the range of 28% to 34% 3 to
5 years post displacement for college graduates. Relative to the earnings losses
of less skilled groups, they find college graduate losses to be mostly driven by
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working hour reductions whereas in the case of less skilled workers these are
lower due to increased hours of work being used as a strategy to counter the
wage drop.
The argument that the most rapid wage growth is experienced at the begin-
ning of one’s career is only valid under the assumption that wage-tenure profiles
are not “back loaded” in order to discourage quits (Abraham & Farber 1988).
Since Kletzer & Fairlie (2003) focus on the first observed job displacement,
their study cannot say anything about the impact of subsequent interruptions
on the wage growth of this age group and especially on their career earnings.
Gregg & Tominey (2005) track individuals up to age 42 in order to control for
early career displacement, as well as subsequent interruptions, on the individ-
uals’ entire prime age wage profiles.
Gregg & Tominey (2005) draw on the UK National Child Development Survey
(NCDS) of a cohort of children born in the week March 1958, following them
until age 42 (10 year intervals), in order to look at the long-term effects of
youth unemployment -between 16 & 24- on subsequent wages. Whilst this
isn’t panel data, the longitudinal nature of this dataset allows the authors to
analyse this phenomenon relative to a counterfactual group experiencing no
youth unemployment using the retrospective content of the survey. In order
to analyse the wage scar, they restrict their sample to individuals reporting
positive wages in the relevant period9. This common strategy in the literature
side steps the issue of “Attrition Bias”. Their sample is further restricted to
individuals with more than 2 years of employment history in order to exclude
youths pursuing further education. Their dataset provides the benefit of a rich
set of controls for demographic and regional characteristics, family background,
as well as unemployment experience.
9This introduces a sample selection issue..... corrected for?
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Gregg & Tominey (2005) adopt an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach
as their estimation strategy. The local unemployment rate at age 16 is used to
instrument for youth unemployment. The authors argue that, since at 16 indi-
viduals’ decision about where to live is largely exogenous to their own personal
characteristics, this should make the indicator a valid instrument (Gregg &
Tominey 2005). As noted by O¨berg & Oscarsson (1979), individuals with simi-
lar characteristics - i.e. income - tend to gravitate to similar regions, driving the
evolution of the compositional mix of a region as well as unemployment. How-
ever, they note that since the decision about where to live at 16 is largely made
by an individuals’ parents, this implies that parental heterogeneity should be
controlled for in order to avoid this as a potential source of bias in the results
(Gregg & Tominey 2005).
Gregg & Tominey’s (2005) results highlight a large wage penalty (‘scar’) for
both males and females, with strong recovery over the next 10 years. However,
this is only the case if further unemployment spells are avoided after 23. Indi-
viduals that experience >7 months of unemployment between 23 and 33 have
wages that are 16% to 33% lower for men, whilst this is 10% to 19% lower in the
case of women. They also find a long-lasting wage scar with lasts for 20 years,
a result that is robust to initial controls for unobserved ability. Furthermore,
results from the IV strategy adopted suggests that unobserved heterogeneity
was not imparting downward bias on the results.
In the worst-case scenario, more than 13 months of youth unemployment
exposure results in a 30% raw wage gap at 2310, which increases to 42% at 33 &
decreases to 42% at 42 for men. In the case of women this raw gap is 34% at 23,
42% at 33 but recovers at a faster rate to 25% at 42 for women. Once education
and region of residence is controlled for, Gregg & Tominey (2005) find that the
10Relative to the counterfactual: the wage penalty associated with no youth unemploy-
ment, given similar subsequent unemployment experience (Gregg & Tominey 2005).
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wage gap is quite similar at 23 (23%) and 33 (16%), suggesting persistence
of the wage scarring effect of youth unemployment. The risk of experiencing
further unemployment spells before 33 is heightened by frequent exposure to
youth unemployment. However, after 33 the relationship between youth un-
employment and unemployment disappears. Education accounts for most of
the wage gap at 42, with qualification to degree level increasing wage by 65%
to 70% relative to the counterfactual. Wages recover slowly and incompletely
after substantial youth unemployment, plus further exposure to unemployment
slows the recovery process. Whilst the possibility of recall bias is evident, the
results support government interventions to target youth unemployment, lend-
ing support to Active Labour Market Programmes like New Deal For Young
People.
3.2.5 Relevant Regional-Level Studies
van Dijk & Folmer (1999) employ the April 1985 Dutch OSA-Labor Market
Survey in order to investigate the effect individual unemployment history on
wage levels, taking into account the regional labour market. The 1985 Dutch
OSA-Labor Market Survey contains data on 4,020 individuals aged 16-60, ex-
cluding students and those in military service (individuals with missing age
information, and those still in full-time education, are excluded from the anal-
ysis). This provides a snapshot of labour market activity at the interview date.
Retrospective data used to capture work life history over Jan. 1980 - April 1985
period, as well as to construct the controls used in the analysis. A sub-sample
of 1,310 males is selected, 1,204 of which were employed at the interview date.
A parametric Heckman Selection Model (Heckman 1979; Puhani 2000; Newey
et al. 1990) is used to correct for sample selection11.
11Controls in the first stage participation equation (probability of being employed in April
1985) are: education; marital status; age; age2; duration of unemployment.
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Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, with wage only being observed
at interview date, individual heterogeniety cannot be adequately controlled for
using individual-level fixed effects. The authors attempt to address this issue
by stratifying their sample into high and low unemployment regions, in order
to test whether the impact of previous unemployment experience varies with
the level of unemployment in a region12.
The Hausman test (Hausman 1978) is implemented to test for endogeneity
of unemployment duration, frequency and number of job changes. The null
hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected in the case of unemployment duration
and frequency, however this could not be rejected in the case of number of
job changes. Thus Tobit-predicted values of unemployment duration and fre-
quency were used to control for simultaneity between the two regressors and the
dependent variable, whilst number of job changes was entered in observed form.
van Dijk & Folmer (1999) assume that the other controls are exogenous. The
dependent variable used in the second stage wage equation is the natural log-
arithm of net hourly wage in April 1985 (weekly earnings after tax - excluding
overtime payments, bonuses,etc - divided by weekly hours of work13. Educa-
tion level, unemployment frequency & duration (months), number job changes,
breadth of jobsearch (if regional migration was necessary), sex, marital sta-
tus, occupation, temporary contract, supervisory role, and sectoral effects are
all controlled for in the wage equation (These indicators are calculated using
interview date as well as retrospective information covering the period Jan.
1980 - April 1985). Due to data limitations, previous labour market status is
restricted to the last 5 years. Labour market states considered are employment
and unemployment (the self-employed and those out of the labour force are
12This strategy is unsatisfactory, given that it imposes the assumption that the wage effect
of unemployment history for those living in high unemployment regions is the same for all
individuals living in those regions, irrespective of individual ability.
13Net hourly wage captures tax regime effects (van Dijk & Folmer 1999).
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excluded from the analysis). No information is available about the nature of
job separations, thus job separations are likely confounded by individual het-
erogeneity. Years with current employer (tenure) at interview date is used to
proxy specific human capital. General human capital is proxied by years of
labour market experience prior to the current job (age - tenure - 15). Both
tenure and potential experience are entered as quadratics in order to capture
non-linearities in their effect on observed wages. Furthermore, an tenure &
potential experience are entered as an interaction.
A wage equation is estimated via OLS. Wages are found to increase with
both tenure and experience prior to job offer acceptance. One year of tenure
increases wages by 1% in core and 4% in periphery regions, both significant at
the 1% level. In line with tenure effects, potential experience is found to have a
positive impact of wages of 1% in core and 4% in periphery regions, significant
at the 1% level. The returns to tenure peak earlier in core (37) than periphery
regions (57), suggesting than in general individuals tend to move on to flatter
tenure-wage profiles in periphery regions (van Dijk & Folmer 1999). Interest-
ingly number of job changes is found to have a positive, significant impact on
wages in periphery regions. An extra job change is found to carry a 6% wage
gain in periphery, but only 2% and insignificant in core regions. Unemployment
incidence is found to be significant in core regions but not periphery regions
Experiencing one extra unemployment spell carries a significant wage gain of
40% in core regions, whereas in periphery regions the effect is insignificant. In
both cases the coefficient is positive, leading the authors to argue that, con-
trolling for unemployment duration, the benefits of career mobility combined
with productive job search far outweigh the other mechanisms through which
unemployment can impact on wage growth. Furthermore, duration of unem-
ployment is found to be insignificant in periphery and negative and significant
in core regions A one month increase in unemployment duration will decrease
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wages by 3%, ceteris paribus (van Dijk & Folmer 1999). This they argue high-
lights that the positive effects of unemployment incidence are reversed once an
unemployment spell exceeds 13 months (van Dijk & Folmer 1999). Key to the
paper’s contribution, personal characteristics are only found to be significant
in core regions. (van Dijk & Folmer 1999) argue that even within a country
the relationship between unemployment and wages is likely to be heterogenous.
They argue that this is more caused by differences in search and recruiting prac-
tises related to the regional labour market, than as a result of intra-national
institutional differences which are likely to be small.
The validity of (van Dijk & Folmer 1999)’s results comes under question
due to lack of exclusion restrictions. The Heckman Selection model is identi-
fied under the joint normality assumption when the same covariates appear in
the selection equation and the equation of interest. However, identification will
be difficult unless there are many observations in the tails where there is sub-
stantial nonlinearity in the Inverse Mills Ratio (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). An
exclusion restriction - at least one variable which appears with a non-zero coef-
ficient in the selection equation but does not appear in the equation of interest
- is required for identification (Puhani 2000). Furthermore a small sample size
makes satisfaction of the joint normality assumption less likely (Newey et al.
1990).
Using the Bank of Italy Survey of Italian Households Income & Wealth, 1993 &
1995, Lippi & Ordine (2002) set out to test their hypothesis that pre-existing
high levels of unemployment will decrease the informativeness of the labour
market status of unemployment as a productivity signal for future employers.
Thus, they predict that high levels of unemployment in the region of residence
should put downward pressure on the re-employment wage penalty, finding em-
pirical evidence for this hypothesis. As an econometric strategy the Feasible
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GLS (within/between) estimator was employed, however no controls were made
for selection or gender differences. The key result of the paper is that individual
unemployment experiences only carry a wage penalty in the Northern regions,
where aggregate unemployment is low. This wage penalty is non-existent in
Southern Italian regions where long-term unemployment is common. This re-
sult is in line with that of van Dijk & Folmer (1999) for the Netherlands who,
correcting for selectivity bias, find that longer unemployment periods carry a
significant negative productivity signal in core regions with low unemployment
rates, whereas in periphery regions where unemployment rates are high this
is attributed to the characteristics of the regional labour market rather than
being seen as a negative productivity signal (van Dijk & Folmer 1999).
3.2.6 Conclusion
This literature raises the following questions:
• Do the van Dijk & Folmer (1999)/ Lippi & Ordine (2002) hypotheses
hold when applied to Great Britain?
• How important is regional heterogeneity in determining individuals’ wage
outcomes?
• Do Arulumpalam’s results still hold when adding the extra waves now
available in the BHPS?
The van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis suggests that these individuals’ em-
ployment experiences will be viewed as less of a negative productivity signal
and more a characteristic of the region. The expectation is that individuals in
tight labour markets (with high Vacancies/Unemployment ratios) that expe-
rience a spell of unemployment will be less scarred relative to observationally
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equivalent individuals who experience unemployment in loose labour markets.
This prediction follows from the hypothesis that these individuals’ employment
experiences will be viewed as less of a negative productivity signal and more a
characteristic of the region (van Dijk & Folmer 1999). This notion has less to
do with these individuals’ human capital accumulation, and more to do with
how employers interpret their unemployment signal. If evidence is found sup-
porting this, there is likely to be substantial heterogeneity across skill groups.
Skilled workers are generally viewed as being more geographically mobile than
their less-skilled counterparts. Furthermore, skilled workers are likely to have
accumulated more general human capital, enabling them to mitigate the stigma
effect of unemployment spells. The analysis in the Chapter 5 may shed some
light on these possibilities.
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3.3 Stepping Stones, Skill Mismatch & Over-education
Background
This section reviews selected contributions to the Stepping Stones, Skill Mis-
match and Over-education literature, as well as identifying gaps in the literature
that raise interesting follow on questions. These questions provide a basis for
the research question in Chapter 6. If the long-term economic prospects of the
unemployed are to be ensured, then moving them out of unemployment and
into high quality employment is key not just for their well being but also for
the nation in terms of aggregate welfare gains. In what follows the selected
literature is divided in terms of the relevant dimensions of match quality.
3.3.1 Employment Quality: Pay.
“Stability of the overall [earnings] distribution [overtime] does not [necessarily]
imply stability for individuals (Stewart & Swaffield 1999).” Drawing on the first
5 waves of the BHPS, Stewart & Swaffield (1999) investigate the persistence of
low pay for the bottom end of the income distribution. Of key interest is the
extent of mobility within the earnings distribution, and the income groups for
which this mobility is limited. Knowing whether low-paid employment leads
to high-paid employment in the future, or whether certain groups get stuck in
a “low-pay no-pay” cycle is relevant from a policy perspective, as well as being
the main research question of this study.
Three low pay thresholds are defined in this study: half the median, half the
mean and two thirds of the median of the overall distribution of gross hourly
wages, including overtime, for full-time men and women (at adult rates). A
pooled Bivariate Probit model is employed, with endogenous sample selection
to control for the initial conditions problem. Six labour market states are distin-
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guished: low paid employment; higher paid employment; employed but missing
earnings information; self-employment; unemployment; out of the labour force
(OLF).
Descriptives suggest the presence of a “low-pay no-pay” cycle. “The low
paid are more likely to be out of employment in the next period than those
higher up the earnings distribution (Stewart & Swaffield 1999, p.33).” Both
males and females are more likely to be in low pay at time t if they were unem-
ployment or Out of the Labour Force (4 times and 6 times more likely for males,
respectively, and 2.5 time more likely for females in both incidences). Further-
more, moving from low pay into unemploymeny/OLF significantly increases
the chances of moving back into low pay.
An extra year of education before t-1 decreases the likelihood of remaining
low paid by 2-3% points, ceteris paribus, and the probability of dropping into
low pay by 1% point. Training in the 12 months before t-1 decreases the
probability of remaining low paid by 5-10% points, and that of dropping into
low pay by 2-4% points. Low paid workers with union coverage at t-1 are less
likely to remain low paid and less likely to drop into low pay at t. Employees
of establishments with more than 25 employees are 7-10% points less likely to
remain low paid. Furthermore, women are 15-20% points more likely to remain
low paid and 2-3% points more likely to fall into low pay than men.
Controlling for endogenous selection (the initial conditions problem) via In-
strumental Variables (instruments: parental variables; socioeconomic group of
parents when 14) suggests that the coefficients above are inflated by a mag-
nitude of 2, relative to a specification which controls for initial conditions.
However, this result relies on the validity of the instruments: that they affect
the level and not the change in low pay status. Granted, the general story
remains robust although the magnitudes of estimated coefficients are reduced.
Stewart (2007) revisits this topic, drawing from the first 6 waves of the
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BHPS. A dynamic discrete-choice framework is employed, with interview date
used as a reference point. The sample is restricted to those in the labour
force (employed or ILO unemployed) at the time of interview. The low pay
threshold used is defined as two thirds of the median, based on weighted BHPS
data. A dynamic random-effects Probit is estimated, using the Heckman (1981)
and Wooldridge (2005) estimators to control for the initial conditions problem.
Unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for by specifying this as discrete mass-
points of unknown distribution (Heckman & Singer 1984). Moreover, correlated
errors are allowed by specifying a bivariate error structure, which relaxes the
independence assumption.
Main results suggest that, holding observed and unobserved characteristics
constant, an individual that was unemployed at time t-1 is twice as likely to
be unemployed at t than an individual who was employed at t-1. Moreover,
being in low wage employment at time t-1 decreases the probability of being in
employment at t as much as being in unemployed at t-1. Formal statistical tests
of the differences in these estimates affirm these conclusions. Stewart (2007)
argues that low-wage jobs are the main driver of repeat unemployment and that
getting a better job substantially decreases the risk of repeat unemployment.
Entering low-wage employment at time t from unemployment (t-1) triples the
risk of re-entering unemployment, relative to someone whose previous status
at t-1 was employment.
Investigating the “hidden brain drain” of female part-time work, Connolly
& Gregory (2008) draw on two samples from the NESPD and the BHPS. Al-
though quite different data sources, the NESPD and the BHPS have their rel-
ative merits. Whilst the former contains information on “actual” contractual,
instead of self-reported “usual”, hours of work, the NESPD under-samples both
part-time workers as well as job movers (Connolly & Gregory 2008). To aid
comparability, the samples are restricted to follow individuals aged 22 to 59 on
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an annual basis over the 1991-2001 period. Moreover, the analysis is restricted
to job-to-job transitions. Whether women change occupation on moving from
full-time to part-time work, and whether this involves downgrading to occupa-
tions with involve lower skill-levels on average is of main interest. To capture
occupations skill composition, a detailed fixed ranking is developed (15 occupa-
tional groups) using the SOC90 data from the 2000 LFS. This ranking is based
on the average level of (highest) qualifications employed in each occupation as
well as the similarity of the tasks performed.
Connolly & Gregory (2008) estimate a standard Multinomial Logit for the
probability of upgrading/ downgrading relative to remaining in the same oc-
cupation, and whether this involves a change in employer and/or full-time
employment status. The odds of downgrading are found to be relatively higher
for women previously in higher-skilled occupations, with the odds of upgrading
found to be highest for those whose previous occupations were low-skilled. In
this study the cost of occupational downgrading is emphasized in terms of the
number of years of education underutilised. Furthermore, measurement error
issues with their approach are highlighted.
“Evaluating the extent of the underutilisation of formally acquired
skills is a rather approximate exercise, as individual unit groups
within each of the 15 occupations involve differing numbers of years
of post-compulsory education, and the structure, particularly of
vocational qualifications, has evolved across age-groups (Connolly
& Gregory 2008, p. F69).”
This issue would not be faced to the same extent if the ranking of occupations
were allowed to vary across time. The extent of downgrading on occupational
change is gauged for each occupation in the 15-point ranking. This exercise
is restricted to the NESPD due to small cell size limitations of the BHPS
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(Connolly & Gregory 2008). 89% of Teachers and Nurses switched occupation
between 1991-2001 without changing occupational group. Out of these, half of
teachers and two thirds of nurses moved into lower-skilled jobs, for example,
secretarial and carers respectively. The higher up the occupational ranking,
the higher the likelihood of downgrading given that there are more occupations
to downgrade into (Evans 1999). In terms of managerial posts, “Other man-
agers” are found to have the highest probability of downgrading, 47%, whilst
for “Corporate managers” this is slightly lower at 29%. Connolly & Gregory
(2008) argue that since experience and on-the-job training usually trumps for-
mal education when it comes to career progression into corporate management,
a measure of the underutilisation of high-level skills is not very meaningful for
this occupational category given that they are not often a prerequisite. Whilst
that may be the case, if future career outcomes are of interest then the un-
derutilisation of their accumulated specific skilled human capital may carry
more serious implications for low-formal-qualification-members of this group
especially in the face of limited transferability of skills.
Mosthaf et al. (2009) ask whether it is better for west German women to
remain unemployed and wait for a better job offer than to take up low-wage
employment, given that low-wage may increase the likelihood of future “low
quality” employment or result in repeat unemployment. If human capital de-
preciates whilst unemployed, then one would expect that accepting “low qual-
ity” employment sooner rather than later would mitigate the future earnings
impact of unemployment spells. However, since human capital accumulation
is generally low in “low quality” employment, taking up this kind of work may
prolong the negative earnings effects. If previous “low quality” employment
is seen as a negative productivity signal for “high quality” employers, then
engaging in this kind of work may limit future earnings mobility.
The aim of Mosthaf et al. (2009) is to investigate (true) state dependence
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of low-wage employment and how this differs by firm and individual character-
istics. Furthermore, the extent of unemployment risk, upward mobility of low
wage earners and when low-wage jobs can act as “stepping stones” to high-wage
employment. 5 labour market states are distinguished: high-wage employment;
low-wage employment (part-time and full-time); ILO unemployment and inac-
tivity (OLF).
The 2000-2006 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP) are
used to investigate the labour market dynamics of western German Women.
Women less than 20 in 2000 and greater than 55 in 2006, as well as full-
time education to work and work to retirement transitions, are excluded from
the analysis. Furthermore, the self-employed, trainees, students, women in
disabled employment and women in agriculture are dropped. Monthly unem-
ployment rates capture the effect of the Business Cycle. An unbalanced panel
is constructed of all individuals observed in 2000 and 2001. These individ-
uals are followed until the first instance of attrition or until a missing value
of an independent variable is encountered. A low-paid job is defined as two
thirds of the median hourly gross wage, calculated for each year for the whole
German population using a weighted sample to correct for attrition bias. A
dynamic Multinomial Logit Model with correlated random effects (Mundlak
1978 methodology) is implemented, using the Wooldridge (2005) estimator to
deal with the initial conditions problem.
Being in a low-paid job at t-1 increases the probability of being in a low-
paid job at t, and decreases the probability of being in a high-paid job. This is
highest for those in low-paid part-time work at t-1. However, low-paid women
are better off than unemployed or inactive women, where the probability of
transition into high-wage employment is the lowest and the probability of be-
coming unemployed or inactive again is the highest. Mosthaf et al. (2009) argue
that this is evidence in favour of the hypothesis that low-wage jobs can be step-
3. Literature Review 107
ping stones to high-wage employment. However, this should be taken in the
context that low-wage women working in large firms are found to have lower
probabilities of moving into higher paid jobs than their full-time counterparts,
and this upward mobility is also found to be lower if these women live alone
and/or have young children in their household. The authors acknowledge that
this study ignores duration dependence. Taking low-wage employment may be
more appropriate for the long-term than short-term unemployed. Furthermore,
the effect of a low-wage job may also depend on its duration (Mosthaf et al.
2009).
3.3.2 Employment Quality: Stability.
The Stepping Stone hypothesis in its original formulation suggests that tempo-
rary jobs (fixed term contracts/temporary help agencies) are stepping stones to
permanent employment (Boheim & Taylor 2000; Booth, Francesconi, & Frank
2002). Temporary contracts are generally seen as an instrument for labour
market flexibility. However, human capital accumulation may be lower in tem-
porary jobs, resulting in workers getting stuck in these jobs and not being
able to progress into permanent employment due to human capital depreci-
ation (Picchio 2008). Picchio (2008) uses the 2000, 2002 and 2004 waves of
the Survey of Italian Household’s Income and Wealth (SHIW) to assess the
strength of the Stepping Stone effect of temporary jobs in Italy. The sample is
restricted to individuals aged 15 to 64 in 2000, resulting in a balanced panel of
1677 individuals. Dynamic unobserved effects Probit models are estimated for
the probability of having a permanent job. In order to distinguish between true
versus spurious state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity is initially specified
as a random effect where this is allowed to be correlated with average observed
characteristics according to the Chamberlain (1980) methodology. Moreover,
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initial conditions are incorporated using the Wooldridge (2005) and Heckman
(1981) Conditional MLE approaches. Relative to temporary work, a permanent
job at time t-1 significantly increases the probability of permanent employ-
ment at time t. Furthermore, relative to a temporary job, unemployment at
t-1 significantly decreases the chances of permanent employment at t-1. Wald
tests confirm the significance of unobserved heterogeneity. The Wooldridge
(2005) and Heckman (1981) solutions to the Initial Conditions problem result
in marginal effects, evaluated at the sample means, of 16.2 and 13.7 percent-
age points respectively. Relative to sample descriptives suggesting an average
Stepping Stone effect of 29 percentage points, controlling for observables re-
duces this estimate to 20 percent. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
and initial conditions reduces this estimate further. This suggests that half of
the average Stepping Stone effect is spurious (Picchio 2008). Specifying the
unobserved heterogeneity as discrete mass point distributed, as well as using
Efficient Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) and first-differencing tech-
niques (OLS and Instrumental Variables) results in estimates which closely
bound the Stepping Stone effect found in the main analysis of 13.7 to 16.2 per-
centage points, once initial conditions are controlled for. Defining temporary
employment as jobs with fixed term contracts and casual work, and employing
the 1994-1999 waves of the European Community Household Panel, D’Addio
& Rosholm (2005) found evidence that temporary work increases the proba-
bility of future labour market exclusion, notably for men. In contrast, for UK,
Booth et al. (2002) only find a Stepping Stone effect of fixed term and not
temporary (casual work) contracts which is strongest for women using BHPS
data. Tougher Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) implies higher fir-
ing costs and thus a greater incentive for employers to use temporary jobs
as a “screening device (Cockx & Picchio 2009a).” However, Cockx & Picchio
(2009a) argue that a permanent contract is not necessarily a guarantee of job
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security, proposing that effective job tenure (≥1 year) as a sign of job security.
They also argue that temporary employment is not always short-lasting and
thus not necessarily an indicator of “low quality” employment. The definition
of a short-lived job used in this study is: ≤1 quarter and involuntarily inter-
rupted. “This is likely a lower bound for the conversion of temporary jobs to
long-lasting jobs (Cockx & Picchio 2009a, p.3).”
The main research question is whether by accepting short-lived jobs (the
treatment), individuals are more likely to enter long-lived jobs than if they
had remained unemployed, continuing to search for a stable position Cockx
& Picchio (2009a). Micro-simulation techniques are then used to simulate the
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), based on the estimates in
the first stage regressions. Three labour market states are considered: insured
(registered) unemployment, employment, and an all absorbing censoring state.
Moreover, job-to-job transitions are explicitly modelled in the analysis. The
quarterly Belgian Crossroads Bank for Social Security (CBSS), a 100% adminis-
trative sample of school-leavers’ labour market histories is drawn on. The sam-
ple is restricted to 18-25 year olds who in 1998 were still unemployed 9 months
after graduation. Since in Belgium school leavers only become entitled to unem-
ployment benefits after 9 months, this simplifies the initial conditions problem
to a left censoring issue. The final sample contains the (un)employment his-
tories of 8,921 women and 6,627 men, beginning in 1998 and ending in 2001
(max. 4 years). The detailed set of controls include: firm characteristics (at
the beginning of the spell); nationality, region of residence, education (time-
invariant); age, quarter of entry into spell, household position (head, single,
cohabiting), monthly unemployment benefits, sector, firm size (spell-varying);
time until benefit expiration/drop; unemployment rate (time-varying: state of
labour market).
A discrete-time Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model is estimated with
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a flexible piecewise constant baseline hazard. Possible sources of endogeneity
include unobserved heterogeneity, endogenous censoring, endogeneity induced
by time-varying covariates, and the initial conditions problem. Competing
(correlated) risks, multiple spells and time-varying covariates are accounted
for in the model specification. Selection on unobservables is controlled for by
specifying this as a discrete distribution with unknown number of mass points
(Heckman & Singer 1984), where the optimal number of mass points is cho-
sen to minimise the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Gaure et al. 2008).
Cockx & Picchio (2009a) allow the order, type and duration of the previous
spell to proportionally shift the baseline hazard. HORNY & PICCHIO (2009)
prove that all parameters in such a model are identified in a continuous-time
setting. The authors argues that their approach is appropriate as extensive
Monte Carlo analysis by Gaure et al. (2008) suggests that the discrete-time
approach still produces robust estimates, provided that the likelihood function
is correctly specified.The “all absorbing” censoring state is modelled as a sepa-
rate competing risk so as not to contaminate the destination-specific hazards of
interest, in the event of the independent risks assumption failing (van den Berg
& Lindeboom 1998). Moreover, the initial conditions problem is controlled for.
Lagged occurrence dependence is found to be more important than lagged
duration dependence, however, unlike Doiron & Gorgens (2008) who draw on
a survey of Australian youths, lagged duration dependence is also found to be
significant. This impact of past unemployment occurrence is found to only in-
crease the likelihood of future unemployment (employment-to-unemployment
transitions), and not job-to-job transitions. Increasing previous unemployment
spell length by a quarter (4 months) is found to decrease transitions out of
employment and into unemployment by 3%, whereas job-to-job transitions de-
crease by 4% for women. For men, previous unemployment duration is only
found to have a negative impact of 3% per quarter on job-to-job transitions.
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Youn men and women entering employment from unemployment, rather than
a job-to-job transition, are found to be 27%(35%) more likely to be dismissed.
The order of unemployment spells is found to be very important. Relative to
the first spell (during which no work experience had been accumulated under
assumption), the probability of re-employment in the second unemployment
spell is 37% higher for men and 75% higher for women. This increases to 70%
and 98% in the third spell, for males and females respectively. Cockx & Picchio
(2009a) argue that this highlights the importance of work experience. The
length of the past job is found to increase job duration. An increase in previous
job duration by one quarter decreases job-to-unemployment transitions by 12%
for men and 6% for women. However, this also decreases job-to-job transitions
by 4% for women. Longer previous (registered) unemployment spells are found
to increase the probability that the current job last longer. However, negative
duration dependence is also found in the re-employment hazard (U− >E).
Rejecting short-lived job offers now reduces the probability of finding a long-
lived job later on. Moreover, length of previous job increases the probability
of re-employment whilst unemployed. This effect increases with the number of
previous job spells, but at a decreasing rate. Thus, Cockx & Picchio (2009a)
argue the importance of finding a first job quickly, to maximise the Stepping
Stone effect.
The simulated ATT lends further support for the Stepping Stone effect.
However, this effect is likely to be very heterogenous. “40% of those who ac-
cepted short-lived jobs would have speeded up their labour market integration
by rejecting these jobs (Cockx & Picchio 2009a, p. 29).” Moreover, the Stone
Effect is smaller for the highly educated and those living in low unemployment
rate districts. Cockx & Picchio (2009a) do not consider the impact on the level
of wages, or on wage growth. Furthermore, the ATT is not generalisable to the
whole population (Cameron & Trivedi 2005) and its simulated nature implies
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sensitivity to correct specification of the empirical model. The study restricts
itself to very short-lived jobs, which involuntarily end in unemployment instead
of a subsequent job (job-to-job transitions) (Cockx & Picchio 2009a). Thus the
Stepping Stone effect is likely to be an underestimate of the population-wide
effect if individuals select themselves into a job-to-job transition. The sam-
ple only captures the outcomes of long-term unemployed graduates, with no
labour market experience (employment spells). The stigma attached to being
long-term unemployed, as well as the associated general human capital depreci-
ation, implies that these outcomes are unlikely to be representative. However,
this study is restricted to the outcomes of the registered unemployed who are
actively searching for work and qualify for active labour market participation.
Thus productive search predictions (Lippman & McCall 1976) are more likely
to apply for this sub-set of the population than for those who are ILO un-
employed. As noted by the authors, if long-term unemployed graduates are
more likely to enter minimum wage jobs, then this provides limited scope for
downward mobility of wages. An obvious problem with the approach, in terms
of the behavioural implications the type of job held, is the backward looking
nature of the short-lived/long-lived definition. How does an employee tell how
stable the job will be before accepting the wage offer? This information about
the status of job security will only accumulate with length of time on the job,
and thus the distinction between a secure and un-secure job is unlikely to be
time-invariant. This issue would in turn made identify the fixed effect of taking
a “short-lived” job, by this study’s definition, problematic at best.
A recent study, by the same authors, considers both the pay and stability
dimensions of job quality. Cockx & Picchio (2009b) jointly model the length
of unemployment, starting wages and subsequent job tenure in order to as-
sess the impact of unemployment duration on job quality. Contrary to the
existing literature, this study does not categorise jobs as low- or high-paid, in-
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stead modelling the starting wage as a separate, pre-employment spell, labour
market state. By allowing for these competing risks to be correlated in both
observables and unobservables, simultaneity between unemployment duration
and starting wages is controlled for without the need for instrumental vari-
ables (e.g. Addison & Portugal 1989). Furthermore, the sample distribution of
starting wages is captured by modelling this as a separate labour market state.
The common definition used is two thirds of the median gross hourly wage.
Stewart & Swaffield (1999) use the New Earnings Survey (NES) to establish
this threshold. Stewart (2007) uses the BHPS survey weights to aggregate
the individual-level data to the national level before calculating this threshold.
Variation is the construction of this indicator may imply some sensitivity of
results to the definitional choice. By only considering the impact on starting
wages (post-wage bargaining wage offers), Cockx & Picchio (2009b) ignore the
impact on subsequent wage growth. Cockx & Picchio (2009b) draw on the same
sample used in Cockx & Picchio (2009a), implementing a similar identification
strategy, in order to asses the causal impact of unemployment benefit receipt
and unemployment duration on the quality (wage and duration) of subsequent
work. The study is motivated by the general finding in the literature that
the incidence, rather than the duration of unemployment matters more for the
impact of unemployment on subsequent wages (e.g. see Arulampalam 2001).
Taking into account initial conditions, wage selectivity and state depen-
dence, key results reject the presence of Unemployment Scarring in Belgium.
Micro-simulations suggest that a 1 year increase in unemployment duration in-
creases wages by 1.6% on average for men, with no significant effect for women.
Possible explanations put forward include the possibility that being long-term
unemployed is already enough of a negative signal to potential employers that
any subsequent unemployment duration is unlikely to have a significant impact
on future wages. The authors argue that limited flexibility of the centralised
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Belgian wage bargaining system, and limited downward wage flexibility, is also
likely to imply that wage penalties can only be incurred through occupational
downgrading down the wage scale. Moreover, if long-term unemployed grad-
uates are more likely to move into minimum wage jobs then wage reductions
will be infeasible due to institutional constraints (Cockx & Picchio 2009b).
Unemployment duration is found to negatively impact on job-to-job tran-
sition intensities. An additional quarter of unemployment decreases transition
intensities by 4% and 9% for men and women respectively. However, job-to-
unemployment transitions are unaffected. Since the study is limited to reg-
istered unemployment spells, this is more likely to capture productive search
due to monitoring restrictions and eligibility for Active Labour Market Policies.
Cockx & Picchio (2009b) interpret this as indirect evidence for Wage Scarring,
as by negatively impacting on job-to-job transition intensities unemployment
duration could hamper long-term career mobility and the long-run growth of
individuals’ wage profiles. However, this subsequent impact on wage profiles is
not modelled.
Whilst unemployment duration is found to be important, starting wages do
not have a significant impact on job tenure for both men and women. “[This is
likely due to] the type of bargained wage profile, rather than the starting wage,
that might affect job tenure (Cockx & Picchio 2009b, p.27).” Economic theory
provided conflicting predictions of this sign effect. If wages are used as an
incentive device (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984), then a positive relationship between
starting wage and job tenure would be expected as high wage individuals would
have a higher incentive to increase their productivity. However, if match quality
is only observed ex ante (Jovanovic 1979) then high wage workers will have a
higher probability of being in a non-profitable match, implying a predicted
negative relationship between starting wages and job tenure (Cockx & Picchio
2009b). However, the authors argue that imperfect information considerations
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will increase employers’ incentives to bargain for a “backloaded” wage profile
with a tenure-based remuneration structure.
The general story presented is robust sensitivity checks including controls
for Active Labour Market participation, allowing the baseline unemployment
exit rate to differ for highly educated workers (≥ university degree) to dif-
fer from lower educated workers (to capture endogenous hetereogenous time-
variation of the reservation wage) and controls for age variation in the min-
imum wage (Cockx & Picchio 2009b). Data limitations generally imply that
the starting wage is used as a proxy for the offered wage. However, these are
likely to diverge for individuals with bargaining power as the starting wage is
the product of the wage bargaining process. The results also rely on the MPH
assumption for identification, however, initial specifications suggest that vary-
ing the identify assumptions leads to similar results when initial conditions are
ignored and the censoring state is treated as exogenous.
3.3.3 Employment Quality: Skill Downgrading & Skill Mis-
match.
A common premise of many mobility studies is that skilled workers are more
mobile than their less-skilled counterparts. Whilst less-skilled workers are less
likely to be upwardly mobile, the notion of downward occupational mobility
implies that skilled workers are also more likely to take on less-skilled jobs
during economic downturns/ downturns in their sectors.
Evans (1999) considers the probability of occupational change (either up-
grading or downgrading), given displacement, as an alternative to remaining
unemployed. Research questions include the characteristics which make down-
grading more likely, as well as the how downgrading varies with the business
cycle. Moreover, an additional aim is to determine whether all types of oc-
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cupational change are a source of flexibility in the labour market. Downgrad-
ing/upgrading is defined as an occupational change that involves movement
down/up the occupational hierarchy, where this ranking is determined by oc-
cupations’ skill-content. Since this approach restrains individual to be unem-
ployed in the first stage, it does not consider movements within a firm. Reder
(1955) argues that firms may use lower hiring standards to “hoard” skilled
labour during downturns. Skilled labour embody a higher investment in spe-
cific human capital, hence downgrading them into less skilled jobs within the
firm may be cheaper if they can be upgraded when things pick up and less
skilled workers can be hired externally to fill their places.
The study is based on the 1989 cross-section of the UK Labour Force Survey
(LFS). Occupational status at the time of interview and retrospective status one
year earlier are used to identify occupational change, given the cross-sectional
nature of the data. This measure is likely to suffer from measurement error
as short labour market spells will tend to be underreported. Furthermore,
systematic recall bias is likely to be an issue due to the retrospective nature
of the previous labour market status. A ranking of occupations is developed
based on the characteristics of the jobs carried out. Six categories are defined:
(6) Professionals; (5) Intermediate Professionals; (4) Skilled (non-manual); (3)
Skilled (manual); (2) Semi-skilled; and (1) Unskilled. Movements up this scale
are defined as upgrading, whereas movements down are defined as downgrading.
Connolly & Gregory (2008) define this ranking based on the average highest
qualification levels paid in each occupational band. Acemoglu (2001) develops
a model of occupational change, where he defines good jobs as high paid and
bad jobs as low paid. Manning & Petrongolo (2008) define this by average
real hourly wages paid in each occupational band. Whether the skill-content,
average pay structure, or stability of a job is the most appropriate measurement
of its quality is an issue of controversy. If up-skilling of the workforce is a long-
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term economic growth strategy, assuming that highly paid jobs are “good”
assumes that highly paid jobs are skilled by nature. Results will be sensitive
to how the high pay/low pay threshold is defined. Moreover, the wider the
classification of the occupational bands, the more likely measurement error is
a to be an issue. However, finer bands introduce a tradeoff with numerical
accuracy due to small cell size.
A Logit model for the probability of downgrading, given displacement and
the individual in question was in full-time employment at t-1, is estimated rel-
ative to becoming jobless. Being older is found to decrease the probability of
downgrading significantly, consistent with higher tenure individuals possessing
higher levels of occupation-specific human capital (Farber 1999). Being white,
as well as having a working spouse increases the probability of downgrading.
Evans (1999) argues that, due to the family means test, since Unemployment
Insurance is withdrawn if a spouse is working more than 24 hours this is es-
sentially an eligibility constraint. Moreover, being ranked higher up the oc-
cupational scale developed increases the likelihood of downgrading. Displaced
low skilled workers are more likely to move into non-employment than their
high skilled counterparts higher up the scale, as the lower down the less jobs
to downgrade into (Evans 1999). These results are robust to controls for (bi-
variate) sample selection and an alternative ranking of occupations based on
average wages paid. Consistent with the previous argument, when the sample
is stratified into 3 occupational groups (low-skilled, intermediate and high-
skilled) education is found to have a significantly larger effect on downgrading
the higher is the occupation in question in the ranking.
The probability of being re-employed in a job at the same level in the
ranking is estimated, given displacement and full-time education at t-1, relative
to downgrading or becoming jobless. Semi-skilled workers are four time more
likely to move into non-employment than professionals. However, the more
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skilled the pre-displacement occupation, the lower the chances of finding an
equally skilled job. The previous finding is driven by the fact that those in
professional occupations at t-1 are twice as likely to move into semi-skilled
work at time t than those that were semi-skilled at t-1 (Evans 1999).
Regional heterogeneity is likely to be relevant in determining this phe-
nomenon. “Since downgrading often involves changing industry, if the propen-
sity to downgrade differs across industries then regional disparities in down-
grading could be driven by regional variation in the industrial mix (Evans
1999, p.87).” However this notion is not tested or controlled for.
According to theoretical predications, “skilled jobs become increasingly ra-
tioned during recessions, but if the secondary sector is market-clearing then
unskilled jobs are freely available. That will increase the relative attractiveness
of taking less skilled work, making downgrading counter-cyclical (Evans 1999,
p.90).” Descriptives suggest that, contrary to expectation, both upgrading and
downgrading are pro-cyclical in nature. This is based on a pseudo-panel (re-
peated cross-sections) drawn from the LFS, of 18 UK sub-regions from 1986 to
1992, recessionary years. A regional-level analysis is conducted to gauge the
determinants of the inflow into upgrading/downgrading. Vacancy rates, wage
rates as well as housing payments data are sourced at the sub-regional level.
Since individuals cannot be followed over time, Evans (1999) stresses that mi-
gration will not be captured. However, no mention is made of commuting, and
whether these sub-regional entities approximate self-contained labour markets
as TTWA would. The analysis employs fixed and random effects techniques,
which Evans (1999) argues are valid if the characteristics of regions evolve
slowly over time. The main argument put forward is that migration between
sub-regions of the UK is low. Despite these limitations, quantitative evidence
is also found in support of the procyclicality of downgrading.
The level of regional inequality, measured by the ratio of the highest wage in
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the lowest decile of the regional-specific hourly wage distribution to the lowest
wage in the top decile, is found to be inversely related to downgrading (signif-
icant at the '10% level). “The more compressed the wage distribution, the
more attractive is downgrading because the relative opportunity cost of unem-
ployment search is high (Evans 1999, p.91).” In contrast, a positive correlation
is found with upgrading. “Provided that displaced workers who chose not to
search for less skilled work spend longer unemployed, inequality will be posi-
tively related to unemployment because it raises the incentive not to search for
less skilled job (Evans 1999, p/92).” Moreover, in support of this arguement,
the lagged unemployment rate is found to be inversely related to downgrading
but unrelated to upgrading.
In conclusion, the Evans (1999) raises the following limitations of the study.
Data limitations mean that the magnitude of wage losses cannot be gauged.
Furthermore, the return to skilled work is likely to be heterogenous depending
on match quality and the skill-level of the worker. Since individuals cannot be
followed over an extended period, the scarring effect of downgrading down the
occupational scale cannot be determined. If upgrading/downgrading is usually
associated with industry changes, then it is important to gauge whether this
phenomena is concentrated amongst a subset of the population and not evenly
distributed. Since industry changes involve loss of industry-specific human cap-
ital, this is likely to have a significant impact on subsequent career trajectories
and associated wage profiles.
Khalifa (2010) develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model,
featuring search frictions, in an attempt to explain both the persistence in to-
tal unemployment as well as unemployment across skills. The observation of
higher persistence of unemployment over the business cycle for the unskilled
acts as a motivation. A two-sector Job Competition model, similar in many
respects to that described in Evans (1999), is developed. On-the-job search is
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allowed. High, at least college education, and low educated workers simulta-
neously search for high and low skilled vacancies. This framework implicity
assumes that human capital is either high or low skilled. The highly edu-
cated unemployed, as well as the highly educated in low skill jobs, lose their
skills whilst in these labour market states. Economic downturns increase the
probability of being unemployed, resulting in skilled workers competing with
unskilled workers for unskilled jobs. This competition results in the unskilled
being “crowded out” of unskilled jobs and into unemployment. However, the
longer mismatched jobs last the more likely that mismatched skilled workers
lose their skilled human capital and become unskilled. The dynamic model of
occupational downgrading developed in this study suggest a potential mech-
anism for the higher persistence of unemployment amongst the unskilled, as
well as the unemployment persistence. However, it ignores some demand side
interactions. For example, employers may anticipate higher turnover levels of
the skilled in less-skilled jobs leading to lower demand for their skills and in-
creasing their transition rates into unemployment (Evans 1999). Furthermore,
if human capital is occupation-specific, a skilled worker may not be as produc-
tive as an unskilled worker at less-skilled tasks (unskilled does not necessarily
imply routine).
The Reder (1955) hypothesis predicts that firms will lower their hiring stan-
dards during economic expansions and raise them during recessions, in order
to keep their wage bill at steady state levels. This mechanism may explain
why upgrading may increase during boom phases Employers may raise their re-
cruitment standards during economic downturns. Furthermore, certain worker-
types may benefit the most from occupational upgrading during upturns. If
employers all raise their standards during downturns, this will have profound
implications for the less skilled as pressure from skilled jobseekers squeezes
them into unemployment/out of the labour market (Devereux 2002).
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3.3.4 Employment Quality: Overeducation/Overqualification.
Over-qualification is an important phenomenon in the labour market, both in
terms of future earnings potential but also in terms of career mobility. This
affects all spectrums of the earnings and skills distribution, impacting on the
prospects of both school leavers, university graduates and even PhDs. As
highlighted by a recent Economist study:
Even graduates who find work outside universities may not fare all
that well. One OECD study shows that five years after receiving
their degrees, more than 60% of PhDs in Slovakia and more than
45% in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany and Spain were still
on temporary contracts. Many were postdocs. About one-third of
Austria’s PhD graduates take jobs unrelated to their degrees. In
Germany 13% of all PhD graduates end up in lowly occupations.
In the Netherlands the proportion is 21% (Economist 2010).
The Overeducation literature is motivated by the observation of an increas-
ing proportion of highly skilled workings in jobs that were once low-skilled
(Borghans & de Grip 2000). This literature argues for two potential underly-
ing mechanisms: technological change has resulted in an upskilling of jobs that
is biased towards skilled labour; Overeducation increases the supply of highly
skilled workers and leads to ‘the crowding out’ of the less skilled. The second
mechanism, overeducation, has widely been interpreted as skill underutilisa-
tion under the premise that higher levels of formal education imply higher
levels of on-the-job productivity14. Granted, limited direct evidence of skill un-
14This is a human capital theory (HCT) based interpretation (Mincer & Polachek 1974).
HCT implies that schooling, and not job characteristics, should determine earnings. Alter-
native interpretations are provided in the literature. The Job Competition model by Thurow
(1975) implies that wages are directly determined by requirements of the job and only indi-
rectly by attained schooling. Firms prefer to recruit individuals that are cheaper to train,
ranking applicants by training cost. If highly educated workers are cheaper to train then
Job Competition could explain why over-qualification arises. Moreover, Signalling Theory
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derutilisation exists due to the inherent expense of collecting this information.
“Unfortunately, much less is known about how workers’ productivity is related
to the way in which people use their skills, than about the allocation of workers
in the labour market (Borghans & de Grip 2000, pp. 5).”
Overeducation is also important from a education policy viewpoint. If educa-
tion is heavily subsidised, then gauging the returns to overeducation informs
policy makes about the effectiveness of these investments in terms of aggregate
welfare gains (Leuven & Oosterbeek 2011)15. The main focus of this litera-
ture has been on the incidence of, and returns to overeducation. The latter
literature attempts to estimate the Duncan & Hoffman (1981) extended wage
equation:
lnWi(t) =δrS
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u
i + x
′
iβ + εi (3.2)
where Sr, So, and So are years of required, over- and under-education on the
job. These components have been consistently shown in the literature to be
different, however not all data sets have information on actual years of edu-
cation, introducing potential measurement error issues. An accurate assess-
ment of these components would be invaluable in policy setting, however the
measurement of overeducation alone is a controversial issue. Here I give a
brief overview, however, this is discussed at length in the chapter 3, section
6. The main problem is assessing job requirements from what is generally
self-reported data. Various approaches have been proposed (see section 6),
however, the incidence of over-qualification is shown to be highly sensitive to
definitional choice. Unobserved heterogeneity is a major issue. Studies which
suggests that education may only have an allocative role, independent of productivity on the
job (Spence 1973).
15The overeducation literature is reviewed extensively in Borghans & de Grip 2000,
McGuinness 2006 as well as Leuven & Oosterbeek 2011.
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have been able to construct measures of unobserved ability find ability to be
negatively correlated with the likelihood of overeducation (Chevalier & Lindley
2009). Omitted Variable Bias makes it difficult to establish the causal effect
of overeducation on earnings. However, since both actual and required years of
schooling are not random outcomes, this complicates things. In terms of dy-
namics, over-qualification is not found to be permanent for all sections of the
workforce. Sicherman & Galor (1990) develop a theory of career mobility in
which individuals accept less-skilled jobs (that they are over-qualified for) with
lower wages in exchange for higher promotion prospects. This study presents
evidence supporting this notion, moreover, drawing on the 1976-1978 US Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, Sicherman (1991) finds high levels of persistence
for the majority of over-qualified but upward career mobility for a some. Inter-
estingly, Sicherman (1991) also finds that the under-qualified are more likely to
progress up the career lader than their well matched counterparts, interpret-
ing this as evidence of higher unobserved ability levels. Traditionally career
progression into skilled jobs through on-the-job experience has been an avenue
open to even those with lower levels of qualifications. However, technological
change and the increased supply of college educated workers has meant that
getting a skilled job increasingly requires both education and experience (Le´ne´
2011). A review of the literature relating to key definitional challenges facing
the over-qualification literature, directly relevant to this thesis, is included in
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.
3.3.5 Conclusion
The existing literature raises some interesting questions that have hitherto
been unaddressed. Chapter 6 analyses the the Stepping Stone effect of less-
skilled employment. Are less-skilled jobs Stepping Stones to better matches
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for the over-qualified? How does this vary with gender, the composition of the
local labour market and over the business cycle? The impact of Occupational
change and the associated Over-Education on labour market outcomes is not
explicitly modelled in the literature. Focus is mainly consigned to the less-
advantaged. However, increased Occupational Downgrading during economic
downturns suggests that skilled workers pose a threat to the job stability of the
less-skilled. By jointly modelling skilled and unskilled labour market transitions
this endogeneity can be taken into account. Moreover, sub-regional differences
in industrial composition suggest a differential impact of economic downturns
within a country. Chapter 6 sets out to assess whether this is the case.
Chapter 4
Job Seeker’s Allowance in Great
Britain: How does the Regional
Labour Market affect the length of
Job Search?
4.1 Introduction
The design of successful labour market policies and their impact on the effec-
tiveness of the social security system highlights the need for an accurate and
rigorous analysis into the impact of regional and individual level determinants
on individual labour market outcomes in an integrated framework. Whilst there
are many existing studies investigating the influence of individual characteris-
tics and unobserved heterogeneity in determining unemployment incidence and
duration, there is a distinct lack of studies providing detailed evidence of the
time-varying role of geographical location in driving unemployment experiences
(some examples include Kalwij 2004; 2010). Although existing UK studies sug-
gest less of a role when compared to regional level characteristics, regional vari-
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ation in average unemployment experiences suggests that geography is may be
more important than the existing studies have acknowledged. Disentangling
its effect is of key interest from a policy perspective. Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1
points to the importance of job arrival rates. Regional variation in job offer
arrival rates may help to explain regional variation in unemployment durations
(Petrongolo 2001). This is typically proxied by labour market tightness (va-
cancies/unemployment, V/U, rates), which summarise the job matching pro-
cess (Kalwij 2010). However, substantial measurement challenges, on-the-job
search, and unsystematic variation in the efficiency in which Jobcentres collect
and post vacancy data raise significant challenges when proxying the regional
context via a single measure.
If socioeconomic groups are geographically concentrated, then lower eco-
nomic prospects can be expected in mostly lower socioeconomic status areas
due to higher unemployment levels, lower spending power, and thus lower levels
of economic activity in the local economy. However, geographical location is
not a random outcome. Individuals select into this, and changes in the compo-
sition of regions means that the relative positions of regions within a country
evolves over time. Thus parameterising the regional heterogeneity via fixed
effects alone is not a very satisfactory solution.
Establishing the pure regional effect is very challenging, possibly explaining
the limited attempts at this. Whilst this aim is beyond the scope of this study,
we attempt to give an answer in this direction by developing a comprehen-
sive database matching individual-level unemployment benefit claimant periods
from the Joint Unemployment & Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) to a
rich set of regional indicators from sources such as NOMIS and the Department
of Work & Pensions (DWP) on a monthly basis. This data is then mapped to
the UK geography using the National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD),
available from UK Borders, allowing the spatial characteristics of regions to be
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identified. Data on further education institutions and unemployment benefit
office locations is included to capture the relevant supply, demand, as well as
structural, social and institutional factors of interest. This database allows
one to conduct research at a highly disaggregated local authority level in order
to answer policy relevant questions. In this paper we link the individual-level
JUVOS data to the regional context in which unemployment benefit claimants
reside, rather than parameterizing regional heterogeneity through fixed effects.
Differences in labour market institutions are cited as a major explanation
of unemployment disparities between countries. However, although institu-
tions do not vary markedly between regions, there is considerable variation
in UK regional unemployment rates (incidence) and individuals’ experiences
(durations). For instance, regional -local authority- ILO1 unemployment rates
varied from 3.3% to 14% over the year 2005. Furthermore, the greater spread
in unemployment rates at lower levels of aggregation in the UK is well doc-
umented in the literature (Brown & Sessions 1997; Collier 2005). Figure 4.1
contrasts the conditional and unconditional distribution of unemployment du-
rations across Great Britain over the period of investigation: 1999 to 2005.
The importance of the job offer arrival rate in explaining average unemploy-
ment durations has been highlighted in the theoretical literature (Cahuc &
Zylberberg 2004). Moreover, there is strong evidence to suggest that match-
ing varies across regional Jobcentres in the Great Britain (Petrongolo 2001).
Unemployment duration has been extensively studied using individual-level
unemployment duration data. However, Collier’s results suggest the regional
context to be significant (Collier 2005). Despite the vast unemployment du-
ration literature, there are surprisingly few studies which explicitly take into
account the regional context. Most use parametric approaches, and regional
effects are implicitly accounted for in some studies (for the UK see Kalwij 2004;
1International Labour Organisation.
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Figure 4.1: Unemployment Duration: Distribution of median unem-
ployment spell length, versus conditional Cox Propor-
tional Hazard estimates*, by NUTS3 region over the pe-
riod 1999-2005. (*Darker = Worse in terms of unemploy-
ment experiences)
Brown & Sessions 1997; for the Netherlands see Folmer & van Dijk 1988) via
fixed effects.
Studies looking at the impact of regional-level indicators like local unem-
ployment rates and local labour market tightness on individuals’ unemploy-
ment experiences include Meyer (1990) for the US and Petrongolo (2001) for
the UK. However very few studies have analysed individual unemployment du-
ration at the UK regional level. We are only aware of Collier’s study which
focusses exclusively on the county of Kent (Collier 2005). Adopting a struc-
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tural job search model and using detailed (unique) individual-level survey data,
the author concludes that differences in regional labour market characteristics
(notably regional variation in job offer arrival rates) may matter more than
individual heterogeneity for unemployment experiences. This result is in con-
trast to more recent results for other countries. Using detailed individual-level
administrative data, Arntz & Wilke (2009) do not observe a strong effect of the
regional labour market on unemployment duration in Germany. They conclude
that regional policies may have a smaller effect than commonly thought.
The standard job search model assumes that the distribution of wages offers
is exogenous (Atkinson & Micklewright 1991). Theoretical job search litera-
ture models the individual job finding probability as a function of the job offer
arrival probability as well as the probability of job offer acceptance (Rogerson
et al. (2005) provide a detailed survey. See Section 2 for more information).
The former will be influenced by individual productivity, human capital ac-
cumulated, and local demand conditions whereas the latter will be influenced
by individuals’ reservation wages as well as (local) demand conditions (Petron-
golo 2001)2. However, studies investigating the importance of geography have
generally limited themselves to single indicators like the V/U ratio and fixed
effects. Given the attempt to model the regional environment in which individ-
uals live and conduct their job search, the relevant local demand conditions will
be those of self contained local labour markets, which Petrongolo (2001) ap-
proximates by using regional indicators at the ‘Travel-To-Work-Area’ (TTWA)
level of aggregation. Her study reaches the conclusion that regional labour
market tightness is negatively related to, whereas the stock of jobseekers in the
region of residence impacts positively on, individual re-employment probability
(Petrongolo 2001). This result is found to be insignificant for females, which
2Lancaster (1979) proxies the former by the local unemployment rate in the region where
the individual resides and the latter by the individual reservation wage.
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the author suggest could be an artifact of the data source (unemployment ben-
efits offices) and heterogeneity in job search strategies by gender resulting in
males being over-represented in the sample of registered claimants. Given the
observation period, 1987, this result may not be generalisable to future time
periods, due to increased female participation in the labour force during the
90s.
Whilst higher local unemployment rates may have a significant spell length-
ening effect, ceteris paribus, over time an increase in local unemployment rates
could actually shorten spells as layoffs increase during economic downturns
and these job separations are precisely the type that carry the least ‘stigma’
in terms of future re-employment probability (Meyer 1990). Furthermore, the
advantage of the legislated requirement of two weeks written notice before ter-
mination of contract should give laid off individuals the added advantage of an
early start to job search (Arulampalam 2001), relative to other job separation
types.
Looking at regional unemployment in the UK, Martin (1997) provides sug-
gestive evidence, via cointegration analysis, that the pattern of regional un-
employment disparities exhibited significant geographical persistence since the
1960s. This is of great concern given that individuals experiencing unemploy-
ment earlier on in their life are more likely to experience it later on (Gregg
2001). Furthermore, Atkinson & Micklewright (1991) highlight that being un-
employed at time t makes it more likely to be unemployed at time t+1 (‘neg-
ative duration dependence’). Petrongolo (2001) finds strong evidence of neg-
ative duration dependence in the UK. However, it is important to distinguish
between spurious & genuine state dependency (Collier 2005), as both genuine
state dependency and unobserved ability of the unemployed can explain the
observation of ‘negative duration dependence’. Controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity will avoid spurious correlations between the probability of leaving
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unemployment and elapsed duration (Lancaster 1979). Using a Mixed Pro-
portional Hazard model, van den Berg & van Ours (1994) found evidence of
negative duration dependence for UK men, whereas heterogeneity was insignif-
icant. This result accords with those of Petrongolo (2001) for both UK men
and women. Table 1 summarises selected unemployment duration literature in
the context of regional effects.
We see scope to exceed the previous work in two aspects. Our data set is
richer, using individual-level administrative unemployment benefit claim peri-
ods linked with to institutional & regional variables at a low level of aggrega-
tion. This allows us to better capture the regional context and thus regional
variation in job arrival rates. As an empirical strategy Figure 4.1 suggests
that our approach is informative as, after conditioning on observed factors in
the Cox proportional hazard model, we observe quite a different distribution
of unemployment durations relative to the unconditional distribution. From
a methodological point of view, we adopt a flexible censored quantile regres-
sion approach to estimating conditional re-employment hazards. The quantile
regression framework allows us to capture different effects on short- and long-
term claimant periods in the same model. In addition, this approach is more
flexible than standard techniques, as even in the case of the semi-parametric
Cox proportional hazards (PH) model (Cox 1972) the sign of the effect of a
regressor is restricted to be the same across all quantiles of the conditional
distribution. Rather than the usual conditional mean, our approach employs a
conditional quantile function which is unaffected by outlier observations. This
implies that results are also robust to the shape of the error distribution.
Non-parametric conditional hazard rates are estimated from the quantile re-
gression estimates using a resampling method similar to Machado et al. (2006).
Since this econometric model imposes less structure, the resulting conditional
hazard rates can be disproportional and they can even cross. Our estimation
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results obtained by the censored quantile regressions provide evidence of several
violations of the proportional hazard assumption.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a detailed
account of the relevant institutional setup. Following this, we briefly cover the
data set construction, variable selection3, as well as the individual and regional
level data included4. The methodology exploited as well as the empirical re-
sults are considered in the following sections. Subsequently, relevant policy
implications are detailed in light of the analysis.
3For a detailed exposition of the data preparation steps, see Appendix D.
4The procedure for linking the individual & regional levels is documented in appendix
A2.
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4.2 Institutional setup
Unemployment benefits (Job Seeker’s Allowance, JSA) are administered by
the Jobcentre Plus which is a part of the Department for Work and Pensions
(DWP). As in many other countries, the number of people on unemployment
benefits in the UK and the number of people unemployed according to the In-
ternational Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definition do not necessarily coincide.
Jobseeker’s Allowance is the main benefit for people who are out of work. In
order to get Job Seeker’s Allowance, an individual must be able to work for at
least 40 hours a week and have been actively looking for work. There are two
types of JSA: The first is called ‘Contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance’
and lasts for up to six months (182 days), subject to eligibility. An unem-
ployed person gets Contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance if he or she paid
or was credited with class 1 National Insurance (NI) contributions in the pre-
ceding 2 tax years. The other is based on a family Means test, which includes
personal and/or family income and savings, whichever is relevant given an indi-
vidual’s circumstances (single/married/cohabiting). Unlike the Contributions-
based JSA, this Means-tested JSA can be granted for an indefinite period.
This is called ’Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance’. Thus, type one requires
that the individual has paid enough national Insurance on income and the sec-
ond requires that current household income and savings are below a certain
threshold.
Independent of the type of JSA, the level of unemployment benefits are the
same and do not depend on the pre-unemployment wage. Since April 2008 the
weekly level has been set at £47.95 for individuals aged 16 - 24 and £60.50 for
those aged 25 or over. However, the level of benefits can increase, depending on
household size. This implies that the JSA wage replacement rate is in general
very low for previous high earners, an important difference when compared to
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many other European countries with more generous income-related benefits.
The receipt of other benefits may make an individual ineligible for JSA.
Quitting a job voluntarily may lead to a benefit sanction of up to 26 weeks.
In order to remain eligible for entitlements, the unemployed must visit the
Jobcentre at least once every two weeks, and provide evidence that they have
been actively looking for employment5 and are ready to work. In the UK,
eligible individuals must be normally between 18-65 years and have a jobseekers
agreement with the jobcentre. For more details on the institutional setup see
Jobcentre (2008).
The Jobcentre Plus operates across 8 major regions which cover the whole of
Britain (excluding Northern Ireland). It maintains over 1,000 offices, amongst
which includes back office branches and call centres. The administrative and
institutional structure is generally the same across the country, whilst inter-
mittent internal restructuring and the introduction of nationwide policies may
lead to temporary regional disparities. For example, the New Deal Programme
was first introduced in pilot regions before being implemented in the rest of the
country. However, we are not aware of permanent regional differences in the
institutional setup of the programme.
Jobcentres administer the main active labour market policy programme:
the New Deal Programme. This is a programme that gives people on ben-
efits additional support, including training and preparing for work, in order
to improve their employment prospects. Whilst eligibility for this programme
is the same nationwide, there are considerable regional and local disparities
in the share of eligible individuals starting the scheme. The New Deal for
Young People programme is compulsory for JSA claimants aged 18-24 after
6 months. Investigating the impact of RESTART, Dolton & ONeill (1996)
5There are various ways of providing this evidence, as highlighted in the JSA brochure:
”You should do at least 3 things every week. This could include writing a CV or speaking
to employers (Jobcentre 2008, pg.10).”
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highlight that self-selection on to the scheme may be an issue due to perceived
re-employment prospects. Tighter monitoring restrictions, as well as poor re-
employment prospects, make exits to alternative labour market states, e.g.
Income Support, a more attractive proposition.
4.3 Data
Our analysis bases on comprehensive linked individual-regional level data from
Great Britain.
Individual data. We use the JUVOS (Joint Unemployment and Vacancies
Operating System) cohort, which is a randomised 5% sample of all benefit
claimants. This data is organised into daily spells relating to individual un-
employment benefit claim periods. See Ward & Bird (1995) for a general de-
scription of the JUVOS. Our version covers the period 1982 to June 2007. The
data is available as a scientific use file from the Office for National Statistics.
We restrict our sample to spells starting from the 1st of January 1999 to 31st
of December 2005, censoring all spells ongoing on the 8th of August 2007.
It is well known that the claimant count-based and ILO-defined unemploy-
ment measures diverge, notably following the 1996 introduction of JSA. Wilke
(2009) proposes ways to deal with the limitation in the JUVOS of not being
able to identify the true length of unemployment periods, as well as the gaps in
individuals’ employment histories due to lack of matched administrative data.
In Wilke (2009) study, the author suggests several implementations of unem-
ployment duration in the JUVOS as, in many cases, single claim spells will not
coincide with the true duration of unemployment. By using the reason for leav-
ing markers at the end of claim periods, it develops bounds for the true level of
unemployment as well as enabling the use of a competing risks approach with
respect to destination state.
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In this paper we consider durations of continuous receipt of unemploy-
ment benefits (Concept 1 of Wilke 2009). This is a lower bound for the true
unemployment duration and should not contain periods other than claimant
unemployment. By restricting the sample to spells with sufficient foregoing
employment duration, this should ensure that, in most cases, the start of an
unemployment spell equals the start of a claimant spell. This selection limits
our study to re-employment prospects of the registered unemployed entering
the current claimant period via a spell of employment. Thus our results are
not generalisable to the experiences of the full claimant population. Since JSA
is means tested after six months, we face the problem of attrition in particular
for individuals with an employed spouse6. Thus we restrict our sample to single
males and single females aged 18-65 and 18-59 respectively since, in the case
of singles, the benefit duration is more likely to bear a closer resemblance to
the true unemployment duration for this sub-group of the population7. Re-
moving individuals aged 16-18 minimises the likelihood of capturing dependent
teenagers still living with their parents. Our duration analysis is therefore not
an analysis of ILO unemployment duration. However, our sample of claim
periods should be comparable to unemployment durations, as individuals are
likely to be entitled for JSA for the duration of unemployment. 2.5% of spells
in our data are right censored at the end of the observation period (8th of
August 2007). Following Rosholm (2001), we also right censor observations
with exits to states other than employment. Based on the definition, 39.1% of
observations are right censored in the final sample. This approach is feasible
given the independent risks assumption commonly employed when using the
Cox Proportional Hazards model (Cox 1972). This assumption implies that the
6Due to the family Means test
7Using German data, Arntz & Wilke (2009) show that empirical results for single males
and females are quite similar while married males and females possess different result pat-
terns. This is likely due to the well documented labour market attachment differences be-
tween married males and females (Kalwij 2004).
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partial likelihood can be considered the sum of the destination-specific hazards,
without having to explicitly model the censoring mechanism as one would in a
correlated risks setting (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). Conditional on the validity
of the independent risks assumption, our empirical strategy is consistent and
takes into account the competing risks structure of the JUVOS, without the
need to separate these alternative risks 8. Consistency is enhanced by allow-
ing the destination-specific hazards to be fully flexible in the semi-parametric
approaches adopted herein.
As with most administrative individual data, the JUVOS is handicapped by
a limited covariate set. Information contained in the JUVOS includes: start &
end date of claims, gender, age and marital/cohabiting status. Following Wilke
(2009), we refer to the 2000 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC2000)
aggregating the 4-digit occupational codes in the JUVOS to the 1-digit level.
We then further group these into 5 representative categories: elementary. man-
ufacturing, trade/services, technical and senior/professional (see Wilke 2009).
van den Berg & van Ours (1994) find that the season of entry onto the un-
employment register impacts significantly on exit probabilities, leading us to
control for seasonal influences by including quarterly fixed effects. Calendar
time effects are indirectly controlled for via year dummies, which should also
account for business cycle effects over the period of observation (Lu¨demann
et al. 2006).
Using linked German administrative data, Arntz & Wilke (2009) found a
strong influence of individual heterogeneity - notably work history - on unem-
ployment durations, whereas regional factors were found to be less important.
The importance of work history is also highlighted in the individual-level study
by Lu¨demann et al. (2006). Collier’s (2005) results suggest the opposite, us-
ing unique individual-level survey data for the English county of Kent, finding
8See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 for a brief discussion of competing risks models
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Table 4.2: Work History Variables
Variable Name Description
Active Labour Market
Participation
Individual engaged in at least one past Active
Labour Market Programme participation.
Long-Term Unem-
ployment
Individual experienced at least one period of long-
term unemployment in the past (>365 days).
Incapacity Benefits Individual claimed incapacity benefits on at least
one occasion, on exiting claimant unemployment
in the past.
Income Support Individual claimed income support on at least one
occasion, on exiting claimant unemployment in the
past.
individual characteristics to be less important than regional macroeconomic
environment. Taking this into account, we control for individual work history,
using the measures defined in Table 4.2. Age and gender are also included in
order to control for socio demographic factors.
Our final sample consists of about 187,000 spells, a descriptive summary of
which can be found in the appendix, Table A.1.
Regional data. Regional variation in job offer arrival rates may help to ex-
plain regional variation in unemployment durations (Petrongolo 2001). Kalwij
(2010) captures regional variation in job offer arrival rates via labour market
tightness. Labour market tightness, which summarises the efficiency of the job
matching process, is usually proxied by vacancies/unemployment (V/U) rates.
However, substantial challenges exist in measuring these rates, due to underre-
porting of vacancy data to Jobcentres and the reliance on claimant count data
to proxy unemployment rates. Moreover this measure ignores competition from
employees engaged in on-the-job search. In addition to these measurement chal-
lenges, Jobcentres may vary unsystematically in the efficiency in which they
collect and post vacancy data (implying that fixed effects will not control for
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this).
Geographical differences in aggregate vacancies to unemployment ratios
could also be driven by regional variation in the average propensity to use
alternative channels to advertise vacancies. This is likely to be related to the
industrial mix of the region in question and thus the skill requirements of em-
ployers. Employers requiring employees with highly specialised skills are more
likely to acquire these through specialist recruitment agencies. O¨berg & Oscars-
son (1979) observe that individuals with similar labour market characteristics
tend to gravitate to specific regions. This suggests that the evolution of com-
positional changes as well as time-varying regional demographics are of interest
in determining what is influencing individuals’ unemployment experiences in
these geographies. Given the challenges noted above, single measures like the
V/U ratio, combined with fixed effects, do not lend themselves well to captur-
ing the regional variation in job offer arrival rates. This motivates the detailed
approach to modelling the regional context adopted herein.
Regional-level data was sourced from the quarterly Local Area Labour Force
Survey, available from UK Data Archive. Regional data was also sourced from
other providers, however missing values limited the final covariate set (e.g.
NOMIS censors all observations with values less than 500, implying that small
area data is likely to be affected). Continuous variables at the regional level
were standardised across regions by month, the shortest interval in the regional
dataset. We link the regional-level to the individual-level data by claimant spell
start month, since we lack continuous daily data on regional characteristics and
individual information is only captured at the beginning of a claimant spell9.
The final data set consisted of 60 possible covariates at the individual and 160
at the regional level of aggregation.
9For a detailed exposition of the data preparation steps, see Appendix D. For details on
how this link was created see Appendix A2.
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In order to aid variable selection and to avoid including highly correlated
regional indicators into the model, we implemented cluster analysis techniques
to class regional variables into representative groups. The Clustering of Vari-
ables Around Latent Variables (CLV) routine by Vigneau & Qannari (2003)
was used. This is a two-stage routine which implements hierarchical cluster-
ing analysis followed by a partitioning algorithm, thus capturing the benefits of
both approaches. This method clusters highly correlated variables together, re-
gardless of the direction of this correlation. This allows us to select a variable
to represent the information captured by the other neighbouring covariates.
Given data availability issues, certain variables would be more attractive than
others. This approach implies that, in addition to motivation from previous
literature, this selection is not arbitrary and based on economic and statistical
criteria. The correlation matrix in Table 4.3 illustrates the performance of this
process.
Following Arntz & Wilke (2009), regional data was sourced in order to com-
pletely characterise the local environment in which individuals reside. Regional
variables were clustered into 5 representative groups, capturing the relevant
supply, demand, as well as structural, social and institutional factors of inter-
est.
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Supply & Demand: Local ILO unemployment rates were used in order to
indirectly capture regional ‘labour market tightness’. An alternative proxy for
‘labour market tightness’ is the unemployment/vacancy ratio. However, this
indicator is plagued by data quality issues due to significant changes to Jobcen-
tre Plus procedures for handling vacancies in 200110. The retrospective average
12 quarter change in ILO unemployment is included as a proxy for the medium-
term evolution of local supply and demand imbalance.
Local economic performance: Regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and (3 year average) change in GDP proxy for the level and medium-term evo-
lution in economic activity in a region. In addition, the rate of new business
startups is a further indicator of economic activity. Since GDP data is unavail-
able at the aggregation level of interest, we use unadjusted quarterly Gross
Value Added (GVA) as a proxy. This workplace-based measure, allocated to
the region in which commuters live, is reported at basic prices11. The retrospec-
tive 3 year average change in GDP per head is used as a medium-term measure
of this phenomenon, as annual changes are likely to be picking up the effects of
transitory shocks at the national level. Table 4.3 shows only a weak correlation
between these GDP indicators of .198. One would expect prosperous areas to
have high levels of GDP, however the magnitude of the GDP growth effect for
these areas is ambiguous. Due to this being a residence-based measure, areas
with high levels of GDP may be not have high-levels of Economic Activity
10The effect being that vacancy statistics are not comparable over time (Bentley 2005).
Regressions on a reduced dataset including the unemployment/vacancy ratio as a control find
this indicator to be insignificant once other controls are included. Moreover, the aggregate
Claimant Count is continuously available from NOMIS over the period of interest. Unfor-
tunately a breakdown of the Claimant Count by occupation is not: availability is restricted
to the 1996 to 2000 and 2005+ periods only. Furthermore, whilst there is only a one year
gap in notified vacancy statistics by country or government office region, at lower levels of
aggregation this is two years. Measurement error in the underlying vacancy statistics suggest
that local ILO unemployment rates may be a better proxy.
11Deflated for changes in prices over time and across regions (ONS 2007).
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due to commuting weakening this relationship. If these areas have high lev-
els of GDP due to historical factors unrelated to economic activity, this will
weaken the correlation between the two GDP indicators employed. The rate
of business startups is proxied by the number of new businesses registering for
VAT each year as a proportion of the resident population. Due to their size,
this indicator will not include sole proprietors. However, since the majority of
VAT-registered businesses employ less than 50 employees, this indicator is cap-
turing small business activity. Less than half of UK businesses are registered
for VAT (NOMIS 2009). It could be argued that this measure is more likely
to capture the economic performance of a region than an indicator capturing
the activity of larger enterprises. Small businesses are more likely to engage in
more localized business activity relative to larger multi-plant firms. They are
also more likely to respond to fluctuations in regional economic performance
than larger firms with less liquidity constraints.
Social Structure: We define Skill Intensity as the proportion of all em-
ployees aged 16 & over working in the following occupational classifications:
Managers & Senior Officials; Professionals; Associated Professionals & Tech-
nical; Admin. & Secretarial; & Skilled Trades 12. This measure proved to
be highly correlated with educational attainment rates, constructed from the
same source. Education attainment and income levels are assumed to be linked
through productivity by Human Capital Theory (Becker 1964). Since educa-
tional attainment and skill intensity are highly correlated, it would then be
expected that individuals living in skill intensive areas would experience higher
job offer arrival rates. Their unemployment spells would thus be expected to be
shorter13. However, the impact of skill level on unemployment duration is likely
12It is acknowledged that this measure is likely to suffer from measurement error due to
heterogeneity of skill-intensities within detailed occupational categories.
13The implicit assumption is one of perfect information, that an individual’s education
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to be endogenous due to the fact that higher job offer arrival rates are likely to
push up reservation wages. The effect of this would lead affected individuals to
be more selective about the job offers they accept and in turn lengthening un-
employment periods (Mortensen 1970). Furthermore, the institutional context
(section 4.2) and monitoring restrictions that the UK unemployment benefits
system places on job offer acceptance/rejection, suggest that the impact of this
covariate is an empirical question.
Institutional Organization: We tried to collect any kind of information
about the internal structure of the jobcentre branches but our requests were
rejected by the DWP. Given the shortage of information and given the nation-
wide identical entitlements for participation in the New Deal Programme, it
is therefore difficult to control for the institutional organization. However, we
have constructed one indicator, the New Deal for Young People Starters as a
proportion of the eligible claimant count. In our analysis this variable is inter-
acted with individuals being aged 18-24. Note that we do not include the base
effect of this variable due to multicollinearity. A negative -shortening- effect of
this variable would indicate that local jobcentres are more likely to assign eli-
gible individuals to the New Deal Programme if the local labour market offers
better re-employment opportunities.
Structural indicators are included in order to characterise the type of region.
Unemployment Dynamics: Regions with high levels of seasonal employment,
level an accurate signal of true productivity and does not pick up unobserved heterogeneity,
viz. Signal Theory (Spence 1973; Silles 2008). In support of the assumed link between
income level and educational attainment, Silles (2008) finds that higher levels of education
are always associated with higher earnings in the UK, however whether Human Capital or
Search Theory can explain this as a causal relationship is a debatable given the influence of
confounding factors like family background (Angrist & Krueger 1999).
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proxied by the ‘flow of unemployed as a proportion of the resident population’,
are more likely to be characterised by longer unemployment spells as the sam-
ple median unemployment duration is around two months.
Urban/Rural indicator: Two versions of this variable were sourced. One from
the National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and one from the Depart-
ment of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). For England & Wales,
the NSPD indicator, a population density-based measure, is derived using the
21st of July 2004 release of the National Statistics Rural & Urban Classification
of Output Areas (NSPD 2007). This Output Area-based indicator is not valid
for higher levels of aggregation which may include a mixture of rural and ur-
ban output areas based on the definitions used. For Scotland, areas are defined
as rural if they have less than 3,000 inhabitants (NSPD 2007). The DEFRA
classification is based on local authorities, but is only available for England14.
The correlation between these two measures is low, .56 by our calculations.
Given the superiority of the DEFRA classification, where it was available it
was implemented, and where not the NSPD definition was used, implying that
this indicator involves some measurement error for Scotland and Wales.
Accessibility: Exploiting the rich data available in the NSPD, the sparsity of
the surrounding area was used in order to define whether a local authority was
accessible or remote in the case of England and Wales. Driving distance to
the nearest large settlement is used as a proxy in the case of Scotland15. One
would expect that, on average, individuals’ labour market outcomes would be
better in regions that are urban and/or near large urban conurbations due to the
positive job-prospect spill-overs as a result of higher levels of economic activity.
14See DEFRA 2007.
15Since this indicator is output area-based, this may be subject to some error. We assume
that this error is small, given the lack of alternative local authority-based measures.
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University Present: Information on Higher Education institution location was
sourced from the Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA). As a pol-
icy relevant variable, one would expect that the presence of higher education
institutions would be a force for improved employment prospects for the local
population, given the support services needed to run such an institution as well
as the influx of young consumers into the local market. However, as pointed
out by Arntz & Wilke (2009), the increased availability of a young flexible
workforce willing to work at minimum wage rates may impact negatively on
the labour market participation on a section of the local population. The over-
all impact of this indicator is likely to be an empirical question, given these
confounding factors.
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The linked data set matching the individual- and regional-level data to
the UK geography is conditioned on the start of claimant spells. In order to
match the continuous individual-level data to the regional information, indi-
vidual spells were matched to the regional information pertaining to the month
in which they started (see also Appendix 4).
The final data set contains the information of 963 unemployment benefit
office (UBO) locations (full postcodes and postcode districts). This is then
mapped to the existing data via the NSPD. Given the self-reported nature
of the JUVOS postcode information, data quality issues were present with
postcode information missing or wrongly imputed at times. In order to main-
tain some regional variation we only replaced this self-reported variable with
the UBO postcode district when this variable was missing and no information
could be obtained from previous spells (implemented in 2% of cases). If the
postcode information was missing, the initial strategy was to replace this with
the postcode reported in a previous spell if this existed, i.e. assuming that the
individual did not move location between the spells. This was implemented in
2.8% of cases.
We omit Northern Ireland from proceedings, due to lack of coverage for some
major regional indicators of interest at all levels. Our analysis thus focusses
on Great Britain. The City of London and Isles of Scilly local authorities
are dropped from the analysis, as data for these geographies is systematically
missing at the aggregation level of interest (local authority level). However,
in the case of randomly missing values we impute values for the variables of
interest given the number of missings is so low for the selected variables. For
each variable affected, the imputation method was to replace the variable by
the data in the preceding period.
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Due to the creation of 46 unitary authorities16 over the period 1995 to 1998
in the regional data, including 13 extra units, we restricted our observation
period to after 1998. This was due to a restructuring of local governments
over the period, from a one-tier to two-tier (lower level) system in some areas.
The resulting geography is a mixture of Local Authority Districts, Unitary
Authorities and Metropolitan Districts. Restricting ourselves to the 1999 to
2005 period also avoids a concordance issue between the 1990 Standard Occu-
pational Classification (SOC90) and the 2000 update (SOC2000), as the Local
Area Labour Force Survey is available according to the SOC2000 methodology
from the first quarter of 1999 (Beerten, Rainford, & Jones 2001).
Due to data limitations, we are unable to distinguish between New Deal
participants on government supported training initiatives and those partaking
in subsidised work-placements. Individual-level studies on the Swedish and the
German labour markets highlight fundamental differences in the re-employment
probabilities of these two population sub-groups (Adda et al. 2007; Arntz &
Wilke 2009). Using individual-level Slovakian administrative data, van Ours
(2004) found a significant locking-in effect of government subsidized jobs. Given
the regional context of our study, this suggests that where these jobs occur may
be of importance.
4.4 Econometric Model
We analyse the determinants of unemployment duration by means of censored
quantile regression and the Cox proportional hazard model. Censored quantile
regression is recently emerging as an attractive and powerful alternative to pro-
portional hazard models (see for example Koenker & Geling 2001). The linear
quantile regression model, introduced by Koenker & Bassett (1978) models the
16”Single-tier administrations with responsibility for all areas of local government (ONS
2004)”
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conditional quantile function of the dependent variable as a linear functional
of the regressors xi, where xi is k× 1 with x1i = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let the
dependent variable lnyi be the logarithm of the ith duration of unemployment
yi. Then the θth conditional quantile of the dependent variable given x is given
by
Quantθ(lnyi|xi) = x′iβθ or
Quantθ(yi|xi) = exp(x′iβθ)
where βθ is a k × 1 vector of unknown coefficients. Note that these coef-
ficients are allowed to vary over the quantile θ ∈ (0, 1). This means that the
framework is flexible enough to allow for different effects of the regressors at
different quantiles of the conditional distribution of unemployment duration.
In particular, as the sign of the coefficients can change, a regressor can have a
shortening effect for a lower quantile θ1 (β
θ1
j < 0) and a prolonging effect for a
higher quantile θ2 (β
θ2
j > 0) with θ1 < θ2. Since our sample of unemployment
duration is partly right-censored, we apply censored quantile regression. Our
sample is (lnyi, xi, yci), i = 1, . . . , N , where yci = lnyi if the unemployment
duration is not censored and yci =∞ when it is right censored. We apply the
censored quantile regression estimator of Powell (1984) and Powell (1986) and
obtain βˆθ by minimising the following distance function
1
N
N∑
i=1
ρθ(lnyi −min(x′iβθ, yci)) (4.1)
with,
ρθ(u) =

θ · |u| for u ≥ 0
(1− θ) · |u| for u < 0.
(4.2)
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For more details on censored quantile regression see the recent survey by
Koenker (2008). We use the censored LAD procedure of TSP 5.0 to estimate
the unknown coefficients at three quantiles θ = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.7. We bootstrap
the full sample 100 times to approximate the distribution of the estimator and
therefore to obtain inference statistics. 17
The Cox proportional hazard model is based on the idea that the conditional
hazard rate is proportional for different values of the regressors x. For the ith
observation let λi(y|x) = fi(y)/P (Yi ≥ y) = exp(x′iβ˜)λ0(y) be the hazard rate
and fi(y) the conditional density of Yi given xi. λ0 is the so called baseline
hazard which is nonparametric. The Cox model gains its popularity from the
fact that it is relatively simple to estimate.
We estimate the Cox model by using the implementation in STATA 10 and
report hazard ratios, i.e. the proportionate change in the hazard rate relative
to a reference group with xi = 0 rather than the estimated coefficients itself.
The Cox model has also several drawbacks. It ignores individual specific er-
ror terms, which can lead to a systematic bias of estimated coefficients even if
the error is uncorrelated with the regressors. Moreover, the estimated baseline
hazard is usually downward biased in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
in particular for longer durations. However, a flexible semi-parametric hazard
rate, with no distributional assumptions, makes this model attractive over al-
ternative parametric approaches. As a robustness check, mixed proportional
hazard models are estimated which incorporate an individual specific error term
as a random effect (unobserved heterogeneity). Alternative parameterisations
of the baseline hazard were implemented, including a semi-parametric piece-
wise constant model both with and without unobserved heterogeneity controls.
17We do not bootstrap more often because of the extensive computational effort and we do
not apply the bootstrap method of Bilias et al. (2000) as the degree of censoring in our data
is rather high. Since our sample consists of dummy variables and standardised continuous
variables only, we do not report marginal effects as interpretation is straightforward in this
case.
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While incorporating unobserved heterogeneity changed little (except the sig-
nificance level of the accessibility indicator), the additional assumption of a
piecewise constant hazard rate did not lead to a change in the order of rele-
vance of the estimated coefficients. We also re-estimated the Cox model with
single spell data by randomly drawing one spell for each individual. Again, this
also led to very robust results, except to a change in the significance level of the
accessibility coefficient (See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of these
checks). For these reasons we only present the Cox results for the estimated
hazard rate model in this chapter.
While the marginal effect of a regressor on the conditional distribution of
unemployment duration can vary over the quantiles, the Cox model implies a
unique sign of this effect (see Lu¨demann et al. 2006). Therefore, the censored
quantile regression model offers an attractive alternative as it is robust with
respect to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and it does not restrict
the effect of the regressors over the distribution of unemployment duration.
Moreover, it relaxes the Proportional Hazards assumption. Note that there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the quantile regression model and the
Cox proportional hazard model, the coefficients β˜ and β are not the same. We
focus our comparison of estimation results therefore on the sign and relative
importance of the regressors and whether we can observe different signs of the
estimated quantile regression coefficients for different quantiles.
In order to provide a more complete insight in the effects of various regres-
sors on unemployment duration, we also investigate conditional hazard rates.
Since the nonparametric baseline hazard of the Cox model is likely to be biased,
we estimate nonparametric conditional hazard rates based on quantile regres-
sion estimates. We apply the resampling procedure of Fitzenberger & Wilke
(2006) for right censored duration data which is a modification of the approach
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by Machado, Portugal, & Guimaraes (2006) (henceforth denoted as MPG).
The main idea of the MPG is to simulate data based on the estimated quantile
regression coefficients given the regressors and to estimate the conditional den-
sity and the conditional distribution function of the dependent variable directly
from the simulated data.
In detail the procedure is as follows:
1. Generate M independent random draws θm,m = 1, ...,M from a uniform
distribution on (θl, θu), i.e. extreme quantiles with θ < θl or θ > θu
are not considered here. θl and θu are chosen in light of the type and
the degree of censoring in the data. Additional concerns relate to the
fact that quantile regression estimates at extreme quantiles are typically
statistically less reliable, and that duration data might exhibit a mass
point at zero or other extreme values. The benchmark case with the
entire distribution is given by θl = 0 and θu = 1.
18
2. For each θm, estimate the censored regression model obtaining M vectors
βθm .
3. For a given value of the covariates x0, the sample of size M with the
simulated durations is obtained as,
Y ∗m ≡ qˆθm(Y |x0) = exp(x′0βθm) with m = 1, ...,M .
4. Based on the sample {Y ∗m,m = 1, ...,M}, estimate the conditional density
f ∗(y|x0) and the conditional distribution function F ∗(y|x0).
18In our application, θl = 0.05 and θu = 0.7. Random numbers are then drawn from
a discrete uniform distribution which has the quantile grid points as support points. This
increases computation time significantly at the cost of small approximation errors.
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5. The hazard rate conditional on x0 and conditional on the durations drawn
in the interval (θl, θu)
19 is estimated by
λˆ0(y) =
(θu − θl)f ∗(y|x0)
1− θl − (θu − θl)F ∗(y|x0) .
MPG uses a kernel estimator for the conditional density
f ∗(y|x0) = 1
M b
M∑
m=1
K
(
y − Y ∗i
b
)
where b is the bandwidth and K(.) the kernel function. Based on this density
estimate, the distribution function estimator is
F ∗(y|x0) = 1
M
M∑
m=1
K
(
y − Y ∗i
b
)
with K(u) =
∫ y
a
K(v) dv .
We follow Fitzenberger & Wilke (2006) and use a kernel density estimator based
on log durations. The estimates for density and distribution function for the
duration itself are easily derived from the density estimates for log duration by
applying an appropriate transformation.
4.5 Empirical Results
Table 4.5 reports estimation results for the duration models as described in the
previous section. It shows the estimated coefficients of the censored quantile re-
gression model and the estimated hazard ratios for the Cox model. Cox model
A is a model which includes the reported variables only while model B also con-
tains dummy variables for the 128 NUTS3 regions in Great Britain. Estimated
conditional hazard rates based on the resampling procedure are presented in
Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
19Simulating the full distribution (θl = 0 and θu = 1), it follows by definition: λˆ0(y) =
f∗(y|x0)/[1− F ∗(y|x0)].
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Table 4.5: Estimated coefficients of the censored quan-
tile regression model and estimated hazard ra-
tios of the Cox proportional hazard model.
NUTS3 Cluster Robust Standard Errors.
Censored Quantile Regression Cox Model
Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.7 A B
Constant 2.315***
(0.031)
4.088***
(0.022)
4.755***
(0.023)
Socio-demographics
age< 25 0.244***
(0.012)
0.148***
(0.005)
0.073***
(0.007)
0.893***
(-0.008)
0.894***
(-0.008)
age≥ 56 -0.094
(0.063)
0.086*
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.03)
0.848***
(-0.033)
0.847***
(-0.033)
female -0.042***
(0.016)
-0.048***
(0.011)
-0.048***
(0.009)
1.024**
(-0.011)
1.033***
(-0.011)
Occupation(ref:Elementary)
Manufacturing -0.148***
(0.026)
-0.19***
(0.015)
-0.167***
(0.019)
1.161***
(-0.018)
1.157***
(-0.018)
Trade, services -0.061***
(0.016)
-0.178***
(0.01)
-0.19***
(0.009)
1.159***
(-0.010)
1.168***
(-0.009)
Technical 0.016
(0.032)
-0.112***
(0.02)
-0.146***
(0.019)
1.111***
(-0.021)
1.129***
(-0.022)
Senior, professional -0.1***
(0.025)
-0.28***
(0.012)
-0.305***
(0.015)
1.270***
(-0.025)
1.288***
(-0.026)
Unknown -0.177***
(0.02)
-0.333***
(0.013)
-0.347***
(0.014)
1.342***
(-0.018)
1.348***
(-0.019)
Work History variables
Active Labour
Market Programme
Participation
0.071***
(0.019)
0.261***
(0.007)
0.276***
(0.012)
0.801***
(-0.010)
0.802***
(-0.01)
Long-Term Unem-
ployment
0.31***
(0.014)
0.501***
(0.007)
0.518***
(0.012)
0.647***
(-0.007)
0.654***
(-0.006)
Incapacity Benefits -0.051**
(0.025)
0.009
(0.017)
0.008
(0.019)
0.971
(-0.018)
0.955***
(-0.017)
Income Support 0.024
(0.047)
0.07
(0.047)
0.067***
(0.024)
0.936* (-
0.034)
0.943
(-0.034)
Calendar time(ref: 1999)
y2000 0.01
(0.019)
-0.009
(0.014)
-0.021**
(0.01)
1.017* (-
0.010)
1.018* (-
0.010)
y2001 0.072***
(0.021)
-0.03***
(0.014)
-0.054***
(0.014)
1.023* (-
0.013)
1.029**
(-0.013)
y2002 0.12***
(0.021)
0.016
(0.014)
-0.01
(0.016)
0.975
(-0.015)
0.985
(-0.015)
y2003 0.209***
(0.022)
0.07***
(0.014)
0.044***
(0.013)
0.925***
(-0.015)
0.935***
(-0.016)
y2004 0.23***
(0.024)
0.119***
(0.012)
0.065***
(0.015)
0.879***
(-0.015)
0.889***
(-0.015)
y2005 0.438***
(0.023)
0.312***
(0.013)
0.273***
(0.016)
0.746***
(-0.011)
0.754***
(-0.011)
Quarter(ref: q1)
q2 -0.029*
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.012)
0.99
(-0.008)
0.991
(-0.008)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Censored Quantile Regression Cox Model
Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.7 A B
q3 -0.026
(0.016)
-0.041***
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.974***
(-0.010)
0.971***
(-0.009)
q4 0.118***
(0.014)
0.193***
(0.011)
0.111***
(0.011)
0.906***
(-0.011)
0.902***
(-0.011)
Regional variables
Accessible] 0.11***
(0.022)
0.088***
(0.017)
0.082***
(0.014)
0.948* (-
0.030)
0.987
(-0.033)
Urban∗ -0.026
(0.024)
-0.013
(0.017)
-0.034
(0.022)
0.901***
(-0.019)
0.947***
(-0.020)
University Present 0.023
(0.018)
0.049***
(0.011)
0.061***
(0.014)
0.966* (-
0.020)
0.919***
(-0.016)
Skill Intensity 0.016**
(0.008)
0.024***
(0.007)
0.028***
(0.005)
0.979**
(-0.009)
1.000
(-0.006)
GDPPH 0.013**
(0.006)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.022***
(0.004)
0.986
(-0.008)
0.972
(-0.069)
ILO unemployment
rate
0.056***
(0.006)
0.072***
(0.004)
0.068***
(0.006)
0.944***
(-0.009)
0.980***
(-0.004)
Change in
GDPPH∗∗
0.01*
(0.006)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.991
(-0.011)
1.003
(-0.006)
Change in ILO un-
employment rate∗∗
-0.018**
(0.008)
-0.035***
(0.004)
-0.039***
(0.006)
1.025***
(-0.009)
1.000
(-0.007)
Flow of Unem-
ployed/ Resident
Population
0.014*
(0.007)
0.023***
(0.004)
0.038***
(0.007)
0.986
(-0.010)
0.976**
(-0.011)
New Small Business
Startups/ Resident
Population
0.098***
(0.011)
0.091***
(0.007)
0.081***
(0.006)
0.918***
(-0.014)
0.978**
(-0.010)
18-24 New Deal
Starters/ Eligible
Population (§)
-0.012**
(0.006)
-0.029***
(0.005)
-0.028***
(0.005)
1.021***
(-0.005)
1.012***
(-0.004)
NUTS3 fixed effects X
Joint significance of regional variables:
χ2(11) 212.83
(0.000)
88.41
(0.000)
Number of obs = 187,032
Standard Errors: Robust bootstrapped standard errors - Bilias et al. (2000) method-
ology (CQR); Cluster (NUTS3) robust standard errors (Cox PH). Significance levels:
***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Interpretation (CQR Ests): exp(βθ) − 1. Marginal effects not drawn on due to lack
of comparability in existing methodologies.
Note: For regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
Robustness: Full robustness checks are detailed in Appendix B
] National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) population density based. *
UK/Wales - DEFRA Local Authority based. Scotland - NSPD-based, Local Au-
thority with >90% of Output Areas Accessible (<30 mins drive from large (>10,000)
urban conurbation).
** 3 year moving average. Captures the medium-term evolution of a region. §- NB.
Interacted with eligibility at the individual level (aged 16-24).
NB. Time-varying variables standardised across region, by month. Captures the evo-
lution of where a region sits in the regional distribution.
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Censored Quantile Regression Cox Model
Quantile 0.1 Quantile 0.5 Quantile 0.7 A B
NB. Variable selection to fully characterise time-varying regional heterogeneity: Eco-
nomic theory combined with Clustering of Variables Around Latent Variables (CLV)
routine by Vigneau & Qannari (2003).
In what follows we discuss and compare the estimation results in more
detail. The Cox model estimates are similar to those of Wilke (2009) although
the time period differs. Whilst the presence of region dummies in the Cox
model (B) does not impact significantly on the magnitude of coefficients, several
regional variables lose significance. The regional dummies in this model are also
insignificant, suggesting that the regional variables perform well in capturing
the regional variation in the data. This is further supported by the significance
of the region dummies in a model without regional controls. This result is
robust to the inclusion of Travel-To-Work Area fixed effects, as well as to
changes in specification (Exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, Piecewise-Constant,
see Appendix Section B).
The CQR coefficients represent the effect at each quantile of the distribu-
tion, whilst the Cox estimates average out this effect under the assumption
of proportional hazards. The CQR framework is flexible enough to allow for
different effects of the regressors at different quantiles of the conditional distri-
bution of unemployment duration, without restricting the sign of these effects
to be the same. Moreover, the CQR estimator has been shown to be robust
in various situations, including non-normality of the error distribution (Fitzen-
berger & Wilke 2006). Whilst several quantile regression coefficients change
their sign over the quantiles, we observe a significant change of the sign for
only two variables (y2001, q3). These cases imply an immediate violation of
the proportionality assumption. Moreover, hazard rates may be dispropor-
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tionate in absence of sign changes of quantile regression coefficients and it is
therefore of interest to look directly at the estimated conditional hazard rates
to obtain a clearer picture.
Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 present a selection of the estimated conditional
hazard rates, where we do not display results for the calender time and if the
effect of a regressor is very small. The figures provide a more complete im-
age of the impact of the CQR coefficients in Table 4.5, by illustrating how
the impact varies depending on the value of the variable in question. The
support of the estimated hazards is limited to a certain interval as we have
only estimated the quantile regression model for θ ∈ [0.05, 0.7]. The Figures
suggest that the covariate effect is mainly limited to shorter durations of up
to about 150 days, and these effects are largely consistent with the CQR es-
timates in Table 4.5. For instance Figure 4.3 suggests that, as we move from
regions with the maximum to the minimum level of Skill Intensity there is a ce-
teris paribus drop in re-employment probability and on average this difference
lasts until roughly 150 days. This suggests mismatch between the pool of JSA
claimants and the vacancies posted in areas of high Skill Intensity. However,
these figures provide evidence that conditional hazard rates often appear dis-
proportionate (see for example the conditional hazards cross for the aged < 26
category). Unfortunately, since higher moments of the hazard rate estimator
are unknown, we cannot test for this type of shape regularity. However, given
the very large number of observations we believe that it is likely that some of
the non-proportionalities cannot be rejected. Due to the more restrictive na-
ture of the Cox model, the following discussion is based mainly on the quantile
regression estimates. In general Table 4.5 suggests that if a variable has an
economically and statistically significant effect, then this will be reflected in
both models. However, if there is a change of sign in the quantile regression
model, then the Cox estimator is more likely to produce the effect at higher
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quantiles. Thus conflicting effects are more likely for shorter durations.
Figure 4.2: Estimated conditional hazard rates: change from 0 (blue
line) to 1 (green line) in one individual level variable; sam-
ple means of all other variables.
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Individual variables and calender time (Table 4.5) Being aged <26, pre-
vious Active Labour Market Programme (ALMP) participation, and previous
long term unemployment experience all have a strong positive impact on the
length of JSA claimant periods. Moreover a clear time pattern is evident, with
longer durations in later years. Being aged <26 and being aged ≥56 display
a reverse trend across the quantiles, relative to being prime-aged. This is not
reflected in the Cox estimates. Relative to elementary occupations, previous
employment in every other 1-digit standard occupational group significantly
shortens claimants’ spells. This effect is significantly more pronounced the
longer the claimant spell. Data limitations implied that skill levels could not
be directly proxied by observed qualifications. However, the observed diver-
gence of reemployment prospects suggests that the negative signal of previous
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elementary occupation increases as spells lengthen. As some individual vari-
ables have a stronger association with the dependent variable, relative to the
other controls, the direct implication is that the individual-level seems to be
more important than the regional-level of aggregation. Estimated effects of
the individual level coefficients are generally similar to the estimates of Wilke
(2009) and for this reason we omit here a more detailed discussion.
Figure 4.3: Estimated conditional hazard rates: changes from sample
min (blue line) to sample max (green line) in one regional
variable ; sample means of all other variables.
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Regional variables (Table 4.5) Although regional labour market conditions
generally possess a significant association with the length of claim periods,
the size of these effects is often considerably smaller than for the individual
level variables. This pattern is not unique to Britain as the same observation
was made with data from Germany after controlling for institutional factors
(Arntz & Wilke 2009). This contrasts the findings of Collier (2005) which
suggest that regional labour market conditions are more important. For the
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set of regional variables, we do not observe any change of sign of the quantile
regression coefficients over the quantiles.
Better accessibility of a region increases the length of JSA claim periods,
in particular for very short durations. This is roughly compatible with the
findings of Arntz & Wilke (2009) for Germany, who observe that a longer driv-
ing time to a higher level city increases the job finding probability for singles.
However, the sign of this effect is inconsistent with our previous hypothesis.
Urban regions are associated with relatively shorter claimant periods, a result
which concords with our expectations from economic theory and is consistent
with Arntz & Wilke (2009). Although consistent with out priors, this result
is insignificant at conventional levels. Given that urban regions are also ac-
cessible, the accessibility indicator is capturing the effect of being accessible
conditional on being urban. As in the case of Germany, over the time period
of observation, the presence of a university lengthens JSA claim periods whilst
the relationship is not significant for shorter durations. The presence of more
skill-intensive jobs increases the length of claim periods. This suggests that a
better social environment is related with poorer employment prospects. This
finding contrasts the results of Arntz & Wilke (2009) and the interpretation of
the effect is unclear and may be affected by endogeneity as the individual level
variable suggests the contrary.
Higher local GDP per head has a positive association with the length of
claim periods although this effect is small in economic terms. Although sur-
prising, this result pattern is also compatible with the observation of Arntz &
Wilke (2009) for Germany. Similar to the results of Petrongolo (2001), our
analysis suggests that a higher local unemployment rate is related with longer
claim periods. The effect increases over the quantiles and it is one of the most
important regional variables. In addition to the unemployment rate, Arntz
& Wilke (2009) also control for the share of long term unemployed and their
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Figure 4.4: Estimated conditional hazard rates: changes from sample
min (blue line) to sample max (green line) in one regional
variable ; sample means of all other variables.
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results suggest that this indicator significantly increases spell lengths. For the
reasons mentioned earlier, we have not included the share of long term unem-
ployed in our final model. However, other model specifications suggest that the
indicator has a comparable effect when used instead of the unemployment rate.
It is not confirmed by our results that emerging regions (in terms of increase
in GDP per head and decrease in unemployment rate) improve JSA claimants’
job finding probabilities. However, the estimated effects are small in terms of
economic significance, notably in the lowest quantiles. Granted, the impact
of higher unemployment rates may suggest a ‘stigma’ effect of living in high
unemployment regions that increases with the duration of unemployment.
The share of New Deal programme starters amongst the eligible claimant
count (18 - 24) has a negative association with the length of JSA claimant
durations. Although this unlikely to be causal, it suggests that assignment
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activity in local jobcentres may be related to regional labour market outcomes
and not fully random.
In line with our expectations we find that the rate of unemployment flows -
which proxies Seasonal Unemployment - has a positive impact on JSA claimant
durations. This effect increases across the quantiles.
Arntz & Wilke (2009) find that the rate of new business startups in an
area - which proxies local ’business activity’ - has a positive, and significant,
impact on the prospects of low-wage earners being re-employed in the local
area. The effect on high-wage earners is found to be insignificant, which may
be due to higher levels of job mobility. Due to lack of earnings information, we
are unable to make this distinction. However, this indicator is one of the most
economically significant amongst the regional variables. The estimates suggest
that higher levels of ‘business activity’, relative to the resident population,
have a lengthening effect on claimant spells which is most notable in the bottom
quantile. This estimate is difficult to interpret, given our priors. Although most
of the estimated effects of the regional variables are rather small in magnitude,
being accessible, the local unemployment rate and ‘business activity’ in a region
turn out to be the most important among them. There are strong shifts in the
estimated conditional hazards for changes from the sample minimum to the
sample maximum in these continuous regional variables. This suggests that
extreme regional labour market conditions do have strong effects, although
Table 4.5 suggests that sample effects on the conditional quantiles are mainly
limited as they are in response to a shift by one standard deviation.
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Table 4.6: Top and worse performing regions in Great Britain. Results from
a Cox regression with individual variables, calender time variables
and 128 NUTS3 region dummies.
Rank Top Performer Worst Performer
1 Eilean Siar (Western Isles) Inner London - East
2 Caithness/Sutherland/
Ross/Cromarty
Inner London - West
3 Shetland Islands Outer London - West and North West
4 East Cumbria Birmingham
5 Aberdeen/Aberdeenshire/
North East Moray
Berkshire
Comparison of regions As a next step we directly compare selected regions.
Table 4.6 reports a ranking of region dummies obtained by the Cox model with
individual variables and region dummies only (e.g. omitting the other regional
variables). The region dummies capture both the observable and unobserv-
able region specific effects and thus provide us a simple performance ranking
in terms of the length of claim periods by controlling for individual specific
characteristics and calendar time. We refer to the Cox estimates as it was
technically impossible to obtain censored quantile regression estimates when
regional dummies were included in the model.
The table suggests that large cities such as London and Birmingham and
the London commuter belt have the strongest positive association with the
length of claim periods. In contrast, remote regions such as the Western Isles
and Shetland Islands are among the regions with the shortest conditional claim
duration. It is remarkable that four out of the five top performing regions are
located in Northern Scotland. Since the results in the table are based on the
simple Cox model’s regional dummies, it is unclear whether the ranking is due
to the observable regional labour market environment or due to unobservable
regional characteristics. It is, however, of interest to explore this in more detail.
For this reason we also compute the resampling based conditional hazard rates
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for the duration of benefit claim periods conditional on being a sample aver-
age individual and residing in the region specific labour market environment
(sample average for each region). This is done for five NUTS3 regions which
overlap with the four major cities in Britain: Inner London (East and West),
Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow.
Figure 4.5: Estimated conditional hazard rates for several regions.
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Apart from Glasgow and Manchester these cities belong to the poorest per-
formers according to the Cox estimates. Moreover, we compute the hazard
rates conditional to the top five performers according to Table 4.6. The re-
sulting estimates are presented in Figure 4.5. It is apparent that the observed
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regional labour market conditions in Greater Manchester (South), Glasgow
and Birmingham result in rather similar conditional hazards. The observed
characteristics for London and in particular for West-London point to a con-
siderably worse observed labour market environment. Hazard rates for the
top performers are considerably higher than for the large cities if we ignore
the Western Isles. Moreover, the figure suggests that simultaneous changes
in several regional variables can lead to considerable shifts in conditional haz-
ard rates. The shape of the hazard rates looks rather disproportionate and
differences are mainly relevant in the interval up to 100 days. These results
therefore provide evidence that the region specific environment matters much
less for longer durations. Our findings therefore suggest that regional policies
may fail to improve employment prospects of the long term unemployed.
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
We create a comprehensive British data set by merging individual claim peri-
ods of unemployment benefits with a comprehensive set of regional indicators
to capture regional variation in job arrival rates. In our empirical analysis
we use this data to investigate the relevance of individual characteristics and
local labour market conditions on the length of JSA claim periods. We em-
ploy censored quantile regression and apply a resampling method to estimate
nonparametric conditional hazard rates.
We find evidence that both individual level variables and the local labour
market environment shape the distribution of re-employment times. Although
individual level variables turn out to be more important, in particular the local
labour demand and supply conditions and structural indicators of a region
are also important determinants of the length of claim periods. Our results
therefore contrast the results of Collier (2005) who observes regional variables
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to be more important, while they are often similar to the results of Arntz &
Wilke (2009) for Germany. This includes the relative relevance and the sign of
the estimated effects. Moreover, we observe that covariate effects are mainly
limited to a duration of up to 150 days while they are generally negligible for
longer duration. Our results therefore suggests that regional (fiscal) policies
are likely to be ineffective for improving employment prospects of long term
unemployed. This is an interesting observation which could not be made by
employing a proportional hazard model.
From a policy point of view we draw the conclusion that regional labour
market conditions and therefore regional (fiscal) policies, targeting job cre-
ation, can affect individual labour market outcomes. Our results, however, do
not suggest that these are the principal driving forces for re-employment times.
Therefore, regional (fiscal) policies seem more to have a supportive role and
they cannot substitute for a lack of individual qualities in the job search pro-
cess. This adds further weight to the already existing support for the targeted
individual-level Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) aimed to improve job-
seekers’ re-employment prospects, e.g. through sponsored work experience and
vocational qualifications. Surprisingly, we observe that large cities such as Lon-
don and Birmingham provide worse local labour market conditions than rural
and even remote regions such as Northern Scotland. This finding is important
as many people likely believe the reverse, although the Government is already
targeting problematic neighborhoods in these cities.
Our research also leaves some scope for extensions in some respects. From
a methodological point of view, the use of censored quantile regression extends
standard econometric techniques in several dimensions. However, it also limits
our econometric model in several aspects. First, it cannot deal with time
varying covariates and thus we only take into account the information at the
start of claim periods. Moreover, we cannot take into account multiple spells in
4. Job Seeker’s Allowance in Great Britain: How does the Regional Labour
Market affect the length of Job Search? 170
our analysis as this is also still to be developed for censored quantile regression.
Multiple spells can be exploited for identification purposes (Abbring & Berg
2000; Van den Berg 2001). “Whether the hazard rate of an event depends
on a previous event, conditional on a previous event, is an important modeling
issue. Second, the form of dependence is of interest. The duration of a previous
spell may enter as a covariate in determining the hazard of a later event; the
occurrence of a previous event may affect the baseline hazard for a later spell;
and, finally, unobserved heterogeneity may show serial dependence. Each of
these raises an important modeling issues (Cameron & Trivedi 2005, pp. 656).”
The extent to which multiple spells of unemployment matter, and when they
matter, for labour market outcomes is a subject of debate within the literature.
The earlier literature on gross worker flows suggested that changes in the size
and distribution of inflows into unemployment are the main determinant of the
unemployment rate. This suggests that incidence of unemployment matters
more for labour market outcomes. Cyclical unemployment is concentrated
in groups with low exit probabilities. Thus, the observed procyclicality in
average exit probabilities from unemployment may largely be explained by
these compositional effects (Darby et al. 1986). Recent work has questioned the
composition explanation (e.g. Shimer 2012). Moreover, recent literature, e.g.
Elsby et al. (2009) and Petrongolo & Pissarides (2008) suggests that incidence
and duration of unemployment are related to the business cycle. It would
thus be fruitful in future work to investigate this further in relation to the van
Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis and research questions under test. Inflow
rates countercyclical, especially for job losers (layoffs), whereas outflow rates
are procyclical. This suggests that high unemployment levels in a recession are
driven by longer unemployment durations, rather than higher incidence.
Finally, competing risks allows us to take into account whether a variable
affects alternative hazard functions differently, (e.g. McCall 1996, for a seminal
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contribution). It is common for studies using survival analysis techniques to
treat transitions to inactivity as right censored or to drop them completely. In
the duration context, treating inactivity as a censored destination state, may
lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters determining the transitions of
interest as this assumes away unobserved characteristics affecting both transi-
tions of interest and those to censored states (van den Berg & van Ours 1994;
van den Berg & Lindeboom 1998). For example, one effect of JSA introduc-
tion was to increase transitions onto Incapacity Benefits by 2.5-3% (Petrongolo
2009). It is likely that the composition of these individuals differed substan-
tially from those that moved into employment as a result of JSA introduction.
From a data point of view, we are unable to fully map individuals’ em-
ployment biographies (their movements in and out of the labour market, wage
changes, etc.) due to the lack of merged administrative individual data. The
availability of individual data from additional registers would enable us to per-
form an extension of our analysis. We do not directly address the issue of
commuting as the resident population may not be contributing to the produc-
tivity of a region. Job density can be used to indirectly control for commuting.
We constructed a job density indicator from the regional data, however this
variable turned out to be highly correlated with other indicators used in the
analysis and for this reason it was not included in our final model. More
comprehensive data with information about the workplace would enable us to
directly analyse commuting and even intra regional migration.
Chapter 5
Mixed Signals: To what extent
does Male Wage Scarring vary
with the characteristics of the
Local Labour Market in which
unemployment was experienced?
5.1 Introduction
Economists have had a long standing interest in the impact of unemployment
on individuals’ labour market outcomes. Whilst extensive work has been con-
ducted on the persistence of unemployment, less exists on the long-term impli-
cations for future earnings trajectories. This chapter tests the hypothesis that
unemployment experienced in high unemployment regions is less likely to be
viewed by employers as a negative productivity signal, and more as a character-
istic of the region. This predicts that unemployment’s short-run negative wage
effects will be mitigated if experienced in high unemployment regions. If so,
then what long-term implications does this have for future wage growth (Wage
Scarring)? What implications do other important sources of regional variation
in previous unemployment experience have in driving wage outcomes?
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Individual unemployment experience(s) are hypothesised to increase the
likelihood of future unemployment and decreasing future earnings potential.
Economic theory provides ambiguous predictions with respect to the question
of Wage Scarring. Job loss, and subsequent unemployment, may be linked to
wage scarring through various mechanisms. There may be stigma effects of un-
employment (since productivity is imperfectly observed, unemployment may
be viewed as a negative productivity signal by prospective employers) which
feed into lower wage offers. Firm-specific human capital is lost when a job
is terminated, implying that, if returns to specific human capital are shared
between the firm and worker(s) and human capital accrues with tenure on the
job, longer tenure workers are at risk of losing the most due to job loss if this
human capital is not transferable across employers. Independent of whether
returns to specific capital are shared, firms have less incentive to layoff high
tenure workers than their low tenure counterparts. Whilst there are many po-
tential mechanisms at work, with some operating in different directions, human
capital theory provides a tractable framework in which to operate as well as
generating testable predictions (Becker 1962).
Individuals may quit their job, or be fired due to low productivity. To
avoid this selection issue the literature has tended to focus on the impact of
employer initiated job displacement, that can be reasonably assumed to be
unrelated to a worker’s characteristics. This approach is taken in order to
approximate a natural experiment. A direct test of human capital theory is
that displaced workers earn less on the post- than pre-displacement jobs (Far-
ber 1999), the first generation of papers investigated short-term implications
conducting before and after comparative studies on North American data. Ad-
dison & Portugal (1989) and Houle & van Audenrode (1995) are examples
of before and after studies employing Displaced Worker Surveys for the US
and Canada respectively. Looking at longer-term viewpoint, Jacobson et al.
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(1993) employed Pennsylvanian administrative data, whilst Ruhm (1991) drew
on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Results for the more flexi-
ble labour markets of the UK and US have found substantial and persistent
earnings losses which remain to the order of 10% to 18% even 10 years af-
ter re-employment (Ruhm 1991; Jacobson et al. 1993; Gregory & Jukes 2001;
Arulampalam 2001), whereas the evidence in Europe is less marked (Kunze
2002). More recent contributions to the debate have replicated the approach of
Jacobson et al. (1993), implementing newly developed econometric techniques
(propensity-score matching) to extend the analysis, using administrative data
for the United Kingdom (Hijzen et al. 2010), Sweden (Eliason & Storrie 2006)
and the US state of Connecticut (Couch & Placzek 2010). Eliason & Storrie
(2006) highlight the increased sensitivity of displaced workers’ earnings losses
to recessionary pressures. Furthermore, Couch & Placzek (2010) cast doubt
over the generalisability of JLS’s results for the US as a whole, given changes
in State and time period. The existing literature suggests that variation in in-
stitutional context may help to explain cross-country differences in the impact
of unemployment on wage growth. However, Gangl (2006) finds that enough in-
stitutional heterogeneity exists to generate marked differences in wage scarring
across EU members.
Although institutions may vary across countries, there is generally not
enough variation in institutional context within a country to generate the ob-
served differences in wage outcomes across regions (Carrington 1993)1. Job
search theory would predict that individuals displaced in tight labour markets
will face lower job search costs due to more vacancies being available relative to
the stock of job seekers (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). In slack labour markets,
the prospects of a successful match are lower as there will be more unem-
1Federal countries are a notable exception, however the extent to which this impacts on
observed wage outcomes across regions is an empirical question.
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ployment job seekers applying for a small pool of job vacancies. Of course,
highly mobile (young and skilled) workers will be more able to mitigate this
phenomenon by migrating to a tight labour market, however this may be less
likely for less skilled workers and older workers with more regional attachments.
Granted, individuals migrating to another region may face larger wage penal-
ties than the equivalent worker finding reemployment in their pre-displacement
region (Carrington 1993). Job offer arrival rates are also likely to be higher in
areas of high (urban) than low (rural) economic activity. van Dijk & Folmer
(1999) hypothesize, and provide cross-sectional evidence, that longer unemploy-
ment periods carry a significant negative productivity signal in regions with low
unemployment rates whereas in periphery regions where unemployment rates
are high, this is attributed to the characteristics of the regional labour market.
This raises the question of whether the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis
holds when applied to Great Britain in a dynamic longitudinal context and
motivates this study. Given the interconnectedness of Britain’s regions, it is
puzzling why persistent differences in average regional earnings remain. This
analysis may shed some light on the cause of these regional differences. Do
the substantial and persistent earnings losses found by UK studies like Aru-
lampalam (2001) remain when adding the extra waves now available in the
BHPS, and what implications do other important sources of regional variation
in previous unemployment experience have in driving wage outcomes?
In order to address these questions, the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) is used to construct continuous work-life histories, following individu-
als from when they first left full-time education. In constructing the dataset,
a rules-based approach is adopted to minimise measurement error and ensure
consistency of the data. Individuals’ labour market histories are prone to over-
lap due to the timing of interviews in the BHPS varying over the period of the
survey (Halpin 1997; Upward 1999; Paull 2002; Mare´ 2006). Retrospective life-
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time histories are constructed, spanning the period since first leaving full-time
education. This information allows for a direct measure of general labour mar-
ket experience, rather than using a potential experience proxy, thus reducing
measurement error. The analysis uses interview dates as reference points due
to better data coverage at these intervals, as well as being integral to the rules-
based approach adopted. This dataset is linked to the Labour Force Survey at
the Travel-to-Work Area & Local Authority levels of aggregation in order to
incorporate time-varying unobserved heterogeneity not adequately captured in
the model, as well as to address the research question. For more information
on the dataset construction please consult Appendix E.
Seminal UK research concludes that the first spell of non-employment car-
ries the highest penalty. Considering unemployment and inactivity, no re-
duction in the penalty associated with incidence of inactivity is found whilst
for multiple spells of unemployment the wage penalty reduces with incidence.
Strong regional differences are found in the impact of redundancy on wage
growth. This is contingent on labour market tightness and urbanity of the
region in which unemployment was experienced. Redundancy followed by un-
employment in areas of high economic activity is equally damaging for future
earnings potential, independent of age. These negative implications are long
lasting. Weaker evidence is found supporting the main hypothesis in the UK
on average, and stronger support for those made redundant in their previous
jobs. These results remain robust to specification changes.
The chapter is organised as follows. Selected contributions to the existing
literature are summarised in the Appendix, Table 5.16. Section 5.2 describes
the data. Section 5.3 describes the methodology in the context of the ex-
isiting literature. Section 5.4 examines descriptive statistics relating to the
consequences of job displacement for future wage growth. Section 5.5 presents
results from an initial replication of Arulampalam (2001). Section 5.6 extends
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the basic results in terms of observation period and regional-level effects. Sen-
sitivity checks are briefly detailed in section 5.7, whilst Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 The Data
Survey data is exploited in order to address the research questions of inter-
est. Administrative data has the advantage of larger sample sizes, and in some
cases matched employer-employee data, but this information is not generally
collected for the purpose of academic use. This makes identifying the phe-
nomenon on interest difficult. For example, Gregory & Jukes (2001) match
the JUVOS to the New Earnings Survey (NES). However, whilst the JUVOS
contains daily information, the NES is only collected once a year. The matched
data set also restricts the study to comparing registered unemployment as an
alternative to employment.
Administrative data is generally limited in its covariate set, with key indica-
tors - reason for leaving job - being non-identifiable. In an attempt to circum-
vent this issue, studies using administrative data have limited their focus to
separations occurring around a firm/plant closure - identifiable with matched
employer-employee data - or to firms experiencing large employment changes/
mass layoffs over a certain time period (for example Jacobson, LaLonde, &
Sullivan 1993). The argument being that these separations are more likely to
be be determined by exogenous demand shocks, unrelated to observed worker
ability (Farber 1999). Despite this potential advantage, it is impossible to be
certain that separations due to reasons other than layoffs are not captured in
this definition. The wider the time period considered, the more likely this is
to be the case (Kunze 2002). Relative to Administrative source, Survey data
suffers from smaller sample sizes. Despite this, Survey data tends to contain
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more information about the respondents, including key variables like reason for
leaving previous job. However, given its self-reported nature, Survey data is
more likely to suffer from problems of measurement error and recall bias.
The high cost of collecting high frequency data means that this information
is usually collected retrospectively (Ju¨rges 2007). Comparability is also ham-
pered as overtime and across survey, value labels for key variables may differ
considerably making it harder to accurately identify key information (Farber
1999). This is why a rules-based approach to data set construction is adopted in
order to minimise these issues (see Apprendix E). The BHPS distinguishes ter-
mination of seasonal work/fixed-term contract from other reasons, however the
DWS does not make this distinction. This introduces some discretion into the
way interviewees may respond, which may make it harder to accurately identify
separation types. Despite these potential drawbacks, the depth of information
available in survey data makes it an attractive alternative to administrative
data.
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) Detailed individual-level in-
formation is sourced from the BHPS. The version of the BHPS used in this
study covers 11 waves of the survey, from 1991-2001. Unfortunately data cov-
erage over the full survey period, 1991-2008, is incomplete for a key indicator
at the sub-regional level. ‘Labour market tightness’ is commonly proxied by
the vacancy/unemployment ratio, key to the Matching literature. The vacan-
cies series is available from NOMIS (www.nomisweb.co.uk) at the sub-regional
level. Vacancy statistics are likely to suffer severe downward bias due to the
fact that vacancy posting is not obligatory for firms (Folmer & van Dijk 1988).
The existence of internal labour markets, implies that vacancy statistics will
5. Mixed Signals: To what extent does Male Wage Scarring vary with the
characteristics of the Local Labour Market in which unemployment was
experienced? 179
tend to underestimate the true level of labour demand as firms may recruit
internally as a first option (Atkinson & Micklewright 1991). In addition to
being plagued by data quality issues, there is a one year gap the series due
to significant changes to Jobcentre Plus procedures for handling vacancies in
2001. Moreover, the effect of this change was that vacancy statistics are not
comparable over time (Bentley 2005). The extended time-frame under investi-
gation was reduced from 1991-2008 (for which data was available at the time
of writing) to 1991-2001 in order to account for this issue. Socio-Economic
data available in the BHPS at the individual & household level. The survey
provides an annual nationally representative sample of 5000+ household and
over 10000 individual-level observations per wave. Retrospective job history
information is collected for the 12 months prior to the current wave interview.
In addition, the survey contains information on complete work-life histories
since leaving further education. Appendix 5.8.4 illustrates the structure of the
BHPS, whilst full data preparation steps are detailed in Appendix E.
Unlike the US Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), the BHPS contains re-
gional location information relating to the time of displacement, the time an
individual was searching for a job, and the time of re-employment. This allows
control for the timing of moves across regional entities, and thus the identifica-
tion of regional effects. This regional information is available on a spell-by-spell
basis for spells lasting less than a year. For spells which have lasted for more
than one year, regional location is coded at survey date. The date a move took
place is also available, as well as whether an individual moved for employment
reasons. Location information is only collected at the beginning of each labour
market spell in the pre-1.9.90 data. 1.3% (153) of the sample move travel-to-
work area between labour market spells, whereas 4.3% (527) move travel-to-
work area over the sample period as a whole. 1.6% (190) of the sample move
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local authority between labour market spells, whereas this figure is 5.92% (718)
over the sample as a whole. These figures are based on the Original Sample
Members (OSM), using the current sample selection strategy, for the full 11
waves. These figures do not change markedly once the window is increased to
2 years around job take-up, to capture tied moves. They suggest that selection
into a move across regional boundaries (LAD, TTWA) between labour market
spells is less of a concern. Furthermore, household moves which are confined
within the geographical entity of interest -local authority, travel-to-work area
- are ignored.
Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LAQLFS) The LAQLFS
is available for the period 1992q2-2006q1. Quarter 3 waves of the Local Area
Quarterly Labour Force Survey are used to link the regional-level data to the
BHPS. 20 out of the 323 local authority areas could not be matched, due to
changes in the way regions are classified in 1996. In 1996, 46 Unitary Authori-
ties were introduced in the UK. Initial attempts to acquire a concordance table
from ONS Geography failed. The strategy adopted was to match regions by
name. This may not be the most accurate procedure, as there are cases where
pre-1996 regions were split into smaller administrative entities. However, given
the tools at my disposal this seemed the best approach2. Leaving these regions
out of the individual-level data (dropping anyone who ever lived in them) does
not seem to have a significant impact on the composition of the sample, sug-
gesting that results are likely to be robust to this restriction. Furthermore,
pairwise t-tests of the null hypothesis that dropping problematic does not have
2The 20 non-matches include: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North
East Lincolnshire; North Somerset; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West
Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dun-
bartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South
Lanarkshire
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an impact on the means cannot be rejected. Ball (2009) can be consulted for
a detailed discussion of the dataset construction.
In order to investigate the importance of the regional dimension, controls are
introduced for the ILO Unemployment, the Vacancies-to-Unemployment Ra-
tio, Accessibility, and whether the respondent is living in an Urban area at
the time of interview. Labour market tightness is defined at the TTWA level
of aggregation. Accessibility and Urban indicators in the BHPS are acquired
from the National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and measured at the
Output Area level of aggregation. Local authorities may contain a mixture of
urban and rural Output Areas, thus using a classification at this level of aggre-
gation is likely to be inappropriate implying that these measures are unlikely to
capture the local labour market environment very well. Adopting the approach
implemented in Ball (2009), Urban combines the Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) local authority-based urban/rural classifica-
tion, valid for England only, with the output area-based NSPD classification
for Scotland & Wales (implying some measurement error). Unemployment in-
cidence and the length of previous interruption are controlled for in all regional
level regressions. Detailed continuous sub-regional data is unavailable from
most standard sources over the period of interest. Furthermore, the Special
Access LFS is only available from 2003, which would not allow me to construct
full work-life histories given that this information is only collected in the sec-
ond and third waves. Thus the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey
(LAQLFS) is drawn upon in order to construct these measures. The LAQLFS
is available for the period 1992q2 - 2006q1. Given the rotating nature of the
LFS, 1991q3 values are assumed to be the same as those in 1992q3. The BHPS
and LAQLFS are linked at the local authority level of aggregation using the
concordance scheme developed in Appendix D.
5. Mixed Signals: To what extent does Male Wage Scarring vary with the
characteristics of the Local Labour Market in which unemployment was
experienced? 182
Focus is limited to a sample of males aged between 16 and 58 and directly
interviewed at Wave 1, excluding proxy interviews3. These individuals are
followed from when they first leave full-time education until 65. In order to be
able to derive full employment biographies for the Original Sample Members
(OSM) used in the study, multiple data sources needed to be drawn on. This
raised awareness of the inherent complexities in the survey design. Clearly
defined, well justified data preparation steps are required in order to ensure
further biases are not imparted on the final data. This sensitivity of the BHPS
work-life histories to data preparation steps is well highlighted in (Paull 2002).
For this reason an extensive technical appendix to this paper was created,
see Appendix E for details. This details the rules-based approach adopted to
minimise the major sampling issues. Furthermore, the study aims to test the
van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypotheses by matching the individual-level data to
the regional context in which these individuals reside.
5.3 Methodology
Ideally our treatment, job displacement, would be randomly assigned (Angrist
& Pischke 2009). Lack of experimental data means that most studies investi-
gating job displacement have employed administrative or survey data. Since
from a policy point of view this study’s interest is in heterogeneity across sepa-
ration types, careful attention to potential sources of endogeneity is called for.
3The initial interest was in replicating Arulampalam (2001)’s results and then extending
the observation window with the extra survey waves now available. Due to lack of information
about the exact data preparation steps, an exact replication was not possible. Replication
is made harder due to regular updating of the panel due to coding errors, etc. I am grateful
to Professor Arulampalam for providing her SPSS code detailing her data prepartion steps.
Unfortunately this code referred to a preliminary version of the paper and the preparation
steps used to construct certain key variables were missing. Granted, I developed alternative
proxies due to these inherent ambiguities. Alternative proxies for key indicators were devel-
oped in order to address these ambiguities. This exercise raised valid questions about the
robustness of findings to these data preparation steps.
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Unobserved heterogeneity, Selection Bias, Omitted Variable Bias, Measurement
Error, systematic Recall Bias and Attrition Bias are of particular concern. Si-
multaneity bias is less of a concern given that timing is directly controlled for.
“In the absence of experimental evidence, it is very difficult to know whether
the higher earnings observed for better-educated workers are caused by their
higher education, or whether individuals with greater earnings capacity have
chosen to acquire more schooling (Card 1999, pp. 1802).” By exploiting the
longitudinal nature of the BHPS the time-invariant component of ability can
be “differenced” out using the fixed effects estimator, leading to consistent es-
timates under OLS when controlling for a rich set of observed characteristics.
However, since the BHPS does not allow one to isolate redundancies due to
plant closures and/or mass layoffs, self-reported redundancy is less likely to be
exogenous to individual characteristics. This caveat should be taken into ac-
count when interpreting the results. The fixed effects estimator is inconsistent
under the presence of omitted variable bias (OVB) and measurement error,
which is likely to be present in survey data due to systematic Recall Bias. In
extensions of this study, the regional variation in the BHPS is exploited as an
extra dimension for identification.
The following Mincerian Earnings function is estimated:
ln(wit) = x
′
itβ + (d
′
itZit)
′γ + λt + αi + εit ∀ i = 1 . . . n, ∀ t = 1 . . . T
(5.1)
Where:
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wit = Hourly wage of individual i at time t, deflated by CPI in 1991 prices.
xit = Matrix of observed personal and workplace characteristics.
di = Dummy variable, taking the value 1 if individual i entered the current
employment spell via a spell of interruption.
Zit = Matrix of selected individual characteristics (interacted with dit).
λt = Time dummy.
αi = Time-invariant individual-specific error component.
εi = Idiosyncratic error component.
5.3.1 The Within-Groups estimator
The Within-Groups estimator, ln(wit − w¯i) = (xit − x¯i)′β + (dit − d¯i)′γ +
(λt − λ¯) + (εit − ε¯i) ∀ i = 1 . . . n, ∀ t = 1 . . . T , is still consistent in a
model with the inclusion of endogenous regressors, provided that the source
of endogeneity is time-invariant, e.g. Due to ability bias (Cameron & Trivedi
2005). The parameters in specifaction 5.1 are estimated as deviations from their
individual-specific means, with appropriate adjustments made to the standard
errors. Unobserved heterogeneity, υi, is modelled as υi = αi + εit. When pa-
rameters are estimated as deviations from their means, the individual-specific
error component drops out, given its time invariant nature, leaving us with only
the idiosyncratic error component to deal with. By construction εit is uncor-
related with the explanatory variables. A Random Effects estimation strategy
is not implemented due lack of an appropriate instrument for ability, implying
that the assumption E(εit|xit) = 0 is inappropriate in this case. Furthermore,
Fixed Effects relies on the identifying assumption that E(εit|xit, αi) = 0, i.e.
Conditional exogeneity. Fixed effects estimates are susceptible to attenuation
bias due to measurement error. If a variable is persistent, incidence this year
makes incidence next year more likely, and changes from year-to-year are mis-
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reported/miscoded, although there may be measurement error in a sub-sample
of the population in each year observed year-to-year changes in the variable will
be mostly noise (Angrist & Pischke 2009). This implies more measurement er-
ror in differenced estimates than in their levels, explaining one reason why fixed
effects estimates are generally smaller than their OLS counterparts(Angrist &
Krueger 1999).
5.3.2 Sample Selection
The sample appearing in the wage equation is unlikely to be a random sam-
ple of the underlying population. For individuals that do not appear in the
wage equation, the wage distribution will be truncated at zero. However, this
truncation is non-ignorable since it is the product of a underlying deterministic
process influencing the labour market participation decision. List-wise deletion
of cases in which real wages are not observed would lead OLS to produce biased
estimates of the true extent of Wage Scarring, due to sample-selection bias, as
these cases cannot be assumed missing at random. This incidental truncation
is corrected for using the two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979).
Given the data structure employed, a cohort followed over time, the Heckman
approach seemed a natural way to model initial selection into the sample. This
technique follows Arulampalam (2001) and involves two steps. First, a model
to explain the probability of an being in the wage equation sub-sample is esti-
mated using a reduced form probit. Second, a correction term is constructed
(inverse Mill’s ratio) from the probit and used as an additional regressor in the
wage equation to correct for the selection. The identifying restriction required
to identify the parameters of the wage equation using the selected sample is
that the identifying variables (exclusion restrictions) are assumed to impact on
the probability of being in the selected sample but are assumed not to influ-
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ence the wages conditional on being in the sample (Arulampalam 2001). A
fundamental challenge is that of finding valid instruments.
Selection Rule: For an individual to appear in the wage equation they must
be continuously present in the survey for at least two wave since the beginning
(1991); a positive real wage must be observed (defined only for those in em-
ployment and continuously present) and they must be in employment at least
twice. Since the Within-Groups estimator applied to an earnings regression
requires an individual to be in employment at least twice, individuals appear-
ing in the wage equation are not representative of all workers in employment.
This fact is explicitly taken into account when formulating this selection rule
(Arulampalam 2001). Sensitivity of the results to the selection rule is formally
tested in the robustness checks for attrition bias.
Identification Strategy: Fixed Effects relies on the identifying assumption
that E(εit|xit, αi) = 0, i.e. the Conditional exogeneity/ Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption (CIA). Strategies are adopted in an attempt to satisfy this
criterion. The advantage of using survey data is that this allows a rich set
of regressors commonly thought to impact on wage outcomes to be controlled
for, including regional-level interactions with state dependence. Regional-level
identifiers in the BHPS allow time-varying regional characteristics to be incor-
porated. Heteroscedasticity is controlled for using White’s heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors. Furthermore, a rules-based approach to data prepara-
tion is taken in order to minimise measurement error (see Appendix E).
How to control for the fact that most factors that influence unemployment
also influence accepted wages is the fundamental identification challenge faced
when attempting to control for sample selection (incidental truncation) using
the Heckman two-step approach (Heckman 1979). Exclusion restrictions in the
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first stage participation strengthen identification, however a fundamental chal-
lenge is that of finding valid instruments. Exclusion restrictions include whether
an individual has children, which is expected to impact on re-employment prob-
ability through mobility costs, but not on wage offers (Stevens 1997). This
instrument may not have the appropriate properties of a good instrument,
as the relationship between fertility and labour supply suggests the presence
of endogeneity between the presence of children and labour market outcomes
(Angrist & Krueger 1999). Father’s occupation when 14, whether they were
self-employed at 14, and current housing tenure are also included as identi-
fying variables in the first stage participation decision. As in Arulampalam
(2001), the Travel to Work Area (TTWA) unemployment rate in 1991 is in-
cluded as in as a further exclusion restriction, the identifying assumption being
that historic local labour market unemployment rates impact directly on the
current unemployment rate and only indirectly on the current wage, through
the current unemployment rate. Ideally 1981 Census would have been used to
gauge the TTWA unemployment rate. This proved impossible due to severe
lack of concordance between the TTWA classification methods used4. Unlike
in the National Child Development Survey, TTWA unemployment rate at 16
is unavailable. A χ2 test for the joint significance of the identifying variables is
significant at the 99.9 percent level. Redundancies are more likely to be orthog-
onal to individual characteristics, relative to other separation types. However,
even within the redundancy category, there is likely to be heterogeneity. Un-
fortunately this cannot be controlled for, since the BHPS does not distinguish
between mass layoffs and plant closures.
4No guidance is provided in Arulampalam (2001) on how she defined certain key variables,
including the 1991 Travel to Work Area (TTWA) unemployment rate. In the subsequent
analysis this is defined as the total of male and female unemployment as a proportion of the
resident economically active population.
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5.4 Descriptive Analysis
In the analysis that proceeds, previous labour market history is considered in
relation to current labour market status, given that the individual reporting
is currently employed. Preliminary analysis - not reported - highlighted close
similarities between the sample of individuals directly interviewed in 1991 and
the sub-sample used in the wage analysis (continuously present for at least 2
waves). These similarities persisted when the sample was further conditioned to
exclude those reporting themselves as self-employment status at interview date,
as well as when problematic regions are dropped. Moreover, the composition of
the non-extended and extended samples are very similar (Table F.5, Appendix
Section F). Thus the descriptive analysis mainly focusses on the extended 1991-
2001 period.
Table 5.1: Current Employer Tenure, by previous labour
market status, 1991-2001(§).
Previous Status
Tenure EMP UNEMP OLF Total
<1 year 790 375 98 1263
1-2 years 649 263 102 1014
2-3 years 556 191 87 834
3-4 years 488 152 72 712
4-5 years 407 126 64 597
5-10 years 1596 437 260 2293
>10 years 2623 532 1058 4213
§ - Excluding: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lin-
colnshire; North Somerset; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns;
West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly; Ab-
erdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North
Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South Lanarkshire.
Previous labour market states considered (since leaving full-time education):
Employment/Self-Employment; Unemployment; OLF (Out of the Labour Force).
Table 5.1 excludes problematic regions. Previous “Out of the Labour Force”(OLF)
includes previous full-time education (see Arulampalam 2001, Table 2: pp.
F594), with the sample restricted to individuals who have left full-time educa-
tion for the first time. Differences between Table 2, Arulampalam (2001), and
Table 5.1 can be explained not just by the extended period but also by her
definition of previous status only capturing the last five years of work-life his-
tory. Using all information since respondents left full time education captures
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a significant proportion of continuous ‘first job’ employment spells which expe-
rienced no interruption over the observation window5. Existing studies in the
literature have generally restricted their attention to high tenure individuals,
thus excluding most of the early career workforce.
Previous labour market status of ‘first job’ spells is recorded as “out of
the labour force”, given the OECD definition. Arulampalam (2001) used the
BHPS-supplied “current spell length” indicator, recorded at interview date, to
construct her tenure variable. This indicator is likely to suffer from recall bias,
leading to inconsistencies with the spell length measure used in this analysis.
Summary statistics for the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 period are presented in
Table 5.2: Comparison of Means of Sample used in Regional
Wage Analysis, 1991-2001.
PREV STAT: EMP. UNEMP. OLF
[1] [2] [3]
Region
SE 0.20 0.17 0.20
SW 0.08 0.11 0.11
East Anglia 0.05 0.05 0.03
E.Midlands 0.09 0.07 0.09
W.Midlands 0.12 0.11 0.09
N.West 0.13 0.13 0.11
Yorksire & Humber 0.06 0.13 0.10
North 0.07 0.07 0.10
Wales 0.03 0.03 0.01
Scotland 0.06 0.06 0.04
Total 7109 2076 1741
Statistics refer to sample used in the Wage analysis, which excludes the
problematic regions defined in Table 5.1
Table F.5, Appendix Section F. According with intuition, tables F.5 suggests
that individuals younger than 30 are relatively more likely to have come into
their current employment spell via a spell of non-employment than those over
30. They are more likely to be single, have an employed spouse, be less qualified,
and a private tenant. In terms of workplace characteristics, these individuals
are less likely union members, more likely to be in part-time and temporary
employment, and more likely to be in unskilled manual/non-manual jobs. On
5No interruption pre-1.9.90 that lasted longer than 1 month, given that the pre-1.9.90
data does not capture very short spells by design. I include a control for whether individuals
are in their first job as a control in the regression analysis.
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the contrary, over 30s are more likely to have made an employer-to-employer
transition.
General experience levels are significantly lower for those who came into
their current employment via a spell of unemployment, 223 months versus 265
months (1991-1997). This was lower at 198 months for previous OLF and car-
ries over to the extended sample. However, previous status is not an accurate
predictor of current employer tenure when labour market history since leav-
ing full-time education is considered and non-employment is considered as a
grouped category (107 months for employer-to-employer transitions, and 116
months for those from non-employment, 1991-1997). Those entering current
employment from unemployment had 72 months of employment tenure on av-
erage, whereas those entering from OLF spells had accumulated 173 months of
current employer tenure over 1991-1997. This pattern carries itself over to the
1991-2001 period on which the descriptive analysis focusses. Granted, those
with previous interruption are consistently worse off in terms of earnings, re-
gardless of assumed rate of overtime pay (not reported), suggesting a lack of
catchup of wages to counterfactual levels. These tables highlight considerable
differences within the category of Non-Employment, motivating this studies
approach separating this labour market state into Unemployment and Out of
the Labour Force (OLF).
Table 5.2 shows substantial regional heterogeneity in the incidence of job
interruption as well as job-to-job transitions, motivating this studies interest
in regional variation in wage scarring. State dependence aside, if one is inter-
ested in how wage profiles of individual change over their career, then taking
into account the nature of those separations is key given differences in their
productivity signalling effect for future employers. Table 5.3 suggests that men
who entered their current job via an employer-to-employer transition, without
interruption, are 67% more likely to have quit their previous job voluntarily.
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A significant proportion of individuals who were made redundant in their pre-
vious jobs experienced no interruption (50.64%). This figure drops to 49.97%
when the information used to construct previous status is restricted to the last
five years. Arulampalam (2001) cites a larger figure, with 81% of redundancies
experiencing no interruption in her sample. Given that I could not establish
some of her data preparation steps, it is hard to reconcile these differences.
No mention is made in Arulampalam (2001) of the difficulties of constructing
continuous work-life histories, and how she dealt with overlapping data sources.
It could be that differences in the approach to this issue explain some of the
differences. If the methodology adopted in Arulampalam (2001) does not adopt
strategies to minimise systematic recall bias, then one could expect a general
underreporting of non-employment periods especially for frequent job changers
and/or if these periods were short in duration (Paull 2002). However, given
that the main BHPS uses a 12 month recall period, this recall problem would
not be as much of an issue as in the DWS for example. Using BHPS data Paull
(2002) does show that different methods for dealing with the recall issue does
lead to economically significant differences in results.
Table 5.3: Reason for leaving previous job by previous sta-
tus, 1991 - 2001.
EMP UNEMP OLF
% (Obs.) % (Obs.) % (Obs.)
Redundant 0.12 (888) 0.41 (846) 0.02 (43)
Sacked/ Dis-
missed
0.01 (83) 0.05 (105) 0.00 (5)
Temporary Job
Ended
0.03 (205) 0.11 (230) 0.02 (31)
Voluntary Quit 0.68 (4,827) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Missing 0.06 (419) 0.04 (93) 0.04 (68)
Other Reason 0.10 (688) 0.27 (567) 0.15 (262)
N/A 0.00 (0) 0.11 (235) 0.77 (1332)
Total 7109 2076 1741
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Statis-
tics refer to sample used in the Wage analysis, which excludes the problematic
regions defined in Table 5.1
Figure 5.1 illustrates how displacement rates varied over the survey years by
displacement type. Figure 5.1’s rates are as a percentage of the population
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‘at risk’ of displacement Following Farber (1999), those ‘at risk’ are proxied
by the number of employed workers at survey date. These rates are likely to
understate between survey-date dynamics in the sample.
Figure 5.1: Reason for Previous Job Ending (as % of total
displacements), 1991 - 2001.
Included in the analysis are workers that lost their jobs for “other” reasons.
This category includes separations for health reasons, maternity leave, and fam-
ily care, etc. Individuals that lost their jobs for unidentified/‘missing’6 reasons
are also included as a separate category. The “not applicable” category cap-
tures people who have never been displaced since leaving full-time education7.
Figure 5.1 highlights a trend increase in the proportion of people ending their
jobs for “other” reasons. These figures rose from 12% (1991), 18.8% (1997),
to 23.2% (2001). Due to the nature of the data in the BHPS, one is unable to
identify whether these individuals were subsequently recalled to their previous
employer. However, recall is less of a common practise in the UK than in the
US (Farber 1999). A sizeable increase in the proportion of redundancies is also
6Due to the inclusion of individuals present at Wave 2 and never after, ‘reason for leaving
previous job’ is systematically missing for a significant proportion of the sample that never
contributed to the wave 3 job history file, i.e. exited the sample at wave 2, as reason for
leaving previous job is not asked in the wave 2 labour market history. Thus this heterogeneous
category cannot be considered missing at random.
7Estimates are likely to be sensitive to the observation period over which labour market
history is considered when constructing the control group.
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apparent (14.3% in 1991, peaking at 18.1% in 1993 and dropping to 16.3% in
2001).
In addition to genuine cases, the missing category includes individuals who
were left the sample at wave 2, as well as individuals for which there was no life-
time job history (CLIFEJOB file) even though according to the survey design
there should be8. A significant proportion of individuals continuously present,
according to our definition, did not seem to contribute to the CLIFEJOB file
even though they were present in waves 2 & 3. This category is likely to be
considerably heterogenous and thus one does not expect any precise results
regarding the wage implications of this separation type.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Probit selection equation
Of the 3,516 individuals that were directly interviewed at Wave 1, 3,444 were
included in the selection equation after dropping problematic regions. This
figure reduced to 2,140 when those who were ever self-employed were dropped.
This figure drops to 2029 after observations with missing real wage values are
dropped. These individuals were not all subsequently followed, implying that
some of these individuals may drop out of the sample at a later date, something
-attrition- that the sample used in the wage analysis is conditioned to not in-
clude. The data selection rule is detailed in Section 5.3.2, as well as motivation
for controlling for sample selection and identification considerations. Follow-
ing Arulampalam (2001), the Inverse Mills Ratio λ(Xδ2) = φ(Xδ2)/Φ(Xδ2) is
then interacted with year dummies in order to model how this initial selection
varies across the years. Current labour market status is also conditioned to
exclude self-employment. Individuals reporting themselves in self-employment
8Issue with rule for dealing with pre-1.9.90 data as still remains an issue even after drop-
ping individuals not present for at least 3 waves.
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at interview date are excluded from the main analysis. This robustness of the
results to this restriction is tested in subsequent sections.
Probit results for the first stage participation decision are presented in Ta-
ble 5.13, in Appendix, Section 5.8.2. In a wage equation which only controls
for tenure, experience and individual fixed effects, selection is significantly neg-
ative. However, inline with both Arulampalam (2001) & Gregory & Jukes
(2001), I find evidence to suggest that in a fully specified model sample selec-
tion is insignificant and does not seem to play a major role in the data consid-
ered, once observed characteristics are controlled for. The Inverse Mills ratio
λ(Xδ2) = φ(Xδ2)/Φ(Xδ2) is consistently insignificant across specifications un-
der consideration. Furthermore, its inclusion does not have any bearing on the
estimated coefficients in the full specified model. The identifying variables are
jointly significant. However, given the limitations of the identifying variables
highlighted in Section 5.3, this cannot be interpreted as clear evidence of the
absence of sample selection.
5.5.2 1991-1997: Replication of Arulampalam (2001).
Key wage equation results for the 1991-1997 period are summarised in Tables
5.4, specifications 3 & 4 (OLS results are presented for comparison). Model 3/7
estimates the baseline model illustrated in equation 5.1, with d′itZit capturing
whether an individual entered the current employment spell via an unemploy-
ment/OLF spell. In Model 4/8 d′itZit enters as an interaction between previous
labour market status and current tenure. This captures how real wages recover
whilst on the job, relative to an individual who entered their current employ-
ment spell via a job-to-job transition. Current (interview date) labour market
status is conditioned to exclude self-employment in the main analysis, however,
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pre-1.9.90 labour market status is not9. Tenure effects are allowed to vary up
to 10 years, with the effect of tenure on wage restricted to being constant for
job spells longer than this. This permits non-linearities in the impact of tenure
on wage growth to be better captured, relative to a more restrictive quadratic
specification. Models 3 & 7 restrict the impact of previous labour market sta-
tus to be constant over time, whereas 4 & 8 allow this to vary up to 4 years
after the event, with the impact after 4 years restricted to being constant.
Table 5.4: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample: Individual-level observed heterogene-
ity and Fixed Effects, Previous Status unre-
stricted. Robust Standard Errors in parenthe-
sis.
1991-1997 1991-2001
OLS FE OLS FE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
constant 0.922*** 0.950*** 1.356*** 1.292*** 0.907*** 0.933*** 1.194*** 1.169***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.188) (0.189) (0.082) (0.085) (0.144) (0.144)
Tenure in current employment.
base is <1 year.
1-2 years 0.021 0.040 0.020 0.040*** 0.030* 0.038* 0.020* 0.034***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012)
2-3 years 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.019 0.035*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
3-4 years 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.056*** 0.063***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
4-5 years 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.068*** 0.082***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
5-10 years 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.075*** 0.088***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
10 years + 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.123*** 0.145*** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.113*** 0.125***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
Previous labour market status.
Inactivity -0.108*** -0.115** -0.106*** -0.100**
(0.020) (0.051) (0.016) (0.040)
Unemployment -0.095*** -0.084*** -0.093*** -0.098***
(0.012) (0.029) (0.010) (0.023)
Time since interruption (ref. Previous Employment)
Unemployment.
< 1 year -0.083*** -0.050 -0.098*** -0.076***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027)
1-2 years -0.133*** -0.107*** -0.116*** -0.115***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
2-3 years -0.110*** -0.117*** -0.096*** -0.100***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033)
3-4 years -0.111*** -0.107** -0.091*** -0.092***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.035) (0.034)
4 years + -0.085*** -0.122*** -0.086*** -0.123***
(0.016) (0.042) (0.012) (0.035)
Inactivity.
< 1 year -0.159** -0.065 -0.144*** -0.081
(0.066) (0.060) (0.055) (0.050)
1-2 years -0.177*** -0.129** -0.163*** -0.124**
(0.057) (0.060) (0.049) (0.051)
2-3 years -0.063 -0.093 -0.064 -0.056
Continued on next page
9Job history in the last 12 months is not conditioned to exclude self-employment. This is
consistent with the approach adopted by Arulampalam (2001). Wave 1 interviews did not ask
this question, and thus self-employment status cannot be easily determined for individuals
who did change labour market status between 1990 and 1991. Halpin (1997) uses the overlap
between Wave 1 and the retrospective labour market history information collected at Wave 2
in order to determine this information. I do not attempt to ascertain this, grouping previous
employment and self-employment instead.
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Table 5.4 – continued from previous page
1991-1997 1991-2001
OLS FE OLS FE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(0.055) (0.067) (0.049) (0.056)
3-4 years -0.177*** -0.179*** -0.142*** -0.115**
(0.046) (0.064) (0.043) (0.053)
4 years + -0.081*** -0.174** -0.089*** -0.116**
(0.023) (0.070) (0.018) (0.051)
N 7666 7666 7666 7666 10912 10912 10912 10912
LL -3079 -3074 1414 1422 -4225 -4222 1440 1445
R¯2 0.573 0.573 0.367 0.368 0.604 0.604 0.512 0.512
RMS error 0.363 0.363 0.202 0.202 0.358 0.358 0.213 0.213
AIC 6315.729 6321.938 -2673.422 -2674.406 8623.324 8633.461 -2707.988 -2702.320
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: Current
tenure, cumulative experience, age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since
leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term
contract, part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies
and industry dummies. Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Full results are available from the author on request.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Empirical results highlight persistent average wage penalties that depend on
previous labour market status. These results replicate those of Arulampalam
(2001) very closely. Table 5.4 presents fixed effects estimates based on an
the unrestricted previous labour market definition. Specification [3] suggests
that, relative to a job-to-job transition, previous inactivity carries the largest
average wage penalty at 11.5%. Previous unemployment carries a relatively
lower penalty of 8.4% into future employment.
Specifications 4 & 8 suggest that, relative to a job-to-job transition, entering
one’s current job via a spell of unemployment carries an estimated 5.0% average
wage penalty in the first year of employment. This initial penalty is insignificant
at conventional levels, but increases to a significant 11.7% over the first 3
years of employment, with a long run penalty of 12.2% after 4 years. Previous
inactivity carries a higher initial penalty, 6.5%, which rises to a significant
12.9% in the second year, relative to the baseline. This penalty rises to 17.9%
during the third year of re-employment. A significant penalty of 17.4% remains
in the long run, however, the wage consequences of this category are likely to be
less precisely measured due to heterogeneity within this labour market state.
Due to small cell size, Arulampalam (2001) grouped previous labour market
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status into non-employment versus employment categories. This strategy is not
pursued as this study is not hampered by this limitation to the same extent.
The estimates are lower than many found in the existing US/UK literature
due to the fact that they are averaged over all possible separation types, and are
estimated relative to individuals who came into their current employment spell
via a job-to-job transition. Studies focussing on involuntary job displacement
are likely to find larger estimates of the impact of job loss, especially if they
focus on high seniority/highly attached workers who stand to lose the most
from job displacement. Furthermore, substantial heterogeneity exists across
countries. However, the wage losses found in this study are consistent with
those reported by UK longitudinal studies. See Table 5.16 for the results of
selected studies.
5.6 Extensions
5.6.1 1991-2001
Columns 4 & 8, table 5.4, highlight that extending the time-period under con-
sideration to 1991-2001 reduces the economic significance of previous inactivity.
Previous inactivity over the 1991-2001 period is estimated to carry a 9.9% wage
penalty in the current job. As the interaction terms indicate, this penalty seems
to be less precisely measured relative to the large persistent impact of previous
unemployment. Coming into employment via a spell of inactivity is estimated
to carry an insignificant wage penalty of 8.1% in the first year, relative to a
job-to-job transition. This penalty increases to a significant 12.4% in the sec-
ond year, and the long run penalty of 11.6% which is significant at the 5%
level. Initial wage losses of individuals coming into their current job via a spell
of unemployment shows no sign of recovery, with an initial penalty of 7.6% in
the first year of employment, rising to around 12.3% in the long-run.
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The results so far suggest that the wage penalty associated with a spell of
unemployment is large and persistent, with no sign of recovery. Although mag-
nitudes may differ, this is consistent with the findings in the existing literature.
There is likely to be substantial heterogeneity across separation types. Data
limitations have prevented many previous studies from explicitly addressing
this issue. In what follows the impact of an interruption by reason for that in-
terruption is considered. Displacements “for cause” are likely to carry different
implications into future employment than separations that can be considered
as independent of individual characteristics. Unfortunately, the BHPS does not
contain enough information to accurately identify the impact of being sacked
from a previous job. Furthermore, the UK institutional context means that
the reported reason for leaving previous job categories are unlikely to be pre-
cise. Temporary contracts are likely to be stepping stones to permanent jobs
(Booth et al. 2002), and whether someone reports themselves as redundant or
sacked/dismissed is likely to be more subjective in the UK than the US (Bor-
land et al. 2002). Unlike US DWS-based studies, the BHPS does not allow for
the separation of layoffs from plant closures.
5.6.2 Reason for leaving previous job: Redundancy
The evidence of State Dependence in individuals’ Wage-Tenure profiles on re-
employment raises the question of how this varies across reasons for leaving
previous employment. A full analysis of involuntary job displacement is beyond
the scope of this study, due to lack of administrative data. However, whether
the impact of displacement on wage scarring varies with self-reported reason
for leaving previous job is of interest. Focus is limited to impact of self-reported
“involuntary” displacement (redundancies), which are likely to be an imperfect
proxy for exogenous job separations.
The definition of a displacement implemented in this analysis is consis-
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tent with Arulampalam (2001). The impact of involuntary displacements (re-
dundancies) is gauged relative to a reference group which includes all other
separation types (dismissals, temporary job ended, other reasons), job-to-job
transitions (which are not considered as job displacement) and the group of
never displaced (who were in their first labour market spell). I control for the
missing category in all specifications and do not include this in the base cate-
gory. Where an individual left their previous employment for a better job and
subsequently experienced a spell of non-employment, this is treated as a move
for undefined (other) reasons. This affects 0.035% of separations.
Wage Scarring effect of Incidence and Duration of previous Unemploy-
ment/OLF
Contrary to Arulampalam (2001), who finds a positive average impact of 1.8%,
specification 1, Table 5.5, suggests that being made redundant carries an av-
erage wage penalty of around 7.0% in the subsequent job. This is not a new
observation in the literature, and accords with intuition more closely than the
aforementioned result. “A surprising fraction of job changes (with and without
on-the-job search) involve wage cuts (Devine & Kiefer 1993).” Holding reason
for leaving previous job constant, coming into the current employment spell
via a spell of unemployment carries a large wage penalty of 10% (significant
at the 5% level). Although insignificant at conventional levels, for those that
were made redundant the penalty associated with previous unemployment is
non-linear with age, being lower for those under 45. This suggests that on aver-
age, the impact of being made redundant and experiencing a spell of disruption
does not carry a significantly different wage penalty to other separation types
over and above the impact of experiencing a spell of unemployment.
Data limitations implied that Arulampalam (2001) was not able to iden-
tify the impact of previous unemployment and non-employment separately,
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grouping them into a non-employment category. Specification 1 separates out
previous unemployment and inactivity (out of the labour force). Both the in-
cidence and the duration of unemployment carry a significant negative wage
penalty into subsequent employment. Controlling for duration, previous unem-
ployment carries a wage penalty of 6.2% into subsequent employment spells.
Moreover, unemployment spells lasting between six and twelve months carry an
additional 8.9% penalty into subsequent employment relative to those lasting
less than six. Specification 3 suggests that for multiple spells of unemploy-
ment the wage penalty associated with unemployment reduces with incidence,
i.e. the first spell carries the highest penalty (consistent with the finding for
non-employment in Arulampalam (2001). However the penalty associated with
inactivity does not diminish with incidence in the same fashion.) The first spell
carries the same wage penalty as the next. This should not be interpreted as
suggesting that experiencing more unemployment spells is better than less.
It may be that unemployment leads to re-employment in lower paying jobs,
implying a lower wage penalty due to future incidence.
The general story seems to be robust to extensions of the observation period,
bar from the duration effect (specifications 4 to 6, table 5.5). Whilst previous
inactivity remains insignificant once holding duration constant, the impact of
unemployment duration loses significance over and above the impact of a state
dependence in the extended sample. Moreover, OLF spells lasting between six
and twelve months are estimated to carry a significant 19.5% wage penalty
relative to those lasting less than six. The estimates from the 1991 to 2001
period are likely to be more precisely estimated, suggesting that the impact of
inactivity runs primarily through the duration effect. However, extending the
observation period strengthens the argument that the penalty associated with
inactivity doesn’t diminish with incidence.
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Table 5.5: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, Individual-level observed heterogene-
ity controls, Previous Status unrestricted. Ro-
bust Standard errors in parenthesis.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Reason for leaving job§.
redundant -0.070* -0.071**
(0.039) (0.030)
Previous Status (ref. Previous Employment.)
Unemployment -0.100** -0.062* -0.145** -0.102** -0.084** -0.150**
(0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Inactivity -0.082 -0.054 -0.135** -0.079 0.009 -0.142**
(0.066) (0.084) (0.057) (0.049) (0.070) (0.049)
Reason for leaving job by previous labour market status.
(ref. previous employment/no interruption)
Unemployment
Redundant 0.105 0.086
(0.065) (0.054)
Redundant*45+ -0.065 -0.076
(0.055) (0.048)
Inactivity
Redundant -0.094 0.004
(0.141) (0.102)
Redundant*45+ 0.217 0.176
(0.220) (0.211)
Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.)
Unemployment
6-12 months -0.089* -0.060
(0.049) (0.039)
12 months+ -0.033 -0.026
(0.074) (0.053)
Inactivity
6-12 months -0.078 -0.195**
(0.114) (0.091)
12 months+ -0.091 -0.129
(0.112) (0.092)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
1+ spell -0.074 -0.057
(0.059) (0.047)
Previous Unemployment
1+ spell 0.119** 0.107**
(0.058) (0.044)
Previous Inactivity
1+ spell 0.033 0.072
(0.144) (0.101)
N 7666 7666 7666 10912 10912 10912
LL 1430 1418 1427 1468 1459 1469
R¯2 0.369 0.367 0.368 0.513 0.513 0.514
RMS error 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.212 0.213 0.212
AIC -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.8e+03
§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a
displacement (first job spells). Dummy variable for missing reasons included in all specifications. Sample selection:
Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: Current tenure, cumulative
experience, age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-
time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry
dummies. Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Full results are available from the author on request.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
5.6.3 Regional data
The results so far could be subject to a heterogeneity explanation if, conditional
on regional mobility, the wage penalty due to job displacement varies within a
country. The van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis would imply that the short-
run wage penalty faced by individuals who experience unemployment in high
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unemployment regions will be relatively lower than that faced by the equivalent
individual in low unemployment regions, due to their unemployment being seen
as more a characteristic of the region rather than an individual productivity
signal. In accordance with the predictions of job search theory, one would
expect the average wage penalty associated with disruptions to be higher in
slack than in tight labour markets.
Job search theory would predict that individuals displaced in tight labour
markets will face lower job search costs due to more vacancies being available
relative to the stock of job seekers (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). In slack labour
markets, the prospects of a successful match are lower as there will be more
unemployment job seekers applying for a small pool of job vacancies. Of course,
highly mobile (young and skilled) workers will be more able to mitigate this
phenomenon by migrating to a tight labour market, however this may be less
likely for less skilled workers and older workers with more regional attachments.
Granted, individuals migrating to another region may face larger wage penal-
ties than the equivalent worker finding reemployment in their pre-displacement
region (Carrington 1993).
In the UK context, the closest approximation to a self-contained local labour
market is the Travel-To-Work Area (TTWA) level of aggregation (see Ball 2009
for more information). The criterion on which TTWAs are defined is that: at
least 75% of the resident economically active population actually work in the
area, and that of everyone working in the area, at least 75% actually live in
the area (Office for National Statistics 2008a). An important limitation of the
TTWA measure is that: “[a]s some, predominantly professional and manage-
rial, workers have increased their travel to work distance the self containment
factor has been reduced. In effect this removes the extreme cases, so the TTWA
definition has moved closer to a manual/ semi-skilled based definition (NOMIS
1998).” The underlying difficulty of defining self-contained labour markets im-
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plies that an argument relating to the regional-specificity of human capital will
be confounded by the fact that highly mobile young and/or skilled workers are
less likely to work in their region of residence than their less skilled counter-
parts. Conducting this analysis at the Local Authority aggregation level makes
the local labour market story even more implausible. A more plausible expla-
nation may be that region of residence act purely as a signal of potential ability
in the recruitment process. Individuals may select into a move across regional
boundaries (LAD, TTWA) between labour market spells. However, evidence
from the BHPS suggests that this is less of a concern given the low incidence
(see Section 5.2).
Table 5.6: Average wage penalties by previous labour mar-
ket characteristics. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis (“Reason for leaving previous job”
not controlled for).
Previous Labour Market Characteristics.
Time Period Tight Slack Urban Rural High U Low U
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).[
Unemployment
1991 - 1997 -0.085***
(0.030)
-0.094***
(0.038)
-0.052
(0.033)
-0.141***
(0.053)
-0.084***
(0.030)
-0.097**
(0.038)
1991 - 2001 -0.098***
(0.024)
-0.098***
(0.030)
-0.072***
(0.025)
-0.141***
(0.044)
-0.097***
(0.024)
-0.104***
(0.030)
Inactivity
1991 - 1997 -0.085
(0.052)
-0.102*
(0.057)
-0.067
(0.052)
-0.114
(0.073)
-0.098*
(0.051)
-0.056
(0.055)
1991 - 2001 -0.078*
(0.043)
-0.102**
(0.047)
-0.073
(0.044)
-0.089
(0.057)
-0.089**
(0.042)
-0.062
(0.044)
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).†
Unemployment
1991 - 1997 -0.079**
(0.034)
-0.093***
(0.032)
-0.052
(0.033)
-0.140***
(0.053)
-0.084***
(0.031)
-0.088***
(0.033)
1991 - 2001 -0.091***
(0.028)
-0.106***
(0.027)
-0.072***
(0.025)
-0.141***
(0.044)
-0.098***
(0.024)
-0.098***
(0.024)
Inactivity
1991 - 1997 -0.085
(0.054)
-0.092*
(0.054)
-0.067
(0.052)
-0.115
(0.073)
-0.083
(0.052)
-0.094*
(0.053)
1991 - 2001 -0.064
(0.044)
-0.102**
(0.045)
-0.073*
(0.044)
-0.089
(0.057)
-0.078*
(0.043)
-0.084*
(0.043)
[ Definitions: Tight Labour Market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio ≥ 2/3*Median. High Unemployment Region
- Unemployment Rate ≥ 2/3*Median. Urban/Rural - Defined in text. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
† Definitions: Tight Labour Market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio ≥ Median. High Unemployment Region -
Unemployment Rate ≥ Median. Urban/Rural - Defined in text. Full results in Appendix 5.8.3. Significance levels:
***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
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TTWA Labour market tightness
Table 5.6 suggests that the average wage penalty associated with a job interrup-
tion is slightly higher in slack local labour markets, however this difference is not
statistically significant at the 10% level. In tight local labour markets, a spell
of unemployment carries an 8.5% wage penalty into subsequent employment.
This figure rises to 9.4% in slack Travel-to-Work Areas. Spell of inactivity
carry an 8.5% wage penalty if experienced in tight labour markets. However,
this penalty is insignificant at conventional levels (using a pairwise t-test under
the assumption of independence). A significant 10.2% wage penalty is associ-
ated with inactivity spells experienced in slack labour markets, however this
is insignificantly different to the 8.5% penalty mentioned above. This remains
robust over the 1991-2001 period, no significant differences in the penalty asso-
ciated with unemployment or inactivity persist, conditional on labour market
tightness.
This result could be confounded by heterogeneity across separation types
conditional on labour market tightness. Controlling for reason for leaving pre-
vious job, the average wage penalty associated with a spell of unemployment
experienced in a tight local labour market is marginally larger over both periods
(Table 5.6). But the average only tells part of the story. Redundancy followed
by unemployment in tight labour markets implies a 2.2% wage gain (13.7%-
11%) on average, with no significant age variation in this effect. However,
unemployment in slack local areas carries the full 9.4% wage penalty, with no
variation by age. This story is robust to extensions of the observation period,
although whilst the wage gain becomes marginal (0.1% gain) in tight labour
markets the difference in the penalties is insignificant at conventional levels
for the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 periods. Being made redundant and then
experiencing a spell of inactivity in a slack labour market has a large positive
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impact on wage growth for the over 45’s, whereas the impact is negative but
insignificant at conventional levels for those under this age threshold. However
these estimates loses significance when the observation window is extended.
This may be capturing the possibility that higher levels of industry-specific
human capital (more to lose from switching industry) and more disposable in-
come imply that the older workforce are more likely to engage in productive
search, i.e. more likely to be targeted in their search efforts, and more likely
wait until an appropriate job offer is received than to accept the first job of-
fer that comes along (Lippman & McCall 1976). Productive search suggests
a positive relationship between non-employment duration and re-employment
wages. However, this could also be due to an inappropriate control group, as
wages are generally higher for those over 45 and wage profiles flatter (Kletzer
& Fairlie 2003).
Panel 3 looks at the time pattern of wage scarring whilst holding reason for
leaving previous job constant. No significant variation by age is found. This
specification suggests that a higher variance in the wage penalty associated
with a spell of unemployment experienced in tight relative to slack local labour
markets over the 1991 -1997 period. The penalty associated with previous
redundancy, and subsequent unemployment, increases roughly monotonically
with time on the job in both tight and slack labour markets. Over the 1991-
1997 period, this decreases from a 13.4% gain in the first year (6.7% penalty,
insignificantly different to the average effect), a 1.6% gain in the second (13.4%-
11.8%), a 1.7% penalty in the third (13.4%-15.7%), and a long-run 1.6% wage
penalty (13.4%-15%) relative to the counterfactual. However, all the short-
term gains seem to be in tight labour markets. The biggest wage losses are
associated with unemployment spells experienced in slack TTWAs. This wage
penalty is 12.4% in the first year of tenure, 22.1% in the second, and 11.5% in
the long-run. This story carries over to extensions of the observation period.
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Being made redundant and then having a spell of inactivity (not reported)
is found to carry an insignificant wage penalty into subsequent employment
spells, over and above the average effect in panel 2, regardless of where it was
experienced.
Time-varying Regional Heterogeneity Accessibility, a population-density
based measure10 enters positively and significantly into specification 2 (These
results, not presented here, are available from the author on request). Individ-
uals living in accessible regions earn on average 20-24% more than individuals
living in inaccessible regions, holding all else constant and depending on time-
period considered. Although negative, the impact of living in an urban area
on earnings is insignificant in all specifications, and halved in the extended
sample. The 12 month moving average of the change in ILO unemployment
rate enters positively and significantly. Individuals living in local labour mar-
kets with higher longer run unemployment growth rates earn more on average,
whilst the quarterly unemployment rate is insignificant. A one standard devia-
tion increase in the 12 month average change in quarterly ILO unemployment
increases real wages by 78%, everything else held constant. Although incon-
sistent with a priori expectations, this effect is not robust to extensions of the
observation period as is likely a feature of the economy during the 1991-1997
period the first half of which was characterised by recession with unemployment
levels peaking in the first quarter of 1993. These results are robust to the in-
clusion of both local authority and travel-to-work area fixed effects, suggesting
that the main story seems to be robust for this period of observation. These
10England & Wales: Based on the population density of the surrounding area. National
Statistics Postcode Directory based. Measured at Output Area (OA) level. Local Authorities
with more than 90% of OAs accessible are defined as accessible. Scotland: Based on driving
distance to nearest large settlement (>10000 inhabitants). See Appendix D, Section D.5.1
for more information on construction.
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Table 5.7: Wage Penalties: Labour Market Tightness†.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
Tight -11.0%***
(0.042)
-10.5%***
(0.033)
Slack -9.4%*
(0.051)
-10.4%***
(0.037)
Inactivity
Tight -3.9%
(0.070)
-5.9%
(0.053)
Slack -5.8%
(0.071)
-7.4%
(0.055)
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancy§ -8.1%* (0.039) -7.2%** (0.029) -8.3%* (0.040) -7.3%** (0.030)
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancy§ (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Tight ALL 13.7%**
(0.065)
10.6%*
(0.055)
13.4%**
(0.065)
10.5%**
(0.054)
x ≥ 45 -5.1%
(0.057)
-7.8%
(0.049)
-5.5%
(0.058)
-8.0%
(0.049)
Slack ALL 7.6%
(0.079)
6.3%
(0.071)
7.8%
(0.077)
5.8%
(0.068)
x ≥ 45 -3.1%
(0.074)
-3.7%
(0.067)
-2.2%
(0.076)
-3.3%
(0.064)
Inactivity
Tight ALL -7.5%
(0.156)
3.8%
(0.128)
-10.7%
(0.158)
2.4%
(0.128)
x ≥ 45 12.1%
(0.227)
10.9%
(0.219)
12.4%
(0.221)
11.6%
(0.215)
Slack ALL -16.2%
(0.190)
-5.9%
(0.089)
-5.9%
(0.219)
1.0%
(0.119)
x ≥ 45 47.4%**
(0.219)
23.0%
(0.165)
57.6%**
(0.237)
35.2%*
(0.190)
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job §.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,∞)
1991 - 1997
Tight -6.3%
(0.046)
-11.8%*
(0.044)
-15.7%***
(0.051)
→ -15.0%***
(0.052)
Slack -12.4%*
(0.075)
-22.1%**
(0.093)
-7.0%
(0.170)
→ -11.5%**
(0.056)
1991 - 2001
Tight -7.6%**
(0.035)
-11.4%***
(0.036)
-12.4%***
(0.041)
→ -13.3%***
(0.042)
Slack -15.2%**
(0.062)
-18.8%***
(0.070)
-6.3%
(0.116)
→ -10.6%**
(0.044)
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > 2/3*Median. Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced
a displacement (first job spells). Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specifications.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions insignificant over and above the average impact. Full results
available from author on request.
results are generally invariant to the choice of specification. Therefore, in the
interest of brevity, I do not discuss them further in subsequent sections.
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Table 5.8: Wage Penalties: URBAN/RURAL†. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
Urban -5.8%
(0.044)
-7.5%**
(0.033)
Rural -19.3%**
(0.075)
-16.5%***
(0.062)
Inactivity
Urban -0.1%
(0.067)
-4.0%
(0.054)
Rural -7.8%
(0.086)
-7.3%
(0.064)
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancy§ -8.1%* (0.039) -7.2%** (0.029) -8.3%* (0.040) -7.3%** (0.030)
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancy§ (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Urban ALL 7.6%
(0.074)
7.7%
(0.060)
7.5%
(0.074)
7.7%
(0.059)
≥ 45 -2.4%
(0.075)
-4.3%
(0.057)
-2.2%
(0.074)
-4.0%
(0.057)
Rural ALL 21.7%**
(0.100)
16.7%*
(0.089)
21.4%**
(0.100)
17.3%*
(0.089)
≥ 45 -9.5%
(0.088)
-12.4%
(0.085)
-9.7%
(0.089)
-13.5%
(0.085)
Inactivity
Urban ALL -14.3%
(0.161)
0.2%
(0.112)
-15.6%
(0.158)
1.0%
(0.110)
≥ 45 38.0%**
(0.191)
27.0%**
(0.136)
34.1%*
(0.185)
27.1%**
(0.131)
Rural ALL -8.3%
(0.173)
-7.9%
(0.163)
-3.9%
(0.201)
-3.4%
(0.176)
≥ 45 9.0%
(0.306)
18.8%
(0.334)
7.1%
(0.331)
14.6%
(0.343)
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job §.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,∞)
1991 - 1997
Urban -1.6%
(0.047)
-10.3%**
(0.049)
-7.2%
(0.056)
→ -9.6%*
(0.055)
Rural -18.6%**
(0.085)
-15.5%**
(0.079)
-24.3%***
(0.093)
→ -21.9%***
(0.085)
1991 - 2001
Urban -4.4%
(0.035)
-11.2%***
(0.038)
-7.7%**
(0.044)
→ -9.6%**
(0.044)
Rural -16.7%**
(0.069)
-15.0%**
(0.065)
-16.1%**
(0.074)
→ -20.4%***
(0.076)
† Urban/Rural - Defined in text. Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced
a displacement (first job spells). Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specifications.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignificant. Full results available from author on
request.
Local Authority-level characteristics
Due to lack of detailed controls at the travel-to-work area (TTWA) level of
aggregation, I disaggregate the study to the local authority (LAUA) level in
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order to control for detailed regional-level characteristics. This exercise is car-
ried out whilst maintaining a one-to-one link between the LAUA and TTWA
levels of aggregation. Controlling for the length of interruption, unemployment
incidence and regional-level characteristics, Table 5.6 suggests that, relative
to a job-to-job transition, the impact of experiencing both inactivity and un-
employment carry higher wage penalties for individuals living in rural local
authorities. Coming into the current employment spell via unemployment in a
rural local authority carries a 14% wage penalty over the 1991-1997 period, rel-
ative to a job-to-job transition. This compares to an insignificant 5.2% penalty
associated with the same experience in urban LAUAs. Likewise, experiencing
a spell of inactivity in a rural LAUA carries a 11.4% relative wage penalty,
whereas the penalty associated with urban local authorities is lower at 6.7%
and insignificant at conventional levels. Average results are robust to exten-
sions of the observation period. This may be driven by the fact that there are
less jobs in rural areas, so an individual would have to search wider in order to
find re-employment. However, local authorities cannot credibly be considered
self-contained labour markets. It may be the case that less skilled workers are
more likely to find local re-employment, however this is less likely for the mobile
skilled workforce for whom even travel-to-work areas may be inappropriate. If
distance is a factor when considering job offers, this may manifest itself in a
negative correlation between urbanity and unemployment duration given that
urban areas are generally characterised by higher levels of economic activity.
However, Chapter 4 showed that urban conurbations were amongst the worst
places in Great Britain to live in terms of unemployment experiences. The
time pattern of Wage Scarring suggests that being made redundant and then
experiencing unemployment in an urban area is equally damaging for future
earnings potential, independent of age. Taken together, these results suggest
profound negative implications of unemployment experience for those living in
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urban areas, lending further support to Government initiatives like New Deal
for Communities targeting these locations.
Controlling for reason for leaving previous job, only the impact of an un-
employment spell experienced in a rural local authority remains significant at
conventional levels over the 1991-1997 period (Panel 1). Whilst a spell of ru-
ral unemployment carries a 19.3% wage penalty into subsequent employment,
relative to a job-to-job transition the penalty associated with urban unemploy-
ment spell is insignificant at conventional levels. Moreover, the impact of rural
unemployment is non-linear with age (see panel 2, column 3). For those under
45, a spell of unemployment experienced in a rural local authority after being
made redundant carries a 2.4% (21.7% -19.3%) wage gain into future employ-
ment relative to a other separation types. However, over 45s experience the
full 19.3% wage penalty regardless. Since the over 45s are more likely to be
mortgaged home owners, this result may be due to financial and residential
mobility constraints implying that displaced mortgaged home owners are more
likely to lower their reservation wages and accept local re-employment than
renters who have more flexibility to widen their job search (Coulson & Fisher
2009). Although the average wage penalty associated with inactivity is insignif-
icant over the 1991-1997 period, being made redundant and then experiencing
a spell of inactivity in an urban local authority carries a substantial wage gain
into future employment for the over 45s (38%). These results are robust to
time-period extensions.
The wage scar associated with previous inactivity is insignificant at con-
ventional levels over the 1991-1997 period. Granted, a large and persistent
wage penalty is associated with unemployment both in urban and rural local
authorities. The magnitude of this effect is twice as large in rural areas on
average (see panel 3). Moreover, this story carries over to extensions of the
observation period to 1991-2001. Over the 1991-1997 period, for the under 45s
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redundancy and subsequent rural unemployment implies a 2.8% wage gain (-
18.6% + 21.4%) in the first year of tenure, a 5.9% gain (-15.5% + 21.4%) in the
second, a 2.9% wage loss (-24.3% + 21.4%) in the third and a long-run wage
penalty of 0.5% (-21.9% + 21.4%). However, the over 45s the same scenario im-
plies the full penalty of 18.6% in the first year, 15.5% in the second, increasing
to 21.9% in the long-run. Redundancy and subsequent urban unemployment
implies an insignificant 1.6% wage loss in the first year, rising to a significant
10.3% penalty in the second, and a 9.6% wage penalty in the long-run, relative
to the job-to-job transitions. No significant age variation is found in the impact
of redundancy followed by urban unemployment, and these results carry over
to extensions of the time frame.
van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis: Weak support for the van Dijk &
Folmer (1999) hypothesis is found for the UK (Table 5.9, Panel 1), on aver-
age and stronger support for over 45s made redundant in their previous jobs.
However, the average differences in the wage penalties associated with unem-
ployment experienced in high versus low unemployment regions are consistently
insignificant at conventional levels (using a pairwise t-test under the assump-
tion of independence). The strongest support being in the case of redundancies.
In a specification without controls for heterogeneity across separation-type, on
average unemployment experienced in areas of low unemployment is found to
carry a higher wage penalty into subsequent employment, all else constant
(Table 5.6). Holding duration of interruption, unemployment incidence and
reason for leaving previous job constant, unemployment spells experienced in
high unemployment regions carry an average 10.8% wage penalty into subse-
quent employment. This figure is higher at 13.1% in low unemployment regions
(Column 1).
The economic significance of these two labour market states remains robust
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Table 5.9: Wage Penalties: High Unemployment/Low
Unemployment†. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
High U -10.8%***
(0.041)
-10.8%***
(0.031)
Low U -13.1%**
(0.055)
-12.1%***
(0.042)
Inactivity
High U -4.9%
(0.069)
-6.7%
(0.053)
Low U -1.8%
(0.072)
-4.8%
(0.054)
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancy§ -8.1%* (0.039) -7.2%** (0.029) -8.3%* (0.040) -7.3%** (0.030)
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancy§ (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
High U ALL 11.9%*
(0.065)
10.1%*
(0.056)
11.5%*
(0.065)
10.2%*
(0.055)
≥ 45 -2.2%
(0.056)
-6.9%
(0.048)
-2.1%
(0.057)
-6.5%
(0.048)
Low U ALL 19.9%**
(0.079)
13.4%**
(0.067)
19.9%**
(0.080)
13.7%**
(0.068)
≥ 45 -16.6%**
(0.078)
-12.0%*
(0.071)
-15.7%**
(0.078)
-11.9%*
(0.070)
Inactivity
High U ALL -12.2%
(0.133)
-1.5%
(0.098)
-13.3%
(0.135)
0.0%
(0.099)
≥ 45 9.8%
(0.213)
13.7%
(0.205)
11.4%
(0.214)
15.1%
(0.206)
Low U ALL 22.6%
(0.180)
27.2%*
(0.146)
23.3%
(0.186)
28.8%**
(0.144)
≥ 45 -5.4%
(0.229)
-8.6%
(0.242)
-6.9%
(0.229)
-10.3%
(0.235)
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job §.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,∞)
1991 - 1997
High U -6.6%
(0.042)
-12.1%***
(0.044)
-13.1%**
(0.053)
→ -15.2%***
(0.051)
Low U -13.7%
(0.095)
-17.8%**
(0.075)
-16.0%**
(0.075)
→ -16.0%***
(0.057)
1991 - 2001
High U -8.0%
(0.033)
-12.3%***
(0.035)
-11.3%***
(0.042)
→ -13.5%***
(0.042)
Low U -13.2%*
(0.072)
-16.0%***
(0.057)
-10.4%
(0.065)
→ -14.7%***
(0.047)
† High Unemployment labour market - ILO unemployment rate > 2/3*Median. Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5%
*: 10%§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced
a displacement (first job spells). Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specifications.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignificant. Full results available from author on
request.
to extensions of the observation period, however, these estimates may be weak-
ened/confounded due to efficiency wage arguments (Shapiro & Stiglitz 1984).
This argument suggests that if firms use higher wages as a means of decreasing
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turnover and the incentive to shirk on-the-job, then higher unemployment lev-
els make losing a job more costly. This cost is predicted to decrease with the
level of unemployment benefits and increases with the level of unemployment.
As long as the incentive to pay efficiency wages remains constant over time,
then fixed effects will control for this. However, if this is related to the business
cycle then this won’t be the case, although time dummies will help to absorb
most of the business cycle effect.
Panel 2 demonstrates the age variation in wage scarring, by previous labour
market status. In all specifications previous inactivity is insignificant at con-
ventional levels. Over the 1991-1997 period, redundancy and subsequent un-
employment in high unemployment regions carries a significant 1.1% average
wage gain into subsequent employment for under 45s (-10.8% + 11.9%). For
those over 45, the same scenario implies a 1.1% average wage gain. Whilst re-
dundancy and subsequent unemployment in low unemployment regions implies
a 6.8% average wage gain (-13.1% + 19.9%) for the under 45s, the over 45s
experience a 9.8% penalty (-13.1% + 19.9% - 16.6%) in subsequent employ-
ment. This result is robust to extending the time period, however redundancy-
unemployment spells in high unemployment regions imply a -0.7% average wage
penalty, independent of age.
Redundancy and subsequent unemployment in high unemployment regions
is associated with a 6.6% wage penalty which is insignificantly different to the
11.5% average wage gain in the first year of employment. This would imply
a 4.9% wage gain, although this linear combination would be insignificant at
conventional levels (Panel 3). This drops to a 0.6% wage penalty (11.5% -
12.1%) in the second year, with a long-run wage penalty of -3.7% after 4 years
in employment. These penalties are not found to vary with age group.
In the case of low unemployment regions, the first year penalty for the under
45s is insignificantly different to the average wage gain of 19.9% associated with
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previous redundancy and subsequent unemployment for this age category. This
drops to a 2.1% gain (19.9% - 17.8%) in the second year, and a 3.9% wage gain
(19.9% - 16%) in the long-run. For the >45 age category, previous redundancy
and subsequent unemployment is associated with an 13.7% wage penalty in
the first year (insignificantly different to the significant 4.2% average wage gain
(19.9%-15.7%)), dropping to 13.6% (4.2% - 17.8%) in the second and 11.8%
(4.2% - 16%)in the long-run. This time profile of wage scarring carries over
to extensions of the observation period, see table 5.9. Whilst the differences
across region-types are robust but relatively small on average, at around 2%,
the age differences in the impact of redundancy remain large with significant
wage losses associated with unemployment spells in low unemployment regions
for the over 45s (11.8% in low-, versus 3.7% in high unemployment regions, an
8.1% difference). The Local Authority-level results are robust to the inclusion
of TTWA fixed effects, allowing for correlation across LAs within each TTWA.
Table 5.10: Reason for leaving previous job (as proportion of those
‘at risk’ (Farber 1999))
Reason for Leaving Previous Job (♣)
Prev. Unem-
ployment
Redundant Sacked Temporary
Job
Voluntary
Quit
Missing Other N/A Total
Low 0.029 0.004 0.007 0.091 0.010 0.030 0.029 0.200
High 0.133 0.013 0.036 0.350 0.044 0.109 0.114 0.800
Total 1777 192 466 4827 580 1517 1567 10926
♣ - (Proportion of total separations, by level of unemployment)
Incidence and Duration of Separations in previously high versus low un-
employment regions: Table 5.10 suggests that, on average, separations are
more likely in high unemployment Local Authorities, measured as a proportion
of those in employment at survey date (including redundancies). Moreover,
the evidence about average durations of previous spells does not suggest clear
differences in spell durations across region types (see Table 5.11). If incidence
is higher, but durations shorter in high than low unemployment regions (i.e.
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high levels of labour market churn) then one would expect the negative earn-
ings consequences of career interruptions to be lower on average from a human
capital theory perspective. However, the descriptives suggest that whilst inci-
dence is higher in high unemployment regions, there is no marked difference in
average durations over the sample as a whole . This would suggest that the
wage consequences of displacement in high unemployment regions would be
higher on average. Establishing whether this is true, all else constant, would
require further analysis.
Table 5.11: Average length of previous spell, by reason for leaving
previous job
Prev. Unemployment Level
¶ Low (]) High (])
Missing 76 85
N/A 112 114
Voluntary Quit 56 51
Redundant 57 55
Sacked 16 19
Temporary Job 8 11
Other 40 36
Total 60 58
¶ - Reason for leaving previous job. ] - Local Authority Un-
employment Level
The earlier literature on gross worker flows suggested that changes in the size
and distribution of inflows into unemployment are the main determinant of the
unemployment rate. This suggests that incidence of unemployment matters
more for labour market outcomes. Cyclical unemployment is concentrated
in groups with low exit probabilities. Thus, the observed procyclicality in
average exit probabilities from unemployment may largely be explained by
these compositional effects (Darby et al. 1986). Recent work has questioned the
composition explanation (e.g. Shimer 2012). Moreover, recent literature, e.g.
Elsby et al. (2009) and Petrongolo & Pissarides (2008) suggests that incidence
and duration of unemployment are related to the business cycle. It would
thus be fruitful in future work to investigate this further in relation to the van
Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis and research questions under test. Inflow
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rates countercyclical, especially for job losers (layoffs), whereas outflow rates
are procyclical. This suggests that high unemployment levels in a recession are
driven by longer unemployment durations, rather than higher incidence.
5.7 Sensitivity Analysis
Heterogeneity in human capital investment is important when considering the
impact of career interruptions on future wage growth (Kunze 2002). The
OECD-defined ‘Out of the Labour Force’ (OLF) indicator includes full time
education, a productive investment in general human capital complementary
to human capital accumulated in the labour market. This measure is likely
to be confounded by differences across labour market states within the OLF
category if the sample is not conditioned to exclude individuals who have not
permanently left full-time education, or full-time education is not defined as a
separate (productive in human capital terms) labour market state11. The aver-
age effect of an unemployment spell seems to be robust to classifying full-time
education as a separate (productive) labour market state, however the impact
of previous inactivity becomes insignificant in all specifications. This result
is corroborated in the both the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 samples, including
controls for length of previous interruption and unemployment incidence. Al-
though evidence of a persistent impact of previous unemployment on future
wage growth is evident in both samples, the penalty associated with inactivity
is much more variable. The long-run penalty loses significance when the obser-
vation period is extended. In the case of previous unemployment, controlling
for regional heterogeneity, the general story remains robust to defining full-time
11The impact of unemployment and inactivity is assessed relative to a base group which
includes employment and full-time education. See appendix G for the sensitivity analysis.
Further results for the sensitivity analysis are available from the author on request. Previous
labour market status is redefined to only consider disruptions which occurred in the last 5
years of labour market history when constructing this indicator. However, this approach is
dropped in favour of the unrestricted version based on information criterion.
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education as a separate labour market state. However, previous inactivity is
insignificant in all specifications. Redefining the thresholds used in the main
analysis to the median, instead of 2/3rds of the median, does not produce qual-
itatively large changes to the main story, however the result supporting the van
Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis loses strength, with mixed support at best
(see Appendix, Table 5.14 & 5.15). If we are to accept the definition employed
in the main analysis (2/3rds of the Median as a threshold) over a more lib-
eral definition (Median threshold) then support for the hypothesis under test
is strengthened. The choice of the former definition can be justified, given that
the labour economics literature tends to employ the former definition rather
than the latter, e.g. the “Stepping Stone” literature (Stewart 2007). Moreover,
this definition retains the property of being objective, although to an extent
arbitrary.
Individuals may use self-employment as a way of cushioning the wage penalty
associated with job loss. Thus for these individuals, wage losses may be kept to
a minimum. However, there are likely to be systematic unobserved differences
between individuals that pursue the self-employed route, and those that pursue
full-time employment. Including the self-employed in the analysis is likely to
impart downward bias on the estimated average earnings losses associated with
involuntary displacement if this fact is not controlled for. In the main analysis,
consistent with Arulampalam (2001), individuals were allowed to be previously
self-employed, as long as they never reported themselves in self-employment at
survey date. Here self-employment is treated as a separate previous as well as
current labour market state. Although wages whilst self-employed are unavail-
able due to the difficulty of reporting self-employment hours, this approach
allows one to capture whether the wage scarring effects of job displacement
are mitigated for those entering a self-employment spell. This sign effect is
essentially an empirical question, as it is possible that individual moving into
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self-employment in a declining industry may face lower earnings prospects, e.g.
the 80’s mining sector in the UK. Full-time education is treated as a separate
previous labour market state, the aim of this exercise being is to shed further
light on the representativeness of the main results.
Previous self-employment carries a large wage penalty into current employ-
ment, relative to a job-to-job transition. However, this high initial penalty
proves to be very temporary when contrasted with the permanent wage penal-
ties associated with previous unemployment and inactivity. The wage effect of
previous self-employment is insignificant on average, but positive in the long-
run. There is a positive long-run impact on wage growth for individuals enter-
ing employment via a spell of self-employment, having been made redundant in
their last spell of full-time employment. However this effect is only positive in
the long-run, with a temporary penalty in the short-run. Consistent with the
previous robustness check, the effect of previous unemployment seems robust
to the regional heterogeneity extensions.
The final robustness check addresses the representativeness of the sample
used in the analysis. To what extent is the sample representative of the indi-
viduals interviewed in the BHPS? If this is the case, then since the BHPS is
a representative survey, the results can be extrapolated to the population as
a whole. If not, then they are unlikely to be generalisable. Whilst it is com-
mon practise to restrict attention to the OSM who are continuously present
over the observation period, recent studies have cast doubt over the validity
of BHPS-based estimates when attrition is assumed random (Bradley et al.
2007). Results restricted to continuously present OSM are contrasted with the
existing (main analysis) results, where the OSM are followed until the first
instance of attrition. Results for the continuously present OSM are generally
very similar to those presented in the main analysis, notably in the extended
sample. The results for the 1991-1997 period are very close to the basic and
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extended results presented in Arulampalam (2001). Furthermore, the regional
heterogeneity story seems invariant to this restriction.
5.8 Summary and Conclusion
Although institutions may vary across countries, there is generally not enough
variation in institutional context within a country to generate the observed
differences in wage outcomes across regions (Carrington 1993). The aim of this
exercise is to shed some light on the potential underlying mechanisms at play.
The main hypothesis under test is whether unemployment spells experienced
in high unemployment regions are seem by future employers as more a charac-
teristic of the region than a negative productivity signal (van Dijk & Folmer
1999). If so, then what long-term implications does this have for future wage
growth (Wage Scarring)? In order to address this question, the British House-
hold Panel Survey (BHPS) is used to construct continuous work-life histories
following individuals from first entry into the labour market and capturing
spells of employment, unemployment and inactivity. Furthermore, this novel
dataset allows for the importance of regional heterogeneity to be gauged in the
Wage Scarring context.
Strong evidence of Wage Scarring is found, with no sign of earnings recovery.
Arulampalam (2001) concludes that the first spell of non-employment carries
the highest penalty. Separating non-employment into unemployment and in-
activity spells, no evidence of a reduction in the wage penalty associated with
incidence of inactivity is found. Moreover, whilst incidence of unemployment
matters and the significance of duration at conventional levels is not robust
to extensions of the observation period, the impact of OLF spells runs mainly
through the duration effect. Large regional differences, with respect to labour
market tightness and urbanity, are found in the impact of redundancies on fu-
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ture wage growth, which could not be accurately accounted for without the data
structure employed. Pronounced age differences in the wage scarring effect of
redundancies are also found in the extensions to the study. The wage scarring
effect of being made redundant is negligible for all unemployment spells expe-
rienced in tight local labour markets, with a short-run wage gain, whilst under
45s’ with the same experience in rural areas face a marginal long-run wage
gain. Experiencing a spell of unemployment in slack labour markets implies
a substantial wage scar, independent of age. For over 45s, with higher levels
of regional attachment, the wage penalty associated with rural unemployment
spells is substantial with no sign of recovery. Whilst skilled workers are prone
to engage in wider job search, the over 45s are more likely to be mortgaged
home owners and thus are more likely to accept lower reservation wage jobs
locally in order to maintain mortgage payments than those without these fi-
nancial constraints. The impact of accepting ‘low quality’ employment, rather
than waiting for a higher quality match, may have far reaching consequences
for future human capital accumulation and subsequent wage growth. Ball &
Wilke (2009) showed that urban conurbations were amongst the worst places in
Great Britain to live in terms of unemployment experiences. Estimates imply
that being made redundant and then experiencing unemployment in areas of
high economic activity is equally damaging for future earnings potential, inde-
pendent of age. Taken together, this suggests that the negative implications
of urban unemployment experience are long lasting, lending further support
to Government initiatives like New Deal for Communities targeting these loca-
tions.
Weaker long-run evidence is found supporting the van Dijk & Folmer (1999)
hypothesis, on average and stronger support for over 45s made redundant in
their previous jobs. This is robust to specification changes. Redundancy implies
a 3.7% wage loss if unemployment spells were experienced in high unemploy-
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ment regions, independent of age. However, if experienced in low unemploy-
ment regions this implies a 3.9% wage gain for those under but an 11.8% wage
loss for those over 45. The low unemployment region results may be hard to
reconcile with the regional mobility story, however recent work by the Policy
Exchange think tank suggests that age discrimination may be an important
driver in the wage outcomes of the UK’s older workers and may help to explain
this observation which is complementary to the main hypothesis under test
(Tinsley 2012). This story is independent of whether controls for reason for
leaving previous job are introduced, full-time education is treated as a separate
labour market state, whether the self-employed are included and whether the
sample is restricted to the Original Sample Members continuously present over
the observation period. However, the penalty associated with previous inac-
tivity is found to be less robust. Given that inactivity is a very heterogenous
state, this is not surprising. Addressing the impact of inactivity sub-states is of
interest, however this is not pursued given that this would result in imprecise
results for some categories due to small cell size. Cockx & Picchio (2009b)
model the joint distribution of unemployment duration, accepted wages, and
subsequent employment duration using detailed Belgian Administrative data.
Incorporating the impact on subsequent wage growth, using a similar approach,
would be a promising avenue for future research.
Appendix
5.8.1 Data Descriptives
Table 5.12: Male sub-sample by previous labour market
status.
1991-1997. 1991-2001.
PREV STAT: EMP. UNEMP. OLF EMP. NON-EMP. OLF
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Personal Characteristics
Continued on next page
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Table 5.12 – continued from previous page
1991-1997. 1991-2001.
PREV STAT: EMP. UNEMP. OLF EMP. NON-EMP. OLF
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Age < 25 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.18
Age 25 - 29 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.15
Age 30 - 34 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Age 35 - 39 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.14
Age 40 - 44 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.11
Age > 45 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.37 0.32 0.26
White 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.96
Married 0.79 0.70 0.63 0.80 0.72 0.67
Spouse Employed 0.61 0.52 0.47 0.62 0.54 0.50
Children 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39
Health limits type of work 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.06
Disabled 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
School Type Attended
Grammar School 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16
Private School 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Technical 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05
Highest Qualification
Degree 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18
Other Higher 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.23 0.29
A’Levels 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.17
O’Levels 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.22
Other Qualifications 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.03
Apprenticeship 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Housing Tenure
Owned 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13
Mortgage 0.73 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.65 0.72
Council tenant 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06
Housing Association 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Workplace Characteristics
Public Sector 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Public Services 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.24
Charity 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Other Sector 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Missing 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workplace Size
50 - 99 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12
100 - 199 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.10
> 200 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.40
Workplace Union Presence 0.57 0.51 0.60 0.56 0.49 0.60
Union Member 0.41 0.31 0.43 0.39 0.30 0.43
Contract
Current job is part-time 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.06
Current temp. 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.07
Occupation
Skilled Non-Manual 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.27
Unskilled Manual 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.11
Non-manual 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.31
Professional/ Managerial 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.26
Industry
Energy & Water Supplies 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
Extraction of Metals, etc. Manufac-
ture of Metals
0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
Metal goods, engineering & Vehi-
cles
0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Other Manufacturing 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.07
Construction 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Distribution, Hotels & Catering,
Repairs
0.12 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.15
Transport & Communications 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07
Banking, Finance, etc. 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12
Other Services 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.25
Income
Deflated Real Wage] 9.62 7.98 9.02 10.72 8.96 10.10
Usual hours worked 39.82 37.78 37.73 39.89 37.82 37.80
Usual paid overtime hours 3.37 2.89 2.69 3.17 2.90 2.61
Cumulative Employment Experi-
ence (months)
265 223 198 276 240 216
Current Spell Length (months) 108 72 173 111 81 185
Total 4917 1437 1312 7109 2076 1741
]: Assumes overtime is paid at 1.5 times normal rate. Full labour market history since leaving full-time education
used to construct indicators. Specifications 1 to 6 are from the sample used in the Wage analysis which excludes the
problematic regions: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Somerset; South
Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly;
Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire;
South Lanarkshire.
5.8.2 Selection Equations
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Table 5.13: Marginal Effects from Sample Selection Pro-
bit for Full (Male) Sample.
Variables. dy/dx
Individual Characteristics
Age (ref. <25)
Age 25 - 29 0.140**
Age 30 - 34 0.071**
Age 35 - 39 0.144**
Age 40 - 44 0.061
Age > 45 -0.025
White 0.198**
Married/Cohabiting -0.002
Spouse Employed 0.132**
Children -0.090
Children And Married/Cohabiting 0.091
Disabled -0.269**
Health Limits Type Of Work -0.178**
School Type Attended (ref. Comprehensive, other)
Grammar School (no fee) 0.010
Private School -0.003
Technical -0.016
Highest Qualification (ref. No Formal Qualifications)
Degree 0.188**
Other higher 0.096**
A’Levels 0.129**
O’Levels 0.072**
Apprenticeship 0.096*
Other Qualifications 0.082**
Housing Tenure (ref. Private renter)
Owned 0.123**
Mortgage 0.196**
Council tenant 0.011
Housing Assoc -0.005
Father’s Occupation when 14 (ref. to Army, Agriculture, Unskilled manual, unknown/invalid).
Skilled manual -0.054**
Non-manual 0.012
Professional/Managerial -0.071*
Self-Employed -0.076*
1991 Economically Active TTWA Unemployment Rate -1.851**
Government Office Region (Ref. London)
SE -0.143**
SW 0.093*
E.Anglia 0.047
E.Midlands -0.002
W.Midlands -0.101**
N.West -0.055
Yorkshire & Humber -0.052
North -0.012
Wales 0.001
Scotland -0.134**
N 2029
LL -1034.265
LL int -1235.435
Pseudo R2 0.163
χ2(12) 73.10***
AIC 2150.531
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10% (TTWA98 Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
Marginal Effects evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variable in question.
χ2(12) tests joint significance of 12 identifying variables (exclusion restrictions).
Excludes individuals ever in self-employment at interview date plus missing real wage
observations (reducing count from 2140 to 2029.)
LL int - Likelihood ratio of intercept only model.
5.8.3 Alternative Threshold Definition: ≥ Median.
5.8.4 Continuous Work-life histories
Figure E.1 illustrates the structure of the British Household Panel Survey. In
addition to the basic structure, retrospective job and employment status infor-
mation, covering the period since first leaving full-time education, is collected
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Table 5.14: Wage Penalties: Labour Market Tightness†.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
Tight -7.6% -8.4%**
Slack -13.7%** -13.4%**
Inactivity
Tight -3.9% -5.0%
Slack -4.8% -8.0%
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancy§ -7.9%* -7.5%** -7.9%* -7.5%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancy§ (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Tight ALL 9.9% 8.2% 10.0% 8.6%
≥ 45 -7.4% -9.7%* -7.6% -9.6%*
Slack ALL 16.7%** 12.9%* 16.8%** 13.0%**
≥ 45 -3.7% -5.5% -3.8% -5.5%
Inactivity
Tight ALL -5.9% 6.1% -5.3% 8.8%
≥ 45 0.1% 7.7% -0.3% 2.7%
Slack ALL -13.7% -2.4% -12.2% 0.8%
≥ 45 38.3%** 18.2% 36.5%** 16.2%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job §.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,∞)
1991 - 1997
Tight -1.7% -9.2%* -12.1%** → -12.2%**
Slack -12.6%** -16.7%** -15.0%** → -16.1%**
1991 - 2001
Tight -6.2% -9.3%** -10.2%** → -11.3%**
Slack -11.6%** -16.3%** -12.2%** → -15.7%**
Interpretation: On average there is a higher penalty for unemployment spells experienced in tight labour markets,
once reason for leaving previous job is controlled for (panel 1). 1991-1997: Redundancy followed by unemployment
carries a 1.7% penalty & 0.1% wage gain if experienced in tight and slack labour markets respectively. This increases
to a long-run penalty of 12.2% for the former case, and a .7% wage gain for the latter. No significant age variation
is found, over and above the average effect. 1991-2001: Redundancy followed by unemployment carries a 6.2% &
9.6% wage penalty for under and over 45s respectively, if experienced in tight labour markets. This increases to a
long-run penalty of 11.3% and 20.9% for under and over 45s respectively. In slack labour markets, the same scenario
implies a 1.4% wage gain in the first year of tenure, decreasing to a 2.7% long-run penalty relative to a job-to-job
transition.
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median. Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced
a displacement (first job spells). Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specifications.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignificant. Full results available from author on
request.
at Waves 2 & 3. There is a developing literature on the systematic construc-
tion of continuous work-life histories, including Halpin (1997), Upward (1999),
Paull (2002) & Mare´ (2006). Mare´ (2006) provides an extensive review of these
studies, highlighting the benefits and limitations of each approach. Given that
a direct measure of experience was desired and given the lack of a satisfactory
data source, steps were taken to develop continuous work-life histories indepen-
dently. A systematic, rules-based approach was adopted in order to minimise
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Table 5.15: Wage Penalties: High Unemployment/Low
Unemployment†. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
High U -10.8%** -10.6%**
Low U -10.9%** -11.2%**
Inactivity
High U -2.5% -5.3%
Low U -4.8% -6.6%
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancy§ -7.7%* -7.3%** -7.7%* -7.3%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancy§ (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
High U ALL 13.4%** 10.2%** 12.8%* 10.1%*
≥ 45 -5.2% -7.7% -5.3% -7.7%
Low U ALL 12.7%* 11.4%* 12.5%* 11.4%*
≥ 45 -5.4% -8.2% -5.5% -8.2%
Inactivity
High U ALL -14.9% -1.5% -16.7% -0.0%
≥ 45 -12.4% 7.9% -8.5% 9.4%
Low U ALL 1.5% -4.9% -2.0% 2.9%
≥ 45 16.8% 13.4% -19.3% 14.6%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job §.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,∞)
1991 - 1997
High U -7.9%* -11.9%** -8.6% → -15.2%**
Low U -7.0% -13.1%** -18.6%** → -13.6%**
1991 - 2001
High U -9.6%** -12.4%** -7.7%* → -13.1%**
Low U -8.2%* -12.9%** -15.1%** → -13.6%**
Interpretation: On average there is some weak evidence (0.1%-0.6%) in support of the van Dijk & Folmer (1999)
hypothesis, once reason for leaving previous job is controlled for (panel 1). In terms of redundancies, this evidence
is more mixed. 1991-1997: Redundancy followed by unemployment carries a long-run 2.4% and 1.1% wage penalty if
experienced in high and low unemployment regions respectively. 1991-2001: For the 1991-2001 period, these figures
are 3% and 2.2% after 4 years in high and low unemployment regions respectively. No significant age variation is
found, over and above the average effect of being made redundant and then experiencing unemployment when the
median threshold is employed.
† High Unemployment labour market - ILO unemployment rate > Median. Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *:
10%§ Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced
a displacement (first job spells). Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specifications.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age
dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment
sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for
selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignificant. Full results available from author on
request.
highlighted issues in the literature as well as to aid replication. Appendix E
documents and justifies the steps taken.
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Figure 5.2: BHPS Data Structure: Time line showing data collection
points and data source coverage.
U J
J U
J
J
1991m9
INDRESP
1992m11
INDRESP
1993m10
INDRESP
1994m12
INDRESP
U
J
1991m9 1992m9 1993m9 1991m9
U
1990m9
U
1993m10 JOBHIST 1994m12 JOBHIST
Job history (JOBHIST) file is a retrospective data source, covering the last
12 months (since the first of September of the previous year). Individual
response (INDRESP) file is a snapshot of labour market activity at interview
date. JOBHIST data only collected if labour market status changed in the
last 12 months. For an alternative illustration of the overlap (Halpin 1997, see
Figure 1).
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Chapter 6
Seeds of Change? Over-Education,
Gender & The Persistence of Low
Skilled Employment in Local
Labour Markets.
6.1 Introduction
Education is not the piling on of learning, information, data, facts,
skills, or abilities - that’s training or instruction - but is rather
making visible what is hidden as a seed.
Sir Thomas More (7 Feb 1478 - 6 July 1535)
The debate about whether formal qualifications reflect true ability has been
raging on for centuries, yet the signalling effect of schooling has only been
formalised in the last century (Spence 1973). Skill mismatch refers to the mis-
match between the skill requirements of the job and the ability of the worker.
Lack of adequate measures of skill have lead researchers to use formal qualifica-
tions as a proxy. This explains the proliferation of the over-education literature.
In this context, over-education could be interpreted as an indicator the imper-
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fect signal of schooling, i.e. overqualified workers have lower innate levels of
ability than under-qualified workers. However, neoclassical proponents would
argue that this is essentially a short-run phenomenon (Duncan & Hoffman
1981). If this transitory nature holds, then mismatched jobs may be a Step-
ping Stone to better matches for the overqualified. Moreover, spatial mismatch
theories suggest that the Stepping Stone effect would not be the same across a
country.
This study asks specific research questions: Does over-education (as a measure
of observable skill mismatch) carry worse implications for workers in skilled or
less-skilled occupations? How does this vary with gender, the composition of
the local labour market and over the business cycle? Sub-regional differences
in industrial and skill composition suggest a differential impact of economic
downturns within a country. Does this prediction stand when confronted by
the data? This study focusses on the UK and is the first study that I am
aware of that considers the impact of over-education (and the associated skill
mismatch) on the persistence of low-skilled employment. A key advantage of
this approach is that, whilst it does not provide direct evidence of job require-
ments, it gets closer to to a classification of mismatch which takes into account
heterogeneity of jobs (approximated by the average skill requirements of a de-
tailed 3-digit occupation (ISCO methodology)). Moreover, in sensitivity tests
job matches are further disaggregated by self-reported “job quality” using a
method similar to Chevalier & Lindley (2009).
The “hidden brain drain” refers to the negative economic efficiency implications
of Skill Mismatch. This phenomenon, key to a Knowledge Economy’s prospects
of sustainable long-run economic growth, is likely to arise if the existing skills
base is not fully exploited and measures are not made to develop future skill
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potential (Connolly & Gregory 2008). If the long-term economic prospects of
the unemployed are to be ensured, then moving them out of unemployment
and into high quality employment is key not just for their well being but also
for the nation in terms of aggregate welfare gains.
Employment quality can be measured in many dimensions, intrinsic and
extrinsic; In this study the dimension of match quality and subsequent em-
ployment stability is of primary interest. The existing economic literature
takes into account the pay or the stability dimension, but generally not con-
sider both in an integrated framework. Moreover, the impact of occupational
change and the associated Skill Mismatch on labour market outcomes is not
explicitly controlled for in a dynamic regional context controlling for regional
differences in industrial and skill composition. Analyses are primarily limited
to pairwise comparisons of changes in occupational status between the current
and previous time periods and not the persistence of Skill Mismatch. Due to the
inherent difficulty of measuring the phenomenon, focus is mainly consigned to
the less-advantaged, however increased occupational downgrading during eco-
nomic downturns suggests that skilled workers pose a threat to the job stability
of the less-skilled (Evans 1999). By jointly modelling both skilled and unskilled
labour market transitions, this endogeneity can be taken into account. I explic-
itly control for the time-varying impact of regional environment. No studies
which I am aware of have explicitly considered sub-regional variation in the
impact of Mismatch on individuals’ labour market flexibility, or the impact of
time-varying regional heterogeneity in driving this phenomenon.
If the extend of Skill Mismatch increases during economic downturns, then
this could profound implications for matching efficiency during recovery. If
skill-mismatch is persistent, in that mismatched jobs do not act as Stepping
Stones to better matches, then a situation where skilled vacancies are created
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that can’t be filled with appropriately trained domestic workers is likely to
arise. Domestic skill-shortages lead firms to change their hiring practises, mak-
ing skilled migrant workers more attractive. As already stressed, this is likely
to have a strong (sub-)regional dimension. All in all, this phenomenon has
the potential of profound implications for unemployment persistence, as well
as negative implications for long-term economic policy and public opinion.
Moving disadvantaged groups, e.g. the youth, women, part-time workers,
those at the bottom end of the income distribution and the long-term unem-
ployed into regular, stable employment is the main motivation for this research
area. Addressing this issue adequately requires directly controlling for a wide
range of econometric issues. Many studies addressing the Stepping Stone effect
consign themselves to looking at job-to-job transitions, or considering employ-
ment and unemployment spells only (for example Stewart 2007). The origi-
nal aim of this study was to consider unemployment, out of the labour force
and self-employment spells as competing states. Computational considerations
meant that this was limited to exclude the self-employed, considering high-
and low-skilled employment versus non-employment as alternative destination
states. Much of the existing literature has adopted a dynamic discrete-choice
framework to address this issue (Stewart 2007). Given the dynamic context,
the Initial Conditions Problem arises and needs to be accounted for (Hsiao
2003). Since with most labour market data an individual’s complete labour
market history is not observed, the initial state cannot be treated as exoge-
nous: it is a product of an individual’s previous labour market history. This
initial state may either be determined by state dependence, or unobserved het-
erogeneity (Mosthaf et al. 2009). Various methods have been proposed to deal
with this issue, each with their relative merits. See Section 2.2.4 for a brief
discussion. To maximise sample size, ideally initial conditions from the year
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prior to entering the sample would be controlled for. In this study the initial
conditions problem was not controlled for due to difficulties establishing this
as individuals were allowed to enter the sample at any point in time over the
observation period.
In what follows, due to data limitations in assessing both the skills of the worker
(total human capital) and job skill requirements, I focus on over-education and
not skill-mismatch. Moreover, I do not use these terms interchangeably. The
motivation of this chapter was to study less-skilled employment persistence.
Given data limitations the skill requirements of the job were proxied using
an average measure of skill requirement at the 3-digit occupational level (In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations). I investigate transitions
into less-skilled employment, conditional on overqualification at t-1 in order
to get closer to the skill requirements of the actual job. This gives an alter-
native slant on the issue of overqualification which can be motivated by the
skill down/upgrading models presented by Evans (1999) and Le´ne´ (2011). I do
not study transitions into overqualification, conditional on being in less-skilled
employment at t-1. Given the barriers faced to fully implementing a dynamic
estimation of the MNL, and sample size restrictions in the BHPS, further divid-
ing the transition matrices into ”employment skill”-”over-qualification” blocks
would be unlikely to produce precise results if any in the current setup (the
dynamic model failed to converge most likely due to small cell size issues).
Looking at transitions into overqualification conditional on skill requirements
of the previous job would be a more viable alternative. Future implementations
could investigate this as an alternative perspective given that the literature on
overqualification concentrates on the persistence of the phenomenon.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes and motivates
the data construction based on the existing literature. Section 6.3 describes
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and motivates the empirical methodology. Section 6.4 examines descriptives
relating to the impact of state dependence on the probability of transition to a
mismatched job. The results from a pooled discrete-choice Multinomial Logit
(MNL) are discussed in detail in Section 6.5. Robustness checks are conducted
in the sensitivity analysis, Section 6.6, whilst Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Data Construction & Motivating This From
The Related Literature
The British Household Panel Survery (BHPS) is restricted to exclude the Eu-
ropean Community Household Panel (ECHP) sub-sample, as well as proxy
respondents. I follow individuals from 1991 to 2008 on an annual basis (survey
date as reference point) until the first instance of attrition or a key variable
becomes missing at the reference point. This approach produces consistent
estimates under the assumption that attrition random, and unrelated to ∀Xi.
This also minimises attrition bias relative to a strategy which restricts the
sample to Original Sample Members (OSM) continuously present for all waves.
Consistency also requires that observations are not systematically missing. I
allow individuals to enter at any point between 1990 and 2008, following using
the selection rule above.
Individuals are followed from 16, or from their secondary school leaving age
which ever is first, until the first instance of retirement. Most studies in the lit-
erature treat each period of employment with an employer as a single job spell.
The definition of a job implemented in this study captures promotions as the
start of a new job with the same employer. Following much of the literature,
the occupation at the start of each job spell is taken to represent that of the
spell. Thus occupational change within a firm will be captured. This can be
justified since the main interest is in the complexity/skill-content of the job,
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which may change due to promotion or due to ‘labour hoarding’ during down-
turns. To the extent that queues for skilled jobs lengthen during downturns,
labour market adjustments may manifest themselves in skilled workers moving
down the occupational skill-ranking prior to firm exit (Evans 1999). Individu-
als who were ever self-employed (spells lasting at least a month) are dropped,
however those were ever in full-time further education are not, with these spells
treated as OLF spells. Previous and current labour market statuses considered
are OLF, unemployment, high- and low-skilled employment. Previous labour
market status is interacted with whether the individual was mismatch status
in the previous period/spell to capture differences across skill categories.
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) Employment biographies are con-
structed by merging the survey date and retrospective information collected in
the BHPS (see Appendix Section E for details of how this was done). Atten-
tion is limited to complete labour market spells which started on or after the
1st of September 1991. In order to minimise attrition bias, I do not restrict
the sample to the Original Sample Members (OSM) continuously present over
the observation period. I allow the OSM to enter the sample after 1991, but
only follow respondents until the first instance of attrition. The BHPS contains
time-invariant, spell-varying and time-varying information. Following Upward
(1999), I assume that time-varying covariates only collected at the interview
date were constant during the preceding year. Given this imputation is not
carried out over survey dates, this measurement error is likely to be kept at
a minimum. Industry of employment is recorded according to the Standard
Industrial Classification 1980 (SIC80) up to wave 12, with the 1992 (SIC92)
methodology superseding this from thereon. A detailed (3-digit) concordance
scheme was kindly provided by Richard Upward. Unfortunately this scheme
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is unable to concord roughly 5% of pre-wave twelve SIC80 codes, affecting a
fraction of less-skilled occupations in the current analysis. I do not drop these,
keeping them in the reference case.
Table 6.1: International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO-88).
Skill
Level
Description Major Group
1 Competence associated with general education
acquired through compulsory education
(9) Elementary Occupations
2 Requires knowledge as for skill level 1, plus a
larger period of work-related training or work
experience
(4) Clerks, (5) Service workers & shop
& market sales workers (6) Skilled agri-
culture & fishery workers, (7) Craft &
related workers (8) Plant and machine
operatives and assemblers.
3 Requires a body of knowledge associated with
a period of post-compulsory education but not
to degree level
(3) Technicians & associate profession-
als
4 Requires a degree or an equivalent period of
relevant work experience
(1) Legislators, senior officials & man-
agers, (2) Professionals
Definitions: Low-Skilled Occupations: 1, 2; High-Skilled Occupations: 3, 4.
Category 4 includes “Corporate Managers”, career progression into which may be independent of
formal qualifications (Connolly & Gregory 2008).
Source: (Upward & Wright 2004)
Defining Occupational Skill Groups How to capture the skill requirements
of a job through observational data is an issue of controversy. Skill groups
are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988 defines skill-levels using both task- and
competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time
deemed necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of
tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”. Occupations are classified into
4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general educa-
tion and (2) the level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward
& Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4 as high-skilled.
Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill
requirements of a job. The key question, in this context, is the comparability
of the occupations in each skill group over time, and whether their composition
changes. Do occupations become more or less skilled on average? More im-
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portantly, does the ranking of occupations within each skill group change over
time due to this?
In order to take this into account the composition of these groups should
be allowed to vary over time. Ideally, a time-varying method of classifying oc-
cupations by skill requirements would also be available. The ISCO-1988 clas-
sification has been updated to 2008 rankings, and a concordance between the
two methods is available from the International Labour Organisation 1. I draw
on the up-to-date 2008 rankings, as a robustness check. As with most studies
using other classifications, the ISCO-1988 methodology is a fixed ranking of
occupations. Given the time of its release, it is likely that substantial composi-
tional changes may have changed within occupations. These questions suggest
the presence of significant cohort effects, as standardisation due technological
change results in once skilled occupations becoming unskilled. Moreover, at the
same time “skill upgrading” of the existing workforce through the acquisition
of further qualifications implies a dynamic context not adequately captured in
a static analysis. If individuals do not retrain and change occupation, then
their once skilled human capital would gradually become less skilled over time.
Alternative measures include social prestige indicators (Goldthorpe index) and
average earnings.
Using average earnings in this context makes the implicit assumption that
high wage jobs are skilled jobs. Connolly & Gregory (2008) use a fixed rank-
ing of detailed SOC90 occupations by average wages paid in 2000. Since their
study considers a 11 year period, significant changes in the skill composition
of occupations are likely to have occurred. This issue is likely to exacerbated
in the current study, given that 18 years are considered. Granted, Table A1
in their appendix highlights that a ranking based on average wages, as em-
ployed in Manning & Petrongolo (2008), would not perfectly match a ranking
1http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm
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based on average qualifications attained. If technological change favours work-
ers with higher skill levels, then we would expect the two approaches to be bet-
ter aligned. Evidently there are other forces at play in determining earnings.
This could be due to higher levels of experience, rather than formal qualifica-
tions, tending to characterise pathways into managerial-level jobs (Connolly &
Gregory 2008). More recently, the task-composition of occupations has been
used to make a distinction between complex and routine jobs using the Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles (Goos et al. 2009).
Defining Over-education in the Literature Overeducation and Skill Mis-
match are terms which have been used interchangeably in the literature as
they both attempt to capture the same thing: The mismatch between the ac-
tual and required skills to undertake the job at hand. The assumed equivalence
of the terms is mostly due to data limitations, rather than true equality. At the
best, formal education levels are highly correlated with skill, but to argue that
overeducation implies underutilisation of skills is fraught with difficulties due
to the difficulty of measuring human capital. The main focus of the Overeduca-
tion literature is on the impact of “skill underutilisation” on earnings, although
persistence has been taken into account. This is spurred by the observation of
a decreasing return to education of college graduates (college premium) in the
US during the 90s. The essential argument is that this is a cohort effect, due
to supply-side factors forcing highly educated workers to take less-skilled jobs,
rather than solely demand-led due to Skill Biased Technological Change. In a
Human Capital Theory framework, the expected sign of the returns to school-
ing parameter in a wage equation is positive as it is assumed that schooling
raises on-the-job productivity. However there is substantial evidence to suggest
that schooling is an imperfect signal of actual ability, and that schooling may
be purely a screening device in the recruitment process (Spence 1973). The im-
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plicit assumption of the basic Human Capital model is that an individual with
low levels of schooling would be unproductive in a highly educated worker’s job.
This is at odds with the stylized facts, as the proportion of individuals with low
formal education levels employed in highly skilled jobs is non-negligible. Propo-
nents of Human Capital Theory would contest that total human capital is what
matters, and thus a trade-off exists between formal education and on-the-job
experience. Lack of adequate measures that quantify on-the-job training imply
that direct tests of this notion are limited. This also makes it difficult to gauge
the true extent of total human capital, and thus mismatch. The fundamental
question pertains to the causal effect of moving someone with a given level of
education from one job to another. Sample size restrictions, coupled with the
fact that job changes are relatively infrequent, makes identifying this causal
effect difficult using programme evaluation techniques.
Coming from a neoclassical point of view, Duncan & Hoffman (1981) argue
that overeducation is only a serious long-run issue if changes in the relative
supplies of education do not affect the skill composition of labour demand, in
other words firms do not adjust their production techniques to cater for changes
in the industrial skill base. In essence, their argument is that Skill Mismatch is
a short-run phenomenon. The difficulty of measuring true skill mismatch has
driven the educational mismatch literature. If market failure implies that skill
underutilisation is common, then this will have important implications for the
economy in the aggregate.
Both subjective and objective measures of overeducation have been com-
monly employed. The subjective approach takes advantage of survey data
with questions relating directly to the minimum (skill/education) requirements
of the job. Whilst this is more likely to provide direct evidence of skill mis-
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match, lack of these questions in the survey design mean that researchers have
commonly been restricted to indirect measures. Common objective approaches
attempt to determine the educational requirements of the job by using job title
information and occupational classification systems like the Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles. One example of an objective approach considers individuals
with formal qualifications that are 1 standard deviation above their (detailed)
occupation’s mean as overeducated. Yet another compares actual educational
levels to modal values in (detailed) occupational groups. McGuinness (2006)
provides a detailed survey. Objective approaches are generally considered to be
inferior to their subjective counterparts. Objective approaches almost invari-
antly use a time-invariant classification of occupations to calculate mismatch.
However, this is a dynamic problem as average educational requirements are
likely to evolve over time as the relative supply of highly skilled individuals
increases. Moreover, the Reder hypothesis (Reder 1955) highlights that hir-
ing standards are likely to respond due to fluctuations in the business cycle.
Despite their inherent limitations, strong arguments in favour of the modal ob-
jective approach have been put forward. “[If] a particular occupation contains
a higher proportion of overeducated workers, this will raise the occupational
average and corresponding cut-off point thus underestimating the true level
of overeducation (McGuinness 2006, pp. 396).” In a dynamic context, the
fact that the proportion of highly skilled individuals working in an occupa-
tion increases due to occupational downgrading does not necessarily make that
occupation skilled. However, if these individuals have difficulty moving back
into skilled employment then this may lead to employers increasing their hiring
standards once and for all.
Chevalier (2003) defines overeducation by skill-level, but distinguishes be-
tween “apparently” and “genuinely” overeducated if they are satisfied or dis-
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satisfied with their match, respectively. This approach allows for the account of
heterogeneity of job match quality, giving clues into the unobserved relationship
between actual and skill requirements. Chevalier & Lindley (2009) implement
this definition in a study of over-education in the UK graduate labour market.
They find profound differences between genuinely and apparently over-educated
graduates, whilst little observed differences exist between the latter and well
matched graduates. Moreover, being genuinely over-education increases un-
employment duration by three months but has no impact of the number of
jobs held (Chevalier & Lindley 2009). Chevalier (2003) criticizes objective ap-
proaches:
Defining overeducation as departing from a norm ignores differ-
ences in the quality of education, assumes homogeneity of skills of
all workers with identical qualification levels, and overestimates the
extent of overeducation. An objective measure based on a profes-
sional classification of occupations, e.g. DoT, assumes that all jobs
within the same title have the same educational requirements. Fur-
thermore, these classifications tend to be out of date. A statistical
definition, based on the observed distribution of qualifications by
occupation, is sensitive to cohort effects, sensitive to the level of
aggregation, and assumes that all jobs with the same title have the
same educational requirements. Both approaches also assume that
individuals with a given level of education are perfect substitutes.
Empirical results are also likely to be sensitive to the definition of
overeducation (Chevalier 2003).
A meta analysis by Groot & Maassen van den Brink (2000) highlights that
the choice of overeducation definition has a large impact on the incidence of
overeducation, but not on the wage penalty associated with overeducation.
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Over-education Individuals working in each 3-digit occupation are consid-
ered overqualified if their attained highest qualifications a higher than the 3-
digit occupational mode2 (or one standard deviation above the mean in the
sensitivity analysis).
This approach use a fixed ranking (Q3 2000 QLFS) of SOC92 major (3-digit)
occupations by the average highest observed qualifications attained using a 7-
point scale index approach similar to (Connolly & Gregory 2008). Following the
same methodology used by the LFS to group qualifications, the scale assigns
the following values to qualification groups:
• 0 - No qualifications
• 1 - Other qualifications
• 2 - Sub GCSE/O’Level Equivalent
• 3 - GCSE/O’Level Equivalent
• 4 - A’Level or equivalent
• 5 - HND or equivalent
• 6 - Degree level or above
An alternative approach would be to use a time-varying ranking of occupations
by mean qualifications, thus allowing the extent to which they are mismatched
to vary with their 3-digit occupation’s observed skill composition. This ap-
proach would be not with its short-comings. An important caveat of the occu-
pational ranking approach is detailed in Elias et al. (1999):
“Simply ranking occupations according to the level of qualifications
held by typical job-holders within the occupation groups will pro-
duce some undesirable results. For some occupations an increase
in the level of qualifications may be an artefact of the dramatic
increase in educational qualifications held by younger age cohorts.
If the increase in supply of higher qualified individuals left to a
2Maximum mode in the case of multi-modal distributions.
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uniform increase in all occupation groups then this would not be a
problem. However, as the increase is most marked in the younger
age cohorts then occupations with relatively high proportions of
young people may appear to qualify for occupation upgrading even
if there is no change in the tasks performed. In addition some occu-
pations are known to be popular forms of employment for students
such as bar work. This approach of ranking occupations by the
qualifications of those who occupy them could, therefore, lead to
inappropriate decisions (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Whilst true, this argument does not take into account demand side interactions,
as employers may raise or lower their hiring standards as a response to business
cycles and/or increased supply of skilled graduates (Reder 1955). Moreover,
using a fixed professional classification of occupations like the ISCO is likely to
minimise this particular issue.
Unfortunately the BHPS does not contain a direct measure of over-education,
as individuals were not asked this directly in the questionnaire. An indirect
measure which compares individual qualifications to the average/mode within
an occupation is generally considered inferior to alternative indirect (set by pro-
fessional bodies, like the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) in America,
and direct measures. It assumes that jobs within an occupation are homoge-
nous and is a product not just of job requirements but also supply and demand
(Leuven & Oosterbeek 2011).
Labour Market Tightness Labour market tightness summarises the efficiency
of the matching process. A tight labour market is associated with excess de-
mand, as their are more vacancies chasing fewer job seekers. Job search theory
would predict that individuals displaced in tight labour markets will face lower
job search costs due to more vacancies being available relative to the stock of
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job seekers (Cahuc & Zylberberg 2004). In slack labour markets, the prospects
of a successful match are lower as there will be more unemployment job seek-
ers applying for a small pool of job vacancies. Following convention, labour
market tightness is proxied by the vacancies-to-unemployment ratio. The ag-
gregate Claimant Count is continuously available from NOMIS over the period
of interest. Unfortunately a breakdown of the Claimant Count by occupation
is not: availability is restricted to the 1996 to 2000 and 2005+ periods only.
Furthermore, whilst there is only a one year gap in notified vacancy statistics
by country or government office region, at lower levels of aggregation this is
two years. This should be taken into consideration when interpreting Travel-
to-Work Area (TTWA) rates. Labour market tightness is controlled for at the
aggregate level in order to capture business cycle effects. Missing values for
the country and government office region series (1 year gap) are assumed to
be the same as those in the same quarter of the preceding year. In the case
of the TTWA series, the first four quarters are imputed using the aforemen-
tioned approach. The last four quarters are assumed to be the same as those
in the same quarter of the following year. As mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5,
Bentley (2005) warns that the vacancies series may be non-comparable pre-
and post- this gap in the series due to significant changes in the way vacancies
were collected. This caveat aside, figures 6.1 highlights significant variation
in the Government Office Region series across the United Kingdom. Despite
having the highest levels of economic activity and resident occupational skill
composition rates, combined with significantly higher industrial skill composi-
tion (employee-based) than anywhere else in the UK, the London region has
the lowest Travel-To-Work-Area vacancies to unemployment ratios over the pe-
riod. This suggests significant mismatch between the resident claimant count
and the vacancies created in this region. Geographical differences in aggregate
vacancies to unemployment ratios could also be driven by regional variation in
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Figure 6.1: Average Vacancies to Unemployment Ratios by Govern-
ment Office Region.
Source: NOMIS.
the average propensity to use alternative channels to advertise vacancies, which
is likely to be related to the industrial mix of the region in question and thus
the skill requirements of employers. Employers requiring employees with highly
specialised skills are more likely to acquire these through specialist recruitment
agencies.
It would be desirable to control for the growth rate of local industry. The
Annual Business Inquiry was drawn on to define a measure at the TTWA level
of aggregation. However, this indicator captures employment and not pro-
ductivity growth. Industry-specific growth rates were assigned to individuals
based on their TTWA of residence and their self-reported industry. The lim-
itation of this approach is that it assumes that individuals live and work in
the same TTWA. This is less likely for skilled workers. Lack of information
about TTWA of work limits the usefulness of this indicator. Moreover, time
and computational constraints meant that the decision was made to restrict
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the analysis to local business cycle effects only (approximated by fluctuations
in the Vacancies/Unemployment rate).
Local Occupational Skill Composition An Occupational Skill Intensity mea-
sure, defined at the local authority level, is drawn from the QLFS. Data limita-
tions imply that only a broad-banded measure can be constructed, with no pos-
sible breakdown to ISCO-88 groups. Skill Intensity is defined as the proportion
of all employees aged 16 and over, resident in an area, and working in the fol-
lowing occupational classifications: Managers & Senior Officials; Professionals;
Associated Professionals & Technical; Admin. & Secretarial 3. Skilled Trades,
Personal Service Occupations, Sales and Customer Service Occupations, Pro-
cess, Plant and Machine Operatives and Elementary Occupations make up the
denominator. This categorisation is based on a fixed ranking of occupations
based on an index of highest qualifications held by employees in each SOC90
1-digit industry is developed from Census 2001 data (see Appendix, Section
I.2).
Changes in weighting methods and discontinuities in data collection strategies
imply that the level values of these regional-level series may not be very com-
parable across time. However, regional-level variables are standardised across
regions by month. This captures the evolution of where a Local Area sits in
Great Britain relative to the distribution of Local Area values of the covariate
in question. Whilst standardisation changes interpretation, this is more likely
to better capture the underlying phenomena of interest.
3This measure is likely to suffer from measurement error due to heterogeneity of skill-
intensities within detailed occupational categories. However, this was the best strategy given
the data at my disposal.
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6.3 Empirical Strategy
Dual labour market model: Evans (1999) describes a two-sector “dual labour
market model” involving a skilled primary sector, in which wages are high, and
an unskilled secondary sector where wages are low. Whilst the unskilled sector
is competitive and is characterised by market-clearing, the skilled sector is not.
Imperfect competition in the skilled sector implies that supply and demand do
not equalize. Under these assumptions, an unemployed skilled worker can either
que for a skilled job, or accept an unskilled one whilst they continue to search
on-the-job for a better match (unskilled workers are not upwardly mobile).
Evans (1999) argues that whilst accepting an unskilled job may pay more than
being unemployed, this may have negative future ramifications if unskilled jobs
are seen by potential employers as a negative signal of future productivity on the
job. Although not considered in this study, duration dependence is likely to be
important in this context. Human capital specific to skilled jobs will depreciate
the longer it takes for a skilled job seeker to find an improved match. The
longer a skilled worker works an unskilled job, the more unskilled they become
(Khalifa 2010). Furthermore, demand for skilled workers in unskilled jobs may
be low if commitment to the job is brought into question. If skilled workers
are using unskilled jobs as Stepping Stones to skilled employment, then this
may be the case. The effect of this will be to increase the transition rate into
non-employment spells.
The intuitive setup is based on the dual labour market model described
in Evans (1999). If an individual’s highest qualifications deviate from their
3-digit occupation’s modal value, this is taken as a sign of Skill Mismatch.
Highest qualifications attained are used to proxy individuals’ skill levels, which
are allowed to vary over time. However, education is an imperfect proxy for
productivity on the job (Spence 1973). The more time a “high skilled” worker
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spends in a low skilled job, the more “low skilled” they become due to deprecia-
tion of their under-utilised skilled human capital (Khalifa 2010). Furthermore,
skills depreciate whilst in non-employment. The dynamic nature of the problem
highlights the importance of duration as well as state dependence in driving
the Stepping Stone effect of mismatched employment. A more recent theo-
retical contribution to the literature, Le´ne´ (2011), investigates the extent to
which education and experience matter for access to skilled jobs in a general
equilibrium framework. This paper is motivated by the recent trend of de-
creased substitutability of education and experience for the less-skilled in the
labour market. Unlike Evans (1999), in this study less-skilled workers are not
restricted to job-search in the less-skilled sector and may upgrade into higher-
skilled employment if experience allows. Increased supply of highly educated
workers limits the less-skilled’s possibility of accumulating experience and thus
their career outcomes. Le´ne´ (2011) argues that this evidence points to the ev-
ery increasing need of both education and experience to progress into skilled
jobs.
The existing literature generally adopts a dynamic multiple discrete choice
data structure (competing risks in the limited studies which have assessed this
issue in a duration context). However, these studies tend to limit themselves
to unemployment and employment, ignoring individuals in inactivity. It is
common for studies using survival analysis techniques to treat transitions to
inactivity as right censored or to drop them completely. In the duration con-
text, treating inactivity as a censored destination state, may lead to inconsis-
tent estimates of the parameters determining the transitions of interest as this
assumes away unobserved characteristics affecting both transitions of interest
and those to censored states (van den Berg & van Ours 1994; van den Berg
& Lindeboom 1998). In discrete-choice Multinomial Logit models (MNL), this
restriction would only be valid if this same restriction were present on the
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contemporaneous individual choice set however, in general restrictions reduce
the generalisability of results. Inappropriate restrictions imply bias induced
by correlation with unobservables (Omitted Variable Bias). Furthermore, the
discrete-choice framework does not take into account duration dependence.
Like serially correlated errors, ignoring duration dependence leads to inefficient
estimation and incorrectly standard errors (Singer & Willett 2003).
6.3.1 Discrete-Choice Multinomial Logit Model
A pooled dynamic discrete-choice Multinomial Logit (MNL) model (analogous
to the standard MNL for cross-section data) is estimated in order to study
the impact of state dependence on the probability of downgrading or upgrad-
ing. This estimation strategy is motivated in Methodology Section 2.2.4 which
highlights ambiguities in the ordering of the labour market states under consid-
eration as a reason for not imposing ordinality on the dependent variable. If we
assume that the lag structure of state dependence follows an AR(1)/Markovian
process, i.e. All that matters for time t is what happened at t-1, then this model
can fully incorporate state dependence, conditional on the labour market status
at t-1. However, if time-series correlation extends beyond t-1, then this model
will be misspecified and likely biased. The standard model also makes the as-
sumption that the error term is independent of the explanatory variables, an
assumption which is unlikely to be valid unless the model is fully specified. The
MNL assumes that the alternative-specific error are independent of the errors
of other alternatives in the choice set. More over the MNL assumes that these
errors are Type-I extreme value distributed. Violation of these assumptions
raises concerns about the validity of regression estimates. The standard MNL
takes the following form:
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Pr(yi = m|xi) = exp(x
′βm)∑m
j=1 exp(x
′βj)
=
exp(x′βm)
1 +
∑m
j=2 exp(x
′βj)
(6.1)
Equation 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the assumptions required for identification of
the parameters in the standard dynamic MNL. Whilst the MNL is more flexible
than the standard Logit model, it places restrictions on the underlying choice
structure. For instance, the MNL only captures variables that are constant
across alternatives, e.g. race (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). The MNL also suffers
from the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) restriction. Since the
MNL coefficients are relative to a normalised base category, “discrimination
amongst the m alternatives reduces to a series of pairwise comparisons that
are unaffected by the characteristics of alternatives other than the pair under
consideration (Cameron & Trivedi 2005, p. 593).” In other words, the ratio of
probabilities of any two alternatives is independent of the probability of any
other outcome. Thus adding an extra alternative to the range of outcomes
has no impact on this ratio, an unrealistic feature of the model for describing
most real world decision making processes. A natural alternative, if the IIA
assumption is problematic, is to jointly model alternatives in order to break
this restriction. The basic setup models outcomes as described in equation 6.2.
yijt = xitβj + yit−1γj + (d′it−1yit−1)
′φj + εijt (6.2)
Thus, the instantaneous probability can be represented as:
Pr(yijt|xit, yit−1) = exp(xitβj + yit−1γj + (d
′
it−1yit−1)
′φj)∑3
k=1 exp(xitβk + yit−1γk + (d
′
it−1yit−1)′φk)
(6.3)
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Where:
yijt = Individual i’s labour market status (j) at time t.
j  (High Skilled Emp.; Low Skilled Emp.; Non-Emp.)
xit = Matrix of observed personal, regional characteristics
(time-invariant and time-varying) and business cycle ef-
fects. I also include a measure of experience due to re-
cent findings of the joint significance of education and
experience (Le´ne´ 2011).
yit−1 = Previous labour market status (t-1), interacted with pre-
vious industry and workplace characteristics.
dit−1 = Categorical variable capturing whether an individual
was matched, underqualified or overqualified in previ-
ous labour market status.
εi = Idiosyncratic error component.
A pooled MNL is estimated, under the assumption that the error term is
independent of the xit conditional on yi,t−1. If the model is not fully specified
then this assumption is unlikely to hold, and it will be impossible to distinguish
between true and spurious state dependence. In order to disentangle true from
spurious state dependence, a random individual-alternative-specific intercept
term (αij) can be introduced to control for time-invariant factors influencing
an individual’s probability of choosing a particular outcome, which varies across
alternatives (random taste variation). Since these random effects are allowed
to be correlated across alternatives, this strategy has the added advantage of
relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, formal tests
of which are viewed with caution (Train 2009).
In the main analysis I condition the standard pooled Multinomial Logit
estimates on a full set of Mundlak (1978) terms, in order to approximate the
fixed effects specification. This specification thus identifies off the time varia-
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tion in the explanatory variables, and thus these terms cannot be included for
time-invariant characteristics like race. Imbens & Wooldridge (2007) show that
both in the pooled and the random effects cases, inclusion of Mundlak (1978)
terms (time-averages of the time-varying covariates) in a panel regression leads
to the fixed effects estimator in the linear panel case. This approach has been
adopted in much of the empirical literature (e.g. Stewart 2007). The “corre-
lated” random effects approach (combining the Mundlak and random effects
approaches), or controls for initial conditions (Wooldridge 2005 approach), are
not currently incorporated in the sensitivity analysis due to computation lim-
itations hampering its timely implementation. Thus the results are subject to
the IIA restriction. Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) are estimated in order to
approximate the Average Partial Effects of interest. Estimated is carried out
using the delta method, via standard in-built Stata routines, as a numerical
solution exists for the ML function. An estimation strategy for the random ef-
fects Multinomial Logit is discussed in Chapter 2. This strategy was not drawn
on (possibly) due to small cell size issues implying that the routine did not con-
verge. Estimation was carried out on an Intel PC with 8GB RAM running 4
cores at 2.86GHz each, using 64-bit Stata MP version 11.
Table 6.2: Individual Characteristics. Current Labour
Market Status: ISCO1988-Based. Males vs.
Females, Annual Discrete-Choice Data, 1991 -
2008.
MALES FEMALES
LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP
Variable Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Age
30 - 45 0.381
(0.486)
0.458
(0.498)
0.207
(0.405)
0.386
(0.487)
0.449
(0.497)
0.344
(0.475)
45 + 0.311
(0.463)
0.351
(0.477)
0.496
(0.5)
0.342
(0.474)
0.338
(0.473)
0.394
(0.489)
School Type Attended
Grammar no fee 0.054
(0.225)
0.196
(0.397)
0.069
(0.254)
0.098
(0.298)
0.184
(0.388)
0.099
(0.299)
Private 0.031
(0.173)
0.09
(0.285)
0.037
(0.188)
0.031
(0.175)
0.086
(0.28)
0.047
(0.211)
Technical 0.07
(0.255)
0.107
(0.309)
0.115
(0.319)
0.082
(0.275)
0.117
(0.321)
0.103
(0.304)
Highest Academic Qualifications
Degree 0.046
(0.21)
0.354
(0.478)
0.061
(0.239)
0.046
(0.209)
0.334
(0.472)
0.056
(0.229)
Continued on next page
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Table 6.2 – continued from previous page
MALES FEMALES
LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP
Variable Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Other Higher 0.301
(0.459)
0.36
(0.48)
0.173
(0.378)
0.221
(0.415)
0.376
(0.485)
0.162
(0.368)
A Levels 0.148
(0.355)
0.118
(0.323)
0.122
(0.327)
0.14
(0.347)
0.08
(0.272)
0.107
(0.31)
O Levels 0.23
(0.421)
0.101
(0.302)
0.167
(0.373)
0.28
(0.449)
0.141
(0.349)
0.219
(0.413)
Vocational Training
Yes 0.395
(0.5)
0.406
(0.5)
0.288
(0.5)
0.381
(0.5)
0.436
(0.5)
0.269
(0.5)
Individual Characteristics
White 0.96
(0.195)
0.956
(0.205)
0.936
(0.244)
0.961
(0.194)
0.96
(0.195)
0.931
(0.254)
Married/Cohabiting 0.683
(0.465)
0.789
(0.408)
0.555
(0.497)
0.729
(0.444)
0.739
(0.439)
0.685
(0.464)
Children 0.331
(0.471)
0.382
(0.486)
0.223
(0.416)
0.387
(0.487)
0.357
(0.479)
0.517
(0.5)
Children X Mar-
ried/Cohabiting
0.326
(0.469)
0.377
(0.485)
0.212
(0.408)
0.328
(0.47)
0.306
(0.461)
0.389
(0.487)
Employed Spouse 0.524
(0.499)
0.635
(0.482)
0.217
(0.412)
0.655
(0.475)
0.671
(0.47)
0.472
(0.499)
Health Limitations 0.087
(0.282)
0.054
(0.226)
0.444
(0.497)
0.091
(0.288)
0.08
(0.272)
0.291
(0.454)
Disabled 0.011
(0.107)
0.005
(0.07)
0.152
(0.359)
0.006
(0.08)
0.005
(0.07)
0.058
(0.234)
Housing Tenure
Owned Outright 0.146
(0.354)
0.142
(0.349)
0.193
(0.395)
0.156
(0.363)
0.136
(0.343)
0.193
(0.395)
Mortgage 0.637
(0.481)
0.74
(0.439)
0.273
(0.446)
0.618
(0.486)
0.736
(0.441)
0.374
(0.484)
Council 0.104
(0.305)
0.018
(0.132)
0.345
(0.475)
0.117
(0.321)
0.029
(0.169)
0.271
(0.444)
Housing Assoc. 0.036
(0.187)
0.012
(0.107)
0.075
(0.264)
0.037
(0.188)
0.016
(0.124)
0.073
(0.26)
Work-Related Training in last 12 months (+ part-time courses)
Yes 20.65
(12.869)
20.38
(11.031)
24.813
(16.377)
21.647
(12.718)
19.55
(10.853)
22.97
(13.705)
Potential Experience
Pot. Experience 1.588
(2.095)
1.848
(2.101)
0.883
(1.777)
1.629
(2.132)
1.801
(2.083)
1.413
(2.02)
X 30 - 45 2.322
(3.52)
2.473
(3.418)
4.037
(4.161)
2.514
(3.546)
2.366
(3.363)
3.036
(3.829)
X 45 + 0.279
(0.449)
0.406
(0.491)
0.052
(0.222)
0.264
(0.441)
0.467
(0.499)
0.058
(0.233)
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
6.4 Descriptive Analysis
Table 6.3: Current Labour Market Status: By Gender, 1991 - 2008.
Males Females
jbstat4 Freq. Percent Freq Percent
unskill emp 14,795 48.25 18,727 46.02
skilled emp 11,082 36.14 11,007 27.05
non-emp 4,789 15.62 10,962 26.94
Total 30,666 100 40,696 100
NB. Survey Date Reference Point.
In accordance with the literature, gender has a marked impact on current labour
market status. Whilst both males and females are more likely to be in less-
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than more skilled employment at time t, women are much more likely to be in
non-employment than men (Table 6.3). Over the 1991-1998 sample, females
are in non-employment at survey date 27% of the time whilst for men this is
more than 10% lower at 16%. These gender differences are carried through to
detailed descriptives, which suggest greater persistence of non-employment for
females than males (Table 6.2). However, for women the probability of non-
employment does not seem to be related to over-qualification. Married females
are on average 69% more likely to be in non-employment at time t than those
than are not married. For married males this figure is lower at 56%. Moreover,
married females with at least one dependent child in the house are 38.8% more
likely than those that are married without children to be in non-employment
whilst for males this is 21%. Women with an employed spouse are also 46%
more likely to be in non-employment than those without. This figure is 21%
for equivalent males.
Summary statistics in Table 6.2 suggest that younger individuals (<30)
are more likely to be in low skilled employment or non-employment, whereas
prime-aged males and females (30-45) are more likely to be in high skilled
employment. Individuals over 45 are more likely to be in non-employment that
other age groups, independent of gender. Whilst the majority of individuals in
high skilled employment at time t attended Comprehensive (state) high schools,
attending a Grammar or Private school increases the probability of being in
high skilled employment at time t by more than Comprehensive attendance.
In fact, the unconditional probability of being in low-skilled employment at
time t is on average higher for those that attended Comprehensive schools.
As one would expect, higher formal qualifications increase the probability of
being in high skilled employment, but only for qualifications above A Levels.
Vocational qualifications also increase this probability, with the largest effect
being on female skilled employment probability.
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Table 6.4: Regional Characteristics. Current Labour
Market Status: ISCO1988-Based. Males vs.
Females, Annual Discrete-Choice Data, 1991 -
2008.
MALES FEMALES
LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP
Variable Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Regional Characteristics
Urban 0.633
(0.482)
0.604
(0.489)
0.685
(0.465)
0.622
(0.485)
0.642
(0.479)
0.665
(0.472)
Accessible 0.96
(0.195)
0.974
(0.159)
0.971
(0.167)
0.963
(0.19)
0.969
(0.174)
0.97
(0.17)
University (in TTWA) 0.728
(0.445)
0.75
(0.433)
0.71
(0.454)
0.725
(0.446)
0.759
(0.428)
0.733
(0.442)
Skill Intensity -0.166
(0.9)
0.122
(1.0)
-0.269
(1.0)
-0.09
(1.0)
0.065
(1.0)
-0.167
(1.0)
Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
TTWA Labour Market Tight-
ness (V/U)
-0.091
(1.0)
-0.082
(1.0)
-0.197
(0.9)
-0.101
(0.9)
-0.12
(0.9)
-0.178
(0.9)
TTWA Industry Skill Com-
position
-0.004
(1.0)
0.185
(1.0)
-0.043
(1.0)
0.046
(1.0)
0.213
(1.0)
0.01
(1.0)
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Being white, married, being married with dependent children, and having an
employed spouse all increase the probability of being in high skilled employ-
ment by more than alternative labour market states. The likelihood of non-
employment is also sizeably lower for married men than women, regardless of
whether they have dependent children in the household. However, health lim-
itations and being disabled both increase the probability of non-employment
by the most. Given the wide confidence intervals, these differences are not sig-
nificant at conventional levels when looking at the unconditional means. It is
thus of interest to determine, in addition to the other research questions under
address, whether significant gender differences exist when conditional means
are considered.
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Table 6.5: Labour Market Transitions. Current Labour
Market Status: ISCO1988-Based. Males vs.
Females, Annual Discrete-Choice Data, 1991 -
2008.
MALES FEMALES
LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP LSKEMP. SKEMP. NONEMP
Variable Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Previous Labour Market Status (T-1)
LowSkilledEmp.xMatched 0.342
(0.474)
0.013
(0.112)
0.093
(0.291)
0.434
(0.496)
0.02
(0.139)
0.082
(0.275)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U)0.047
(0.213)
0.003
(0.054)
0.018
(0.131)
0.071
(0.256)
0.003
(0.057)
0.017
(0.131)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U)0.078
(0.268)
0.005
(0.069)
0.017
(0.129)
0.132
(0.338)
0.007
(0.081)
0.025
(0.155)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.015
(0.122)
0.000
(0.019)
0.005
(0.072)
0.059
(0.236)
0.002
(0.044)
0.011
(0.103)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.031
(0.173)
0.001
(0.03)
0.005
(0.072)
0.1 (0.3) 0.004
(0.063)
0.012
(0.109)
X Firm Size: 50+ 0.2 (0.4) 0.006
(0.079)
0.044
(0.205)
0.197
(0.398)
0.01
(0.099)
0.031
(0.173)
X Part Time Contract 0.01
(0.1)
0
(0.013)
0.009
(0.093)
0.202
(0.401)
0.005
(0.067)
0.038
(0.192)
LowSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.463
(0.499)
0.032
(0.176)
0.085
(0.279)
0.36
(0.48)
0.033
(0.179)
0.055
(0.229)
Low Skilled Emp. x Overqualified x “Job Satisfaction”
x“Genuine Overqual.” 0.101
(0.301)
0.006
(0.078)
0.013
(0.112)
0.059
(0.235)
0.005
(0.074)
0.01
(0.097)
x“Apparent Overqual.” 0.362
(0.481)
0.026
(0.159)
0.072
(0.259)
0.302
(0.459)
0.028
(0.164)
0.046
(0.209)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U)0.03
(0.169)
0.005
(0.071)
0.012
(0.108)
0.028
(0.164)
0.003
(0.058)
0.007
(0.081)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U)0.125
(0.331)
0.010
(0.1)
0.022
(0.145)
0.115
(0.319)
0.011
(0.105)
0.019
(0.138)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.023
(0.15)
0.002
(0.041)
0.005
(0.072)
0.037
(0.188)
0.003
(0.055)
0.005
(0.074)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.07
(0.255)
0.004
(0.063)
0.01
(0.1)
0.124
(0.329)
0.01
(0.099)
0.013
(0.112)
xFirm Size: 50+ 0.294
(0.456)
0.019
(0.137)
0.048
(0.214)
0.165
(0.372)
0.017
(0.128)
0.022
(0.146)
xPart Time Contract 0.023
(0.149)
0.002
(0.039)
0.009
(0.093)
0.145
(0.352)
0.007
(0.082)
0.025
(0.157)
HighSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.007
(0.081)
0.215
(0.411)
0.017
(0.128)
0.005
(0.074)
0.178
(0.382)
0.008
(0.087)
High Skilled Emp. x Overqualified x “Job Satisfaction”
x“Genuine Overqual.” 0.001
(0.037)
0.03
(0.17)
0.003
(0.056)
0.001
(0.029)
0.022
(0.147)
0.001
(0.034)
x“Apparent Overqual.” 0.005
(0.072)
0.185
(0.389)
0.014
(0.116)
0.005
(0.068)
0.155
(0.362)
0.006
(0.08)
High Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U)0.001
(0.033)
0.031
(0.174)
0.004
(0.064)
0.001
(0.029)
0.016
(0.127)
0.001
(0.03)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U)0.002
(0.044)
0.093
(0.29)
0.005
(0.071)
0.002
(0.046)
0.056
(0.229)
0.003
(0.053)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.001
(0.025)
0.01
(0.1)
0.001
(0.029)
0
(0.015)
0.018
(0.133)
0.001
(0.023)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.001
(0.034)
0.033
(0.179)
0.003
(0.052)
0.001
(0.039)
0.073
(0.26)
0.002
(0.05)
xFirm Size: 50+ 0.004
(0.065)
0.132
(0.338)
0.009
(0.094)
0.003
(0.052)
0.099
(0.299)
0.003
(0.058)
xPart Time Contract 0
(0.016)
0.009
(0.094)
0.001
(0.035)
0.001
(0.027)
0.031
(0.173)
0.003
(0.053)
NON-EMP. 0.176
(0.381)
0.115
(0.319)
0.752
(0.432)
0.188
(0.391)
0.123
(0.328)
0.821
(0.383)
BusServ - Business Services; PubServ - Public Services.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Outright home owners are more likely to be in low-skilled employment or non-
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employment at time t, whereas mortgaged home owners are more likely to
be in high-skilled employment on average. Both council tenants are housing
association renters are more likely to be in low-skilled employment or in non-
employment at time t, whilst private renters are more likely to be in skilled
employment or non-employment.
Living in an Urban Local Authority increases the probability of unemploy-
ment, whereas accessibility increases the probability of high-skilled employment
or non-employment (Table 6.4). Living in a TTWA with at least one Univer-
sity increases the probability of high-skilled employment for both males and
females. Higher Local Authority unemployment rates increase the probability
of non-employment, whereas higher skill intensity and industrial skill composi-
tion levels increase the probability of high skilled employment. Local Business
cycle effects appear to operate in the expected direction, higher levels of which
increase the probability of high-skilled employment and decrease the probabil-
ity of non-employment. However, females seem to be more responsive to the
effect of local business cycles on average.
Table 6.6: DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour Market
Transitions, 1991-2008.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 5,056 (89.6%) 6,847 (90.0%) 189 (2.6%) 98 (3.8%) 2,605 (34.8%) 14,795
skilled emp 142 (25.2%) 356 (4.7%) 6,927 (94.0%) 2,385 (93.1%) 1,272 (17.0%) 11,082
non-emp 446 (7.9%) 408 (5.4%) 255 (3.5%) 80 (3.1%) 3,600 (48.1%) 4,789
Total 5,644 7,611 7,371 2,563 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 8,135 (87.9%) 6,743 (87.4%) 225 (2.9%) 102 (4.8%) 3,522 (25.4%) 18,727
skilled emp 217 (2.3%) 365 (4.7%) 7,120 (92.3%) 1,955 (91.4%) 1,350 (9.7%) 11,007
non-emp 903 (9.8%) 607 (7.9%) 367 (4.8%) 83 (3.9%) 9,002 (64.9%) 10,962
Total 9,255 7,715 7,712 2,140 13,874 40,696
NB. Survey Date Reference Point. % totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Transition matrices in Table 6.6 and 6.15, in the appendix to this chapter,
demonstrate the persistent nature of the underlying data by gender4. These
4Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988 defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based
measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed necessary for a person to be-
come fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
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results highlight greater persistence of skilled/less-skilled employment persis-
tence for males than females, independent of over-qualification status. However,
they also highlight greater skilled/less-skilled employment persistence for well
matched females than those that were overqualified at t-1. There is evidence of
greater non-employment for females than males. Detailed summary statistics
suggest that females are, on average, less-likely to be in skilled or unskilled
employment at time t than their male counterparts. They are also more likely
to move into non-employment (Table 6.5).
6.5 Empirical Results
6.5.1 Skill Mismatch & the Persistence of Low Skilled Em-
ployment
The empirical analysis draws on interview date observations only, in order to
investigate the probability of being in a less skilled job at time t conditional
on whether one was in a mismatched job at time t-1. I condition the standard
pooled Multinomial Logit estimates on a full set of Mundlak (1978) terms, in
order to approximate a fixed effects specification (results excluding the Mundlak
1978 terms are presented in the Appendix, Table 6.19). Imbens & Wooldridge
(2007) show that both in the pooled and the random effects cases, inclusion
of Mundlak (1978) terms (time-averages of the time-varying covariates) in a
panel regression leads to the fixed effects estimator in the linear panel case.
When this is not the case, i.e. in a non-linear setting, heterogeneity bias is still
minimised relative to a pooled MNL without these controls. This approach
has been adopted in much of the empirical literature, e.g. Stewart (2007)
who employs non-linear approaches, and extends this to the correlated random
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level
of general education and (2) the level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Up-
ward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4 as high-skilled. Thus the
ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
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effects case. Computational constraints meant that the random effects/initial
conditions corrections were not applied, a caveat to be taken into account when
interpreting the results. However, since the model is well specified the Mundlak
(1978) based strategy applied to a pooled MNL should help to minimise this
bias.
Individual Characteristics
Relative to reference case, aged 18-29, the probability of low-skilled employ-
ment is significantly lower for prime age (30-45) females, 6.4%, and signifi-
cantly greater for prime aged males, 5.2%. Skilled employment probability
is 5.0% greater for prime aged males and 2.8% more likely for equivalently
aged women than the reference group. For females, this also corresponds to
the period that likelihood of non-employment is highest, 3.6% higher than the
base, whereas for males this is 10.2% lower (the difference being significant at
the 1% level). High-skilled employment probability is greatest for both male
and female over 45s: 30.9% and 24.0% more likely than for under 30’s, re-
spectively. School type attended has a significant impact on labour market
status. Whilst selective (non fee paying) Grammar, Private school and Techni-
cal college attendance significantly reduce probability of being in a low-skilled
job for both males and females, only Grammar school and Technical college
attendance increase the high-skilled employment transitions for males, relative
to the baseline. For females, only Private school attendance significantly in-
creases the likelihood of skilled work. Higher academic qualifications having
effects in the expected direction, moreover, a stronger impact on female skilled-
and non-employment transitions is evident. However, no significant impact on
low-skilled employment probability is found for females. Vocational qualifica-
tions have an insignificant impact on labour market status once unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled for using the current strategy.
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Although race does not significantly predict low-skilled employment transi-
tions, being white significantly increases (decreases) skilled (non-employment)
probability by 2%(2.6%) and 1.5%(2.1%) for males and females respectively.
However these difference are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The level terms of the interactions can be interpreted as holding the alternative
indicator at its base level (e.g. Married/Cohabiting, Children and interaction).
Marital status (married or cohabiting), the presence of dependent children in
the household, and the interaction between the two, significantly impact on
female labour market status only. Being married (without children) decreases
low-skilled employment probability and increases non-employment transitions
for females, with the gender differences in this effect being significant at the 5%
level. For single females, having at least one dependent child in the household
significantly decreases both skilled and less-skilled employment probability, sig-
nificantly increasing non-employment probability by 10.1%. However, only the
gender difference in the impact on low-skilled and non-employment transitions
is significant. Moreover, females that are married or cohabiting with dependent
children are 1.7% less likely to be in skilled jobs and more likely to be in less-
skilled work (-2.3% net effect) and 5.5% more likely to be in non-employment.
Table 6.7: State Dependence. Average Marginal Ef-
fects (AME). Survey Date as Reference Point
- POOLED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL +
Mundlak (1978) Terms, 1991-2008. Time-Const
Skill Mismatch Measure (ISCO2008 + Modal-
based). TTWA Cluster Robust Standard Er-
rors.
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Age (ref. < 30)
30 - 45 0.052** 0.050*** -0.102*** -0.064*** 0.028** 0.036*
(0.026)† (0.017) (0.031)‡ (0.020)† (0.013) (0.020)‡
45 + 0.025 0.309*** -0.334*** 0.095** 0.240*** -0.336***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.020) (0.038) (0.035) (0.017)
Type of school attended (ref. Comprehensive, Secondary Modern.)
Grammar No Fee -0.037*** 0.012** 0.025*** -0.016* 0.005 0.011
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Private -0.035*** 0.005 0.030** -0.039*** 0.015** 0.024**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Continued on next page
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Table 6.7 – continued from previous page
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Technical -0.018** 0.014** 0.004 -0.016*** 0.001 0.015**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Highest Qualification (ref. Below O’Level,None, APPRENTICESHIP)
Degree 0.024 0.100*** -0.123*** -0.005 0.177*** -0.171***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.028) (0.023)
Other Higher -0.024 0.041*** -0.016 -0.023* 0.062*** -0.039***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016)
A Levels -0.011 0.029** -0.018 -0.009 0.046** -0.037**
(0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
O Levels 0.018 0.013 -0.030* -0.004 0.031** -0.027
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017)
Vocational Qualifications.
Yes -0.000 -0.004 0.005 0.014 -0.001 -0.013
(0.035) (0.024) (0.043) (0.030) (0.018) (0.035)
Individual Characteristics.
White 0.006 0.020* -0.026*** 0.006 0.015*** -0.021**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010)
Married/Cohabiting -0.009 0.003 0.006 -0.053*** -0.002 0.055***
(0.010)† (0.010) (0.008)† (0.011)† (0.008) (0.010)†
Children 0.005 -0.029 0.024 -0.084*** -0.017*** 0.101***
(0.030)† (0.027) (0.025)† (0.013)† (0.008) (0.014)†
ChildrenX Married/Cohab. -0.010 0.029 -0.019 0.030*** -0.017** -0.014
(0.035) (0.030) (0.023) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Employed Spouse 0.033*** 0.012* -0.045*** 0.052*** 0.007 -0.059***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Health Limits -0.032*** -0.006 0.038*** -0.035*** -0.022*** 0.056***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Disabled -0.031* -0.020 0.051*** -0.018 -0.022* 0.040***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Housing Tenure (ref. Private Renter)
Owned Outright -0.002 -0.014 0.015 0.016 -0.018* 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012)
Mortgaged Owner 0.022** 0.002 -0.024*** 0.028** -0.012 -0.016
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Council Tenant 0.011 -0.006 -0.005 0.009 -0.018 0.008
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Housing Associstion 0.035** -0.008 -0.027** 0.009 -0.002 -0.006
(0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Work Related Training in the last 12 months.
Yes 0.038*** 0.028*** -0.066*** 0.066*** 0.035*** -0.101***
(0.006)† (0.004) (0.005)‡ (0.006)† (0.003) (0.006)‡
Experience.
Potential Experience (5 years) -0.004*** 0.002 0.002* -0.010*** 0.001 0.009***
(0.001)† (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)† (0.001) (0.001)
X Age Group (ref. < 30)
X 30 - 45 -0.011 -0.017*** 0.028*** 0.032*** -0.011** -0.021***
(0.009)† (0.006) (0.008)‡ (0.009)† (0.006) (0.008)‡
X 45 + -0.023*** -0.049*** 0.071*** -0.016* -0.040*** 0.056***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Mundlak (1978) Terms
√
Year Dummies
√
Government Office Region Fixed Effects
√
N 30666 30666 30666 40696 40696 40696
LL -12413.9 -12413.9 -12413.9 -18130.6 -18130.6 -18130.6
LL int -31219.4 -31219.4 -31219.4 -43306.7 -43306.7 -43306.7
Pseudo R2 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.581 0.581 0.581
AIC 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04
(*) dy/dx = Marginal Effect. (d) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(‡) McFadden’s Pseudo R2: 1 - LL(full)/LL(Intercept Only).
Tests for differences in means (independent samples): ‡ † §- Difference between equivalent male and female coefficient
statistically significant at the 1% 5% 10% level respectively.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
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Being married to, or cohabiting with, an employed spouse significantly in-
creases employment probability (both skilled and less-skilled) for males, whilst
increasing likelihood of less-skilled employment for females. In the case of both
males and females, this scenario reduces the likelihood of non-employment.
Both health limitations and disability reduce employment likelihood and in-
crease non-employment, however in both cases skilled employment probability
is not significantly impacted for males whilst female less-skilled employment
transitions are unaffected by disability status.
Housing tenure has a differential impact for males and females, although
these differences are not statistically significant. Female outright home owners
are significantly less likely to enter skilled employment and more likely to move
into less-skilled work, although this effect is insignificant at conventional levels.
Both male and female mortgaged owners are significantly more likely to be take
up less-skilled employment, with mortgaged males significantly less likely to
move into non-employment than private renters. No significant gender variation
in this effect is evident. This may be driven by financial constraints due to
mortgaged home ownership increasing the likelihood of taking up “low quality”
local employment to keep up mortgage payments, rather than searching wider
for a better match (Coulson & Fisher 2009).
Evidence suggests a significantly larger impact on female than male labour
market mobility of direct human capital investment in the past 12 months,
through work-related and part-time training courses. This increases the prob-
ability of low-skilled employment by 3.8% and 6.6% for males and females
respectively with the gender difference being significant at the 5% level. Direct
human capital investment increases skilled employment probability for both
males and females, by 2.8% and 3.5% respectively. However, non-employment
probability is reduced by almost 1.5 times as much for females than for males
(10.3% and 6.6% respectively) with this difference being significant at the 1%
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level.
Potential experience has a larger average impact for females than males.
Interacting potential experience with age highlights significant non-linearities
in the impact of potential experience accumulation, relative to under 30s. For
the prime-aged (30-45) category, 5 more years of potential experience has no
impact on low-skilled employment probability for men. However, in the case of
females low-skilled employment probability is increased by 3.2% more than the
reference case for every 5 years gained with the difference being significant at
the 5% level. Every 5 years of potential experience accumulated during prime
age significantly reduces skilled employment transitions for both males and fe-
males, with these effects being indistinguishable at the 10% level. However,
30-45 year old men are 2.8% more likely to enter non-employment for every 5
years of potential experience accumulated. Significantly, with this difference
being significant at the 1% level, this effect is 2.1% lower than the reference case
of women for every 5 years of potential experience acquired between 30 and 45.
In addition, potential experience accumulation significantly reduces employ-
ment probability and significantly increases the likelihood of non-employment
for over 45s in general, with this effect being more pronounced (but not signif-
icant different) for males. Whilst potential experience can only proxy actual
labour market experience, this suggests that whilst in general females are more
likely to enter non-employment during prime-age (most likely for child bear-
ing), experience accumulation in the work-force places a constraint on labour
market mobility which reduces this incentive. A potential caveat is the fact
that there is likely to be more noise in the potential experience indicator for
females than males, as females are systematically more likely to take longer
career breaks for child rearing purposes than their male counterparts. If years
of schooling, including further education, were available then interacting this
with actual experience may be a more insightful. The problem with the current
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measure is that education and experience are negatively correlated. Individuals
with higher education levels will tend to have lower levels of actual on-the-job
experience. This implies that they will also have lower levels of potential ex-
perience, however in general potential experience does not take into account
periods of full-time education after entering the job market for the first time.
Since this measure is constructed to take into account age left further or sec-
ondary education, which ever is greater, this issue should be minimised in most
cases.
Time-Varying Regional Characteristics
In general, the significance of time-varying regional heterogeneity is fairly weak.
Whilst urbanity does not significantly impact on transition probabilities, for
males living in an accessible Local Authority significantly increases skilled em-
ployment probability by 5.0%5. Having at least one university in the local
labour market (TTWA) significantly decreases the probability of less-skilled
employment and increases the probability of skilled employment for females
(3.4% and 2.1% respectively). As noted in Section 4.3, the presence of higher
education institutions should improve employment prospects for the local pop-
ulation, given the support services needed to run such an institution as well as
the influx of young consumers into the local market. However, as pointed out
by Arntz & Wilke (2009), the increased availability of a young flexible minimum
wage workforce may impact negatively on locals’ labour market participation.
This result suggest that this negative effect is not working against females’
upward career mobility. Skill Intensity6 is positively related to less-skilled, and
negatively related to skilled employment transitions for males. A one stan-
5Since these variables are unlikely to have changed over time, this effect is identified off a
regional move.
6This time-varying indicator is measured at the Local Authority level due to data limita-
tions.
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dard deviation increase in local authority Skill Intensity increases(decreases)
male less-skilled (skilled) employment probability by 0.6%(0.5%). However,
this effect is insignificant at conventional levels for females. In general, labour
market transitions are non-responsive to contemporaneous local business cy-
cle effects at conventional levels. Granted, a one standard deviation increase
in TTWA labour market tightness decreases male non-employment probability
by 0.6%. Local labour market industrial skill composition proxies the availabil-
ity of skilled jobs in a region. Higher industrial skill composition significantly
increases(decreases) male less-skilled employment(non-employment) probabil-
ity, all else equal. A one standard deviation increase in industrial skill com-
position significantly increases(decreases) male less-skilled employment(non-
employment) probability by 1.3%(2.1%). Out of the time-varying regional
covariates, only the effect of industrial skill composition on non-employment
probability is significantly different for males than females. For females, no
significant effect of industrial skill composition is found.
Table 6.8: State Dependence. Average Marginal Ef-
fects (AME). Survey Date as Reference Point
- POOLED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL +
Mundlak (1978) Terms, 1991-2008. Time-Const
Skill Mismatch Measure (ISCO2008 + Modal-
based). TTWA Cluster Robust Standard Er-
rors.
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Time-Varying Regional Characteristics.
Urban 0.015 -0.002 -0.013 0.021 -0.000 -0.020
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.019)
Accessible -0.014 0.050** -0.036 0.055 0.019 -0.075
(0.030) (0.024) (0.034) (0.050) (0.023) (0.048)
University (in TTWA) 0.016 0.003 -0.019 -0.034 0.021* 0.013
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.012) (0.020)
Standardised Variables (By month, across TTWA Regions.
Skill Intensity 0.006 -0.005* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects (Standardised).
TTWA Labour Market Tight-
ness (V/U)
0.006 0.000 -0.006* -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
TTWA Industrial Skill Compo-
sition
0.013** 0.008 -0.021*** 0.001 -0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007)§ (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)§
Mundlak (1978) Terms
√
Year Dummies
√
Government Office Region Fixed Effects
√
Continued on next page
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Table 6.8 – continued from previous page
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
N 30666 30666 30666 40696 40696 40696
LL -12413.9 -12413.9 -12413.9 -18130.6 -18130.6 -18130.6
LL int -31219.4 -31219.4 -31219.4 -43306.7 -43306.7 -43306.7
Pseudo R2 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.581 0.581 0.581
AIC 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04
(*) dy/dx = Marginal Effect. (d) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(‡) McFadden’s Pseudo R2: 1 - LL(full)/LL(Intercept Only).
Tests for differences in means (independent samples): ‡ † §- Difference between equivalent male and female coefficient
statistically significant at the 1% 5% 10% level respectively.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
Over-education
Consistent evidence is found to suggest that on average over-qualification, in-
dependent of whether experienced in skilled or low-skilled jobs, increases the
probability of low-skilled and decreases likelihood of skilled employment rela-
tive to being in well-matched skilled work at t-1 (see coefficients in Tables 6.9,
6.13, and 6.14 where the average impact of over-qualification in employment at
t-1 is gauged relative to the reference group of those well-matched, high skilled
employment)7.
Tables 6.9 suggests that males in well-matched low-skilled employment at
t-1 are estimated to be 78.5% more likely to remain in low-skilled employment
at t than the reference case, whereas for females this figure is lower at 68.5%.
Well-matched males in low-skilled employment at t-1 are 76.9% less likely to
be in skilled employment at time t than those in well-matched skilled jobs at
7As highlighted in previous sections, this is subject to the caveat that the average char-
acteristics of 3-digit ISCO occupations are used to proxy job characteristics.
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t-1, whilst for females this probability is 68.4% lower, ceteris paribus (both of
these gender differences are significant at the 1% level). However, the impact
on non-employment transitions is insignificant at conventional levels.
Over-qualified males and females in low-skilled employment at t-1 are on
average 80.6% and 71.9% more likely to be in low-skilled employment at time t
than the reference case respectively. Moreover, this gender difference is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Overqualified males in low-skilled employment at t-1 are,
on average, 77.8% less likely to be in high-skilled employment than the reference
case with this figure lower at 71.3% for females. Relative to the reference case,
over-qualification in low-skilled employment at t-1 decreases the likelihood of
non-employment by 2.8% more for males. However this effect is insignificant
for females and the gender difference is insignificant at conventional levels.
On average, over-qualification in high-skilled employment seems to have a
more detrimental effect for females than males. Overqualified females in high-
skilled employment are on average 12.1% more likely to be in less-skilled em-
ployment at time t than those in well-matched high-skilled employment. This
figure is lower at 5.9% for males. Over-qualification in skilled employment at
t-1 implies a reduction in male skilled employment probability by 8.4%, rela-
tive to well-matched skilled employment. For females, this scenario carries an
12.2% lower probability of remaining in skilled-employment at time t. How-
ever, the gender differences in this effect is statistically insignificant. Relative
to well-matched skilled jobs, over-qualification in skilled employment at t-1
has an insignificant impact on nonemployment probability for both males and
females.
Gender differences in the impact of non-employment are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Non-employment carries significantly larger negative
consequences for less-skilled employment probability for males than females.
Relative to well-matched high-skilled employment, non-employment at t-1 im-
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plies a 39.3% and 28.0% higher probability of future low-skilled employment
for males and females respectively. However, relative to the reference category,
non-employment at t-1 implies a 55.9% and 62.6% higher probability of high-
skilled employment at time t for males and females respectively. Compared to
well-matched high-skilled employment, non-employment at t-1 implies a 16.6%
higher probability of future non-employment for males. However, this proba-
bility is significantly higher at 34.6% for females.
The results so far suggest that over-qualification in low-skilled employ-
ment has a greater negative effect on “upward” career mobility than over-
qualification in skilled jobs on average. Moreover, this negative effect is much
larger for males than for females. This average effect is not unexpected as the
higher qualifications one has, the less occupations to upgrade into and the more
likely downgrading becomes (Evans 1999). However, this cannot be extended
to the observation of gender variation in this effect. Average estimates suggest
that less-skilled employment is more of a stepping stone into high-skilled em-
ployment for females, independent of over-qualification. However, conditional
on over-qualification, only women that are overqualified in low-skilled employ-
ment are more upwardly mobile. This is not the case for overqualified women
in high-skilled jobs, who are less likely to remain in skilled employment and
more likely to downgrade into less-skilled work than the reference group. De-
scriptives suggest that on average, non-employment transitions are less-likely
for females than males in employment, however, non-employment persistence
is much higher. Relative to the baseline, males in non-employment at t-1 are
16.6% more likely to remain in non-employment at time t. This figure is twice
as large for females, who are 35.4% more likely to be in non-employment at
time t than those in well-matched skilled jobs.
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Table 6.9: State Dependence. Average Marginal Ef-
fects (AME). Survey Date as Reference Point
- POOLED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL +
Mundlak (1978) Terms, 1991-2008. Time-Const
Skill Mismatch Measure (ISCO2008 + Modal-
based). TTWA Cluster Robust Standard Er-
rors.
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Previous Labour Market Status (T-1) (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LowSkilledEmp.xMatched 0.785*** -0.769*** -0.016 0.685*** -0.684*** -0.001
(0.014)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.011) (0.021)‡ (0.020)‡ (0.016)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.047** 0.060** -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.013
(0.021) (0.026)† (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)† (0.013)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.038** 0.075*** -0.037*** 0.022 0.003 -0.025*
(0.016)† (0.017)‡ (0.009) (0.014)† (0.010)‡ (0.013)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.005 -0.026 0.031 0.028** -0.031*** 0.003
(0.025) (0.031) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.013 0.021 -0.034** 0.061*** -0.017 -0.044***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.033*** -0.022** -0.012 0.027*** 0.004 -0.031***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
XPart Time Contract -0.005 -0.055 0.060** 0.068*** -0.033*** -0.035***
(0.029)† (0.037) (0.027)‡ (0.008)† (0.008) (0.008)‡
LowSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.806*** -0.778*** -0.028** 0.719*** -0.713*** -0.005
(0.011)‡ (0.009)‡ (0.011) (0.019)‡ (0.015)‡ (0.016)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.065*** 0.036*** 0.030* -0.019 0.001 0.019
(0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.010 0.019** -0.009 0.024 0.003 -0.028**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.001 -0.014 0.013 0.042** -0.011 -0.031*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.028** -0.011 -0.017 0.073*** -0.016* -0.057***
(0.013)§ (0.011) (0.011)‡ (0.014)§ (0.009) (0.012)‡
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.016** -0.006 -0.011 0.015* 0.003 -0.018*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
XPart Time Contract 0.011 0.007 -0.018 0.049*** -0.032*** -0.017*
(0.016) (0.013)§ (0.017) (0.010) (0.007)§ (0.010)
HighSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.059*** -0.084*** 0.024 0.121*** -0.122** 0.001
(0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.044) (0.050) (0.034)
High Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.037 0.004 0.034 -0.006 -0.003 0.009
(0.029) (0.016) (0.027) (0.058) (0.017) (0.059)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.045* 0.056*** -0.012 -0.012 0.020 -0.008
(0.026) (0.018) (0.020) (0.041) (0.019) (0.040)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.040 -0.018 -0.022 -0.097 0.064* 0.033
(0.044) (0.020) (0.040) (0.072) (0.036) (0.060)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.014 0.020 -0.006 -0.032 0.029 0.003
(0.032) (0.017) (0.029) (0.041) (0.020) (0.037)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.004
(0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.029) (0.011) (0.027)
XPart Time Contract -0.005 -0.003 0.008 -0.057* 0.018 0.039
(0.052) (0.027) (0.043) (0.034) (0.014) (0.032)
NON-EMP 0.393*** -0.559*** 0.166*** 0.280*** -0.626*** 0.346***
(0.011)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.009)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.011)‡
Mundlak (1978) Terms
√
Year Dummies
√
Government Office Region Fixed Effects
√
N 30666 30666 30666 40696 40696 40696
LL -12413.9 -12413.9 -12413.9 -18130.6 -18130.6 -18130.6
LL int -31219.4 -31219.4 -31219.4 -43306.7 -43306.7 -43306.7
Pseudo R2 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.581 0.581 0.581
AIC 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04 3.7e+04
(*) dy/dx = Marginal Effect. (d) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(‡) McFadden’s Pseudo R2: 1 - LL(full)/LL(Intercept Only).
Tests for differences in means (independent samples): ‡ † §- Difference between equivalent male and female coefficient
statistically significant at the 1% 5% 10% level respectively.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). The ISCO-1988
defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Continued on next page
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Table 6.9 – continued from previous page
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
Previous Firm Characteristics & Local Business Cycle Effects.
Low-Skilled Employment Probability Upward mobility is highest for males
in well-matched low-skilled Business Service jobs: Relative to Industrial sector
employment, this likelihood is 4.7% lower than the average 78.5% in slack and
3.8% lower for those in tight local labour markets at t-1. However, this effect
is insignificant for well-matched males in low-skilled Public Service sector jobs.
Upward career mobility is more limited for well-matched females in low-
skilled Public services. Compared to industrial sector employment, women
working in well-matched less-skilled Public Services at t-1 are 2.8% more likely
to remain in less-skilled work than the average 68.5% effect when the local
labour market is slack and 6.1% higher when it is tight. Notably, the likelihood
of low-skilled employment is 2.1% higher than the reference case for females in
Business Service sector jobs when the local labour market is tight. This suggests
gender differences differences in the nature of jobs traditionally undertaken in
low-skilled sectors. Le´ne´ (2011) points to the ever increasing need for both
education and experience to progress into skilled employment. If these jobs
have increased in their skill requirements then, all else equal, the probability
of upgrading into skilled employment is likely to have decreased. Females have
been shown to have a higher propensity to engage in part-time work (Connolly
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& Gregory 2008). Human capital accumulation is likely to be lower in part-time
work thus further hampering career mobility.
Compared to Industrial sector employment, low-skilled employment proba-
bility is 6.5% lower than the average 80.6% effect for overqualified male Busi-
ness Service sector workers in low-skilled employment when the labour market
is slack, and 2.8% higher for Public Service employees when the labour market
is tight. However, relative to the reference case, the probability of less-skilled
employment is 2.4% higher for overqualified female Business Service sector
employees when the local labour market is tight. Moreover, the likelihood of
less-skilled employment is 4.2% higher for female Public Service sector workers
in slack, and 7.3% higher in tight, local labour markets.
Over-qualification in high-skilled employment increases the average proba-
bility of low-skilled employment by 5.9% for males. On average, over-qualification
in high-skilled employment seems to have a more detrimental effect for females
than males. However, these differences are insignificant at conventional levels.
Overqualified females in high-skilled employment are on average 12.1% more
likely to be in less-skilled employment at time t than those in well-matched
high-skilled jobs. Relative to Industrial sector employment, the probability of
less-skilled employment is 4.5% lower for overqualified male Business Service
sector employees when the local labour market is tight. However, no significant
industry variation in the impact of over-qualification on low-skilled employment
probability is found for females.
Working for a large employer (50+ employees) at t-1 significantly increases
the average probability (78.5% and 68.5% respectively) of remaining in low-
skilled employment for well-matched males and females (by 3.3% and 2.7%
respectively). With respect to over-qualification in low-skilled employment,
working for a large firm increases the average 80.6% (71.9%) probability of
continued less-skilled employment by 1.6% (1.5%) for males (females). How-
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ever, no significant impact of firm size is found for the overqualified in skilled
jobs. Part-time work is an insignificant predictor of low-skilled employment for
men, over and above the average effect of state dependence. However, part-
time work significantly increases the probability of remaining in less-skilled
employment for both well-matched and overqualified women by 6.8% and 4.9%
more than the average effect respectively with the gender difference in the for-
mer effect being stastically significant at the 5% level. Whilst insignificant,
overqualified females in skilled part-time employment at t-1 are estimated to
be 5.7% less likely to be in less-skilled employment than those is well-matched
skilled jobs at t-1.
Skilled Employment Probability Relative to the reference group, when the
local labour market is slack (tight), well-matched males in low-skilled employ-
ment at t-1 are 6% (7.5%) more likely than the average -76.8% effect to be in
skilled employment at time t. However, for equivalent females, Public sector
employment at t-1 significantly reduces the probability of skilled employment
at time t by 3.1% more than the average 68.4% reduction.
Overqualified males in low-skilled employment at t-1 are, on average, 77.8%
less likely to be in high-skilled employment than the reference case. However,
relative to Industrial sector work, Business Service sector employment increases
high-skilled employment probability by 3.6% and 1.9% more than the average
effect when the local labour market is slack and tight respectively. On average,
overqualified females are 71.3% less likely than those in well-matched skilled
jobs to be in skilled employment at time t. Moreover, when the local labour
market is tight over-qualification in low-skilled Public Service sector employ-
ment reduces the average skilled employment probability by 1.6% relative to
industrial sector employment.
Over-qualification in skilled employment at t-1 implies a reduction in male
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skilled employment probability by 8.4%, relative to well-matched skilled em-
ployment. However, when the local labour market is tight overqualified male
Business Service sector employees increase their average skilled employment
probability by 5.6%, relative to the baseline. For females, this scenario car-
ries an 12.2% lower probability of remaining in skilled-employment at time t.
Overqualified females in skilled Public Service employment are estimated to
face a 6.4% higher probability of being in skilled employment when the local
labour market is slack.
Relative to the baseline, working for a large employer (50+ employees) at t-1
significantly decreases the average -76.9% probability of skilled employment for
well-matched males in low-skilled employment by 2.2%, whilst for females this
has an insignificant effect over an above the -68.4% effect of state dependence.
However, no significant impact of firm size is found for both overqualified males
and females. For women in well-matched less-skilled jobs, part-time work im-
plies a 3.3% reduction in skilled employment probability, over and above the
average -68.4% effect. Overqualified females in low-skilled part-time employ-
ment at t-1 are estimated to be 3.2% less likely to be in skilled employment
than the average 71.3% effect at time t. However, no significant effect of part-
time work on skilled employment probability is found for males as well as for
overqualified females in high skilled employment.
Non-Employment Probability Well-matched males in low-skilled employ-
ment at t-1 are 1.6% less likely to be in non-employment at time t than those
in well-matched skilled jobs at t-1, however this average effect is insignificant
at conventional levels. Relative to Industrial sector workers, this probability is
3.7% and 3.4% lower in tight local labour markets for Business Service and Pub-
lic Service sector workers respectively. Although insignificant at the 90% level
on average, females in well-matched low-skilled employment are 0.1% less likely
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than equivalent females in well-matched skilled jobs to be in non-employment
at time t. Compared to Industrial sector workers, this probability is 2.5% and
4.4% lower hen the local labour market is tight for female Business Sector and
Public Service workers respectively.
Over-qualification in low-skilled employment at t-1 significantly decreases
the likelihood of non-employment by 2.8% more than the reference case for
males. Little industry variation is found in this effect, however for overqualified
males employed in the Business Services sector this probability is 3.0% higher
than the reference case when the local labour market is slack. Overqualified
females are 0.5% less likely than those in well-matched skilled jobs to be in
non-employment at time t. This estimate is insignificant at conventional levels.
However, when the local labour market is tight, relative to equivalent Industrial
sector workers, overqualified females in low-skilled Business Service and Public
Service sector jobs are 2.8% and 5.7% less likely than the average effect to be
in non-employment at time t. Moreover, overqualified female Public Service
sector workers are 3.1% less likely to enter non-employment in slack periods.
Relative to well-matched skilled jobs, over-qualification in skilled employ-
ment at t-1 implies an insignificant 2.4% increase in male skilled employment
probability. Moreover, no significant industry variation is evident. For fe-
males, this scenario carries a 0.1% lower probability of remaining in skilled-
employment at time t. However, this is effect is also insignificant. As in the
case of males, industry variation is found to be insignificant at conventional
levels.
Relative to the baseline, working for a large employer (50+ employees) at t-
1 significantly decreases the average -76.9% probability of non-employment for
well-matched females in low-skilled employment by 3.1%, whilst for equivalent
males this effect is insignificant. No significant impact of firm size is found for
overqualified males over an above the average effect of state dependence. How-
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ever, for overqualified females in low-skilled employment, working for a large
employer lowers non-employment probability by 1.8% (where the average effect
is insignificant). Relative to well-matched skilled employment, part-time work
increases the probability of non-employment by 6.0% for well-matched men in
low-skilled employment at t-1. However for women, the same scenario decreases
the probability of non-employment by 3.1%, ceteris paribus. This gender dif-
ference is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, whilst upward career
mobility may be on average more limited for females in part-time than full-
time work, part-time work seems to be an indicator of loose labour market
attachment for males on average. Furthermore, relative to the reference group,
over-qualification reduces non-employment probability by 1.7% for females in
low-skilled employment (where the average effect is insignificant). However,
no significant impact of part-time work on the non-employment transitions of
the overqualified in skilled work is found, over and above the impact on non-
employment propensities of those in well-matched low-skilled employment at
t-1.
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis
The results so far suggest that over-qualification, independent of whether ex-
perienced in skilled or low-skilled work, increases the probability of low-skilled
and decreases the probability of skilled employment when compared to being
in a well-matched skilled job, all else equal. Furthermore, over-qualification is
more damaging for career mobility if experienced in low-skilled employment.
Low-skilled employment is more of a Stepping Stone to skilled employment for
females than males, independent on over-qualification. However, conditional on
being overqualified, only women in low-skilled employment are more upwardly
mobile than men.
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Over-qualification in high-skilled employment carries greater negative ca-
reer mobility implications for females than their male counterparts. Important
variation is evident, both in terms of previous industry and firm characteristics.
Moreover, the effect of being over-qualified is not invariant to the business cycle.
However, the results so far could be sensitive to various definitional assump-
tions. The result that the overqualified in high-skilled employment have poorer
upward career prospects than their well matched counterparts is unexpected.
Taken in the context of existing work looking at the returns to over-education,
this suggests that the negative implications of over-qualification could be fur-
ther reaching. Sicherman (1991) finds that, all else constant, overeducated
workers get higher wages than their coworkers but lower wages than workers
with similar levels of schooling working in well-matched jobs. Moreover, Dolton
& Silles (2008) find that UK graduates that were overeducated in their first
jobs earn less that those which were not. Thus over-education is a potential
signal of education quality. The potential sensitivity of empirical results to the
definition of over-qualification has been highlighted in the literature. Moreover,
it would be of interest to gauge whether results are sensitive to another key
assumption: the definition of a skilled job.
6.6.1 Definition of a Skilled Job: ISCO-2008
I draw on the updated ISCO-2008 classification of occupations, in order to
assess the importance of changes in skill requirements of the 20 year period
1988 - 2008. Significant technological advances and industrial compositional
changes since the 1980’s (e.g. De-industrialisation and the growing prominence
of a two-tier service sector), accompanied by a general up-skilling of the work-
force, suggests that the very nature of skill mismatch is likely to have changed
accordingly. In extensions both the sensitivity of the Skill Mismatch definition
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and sensitivity of results to the definition of skilled job are assessed as both
are ISCO2008 rather than ISCO1988 based in this section.
Table 6.10: ISCO1988 VS. ISCO2008, 1991-2008, Survey Date Refer-
ence Point.
MALES: ISCO2008
ISCO1988 Unknown Skill-level 1 Skill-level 2 Skill-level 3 Skill-level 4 Total
Unknown, Invalid 5,341 0 0 0 0 5,341
Skill-level 1 0 1,697 255 0 0 1,952
Skill-level 2 0 218 12,047 70 22 12,357
Skill-level 3 0 0 2,405 2,969 157 5,531
Skill-level 4 0 0 0 439 8,446 8,885
Total 5,341 1,915 14,707 3,478 8,625 34,066
FEMALES: ISCO2008
ISCO1988 Unknown Skill-level 1 Skill-level 2 Skill-level 3 Skill-level 4 Total
Unknown, Invalid 12,300 0 0 0 0 12,300
Skill-level 1 0 2,184 351 0 0 2,535
Skill-level 2 0 210 13,270 18 0 13,498
Skill-level 3 0 0 4,666 4,872 17 9,555
Skill-level 4 0 0 0 313 6,931 7,244
Total 12,300 2,394 18,287 5,203 6,948 45,132
NB. Survey Date Reference Point.
In addition to being a significant update of the ISCO88 classification, the new
methodology attempts to address some underlying concerns relating to the pre-
vious approach. These include the definition of managers versus sole traders,
the distinction between professional and associate professional occupations and
the separation of supervisory occupations (Source: www.iser.essex.ac.uk). Ta-
ble 6.10 show the concordance between the two approaches for the sample under
consideration.
Table 6.11: Current Labour Market Status: By Gender, 1991 - 2008.
Males Females
Job Status (§) Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
unskill emp 12,725 41.5 14,481 35.58
skilled emp 13,152 42.89 15,253 37.48
non-emp 4,789 15.62 10,962 26.94
Total 30,666 100 40,696 100
§ NB. Definition of a skilled job ISCO2008 based. Sur-
vey Date Reference Point.
Table 6.10 shows that most of the movement in terms of broad occupational
skill has been upwards (“upskilling”) as one would expect from the Techno-
logical Change literature. This change is most notable between the second
and third skill levels. Moreover, this has impacted on females within the sam-
ple more than males (in both absolute and relative terms). Whereas 39% of
employed individuals in the sample were in skilled, and 61% in unskilled em-
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ployment according to the ISCO1988 methodology, this figure is roughly 50%
in both cases under the ISCO2008 approach.
Table 6.12: DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour Mar-
ket Transitions, 1991-2008.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
Job Status
(ISCO2008§)
Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 4,235 (87.9%) 5,837 (88.8%) 210 (2.6%) 144 (4.0%) 2,299 (30.7%) 12,725
skilled emp 186 (3.8%) 376 (5.7%) 7,683 (93.8%) 3,329 (92.5%) 1,578 (21.1%) 13,152
non-emp 399 (8.3%) 362 (5.5%) 302 (3.7%) 126 (3.5%) 3,600 (48.1%) 4,789
Total 4,820 6,575 8,195 3,599 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
Job Status
(ISCO2008§)
Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 6,018 (85.8%) 5,201 (85.4%) 254 (2.6%) 154 (4.1%) 2,854 (20.6%) 14,481
skilled emp 254 (3.6%) 382 (6.3%) 9,171 (92.1%) 3,428 (91.1%) 2,018 (14.5%) 15,253
non-emp 742 (10.6%) 510 (8.4%) 528 (5.3%) 180 (4.8%) 9,002 (64.9%) 10,962
Total 7,014 6,093 9,953 3,762 13,874 40,696
§ NB. Definition of a skilled job ISCO2008 based. Sur-
vey Date Reference Point.
Comparing table 6.11 and 6.3 in the Descriptives section, suggests that
women are on average 10% more likely to be in skilled occupations under the
updated ISCO-2008 methodology. Transition matrices are presented in Table
6.16. Table 6.13 suggests that, whilst on average upward career mobility for
women has increased when the ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 methods are contrasted,
this is not true for all job matches. The following section discusses the results
in more detail. Similar, yet larger, difference in the two approaches are when
the marginal effects are evaluated at their sample means (not reported). The
AMEs are drawn on due to their closer approximation to Average Partial Effects
(APEs), and for contrasting between the male and female sub-samples. See
Bartus (2005) for an argument in favour of the AMEs over MEMs.
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Table 6.13: State Dependence, Previous Industry Charac-
teristics & Business Cycle Effects. Marginal
Effects. Survey Date as Reference Point -
POOLED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL +
Mundlak (1978) Terms, 1991-2008. Skill Mis-
match Measure (Modal-based). TTWA Cluster
Robust Standard Errors.
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
AMEs: ISCO-1988 based. - SPECIFICATION USED IN THE MAIN ANALYSIS.
Previous Labour Market Status (T-1) (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LowSkilledEmp.xMatched 0.785*** -0.769*** -0.016 0.685*** -0.684*** -0.001
(0.014)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.011) (0.021)‡ (0.020)‡ (0.016)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.047** 0.060** -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.013
(0.021) (0.026)† (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)† (0.013)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.038** 0.075*** -0.037*** 0.022 0.003 -0.025*
(0.016)† (0.017)‡ (0.009) (0.014)† (0.010)‡ (0.013)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.005 -0.026 0.031 0.028** -0.031*** 0.003
(0.025) (0.031) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.013 0.021 -0.034** 0.061*** -0.017 -0.044***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.033*** -0.022** -0.012 0.027*** 0.004 -0.031***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
XPart Time Contract -0.005 -0.055 0.060** 0.068*** -0.033*** -0.035***
(0.029)† (0.037) (0.027)‡ (0.008)† (0.008) (0.008)‡
LowSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.806*** -0.778*** -0.028** 0.719*** -0.713*** -0.005
(0.011)‡ (0.009)‡ (0.011) (0.019)‡ (0.015)‡ (0.016)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.065*** 0.036*** 0.030 -0.019 0.001 0.019
(0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.010 0.019** -0.009 0.024 0.003 -0.028**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.001 -0.014 0.013 0.042** -0.011 -0.031*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.028** -0.011 -0.017 0.073*** -0.016* -0.057***
(0.013)§ (0.011) (0.011)‡ (0.014)§ (0.009) (0.012)‡
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.016** -0.006 -0.011 0.015* 0.003 -0.018*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
XPart Time Contract 0.011 0.007 -0.018 0.049*** -0.032*** -0.017
(0.016) (0.013)§ (0.017) (0.010) (0.007)§ (0.010)
HighSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.059*** -0.084*** 0.024 0.121*** -0.122** 0.001
(0.020) (0.026) (0.022) (0.044) (0.050) (0.034)
High Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.037 0.004 0.034 -0.006 -0.003 0.009
(0.029) (0.016) (0.027) (0.058) (0.017) (0.059)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.045* 0.056*** -0.012 -0.012 0.020 -0.008
(0.026) (0.018) (0.020) (0.041) (0.019) (0.040)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.040 -0.018 -0.022 -0.097 0.064* 0.033
(0.044) (0.020) (0.040) (0.072) (0.036) (0.060)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.014 0.020 -0.006 -0.032 0.029 0.003
(0.032) (0.017) (0.029) (0.041) (0.020) (0.037)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.004
(0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.029) (0.011) (0.027)
XPart Time Contract -0.005 -0.003 0.008 -0.057* 0.018 0.039
(0.052) (0.027) (0.043) (0.034) (0.014) (0.032)
NON-EMP 0.393*** -0.559*** 0.166*** 0.280*** -0.626*** 0.346***
(0.011)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.009)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.011)‡
AMEs: ISCO-2008 based. - SPECIFICATION USED IN THE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
Previous Labour Market Status (T-1) (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LowSkilledEmp.xMatched 0.764*** -0.769*** 0.005 0.657*** -0.703*** 0.046***
(0.014)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.010) (0.021)‡ (0.022)‡ (0.016)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.036** 0.046** -0.010 0.024 -0.032* 0.008
(0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.023* 0.058*** -0.035*** 0.039*** -0.010 -0.029**
(0.013) (0.013)† (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)† (0.015)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.008 -0.037 0.045* 0.061*** -0.066*** 0.005
(0.025)§ (0.032) (0.024) (0.016)§ (0.016) (0.014)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.049** -0.014 -0.036** 0.089** -0.041*** -0.048***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.024*** -0.007 -0.017** 0.012 0.023*** -0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
XPart Time Contract 0.021 -0.090* 0.069** 0.048*** -0.019** -0.028***
(0.032) (0.048) (0.031)† (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)†
LowSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.795*** -0.780*** -0.015 0.710*** -0.767*** 0.057**
(0.012)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.011)† (0.027)‡ (0.017)‡ (0.023)†
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.055*** 0.021* 0.034* -0.039* 0.036 0.003
(0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031)
Continued on next page
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Table 6.13 – continued from previous page
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.008 0.010 -0.002 0.021 0.014 -0.036*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.016 -0.050** 0.034 0.063* -0.005 -0.058*
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023) (0.033)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.028** -0.018 -0.010 0.067*** -0.010 -0.058***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.011 -0.006 -0.005 0.016 0.017* -0.033**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
XPart Time Contract 0.003 0.010 -0.014 0.047*** -0.016 -0.032**
(0.014)§ (0.015) (0.015) (0.011)§ (0.011) (0.013)
HighSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.052*** -0.070*** 0.019 0.109*** -0.158*** 0.049
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.034) (0.041) (0.035)
High Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.063** 0.003 0.060** 0.010 -0.006 -0.004
(0.028) (0.020) (0.026) (0.045) (0.018) (0.045)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.067*** 0.061*** 0.006 -0.006 0.019 -0.013
(0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.032) (0.020) (0.035)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.035 -0.009 -0.026 -0.064 0.018 0.046
(0.041) (0.023) (0.036) (0.043) (0.032) (0.048)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.016 0.024 -0.008 -0.067* 0.063** 0.004
(0.029) (0.016) (0.025) (0.034) (0.027) (0.034)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.009 0.002 -0.011
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.022)
XPart Time Contract -0.012 0.043 -0.030 -0.024 0.032* -0.009
(0.052) (0.048) (0.047) (0.034) (0.017) (0.025)
NON-EMP 0.354*** -0.538*** 0.184*** 0.240*** -0.618*** 0.378***
(0.011)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.007)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.011)‡
N 30666 30666 30666 40696 40696 40696
The Marginal Effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. In the categorical variable case, this is measured
relative to the baseline, holding all other options at zero.
Tests for differences in means (independent samples): ‡ † §- Difference between equivalent male and female coefficient
statistically significant at the 1% 5% 10% level respectively.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1988/ISCO-2008). The
ISCO defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Independent Variables: Model includes controls for individual characteristics, housing tenure, educational attainment,
school type attended, work-related training, experience (plus interaction with age), time-varying regional characteristics,
and Mundlak (1978) terms to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
ISCO-2008 & Over-education
The general story, with respect to the average effect of over-education, remains
consistent with that in the main analysis (see Table 6.13). Over-qualification in
low-skilled employment has more of a negative effect on upward career mobility
than if experienced in high-skilled employment. Furthermore, this negative
effect is larger for males than for females. However, whilst over-qualification
was estimated to be worse for overqualified females in high-skilled employment,
this impact is estimated to be close to that of males when the ISCO-2008 based
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methodology is used. The persistence of non-employment is estimated to be
stronger for both males and females, relative to the reference case. Significant
changes in the skill-composition of jobs over the 1988 to 2008 are likely to have
increased the career mobility costs associated with over-education. The ISCO-
2008 based results suggest that over-qualification increases the probability of
low-skilled employment and reduces the likelihood of skilled work by more
than that suggested in Table 6.9. For males the ISCO-2008 update leads us to
the conclusion that over the 20 year period between 1988 and 2008, industry
variation in the impact of over-qualification on career mobility has decreased
for males working in the Business Services sector. With respect to females, the
equivalent impact increased for Public Service sector workers. This is true in
both tight and slack labour markets. However, this is also true for the well-
matched which suggests that career mobility may have increased (decreased)
between 1988 and 2008 for females (males) in general.
Estimates in Table 6.13 suggest that firm size has decreased in importance
for males labour market transitions, possibly due to the increased prevalence of
small and medium size enterprises in the UK Business Service sector as defined
herein. However, females in well matched low-skilled employment, working for
larger employers increases the probability of skilled employment by more as a
result of the job definition change. ISCO-2008 based estimates further imply
that firm size has decreased in importance as a predictor of career mobility for
overqualified women in low-skilled jobs. Whilst part-time work has negative
implications for career mobility, see Connolly & Gregory (2008) for the case
of female part-time work, the move to ISCO-2008 based estimates suggests
that under the updated skilled job definition female part-time workers in low-
skilled jobs actually fared slightly better in terms of upward career mobility,
independent of over-qualification status. However, for males in well-matched
low-skilled jobs, part-time work has a more detrimental effect on the proba-
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bility of skilled employment under the updated skilled job definition, whilst
significantly increasing non-employment transitions.
6.6.2 State Dependence & The Definition of Over-education
The bulk of the literature focussing on the average impact of over-education
incidence (state dependence) on the persistence of over-education addresses
the sensitivity of results to definitional assumptions, without any attempt to
address heterogeneity in the type of job held. Whilst a direct measure of over-
education may come closer to this, it still assumes homogeneity in the impact
of over-qualification in high- and low-skilled jobs on future career mobility. In
this study I do not make this assumption, and in this section I assess sensitivity
to definitional choices whilst relaxing this restriction. In order to test the sen-
sitivity of results to the skill mismatch definition, I redefine this using the main
competing objective measure of mismatch commonly pursued in the literature.
An individual is considered mismatched if their highest formal qualifications are
greater than one standard deviation more than the mean qualification in their
3-digit occupational category. This produces estimates, see Table 6.14, very
similar to those estimated in the main analysis (see appendix for full results).
It seems that the commonly mentioned sensitivity to skill mismatch definition
is not as big an issue when heterogeneity in job skill is taken into account.
However, this ignores job quality differences that may still exist even within
occupation groups which a direct measure of skill mismatch is more likely to
capture (Chevalier 2003).
I also assess heterogeneity within the group of overqualified in an
attempt identify quality of a job match. I divide the overeducated into “appar-
ently” and “genuinely” overeducated sub-groups based on whether respondents
were satisfied or dissatisfied with their actual job itself respectively. This ap-
proach follows the methodology of Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier & Lindley
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(2009), a study based on an Institute of Employment Research (Warwick Uni-
versity) postal survey. The survey used in the two studies asked interviewees
directly whether they considered their qualifications to be ideal or inappropriate
for their job. Thus this allows for a time-varying measure of over-qualification,
which will capture any added qualification which may improve a match over
time. Since the job satisfaction question in the BHPS does not directly ask
about appropriateness of qualifications for the current job, I use self-reported
satisfaction the actual job itself at the beginning of a job spell to reflect sat-
isfaction with a job match, rather than using a time-varying measure which
is more likely to be affected by other non-job match related factors like how
well they get on with coworkers. I also do not use an average job satisfaction
measure, as this again is affected by unrelated job security and pay-related
factors. During economic downturns, when jobs are scarce, an individual may
report that she is satisfied with a job match just because they are happy to get
a job rather than because of their satisfaction with the job itself. However, I
would argue that this issue is likely to be minimised since this study controls
for quarterly local business cycle effects, as well as yearly time dummies to
capture longer-term evolution of the overall economy.
Table 6.14: State Dependence. Marginal Effects. Survey
Date as Reference Point - POOLED MULTINO-
MIAL LOGIT MODEL + Mundlak (1978) Terms,
1991-2008. Robustness to Skill Mismatch Mea-
sure (Modal vs. 1 Std. Deviation > Mean).
TTWA Cluster Robust Standard Errors.
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
ISCO-1988 based.
AME - Skill Mismatch: > Mode.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.787*** -0.754*** -0.032*** 0.771*** -0.731*** -0.041***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.814*** -0.776*** -0.039*** 0.790*** -0.749*** -0.041***
(0.007)† (0.007)§ (0.008) (0.007)† (0.009)§ (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.036*** -0.047*** 0.011 0.052*** -0.044*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
NON-EMP 0.396*** -0.567*** 0.171*** 0.256*** -0.640*** 0.384***
(0.009)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.007)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.010)‡
Continued on next page
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Table 6.14 – continued from previous page
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
AME - Skill Mismatch: > Mode + Job Match Satisfaction.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.785*** -0.753*** -0.032*** 0.770*** -0.728*** -0.042***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL
X“Genuinely Overeducation” 0.833*** -0.780*** -0.053*** 0.784*** -0.747*** -0.037***
(0.013)§ (0.009)§ (0.010) (0.014)§ (0.010)§ (0.014)
X“Apparently Overeducation” 0.808*** -0.773*** -0.034*** 0.791*** -0.748*** -0.043***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL
X“Genuinely Overeducation” 0.069*** -0.110*** 0.041 0.059*** -0.052* -0.007
(0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
X“Apparently Overeducation” 0.031*** -0.038*** 0.007 0.052*** -0.043*** -0.009
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
NON-EMP 0.399*** -0.566*** 0.168*** 0.256*** -0.637*** 0.381***
(0.009)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.007)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.010)‡
AME - Skill Mismatch: 1 Std. Deviation > Mean.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.787*** -0.755*** -0.032*** 0.763*** -0.725*** -0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.814*** -0.772*** -0.041*** 0.793*** -0.754*** -0.040***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.064*** -0.080*** 0.016 0.096*** -0.121*** 0.024
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
NON-EMP 0.396*** -0.563*** 0.167*** 0.253*** -0.638*** 0.385***
(0.009)‡ (0.012)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.007)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.010)‡
ISCO-2008 based.
AME - Skill Mismatch: > Mode.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.778*** -0.770*** -0.008 0.771*** -0.765*** -0.005
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.807*** -0.791*** -0.015** 0.788*** -0.779*** -0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.029*** -0.032*** 0.003 0.032*** -0.039*** 0.008
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
NON-EMP 0.361*** -0.551*** 0.190*** 0.216*** -0.630*** 0.414***
(0.009)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.006)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.009)‡
AME - Skill Mismatch: > Mode + Job Match Satisfaction.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.778*** -0.770*** -0.008 0.771*** -0.765*** -0.005
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL
X“Genuinely Overeducation” 0.828*** -0.793*** -0.035** 0.772*** -0.772*** -0.001
(0.015)§ (0.010) (0.010) (0.017)§ (0.010) (0.016)
X“Apparently Overeducation” 0.801*** -0.791*** -0.011 0.791*** -0.780*** -0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL
X“Genuinely Overeducation” 0.048** -0.063*** 0.015 0.055*** -0.058*** 0.004
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
X“Apparently Overeducation” 0.024** -0.024** -0.000 0.027** -0.036*** 0.009
(0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010)
NON-EMP 0.361*** -0.551*** 0.190*** 0.216*** -0.630*** 0.414***
(0.009)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.006)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.009)‡
AME - Skill Mismatch: 1 Std. Deviation > Mean.
Labour Market Status T-1 (Ref. SKILLED EMP X MATCHED)
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.776*** -0.770*** -0.006 0.761*** -0.756*** -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.811*** -0.793*** -0.019*** 0.794*** -0.786*** -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.041*** -0.052*** 0.010 0.053*** -0.076*** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
NON-EMP 0.357*** -0.549*** 0.191*** 0.213*** -0.628*** 0.414***
(0.009)‡ (0.011)‡ (0.010)‡ (0.006)‡ (0.009)‡ (0.009)‡
The Marginal Effect is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. In the categorical variable case, this is measured
relative to the baseline, holding all other options at zero.
Tests for differences in means (independent samples): ‡ † §- Difference between equivalent male and female coefficient
statistically significant at the 1% 5% 10% level respectively.
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1988/ISCO-2008). The
ISCO defines skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed
necessary for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”.
Occupations are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the
level of job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4
as high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Independent Variables: Model includes controls for individual characteristics, housing tenure, educational attainment,
school type attended, work-related training, experience (plus interaction with age), time-varying regional characteristics,
and Mundlak (1978) terms to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Continued on next page
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Table 6.14 – continued from previous page
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
On average, Table 6.14 highlights strong robustness of estimates across specifi-
cations. This contrasts with results in Groot & Maassen van den Brink (2000)
which suggests that whilst the effect of over-qualification on earnings seems in-
variant to definitional choice, choice of how to classify someone as overeducated
has a large impact on incidence of over-qualification. Consistent with Chevalier
(2003), important differences in job quality exist within occupational groups
when a direct measure of satisfaction with a job match is employed. Being
overqualified carries more damaging implications for upward career mobility
for “genuinely overqualified” men. This result carries over to the case of fe-
males in high skilled employment. However, “genuinely overqualified” females
are more upwardly mobile than those that are “apparently overqualified” in
both the ISCO1988 and ISCO2008 cases. This result, and that for the appar-
ently overqualified, is still consistent with the main story.
6.7 Summary and Conclusions
Over-qualification, independent of whether experienced in skilled or low-skilled
work, increases the probability of low-skilled and decreases the probability of
skilled employment when compared to being in a well-matched skilled job, all
else equal. Furthermore, over-qualification is more damaging for career mobil-
ity if experienced in low-skilled employment. Low-skilled employment is more
of a Stepping Stone to skilled employment for females than males, indepen-
dent on over-qualification. However, conditional on being overqualified, only
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women in low-skilled employment are more upwardly mobile than men. Over-
qualification in high-skilled employment carries greater negative career mobility
implications for females than their male counterparts. Important variation is
evident, both in terms of previous industry and firm characteristics. Whilst
upward career mobility may be on average more limited for females in part-
time than full-time work, part-time work seems to be an indicator of loose
labour market attachment for males on average. Moreover, the effect of being
over-qualified is not invariant to the business cycle. Contrasting results from
a 1988 and 2008 based classification of occupational skill, estimates suggest
that upward career mobility may have increased (decreased) between 1988 and
2008 for overqualified females (males) in general. Moreover, with regards to
state-dependence, this story is robust to the definition of over-qualification.
Whilst desirable, a decomposition by previous industry and firm characteris-
tics based on the Chevalier (2003) methodology was impossible to due small
cell size constraints.
Whilst the results are compelling, it is important to determine whether the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, analogous to the propor-
tionality assumption in the duration model context, is not driving the results as
this assumption is likely to not be appropriate in the setting considered. Given
the dynamic nature of the models presented in Evans (1999) and Le´ne´ (2011),
it is difficult to argue that the choice of less-skilled employment reduces both
the probabilities of skilled and non-employment proportionally. For skilled in-
dividuals downgrading into less-skilled employment, this temporary situation
may act as a Stepping Stone to future skilled employment during skilled job
shortages/economic contractions thus increasing, and not decreasing, skilled
employment probability. For others downgrading, this may turn out to be a per-
manent solution. The more skilled workers downgrade into less-skilled occupa-
tions the more likely that less-skilled individuals in less-skilled employment will
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be squeezed into non-employment. Moreover, the traditional route into skilled
employment for the less-skilled is via experience accumulation in less-skilled
positions (although Le´ne´ (2011) provides evidence to suggest that this route is
becoming less likely). Since labour market states are likely to be correlated over
time periods greater than t and t-1, this would violate the conditional indepen-
dence (across time periods) assumption of the pooled MNL. Techniques can be
exploited to control for the endogeneity of Initial Conditions, and thus fully
capture serial correlation over time when incorporated with Mundlak (1978)
terms (Wooldridge 2005)8. However, alternative labour market states would
still be assumed independent. Haan & Uhlendorff (2006) propose a method
of jointly modelling labour market states using a bivariate normal distribution
(correlated random effects) which breaks the IIA/proportionality restriction of
the standard MNL allowing for more flexible characterisations of state depen-
dence (see Section 2 for more information). Since the booster samples, which
over-sample low socioeconomic group status individuals, are included in the
analysis, it could be argued that this exacerbates the Initial Conditions prob-
lem. The biggest obstacle to applying these methods is time, as they can be
computationally intensive especially when solving higher dimensional integrals
given current computing limitations (Train 2009). Steps are being made to
address these issues, which will be incorporated into a discussion paper version
of this chapter. However, it would be impractical to estimate all versions of the
model given that this process can take 3/4 weeks using the current computing
setup.
Ideally a more appropriate definition of Skill Mismatch could be employed,
in order to better capture direct job skill requirements. There is a wide gap in
8Given the discrete choice setting, the inclusion of Mundlak (1978) terms on their own
without controlling for endogeneity of initial conditions is likely to raise identification issues,
given the endogeneity of Initial Conditions problem, an subject for investigation in a discus-
sion paper version of this chapter. Moreover, identification considerations would be aided by
an explicit formulation of the decision making process under consideration.
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the skill mismatch on the investigation of the impact of measurement error on
coefficient estimates. A limited number of papers in the Over-education litera-
ture have explicitly addressed this issue, e.g. Chevalier, 2003. The main focus
of this literature has been on the identification of “required skills” using both
subjective and objective measures for contrast. Subjective measures have been
championed as giving direct evidence of skill requirements, however they are
almost exclusively from the employees viewpoint and thus likely to suffer from
substantial measurement error. Whilst the subjective approaches are more
likely to capture the time-varying nature of this notion, almost exclusively ob-
jective studies have used time-invariant measures to classify occupations. One
notable criticism of the subjective approach is the nature of individuals ref-
erences. See for example, Bago d’Uva et al. (2009) for an exposition of the
vignettes approach to identification in survey data which attempts to control
the comparison groups which survey respondents use when answering subjec-
tive questions. If individuals are comparing the requirements when they were
hired to current requirements, then this will capture the fact that “upgrading
of skill requirements” due to technological change has resulted in occupations
that were once less-skilled becoming more skilled, thus raising current require-
ments. However, it will not capture accumulation of on-the-job training which
contributes to skill formation. If individuals are comparing their education lev-
els at the time of hire to requirements at that time, then this will essentially
be time-invariant. Subjective methods aside, I am unaware of any studies us-
ing time-varying objective measures of skill mismatch. The current study uses
a time-invariant classification based the mid-point of the observation period,
however the educational composition of the labour force has changed markedly
between 1991 and 2008. I have experimented with this in a shorter panel, and
intend to incorporate this into a working paper version of this chapter. Chap-
ter 7, interesting follow on questions, highlights other considerations if policy
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recommendations are to be drawn from this work.
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Appendix
6.7.1 Transition Matrices
Definition of a Skilled Job: ISCO-1988 + Over-qualification: ≥ 3-digit
occupation’s modal qualification level.
Table 6.15: DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour Mar-
ket Transitions, 1991-2008.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 5,056 6,847 189 98 2,605 14,795
skilled emp 142 356 6,927 2,385 1,272 11,082
non-emp 446 408 255 80 3,600 4,789
Total 5,644 7,611 7,371 2,563 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 8,135 6,743 225 102 3,522 18,727
skilled emp 217 365 7,120 1,955 1,350 11,007
non-emp 903 607 367 83 9,002 10,962
Total 9,255 7,715 7,712 2,140 13,874 40,696
NB. Survey Date Reference Point.
Over-qualification: ≥ 3-digit occupation’s modal qualification level.
Definition of a Skilled Job: ISCO-2008 + Over-qualification: ≥ 3-digit
occupation’s modal qualification level.
Table 6.16: DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour Mar-
ket Transitions, 1991-2008.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 4,235 5,837 210 144 2,299 12,725
skilled emp 186 376 7,683 3,329 1,578 13,152
non-emp 399 362 302 126 3,600 4,789
Total 4,820 6,575 8,195 3,599 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 6,018 5,201 254 154 2,854 14,481
skilled emp 254 382 9,171 3,428 2,018 15,253
non-emp 742 510 528 180 9,002 10,962
Total 7,014 6,093 9,953 3,762 13,874 40,696
NB. Survey Date Reference Point.
Over-qualification: ≥ 3-digit occupation’s modal qualification level.
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Table 6.17: MALE DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour
Market Transitions, 1991-2008, Survey Date Reference
Point.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 7,110 4,793 229 58 2,605 14,795
skilled emp 210 288 7,657 1,655 1,272 11,082
non-emp 580 274 290 45 3,600 4,789
Total 7,900 5,355 8,176 1,758 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 10,318 4,560 259 68 3,522 18,727
skilled emp 310 272 7,706 1,369 1,350 11,007
non-emp 1,102 408 392 58 9,002 10,962
Total 11,730 5,240 8,357 1,495 13,874 40,696
Over-qualification: 1 Standard Deviation ≥ 3-digit occupation’s mean qualification level.
Table 6.18: MALE DISCRETE-CHOICE SPECIFICATION: Labour
Market Transitions, 1991-2008, Survey Date Reference
Point.
MALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 7,110 4,793 229 58 2,605 14,795
skilled emp 210 288 7,657 1,655 1,272 11,082
non-emp 580 274 290 45 3,600 4,789
Total 7,900 5,355 8,176 1,758 7,477 30,666
FEMALES - PREVIOUS LABOUR MARKET STATUS
Low Skill Emp High Skill Emp
jbstat4 Match Ovqual Match Ovqual Non-Emp Total
unskill emp 7,681 3,538 303 105 2,854 14,481
skilled emp 366 270 10,243 2,356 2,018 15,253
non-emp 909 343 585 123 9,002 10,962
Total 8,956 4,151 11,131 2,584 13,874 40,696
Over-qualification: 1 Standard Deviation ≥ 3-digit occupation’s mean qualification level.
Definition of a Skilled Job: ISCO-1988 + Over-qualification: 1 Standard
Deviation ≥ 3-digit occupation’s mean qualification level.
Definition of a Skilled Job: ISCO-2008 + Over-qualification: 1 Standard
Deviation ≥ 3-digit occupation’s mean qualification level.
6.7.2 Average Marginal Effects (AMEs): Multinomial Logit,
no Mundlak (1978) terms.
Table 6.19: State Dependence. Average Marginal Effects
(AME). Survey Date as Reference Point -
POOLED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL NO
Mundlak (1978) Terms, 1991-2008. Time-Const
Skill Mismatch Measure (ISCO1988 + Modal-
based). TTWA Cluster Robust Standard Er-
rors.
Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
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Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
Age (ref. < 25)
30 - 45 0.024 0.044** -0.069*** -0.035* 0.023** 0.012
(0.018) (0.012) (0.022) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020)
45 + 0.043 0.130*** -0.173*** 0.092*** 0.112*** -0.204***
(0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019)
Type of school attended (ref. Comprehensive, Secondary Modern.)
Grammar No Fee -0.042*** 0.014** 0.028*** -0.022*** 0.004 0.017**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Private -0.040*** 0.008 0.032*** -0.046*** 0.014** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012)
Technical -0.021** 0.013* 0.009 -0.017** 0.003 0.014*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Highest Qualification (ref. Below O’Level,None, APPRENTICESHIP)
Degree -0.135*** 0.155*** -0.020** -0.115*** 0.143*** -0.028***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Other Higher -0.048*** 0.076*** -0.029*** -0.051*** 0.072*** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
A Levels -0.041*** 0.058*** -0.017** -0.024*** 0.037*** -0.013
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
O Levels -0.004 0.029*** -0.025*** 0.006 0.022*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Vocational Qualifications.
Yes 0.009* -0.002 -0.007 0.010** 0.009*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics.
White 0.008 0.019* -0.027*** 0.014* 0.017*** -0.031***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
Married/Cohabiting -0.012* 0.021*** -0.008 -0.051*** 0.002 0.049***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Children -0.050** 0.010 0.041 -0.099*** -0.021*** 0.120***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.028) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
ChildrenX Married/Cohab. 0.040* -0.014 -0.026 0.015 -0.019*** 0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Employed Spouse 0.044*** 0.017*** -0.061*** 0.067*** 0.006 -0.073***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Health Limits -0.088*** -0.039*** 0.127*** -0.082*** -0.033*** 0.115***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Disabled -0.050*** -0.041*** 0.091*** -0.081*** -0.034** 0.115***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Housing Tenure (ref. Private Renter)
Owned Outright 0.023** -0.006 -0.017* -0.000 -0.014* 0.014
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Mortgage 0.040*** 0.006 -0.046*** 0.031*** 0.010 -0.041***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Council -0.008 -0.062*** 0.071*** -0.001 -0.035*** 0.036***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Housing Assoc. 0.015 -0.049*** 0.034*** -0.003 -0.024** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Work Related Training in the last 12 months.
Yes 0.049*** 0.045*** -0.094*** 0.084*** 0.060*** -0.144***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Experience.
Pot. Experience 0.002** -0.000 -0.002** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
X 30 - 45 -0.009** -0.003 0.013** 0.006 -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
X 45 + -0.019*** -0.014*** 0.033*** -0.024*** -0.014*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Regional Characteristics.
Urban -0.006 -0.007 0.013** -0.004 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Accessible -0.020 0.010 0.010 -0.014** 0.000 0.014**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
University (in TTWA) 0.014** -0.002 -0.011* -0.003 -0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Skill Intensity -0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Local Business Cycle Effects.
Labour Market Tightness
(V/U)
0.007*** 0.001 -0.008*** 0.005* -0.000 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Industrial Skill Composition 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.005** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Previous Labour Market Status (T-1)
LowSkilledEmp.xMatched 0.796*** -0.791*** -0.005 0.700*** -0.720*** 0.020
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.048** 0.062** -0.014 0.000 -0.006 0.006
(0.022) (0.027) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.038** 0.078*** -0.040*** 0.024* 0.005 -0.029**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.001 -0.020 0.019 0.040*** -0.021* -0.018
(0.026) (0.032) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.017 0.021 -0.038** 0.069*** -0.012 -0.057***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.036*** -0.020** -0.016** 0.026*** 0.007 -0.033***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
XPart Time Contract -0.013 -0.060 0.073*** 0.067*** -0.036*** -0.032***
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Male Mundlakd MNL Female Mundlak MNL
LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP LSKEMP SKEMP NONEMP
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
(0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
LowSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.822*** -0.799*** -0.023*** 0.737*** -0.746*** 0.008
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Low Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.072*** 0.034*** 0.038* -0.021 0.001 0.020
(0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.023)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.015 0.021** -0.007 0.027* 0.004 -0.031**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.005 -0.010 0.015 0.043** -0.008 -0.036*
(0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) 0.026** -0.006 -0.020* 0.078*** -0.013 -0.065***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.014* -0.006 -0.008 0.016* 0.004 -0.020**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
XPart Time Contract 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.044*** -0.037*** -0.007
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
HighSkilledEmp.xOverqualified 0.058*** -0.082*** 0.024 0.129*** -0.143*** 0.014
(0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.044) (0.052) (0.033)
High Skilled Emp. x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial) x Local (TTWA) Business Cycle Effects
xBusinessServicesxSLACK(V/U) -0.041 -0.000 0.041 -0.007 0.000 0.007
(0.031) (0.016) (0.029) (0.060) (0.018) (0.061)
xBusinessServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.044 0.056*** -0.012 -0.013 0.021 -0.008
(0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.040) (0.020) (0.038)
xPublicServicesxSLACK(V/U) 0.048 -0.016 -0.032 -0.097 0.076* 0.021
(0.046) (0.020) (0.041) (0.075) (0.040) (0.067)
xPublicServicesxTIGHT(V/U) -0.017 0.019 -0.001 -0.029 0.037 -0.008
(0.034) (0.017) (0.034) (0.040) (0.023) (0.036)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.009 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.005
(0.023) (0.012) (0.018) (0.029) (0.011) (0.027)
XPart Time Contract -0.003 -0.005 0.008 -0.075** 0.007 0.068**
(0.054) (0.027) (0.046) (0.033) (0.013) (0.032)
NON-EMP 0.385*** -0.588*** 0.202*** 0.274*** -0.666*** 0.391***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Mundlak (1978) Terms
√
Year Dummies
√
Government Office Region Fixed Effects
√
N 30666 30666 30666 40696 40696 40696
LL -12172.5 -12172.5 -12172.5 -18674.2 -18674.2 -18674.2
LL int -30955.5 -30955.5 -30955.5 -43306.7 -43306.7 -43306.7
Pseudo R2 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.569 0.569 0.569
AIC 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 2.5e+04 3.8e+04 3.8e+04 3.8e+04
(*) dy/dx = Marginal Effect. (d) is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(‡) McFadden’s Pseudo R2: 1 - LL(full)/LL(Intercept Only).
Skill groups are defined according the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-2008). The ISCO defines
skill-levels using both task- and competency-based measures: “Skill levels are linked to the length of time deemed necessary
for a person to become fully competent in the performance of tasks associated with a job (Elias et al. 1999)”. Occupations
are classified into 4 skill groups, illustrated in Table 6.1, based on (1) the level of general education and (2) the level of
job-specific training required to perform a job (Upward & Wright 2004). Groups 1-2 are classified as low-, whilst 3-4 as
high-skilled. Thus the ISCO-88 based measure attempts to closely capture the actual skill requirements of a job.
Previous Industry Groupings: Industrial (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry & Fishing; Mining & quarrying, Manufacturing,
and electricity, gas and water supply; Construction); Commercial (Wholesale & retail trade, repairs, etc.; Transport, Storage &
Communications); Business Services (Financial Intermediation; Real estate, renting and business activities); Public Services
(Public administration & defence, social security; Health & Social Work; Education; Other). NB. Unknown category includes
cases assumed missing at random, as well as pre-2002 cases where a concordance between SIC80 and SIC92 could not be
established. 5% of SIC80 codes could not be converted to SIC92 classification. Including these cases in the base category
did not change other estimates markedly.
Symmetry of Transitions (IIA): The Hausman test for IIA is not compatible with clustered data. Moreover, formal tests
for IIA should be viewed with caution (Train 2009). Alternative modeling methods, that relax the IIA assumption, include
the alternative-specific multinomial probit or nested logit models. These alternatives are not pursued in this study and left
for future work.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (NB. Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature, raising some
interesting questions and possibilities for future research. Given the current
economic climate, as a package it is both timely and relevant in terms of re-
newed academic interest in unemployment and its consequences, notably from
the US, and from a political point of view.
Thesis contributions Limited evidence on the importance of regional context
over time implies that gauging the relative importance of the individual versus
the regional level is crucial in order to gain insights into the effectiveness of
government policy. The empirical results in Chapter 4 suggest that, whilst
regional labour market conditions and therefore regional (fiscal) policies can
affect individual labour market outcomes, expansionary regional fiscal policy
(job creation) seem more to have a supportive role and they cannot substitute
for a lack of individual-level qualities in the job search process.
Furthermore the evidence suggests that regional development programmes,
targeting job creation, cannot substitute for targeted individual-level Active
Labour Market Policies (ALMP) aimed to improve individuals’ re-employment
prospects in the long-run (≥ 6 months), e.g. through sponsored work experience
and vocational qualifications. Moreover, since the increasing risk labour market
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detachment implies that re-employment prospects decrease with unemployment
duration, only ALMPs seem to be effective in targeting the prospects of the
long-term unemployed.
This is a new insight, that could not be reached using standard techniques.
Conventional wisdom suggests that regional development policies encouraging
job creation can alleviate the problem of regional unemployment. However,
these results imply that this is only part of the solution, and will only help
those with the highest re-employment probabilities. Given that in the current
context ALMP like New Deal only kick in after 6 months of a claimant spell,
these results point to the potential benefits of early intervention to improve
individuals’ re-employment prospects.
UK studies, Brown & Sessions (1997), Kalwij (2001), Collier (2005) and
Kalwij (2010) all find that regional variation in job offer arrival rates is the
main driver of average unemployment experiences. However, Chapter 4 finds
that regional characteristics are less important than individual effects, and that
regional heterogeneity is insignificant in the long-run. Kalwij (2004) finds less
of a role for regional heterogeneity. Incidence, rather than duration of unem-
ployment is found to be most important for young male career outcomes. Since
the standard duration approaches, including those adopted in Kalwij (2004),
average out the time-varying effect of covariates on the dependent variable, our
results suggest more of a role for regional heterogeneity at least in the short-run.
Although we were unable to test this, and it would be of interest to explore
further in future work, Kalwij (2004) suggests that regional heterogeneity may
be more important for unemployment incidence for young males.
Surprisingly, we observe that large cities such as London and Birmingham
provide worse local labour market conditions than rural and even remote re-
gions such as Northern Scotland. This finding is important as many people
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likely believe the reverse, although the Government is already targeting prob-
lematic neighborhoods in these cities.
A unique feature of this analysis is the use of rich individual-level claimant
count data which has not been fully explored so far. Moreover, we exploit
the regional variation in the data in order to link individuals to the regional
context in which they reside. We exploit flexible Censored Quantile Regression
techniques, as well as drawing on Quantile Decomposition techniques in order
to isolate the “true”1 regional effect (Machado et al. 2006).
Another contribution of this thesis is to address important sources of (re-
gional) variation in Wage Scarring. Seminal UK research by Arulampalam
(2001) concludes that the first spell of non-employment carries the highest
penalty. Considering unemployment and inactivity separately, no reduction in
the penalty associated with incidence of inactivity is found whilst for multiple
spells of unemployment the wage penalty reduces significantly with incidence
with the first spell carrying the highest penalty. Moreover, whilst incidence of
unemployment matters and the significance of duration at conventional levels
is not robust to extensions of the observation period, the impact of OLF spells
runs mainly through the duration effect. Strong regional differences are found
in the impact of redundancy on wage growth. This is contingent on labour
market tightness and urbanity of the region in which unemployment was ex-
perienced. Redundancy followed by unemployment in areas of high economic
activity is equally damaging for future earnings potential, independent of age.
These negative implications are long lasting.
In chapter 5, a rigorous assessment of the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypoth-
esis - that unemployment experienced in high unemployment regions is seen as
1Given that we do not directly control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, regional
rankings based on the CQR results could be criticised. However, CQR is robust to the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in that regions will retain their relative importance
in the results. Rank invariance carries over to the estimates in Table 4.5.
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more of a characteristic of that region and less of a negative productivity signal-
is conducted and its long-term implications assessed for the UK.
This contribution is unique to Wage Scarring and to the UK. Moreover,
the main hypothesis under test has only been tested in the short-run, and for
the Netherlands (van Dijk & Folmer 1999) and Italy (Lippi & Ordine 2002).
Both studies find evidence supporting this hypothesis, however, whilst the ef-
fect points in the right direction, I do not find strong support for the (van Dijk
& Folmer 1999) hypothesis for the UK on average as the differences in these
penalties across high and low unemployment regions are not statistically dif-
ferent. Granted I do find stronger support amongst over 45s made redundant
in their previous jobs. These results remain robust to specification changes.
I develop Continuous Work-Life Histories, using a novel approach extending
that of Upward (1999) and taking into account concerns within the literature.
The novelty of this approach is that labour market history since leaving full-
time education is incorporated, allowing for a direct measure of experience to
be used in the analysis. This allows for the regional location at the time of
displacement, whilst searching for a job, and at re-employment to be directly
controlled for. Since actual and potential experience are more likely to diverge
for women, assessing the questions in this chapter in the context of females’
Wage Scarring outcomes is of direct interest.
Another contribution of this thesis is to investigate whether low-skilled jobs
are a Stepping Stone to better matches for the overqualified. Over-qualification
is an important phenomenon in the labour market, both in terms of future earn-
ings potential but also in terms of career mobility. This affects all spectrums of
the earnings and skills distribution, impacting on the prospects of both school
leavers, university graduates and even PhDs.
This is a contentious area, let alone the measurement of over-education.
Omitted Variable Bias and Measurement error are key issues. This requires
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a rigorous approach to evaluating the impact of over-qualification that has to
date been distinctly lacking in the literature, bar one or two examples (Leuven
& Oosterbeek 2011). By differentiating between the broad skill requirements
of a job (using the ISCO methodology to distinguish between the task compo-
sition of fine 3-digit occupation classifications), this assessment of the career
mobility consequences of over-education gets closer to controlling for the dif-
fering educational requirements across jobs. Furthermore, controlling for job
match satisfaction in robustness checks, following as similar an approach to
Chevalier (2003) as possible with the BHPS, leads to results consistent with
the main analysis.
Over-qualification, independent of whether experienced in skilled or low-
skilled work, increases the probability of low-skilled and decreases the proba-
bility of skilled employment when compared to being in a well-matched skilled
job, all else equal. Furthermore, over-qualification is more damaging for career
mobility if experienced in low-skilled employment. Low-skilled employment is
more of a Stepping Stone to skilled employment for females than males, in-
dependent on over-qualification. However, conditional on being overqualified,
only women in low-skilled employment are more upwardly mobile than men.
Over-qualification in high-skilled employment carries greater negative career
mobility implications for females than their male counterparts. Important vari-
ation is evident, both in terms of previous industry and firm characteristics.
Whilst upward career mobility may be on average more limited for females in
part-time than full-time work, part-time work seems to be an indicator of loose
labour market attachment for males on average. Moreover, the effect of being
over-qualified is not invariant to the business cycle. Contrasting results from
a 1988 and 2008 based classification of occupational skill, estimates suggest
that upward career mobility may have increased (decreased) between 1988 and
2008 for overqualified females (males) in general. Moreover, with regards to
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state-dependence, this story is robust to the definition of over-qualification.
Potential criticisms Drawing on a youth sample from the Joint Unemploy-
ment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS), Kalwij (2004) find evidence
to suggest that regional characteristics impact more on the probability of unem-
ployment (unemployment incidence) than on the probability of re-employment
(unemployment duration). Given that the study does not use linked employer-
employee data it assumes that gaps in employment history, when individuals
are off the claimant register, are periods of employment. This assumption im-
plies that the study’s results are potentially seriously biased. Using linked New
Earnings Survey (NES)-JUVOS data would allow one to construct full employ-
ment biographies. Although not the initial question of this chapter, this would
allow for a better answer to the question of wether region affects the incidence
or duration of unemployment most and be a welcome complement to the thesis
as a whole.
The search and matching literature stresses the importance of labour mar-
ket tightness for re-employment probabilities. Moreover, studies have shown
a role for both the stock of vacancies and jobseekers (Petrongolo 2001). As
noted in chapter 4, incorporating this measure would mean making some strong
assumptions due to a 2 year gap in the vacancies series at lower levels of ag-
gregation. This is why we use unemployment to proxy supply and demand
factors instead. Rather than using the Cox PH model, a discrete-time duration
model with Heckman & Singer (1984) distributed unobserved heterogeneity
could be employed. Moreover, Multiple Spells and Competing Risks are of im-
portance. The advantage of controlling for multiple spells is that identification
in multiple spell context achieved under much weaker assumptions than in the
single spell case (Honore 1993). Individuals moving onto Income Support and
Incapacity Benefits are likely to have very different observed and unobserved
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characteristics to those finding re-employment, which is of direct interest for
policy makers. Incorporating more realism into econometric methods for du-
ration analysis strengthens policy recommendations. However, more flexible
techniques are not without their limitations. Although identification under
competing risks has only been proved under independent risks Van den Berg
(2001), this imposes restrictions on the nature of the error structure between
competing risks.
Since the aim is to control for labour market history since leaving full-time
education, the Chapter 5 could be extended by allowing new labour market
entrants to enter the sample. However, since actual and potential experience
are more closely aligned for males, an alternative approach could be to use
potential instead of actual experience and allow individuals to enter the sample
at any point in time and model selection as a dynamic problem (e.g. Wooldridge
1995).
In Chapter 5 the appropriateness of the un-testable exclusion restrictions,
and those generally used to support Identification of the Heckman LIML 2-
step estimator, was called into question. Given the likely identification issues,
more robust modern techniques like IV could be employed which would not
rely on un-testable assumptions for identification. An important caveat is that
the results testing the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) are based on ILO unemploy-
ment data at the Local Authority and not TTWA level of aggregation, where
TTWA’s approximate self-contained labour markets. Local Authorities can-
not be considered self-contained and thus their use would call for alternative
econometric techniques which take into account this spatial autocorrelation,
e.g. Spatial Econometrics.
In Chapter 6, the transition probabilities associated with the over-qualification
in high-skilled employment category are likely to be measured imprecisely due
to small cell size issues. It would thus be instructive if large scale administra-
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tive panel data could be used to get a more accurate picture for this population
sub-group. Moreover, this would allow for decomposition by previous industry
and firm characteristics based on the Chevalier (2003) methodology.
Whilst the results are compelling, it is important to determine whether the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, analogous to the propor-
tionality assumption in the duration model context, is not driving the results
as this assumption is likely to not be appropriate in the setting considered.
Given the dynamic nature of the models presented in Evans (1999) and Le´ne´
(2011), it is difficult to argue that the choice of less-skilled employment reduces
both the probabilities of skilled and non-employment proportionally.
For skilled individuals downgrading into less-skilled employment, this tem-
porary situation may act as a Stepping Stone to future skilled employment
during skilled job shortages/economic contractions thus increasing, and not
decreasing, skilled employment probability. For others downgrading, this may
turn out to be a permanent solution. The more skilled workers downgrade
into less-skilled occupations the more likely that less-skilled individuals in less-
skilled employment will be squeezed into non-employment. Moreover, the tra-
ditional route into skilled employment for the less-skilled is via experience ac-
cumulation in less-skilled positions (although Le´ne´ (2011) provides evidence to
suggest that this route is becoming less likely).
Since labour market states are likely to be correlated over time periods
greater than t and t-1, this would violate the conditional independence (across
time periods) assumption of the pooled MNL. Techniques can be exploited
to control for the endogeneity of Initial Conditions, and thus fully capture
serial correlation over time when incorporated with Mundlak (1978) terms
(Wooldridge 2005)2. However, alternative labour market states would still be
2Given the discrete choice setting, the inclusion of Mundlak (1978) terms on their own
without controlling for endogeneity of initial conditions is likely to raise identification issues,
given the endogeneity of Initial Conditions problem, an subject for investigation in a discus-
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assumed independent. Haan & Uhlendorff (2006) propose a method of jointly
modelling labour market states using a bivariate normal distribution (corre-
lated random effects) which breaks the IIA/proportionality restriction of the
standard MNL allowing for more flexible characterisations of state dependence
(see Section 2 for more information).
Since the booster samples, which over-sample low socioeconomic group sta-
tus individuals, are included in the analysis, it could be argued that this ex-
acerbates the Initial Conditions problem. The biggest obstacle to applying
these methods is time, as they can be computationally intensive especially
when solving higher dimensional integrals given current computing limitations
(Train 2009). Steps are being made to address these issues, which will be in-
corporated into a discussion paper version of this chapter. However, it would
be impractical to estimate all versions of the model given that this process can
take 3/4 weeks using the current computing setup.
Ideally a more appropriate definition of Skill Mismatch could be employed,
in order to better capture direct job skill requirements. There is a wide gap
in the skill mismatch on the investigation of the impact of measurement error
on coefficient estimates. A limited number of papers in the Over-education
literature have explicitly addressed this issue, e.g. Chevalier (2003). The main
focus of this literature has been on the identification of “required skills” using
both subjective and objective measures for contrast. Subjective measures have
been championed as giving direct evidence of skill requirements, however they
are almost exclusively from the employees viewpoint and thus likely to suffer
from substantial measurement error.
Whilst the subjective approaches are more likely to capture the time-varying
nature of this notion, almost exclusively objective studies have used time-
sion paper version of this chapter. Moreover, identification considerations would be aided by
an explicit formulation of the decision making process under consideration.
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invariant measures to classify occupations. One notable criticism of the sub-
jective approach is the nature of individuals references. See for example,
Bago d’Uva et al. (2009) for an exposition of the vignettes approach to identi-
fication in survey data which attempts to control the comparison groups which
survey respondents use when answering subjective questions. If individuals
are comparing the requirements when they were hired to current requirements,
then this will capture the fact that “upgrading of skill requirements” due to
technological change has resulted in occupations that were once less-skilled be-
coming more skilled, thus raising current requirements. However, it will not
capture accumulation of on-the-job training which contributes to skill forma-
tion. If individuals are comparing their education levels at the time of hire to
requirements at that time, then this will essentially be time-invariant. Subjec-
tive methods aside, I am unaware of any studies using time-varying objective
measures of skill mismatch. The current study uses a time-invariant classifi-
cation based the mid-point of the observation period, however the educational
composition of the labour force has changed markedly between 1991 and 2008.
I have experimented with a time-varying objective measure on a shorter panel,
and intend to incorporate this into a working paper version of this chapter.
However, this would be subject to the criticisms raised by Evans in Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.
Interesting follow on questions In future work I would like to extend Chap-
ter 4, employing flexible discrete-time duration models to address related ques-
tions. Men and women could be analyzed separately, as unobserved factors
impacting on male and female labour market transitions are likely to differ.
Moreover, the difference between the ILO unemployment and Claimant Count
series is more likely to be larger for females than males (anonymous referee
pointed this out). Multiple spells, time-varying covariates, and competing risks
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would also add further realism. Potential questions of interest include the com-
bined impact of jobcenter closures (data at hand), regional labour markets, and
the distance to a jobcenter (data at hand). It would also be interesting to as-
sess how the impact of regional location has changed over time. Has living in
certain areas got better or worse for re-employment prospects?
Recent research suggests that that unobserved factors not adequately cap-
tured in the model may not be biasing results towards not finding strong sup-
port for the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis. Looking at the the psy-
chological cost of being unemployed and whether this is lower if there is more
unemployment around, using Swiss and German data Oesch & Lipps (2011) find
that becoming unemployed hurts as much when regional unemployment is high
as when it is low. Moreover, the impact on well-being does not diminish over
time, nor do repeated episodes of unemployment improve wellbeing. Granted,
this result may not hold for the UK. Thus alternative empirical strategies are
likely to lend credence to the results herein.
In terms of Chapter 5, difference-in-difference approaches could be adopted
to assess the impact of the introduction of JSA on unemployment/wage scar-
ring. It would be of interest to assess whether the cuts the eligibility to non-
means tested unemployment benefits from 12 to 6 months increased the initial
unemployment penalty, and whether this impacted on subsequent wage growth.
Petrongolo (2009) conducts a similar study finding that while tighter search
requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment bene-
fits, they were not successful in moving them onto long-lasting or better jobs.
Establishing whether significant regional variation in this effect exists would
complement the initial research questions. Recent literature, e.g. Elsby et al.
(2009) and Petrongolo & Pissarides (2008) suggests that incidence and dura-
tion are related to the business cycle, and it would be fruitful in future work to
investigate this further in relation to the van Dijk & Folmer (1999) hypothesis
7. Conclusion 305
and research questions under test. Inflow rates countercyclical, especially for
job losers (layoffs), whereas outflow rates are procyclical. This suggests that
high unemployment levels in a recession are driven by longer unemployment
durations, rather than higher incidence.
In addition to the econometric and measurement issues highlighted in the
conclusion to Chapter 6, the following highlights other considerations if pol-
icy recommendations are to be drawn from this work. Determining, beyond
reasonable doubt, whether less-skilled employment is more persistent than non-
employment will aid policy makers when deciding whether to concentrate re-
sources on getting people into work or into a good match. Moreover, an alter-
native approach to quantify the scarring effects is through wage equations.
As noted, the result that the overqualified in high-skilled employment have
poorer upward career prospects than their well matched counterparts is un-
expected. Taken in the context of existing work looking at the returns to
over-education, this suggests that the negative implications of over-qualification
could be further reaching. Sicherman (1991) finds that, all else constant, overe-
ducated workers get higher wages than their coworkers but lower wages than
workers with similar levels of schooling working in well-matched jobs. More-
over, Dolton & Silles (2008) find that UK graduates that were overeducated in
their first jobs earn less that those which were not. This suggests that over-
education is a negative productivity signal that the reflects educational quality
not adequately captured in studies investigating the average returns to attained
levels of education. Establishing the extent to which workers who transition
into low and high skilled jobs suffer a wage penalty relative to workers who were
previously matched in these jobs and the relative magnitudes of these penal-
ties. Dealing with potential endogeneity issues through alternative methods,
e.g. Arellano-Bond and/or GMM, could also strengthen conclusions.
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I see the final chapter as a potential platform for a wide range of future
research initiatives. These research questions include investigating the impact
on unemployment duration: is there a threshold duration above which pre-
vious over-qualification becomes an issue? Moreover, is there a threshold job
duration above which over-qualification starts to deplete skilled human capital?
These questions would require the adoption of a flexible discrete-time duration
approach, as mentioned in the Methodology section. What is the impact of
over-qualification in one’s previous job on accepted wages, and what conse-
quences does this have for future wage growth? Is there a threshold length
of time in low-skilled employment/unemployment for graduates, above which
over-qualification becomes a serious issue? In general, there is a 2 years thresh-
old above which consideration for graduate schemes is very difficult. Moreover,
is there regional variation in the impact of over-education on the graduate
labour market. If liquidity constraints (Chetty 2008), in this case due to mort-
gaged home ownership, mean that unemployed mortgaged home owners are
more likely to accept the first job offer in order to keep up mortgage payments
then do shocks to local (TTWA) house prices (Nationwide time series data at
hand) result in a higher probability of over-education (in less-skilled employ-
ment) and what consequences does this have for future earnings trajectories?
What impact does self-employment have on career mobility, once the type of
job engaged in when self-employed is taken into account? Does human capital
depreciate whilst self-employed? Does it matter whether self-employment was
skilled or unskilled? Is the signal of previous self-employment enough to signal
high productivity to potential employers?
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Appendix A
Chapter 4: Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Description & summary statistics of individual-level covariates, 1999-
2005
Variable Mean SD
Calendar time
Years (ref. 1999):
y2000 .158 .365
y2001 .156 .363
y2002 .137 .344
y2003 .139 .346
y2004 .125 .331
y2005 .121 .326
Quarters (ref.q1):
q2 .231 .422
q3 .244 .429
q4 .263 .440
Socio Demographics:
Age<25 .493 .500
Age>55 .012 .110
Female .223 .416
Occupation (ref. unkown):
Elementary .374 .484
Manufacturing .071 .257
Trade & Services .364 .481
Technical .048 .213
Senior & Professional .057 .231
Work History variables:
Active Labour Market Participation .146 .354
Long-Term Unemployment .357 .479
Incapacity Benefits .059 .237
Income Support .014 .117
Number of obs = 187,032, 39.1% censored.
Min/Median/Max duration in days: 1/60/2,899.
Source: Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) 5% cohort.
Appendix B
Chapter1: Sensitivity Analysis
The multiple spell data structure of the JUVOS raises concerns about the va-
lidity of conclusions made, treating each observation as a single independent
spell. To see whether this concern makes a difference to the results, I draw
a random observation for each individual in the data and rerun the basic re-
sults. Table B.1 compares the basic model across alternative parametric and
non-parametric baseline hazards. The results indicate general robustness to
this restriction. Where there are differences, e.g. to the accessibility indicator,
this does not change the general story.
Table B.1: Estimated hazard ratios of the Exponential],
Gompertz] & Cox PH (vs. original results) mod-
els.
Exponential Gompertz Cox PH
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
exp1A5 gomp1A5 cox1A5 Cox†
b/p b/p b/p
Socio-demographics
age<25 0.971 0.903 0.900 0.894
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age>56 0.687 0.725 0.726 0.847
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 1.084 1.069 1.067 1.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation(ref:Elementary)
Manufacturing 1.256 1.234 1.231 1.157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade, services 1.309 1.263 1.260 1.168
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technical 1.266 1.244 1.238 1.129
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Senior, professional 1.478 1.415 1.405 1.288
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unknown 1.844 1.679 1.672 1.348
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Previous Work History
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Exponential Gompertz Cox PH
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Active Labour Market Programme 0.700 0.743 0.746 0.802
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-Term Unemployment 0.518 0.583 0.587 0.654
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Incapacity Benefits 0.873 0.872 0.873 0.955
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income Support 0.855 0.852 0.854 0.943
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027)
Calendar time(ref: 1999q1)
y2000 1.016 1.002 1.002 1.018
(0.392) (0.891) (0.888) (0.072)
y2001 1.067 1.039 1.037 1.029
(0.001) (0.021) (0.027) (0.006)
y2002 1.063 1.037 1.035 0.985
(0.004) (0.043) (0.049) (0.161)
y2003 0.986 0.963 0.962 0.935
(0.506) (0.030) (0.024) (0.000)
y2004 0.944 0.926 0.924 0.889
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2005 0.874 0.857 0.860 0.754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter(ref: q1)
q2 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.991
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.272)
q3 0.952 0.956 0.958 0.971
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
q4 0.916 0.913 0.914 0.902
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional variables
Urban 0.933 0.948 0.947 0.947
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Accessible 0.929 0.929 0.931 0.987
(0.054) (0.021) (0.023) (0.499)
University Present 0.918 0.919 0.919 0.919
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill Intensity 1.000 1.004 1.004 1.000
(0.966) (0.588) (0.577) (0.936)
GDPPH 1.028 1.051 1.046 0.972
(0.699) (0.410) (0.449) (0.471)
ILO unemployment rate 0.983 0.982 0.983 0.980
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Change in GDPPH 0.993 0.992 0.992 1.003
(0.388) (0.232) (0.252) (0.546)
Change in ILO unemployment rate 0.992 0.991 0.991 1.000
(0.282) (0.175) (0.184) (0.957)
Flow of Unemployed/ Resident Population 0.956 0.966 0.967 0.976
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
New Small Business Startups/ Resident Pop-
ulation
0.979 0.976 0.977 0.978
(0.096) (0.029) (0.035) (0.003)
18-24 New Deal Starters 1.021 1.020 1.020 1.012
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
constant 0.003 0.003
(0.000) (0.000)
gamma
constant 0.998
(0.000)
N 92008 92008 92008 187,032
LL -113328 -111313 -513183
AIC 2.3e+05 2.2e+05 1.0e+06
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
† Original specification.
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A limited covariate set at the individual-level raises the concern that individual-
level unobserved heterogeneity could be driving the results. Despite its flexi-
bility of a semi-parametric baseline hazard, penalized likelihood of the partial
likelihood function in the Cox PH model implies a “curse of dimensionality” as
this estimation strategy penalizes the researcher for loss of degrees of freedom.
This drawback implies that the Cox model cannot accommodate an individual-
level frailty parameter, a limitation not faced in parametric specifications.
Table B.2: Estimated hazard ratios of the Exponential],
Gompertz] & Cox PH models.
Exponential Model Gompertz Model Cox Model
(SE) (SE) (SE)
constant 0.011 0.010
(0.000) (0.000)
Socio-demographics
age<25 0.848 0.878 0.894
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age>56 0.847 0.845 0.847
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 1.044 1.037 1.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation(ref:Elementary)
Manufacturing 1.209 1.175 1.157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade, services 1.214 1.185 1.168
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technical 1.156 1.141 1.129
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Senior, professional 1.372 1.321 1.288
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unknown 1.436 1.380 1.348
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Previous Work History
Active Labour Market Programme 0.761 0.787 0.802
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-Term Unemployment 0.589 0.630 0.654
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Incapacity Benefits 0.951 0.952 0.955
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Income Support 0.933 0.939 0.943
(0.039) (0.027) (0.027)
Calendar time(ref: 1999q1)
y2000 1.014 1.017 1.018
(0.259) (0.120) (0.072)
y2001 1.021 1.028 1.029
(0.113) (0.014) (0.006)
y2002 0.971 0.981 0.985
(0.034) (0.107) (0.161)
y2003 0.907 0.926 0.935
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2004 0.857 0.880 0.889
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2005 0.692 0.732 0.754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter(ref: q1)
q2 0.995 0.992 0.991
(0.598) (0.379) (0.272)
q3 0.972 0.970 0.971
(0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
q4 0.862 0.888 0.902
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional variables
Urban 0.932 0.943 0.947
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Accessible 0.998 0.989 0.987
(0.919) (0.605) (0.499)
University Present 0.899 0.911 0.919
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill Intensity 1.003 1.001 1.000
Continued on next page
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Exponential Model Gompertz Model Cox Model
(SE) (SE) (SE)
(0.567) (0.809) (0.936)
GDPPH 0.957 0.971 0.972
(0.367) (0.487) (0.471)
ILO unemployment rate 0.974 0.977 0.980
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in GDPPH 1.004 1.003 1.003
(0.447) (0.573) (0.546)
Change in ILO unemployment rate 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.957) (0.944) (0.957)
Flow of Unemployed/ Resident Population 0.969 0.974 0.976
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
New Small Business Startups/ Resident Population 0.968 0.975 0.978
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
18-24 New Deal Starters 1.014 1.013 1.012
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
ln the
constant 0.487 0.145
(0.000) (0.000)
gamma
constant 0.998
(0.000)
NUTS3 fixed effects X X X
LL -249553 -249140 -1311963
Number of obs = 187,032
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
] Gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
Maintaining a competing risks data structure, under independent risks,
I estimate parametric models with unobserved heterogeneity controls at the
individual-level as a robustness check. Tables B.2 & B.3 present Exponential
and Gompertz models with Gamma and Inverse Gaussian distributed hetero-
geneity respectively1. The results highlight that the flexible Cox Proportional
Hazards specification captures individual heterogeneity very well. Not directly
controlling for individual heterogeneity implies that the baseline hazard will
be confounded by both state dependence and individual heterogeneity. The
industry standard in the Statistics literature is to compare the Cox estimates
to those of the Censored Quantile Regression model (Portnoy, 2003), hence this
strategy is followed in the main text given the robustness of this specification.
These results reflect the conclusions reached by Cameron & Trivedi (2005) and
1The Weibull model was estimated, however this failed to converge. Furthermore, the
Piecewise Constant Exponential model with a baseline hazard constant for 1 month failed to
converge. The assumption that hazards are constant over each month seems a bit arbitrary,
with no theoretical foundation especially given that the underlying data is in daily format. I
present Piecewise Constant hazards in Table B.4, where the hazard has been assumed to be
constant for 60 day intervals. Reducing this interval increases the data size exponentially. A
hazard constant over each day fails to converge and introduces the limitation of computational
power, even on a system with a quad core processor and 16GB of RAM.
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others in the literature, that with single spell data the specification of unob-
served heterogeneity is not so important given a flexible baseline hazard. One
would expect sensitivity of results across the parametric specifications, how-
ever, no evidence of this is found. It may be that results are more sensitive in
a specification which takes into account time-varying covariates however this
possibility is left for future research.
Table B.3: Estimated hazard ratios of the Exponential],
Gompertz] & Cox PH models.
Exponential Model Gompertz Model Cox Model
(SE) (SE) (SE)
constant 0.012 0.010
(0.000) (0.000)
Socio-demographics
age<25 0.867 0.878 0.894
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age>56 0.829 0.845 0.847
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 1.042 1.037 1.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Occupation(ref:Elementary)
Manufacturing 1.202 1.175 1.157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade, services 1.213 1.185 1.168
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technical 1.155 1.141 1.129
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Senior, professional 1.369 1.321 1.288
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unknown 1.447 1.380 1.348
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Previous Work History
Active Labour Market Programme 0.759 0.787 0.802
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-Term Unemployment 0.585 0.630 0.654
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Incapacity Benefits 0.952 0.952 0.955
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Income Support 0.935 0.939 0.943
(0.043) (0.027) (0.027)
Calendar time(ref: 1999q1)
y2000 1.019 1.017 1.018
(0.142) (0.120) (0.072)
y2001 1.025 1.028 1.029
(0.056) (0.014) (0.006)
y2002 0.976 0.981 0.985
(0.078) (0.107) (0.161)
y2003 0.914 0.926 0.935
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2004 0.861 0.880 0.889
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2005 0.699 0.732 0.754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter(ref: q1)
q2 0.992 0.992 0.991
(0.427) (0.379) (0.272)
q3 0.969 0.970 0.971
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
q4 0.871 0.888 0.902
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional variables
Urban 0.932 0.943 0.947
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Accessible 0.993 0.989 0.987
(0.782) (0.605) (0.499)
University Present 0.901 0.911 0.919
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill Intensity 1.002 1.001 1.000
(0.745) (0.809) (0.936)
GDPPH 0.953 0.971 0.972
(0.326) (0.487) (0.471)
Continued on next page
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Exponential Model Gompertz Model Cox Model
(SE) (SE) (SE)
ILO unemployment rate 0.974 0.977 0.980
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in GDPPH 1.005 1.003 1.003
(0.404) (0.573) (0.546)
Change in ILO unemployment rate 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.974) (0.944) (0.957)
Flow of Unemployed/ Resident Population 0.969 0.974 0.976
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
New Small Business Startups/ Resident Population 0.970 0.975 0.978
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
18-24 New Deal Starters 1.013 1.013 1.012
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
ln the
constant 0.673 0.145
(0.000) (0.000)
gamma
constant 0.998
(0.000)
NUTS3 fixed effects X X X
LL -249935 -249140 -1311963
Number of obs = 187,032
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
] Inverse-Gaussian distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
Table B.4: Estimated hazard ratios of the Piecewise Con-
stant Exponential Hazard model].
[1] [2] [3]
(SE) (SE) (SE)
Socio-demographics
age<25 0.901 0.884 0.887
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age>56 0.712 0.695 0.696
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 0.991 0.989 0.989
(0.356) (0.290) (0.300)
Occupation(ref:Elementary)
Manufacturing 1.191 1.212 1.209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade, services 1.166 1.178 1.177
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Technical 1.116 1.121 1.120
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Senior, professional 1.215 1.227 1.227
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unknown 1.250 1.256 1.257
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Previous Work History
Active Labour Market Programme 0.840 0.832 0.833
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Long-Term Unemployment 0.645 0.620 0.623
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Incapacity Benefits 0.964 0.966 0.966
(0.084) (0.142) (0.131)
Income Support 0.925 0.917 0.919
(0.059) (0.056) (0.057)
Calendar time(ref: 1999q1)
y2000 1.026 1.025 1.025
(0.086) (0.131) (0.121)
y2001 1.041 1.038 1.038
(0.008) (0.027) (0.022)
y2002 0.998 0.990 0.991
(0.915) (0.565) (0.623)
y2003 0.914 0.898 0.900
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2004 0.876 0.857 0.860
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
y2005 0.766 0.737 0.741
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter(ref: q1)
q2 0.987 0.988 0.988
(0.300) (0.362) (0.344)
q3 0.987 0.986 0.986
(0.278) (0.290) (0.279)
q4 0.923 0.913 0.915
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional variables
Continued on next page
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[1] [2] [3]
(SE) (SE) (SE)
Urban 0.940 0.933 0.933
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Accessible 0.937 0.934 0.934
(0.026) (0.033) (0.032)
University Present 0.925 0.918 0.918
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Skill Intensity 1.006 1.008 1.007
(0.355) (0.314) (0.321)
GDPPH 1.003 1.005 1.004
(0.955) (0.930) (0.942)
ILO unemployment rate 0.981 0.978 0.978
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in GDPPH 1.001 1.000 1.000
(0.907) (0.974) (0.952)
Change in ILO unemployment rate 0.997 0.996 0.996
(0.576) (0.603) (0.599)
Flow of Unemployed/ Resident Population 0.972 0.971 0.971
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
New Small Business Startups/ Resident Population 0.978 0.974 0.975
(0.022) (0.015) (0.016)
18-24 New Deal Starters 1.013 1.013 1.013
(0.053) (0.066) (0.064)
ln the
constant 0.242 0.246
(0.000) (0.000)
N 236789 236789 236789
F
LL -130964 -130908 -130913
AIC 2.6e+05 2.6e+05 2.6e+05
Number of obs = 236,789
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
All specifications include regional dummies. Data expanded so that the hazard rate is constant over each 60 day
interval. Data size highlights that a large proportion of spells in the data lasted less than two months.
] [1] No unobserved heterogeneity controls; [2] Gamma [3] Inverse-Gaussian distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
Appendix C
Chapter 4: Linking the Individual
& Regional Levels
This appendix briefly describes how the link between the individual and re-
gional data was established. For more details and a full description of the
regional data see the Appendix, Section D.
Overview of Process
Main data sources included the JUVOS, National Statistics Postcode Directory
(NSPD), NOMIS and the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey (available
from the UK Data Archive). The linked data set matching the individual- and
regional-level data to the UK geography is conditioned on the start of claimant
spells. In order to match the continuous individual-level data to the regional
information, individual spells were matched to the regional information per-
taining to the month in which they started. Merging the two data sources was
a non trivial exercise which involved several technical difficulties due a lack of a
one-to-one link between regional entities. Due to censorship of the full postcode
information in the individual-level JUVOS data1, this introduced an overlap-
ping regions problem, removing the one-to-one link between the individual- and
regional-levels. In addition a one-to-one match between local authorities and
1Only postcode district information is available in the JUVOS
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NUTS3 regions does not exist for Scotland.
In an attempt to overcome this problem, postcode districts were matched
to full postcode information using the National Statistics Postcode Directory
(NSPD). Merging schemes were defined in order to create a one-to-one link be-
tween the different regional classifications. Although more complicated meth-
ods are available, e.g. map-based area interpolation (see Arntz & Wilke 2007),
a simple average weighting method was employed that assigns a postcode dis-
trict to the local authority in which it most falls based on the full postcode
information. This link was established for all regional definitions of interest re-
sulting in a one-to-one link between the postcode district, local authority and
NUTS3 levels of aggregation.
Regional Identifier
Our aim is to exploit the regional variation in the JUVOS in order to create a
link between individual-level and the economic and institutional environment
in which claimants reside. To this end, we identified the following geographical
information in the JUVOS:
• Self-reported residential postcode data (censored to the postcode district
level).
• Unemployment Benefit Office (UBO) codes.
Given the self-reported nature of the first option, we were faced with data qual-
ity issues were present with postcode information missing or wrongly imputed
at times. In order to improve the quality of this indicator, we used the fol-
lowing imputation strategy: Replace the current postcode with the self-reported
postcode during the relevant claimant’s previous unemployment spell (assuming
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Figure C.1: Structure of the data:
Calender Time:
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Continuous (daily) Individual Unemployment Data: (Spell Varying &
Time Invariant Characteristics)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Regional Identifiers: Postcode District; Local Authority.
Time Invariant Regional Labour Market Characteristics,
e.g. Urban/Rural.
Time-Varying Characteristics
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Intervals of Data Availability: Monthly; Quarterly; & Annual data.
Level of Aggregation (Regional data): NUTS3; Local Authority.
* = Individual characteristics collected at the start of each unemployment spell
(assuming constant during spell).
$ = Exit destinations (restricted to Employment vs. Non-Employment).
§= Regional data merged to individual data bymonth of claimant spell commence-
ment.
** * *$$ $
Regional Level§
that the individual did not move during the intervening period). This strategy
was implemented in 2.8% of the cases. In order to maintain some regional
variation we only replaced this self-reported variable with the UBO postcode
district when this variable was missing and no information could be obtained
from previous spells (implemented in 2% of cases). Each observation in the JU-
VOS is reported by Unemployment Benefit Office, which allows us to complete
this assignment in a relatively straightforward manner. The UBO postcodes
were derived using the following procedure.
A spreadsheet containing detailed (but incomplete) information about ben-
efit office locations was sourced from the Department of Work & Pensions
(DWP). In order to prepare this information for use we followed the procedure
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outlined in Figure 2.
Figure C.2: Procedure for construction of Unemployment Benefit Of-
fice indicator:
Procedure:
Cases: UBO Code: Office Name: Postcode:
A
B
C
D
E
F
DWP-
Supplied
Spread-
sheet
• Tranfer to
Stata.
• Data cleaning.
• Drop duplicates
& non-JCP.
Procedure: (cont..)
A: → Straight forward.
B: → Spreadsheet (§) created matching UBO codes in the JUVOS documentation to the
UBO codes on NOMIS.
B: Matched office descriptions in the DWP spreadsheet to (§).
C: → Used an internet search engine, as well as online mapping software, to acquire the
missing postcode information.
D: → Missing information acquired using (§).
E: → Used an internet search engine, as well as online mapping software, to acquire the
missing name. Then: used (§).
F: → Used an internet search engine, as well as online mapping software, to acquire the
missing postcode information. Then: used (§).
• Dropped 35 Northern Ireland UBOs due to data availability issues.
• Dropped SSOs & postcodes not on the DWP website nor in (§).
• Dropped Caller Offices & specialist Disability Services centres.
• Dropped Benefit Offices with no re-employment function.
→ 15 case survived this procedure that were not in the JUVOS docu-
mentation, on NOMIS, but in the JUVOS data.
→ 953 cases matched in all mergers, following this procedure
→ The 15 surviving UBO codes were matched to the nearest (on
average) UBO office, using the claimants’ own recorded postcodes in
the JUVOS data.
→ Finally: 963 UBO code-name-postcode matches.
· SSO = Social Security Office
· (§) = Spreadsheet matching UBO codes provided in the JUVOS documentation to the codes published on NOMIS.
· The JUVOS dataset is conditioned to include post 01/01/1996 data only.
The first step was to clean the data in the supplied spreadsheet, dropping
certain entries and duplicates as well as checking whether the supplied informa-
tion matched that available from the Department of Work & Pensions (DWP)
online system2. Cases with missing UBO codes were noted, and where neces-
2Available at: http://www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/JCP/Aboutus/Ouroffices/Search/LocalOfficeSearch.aspx
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sary postcode information was ammended using internet search engines, Job
Centre web pages, as well as the aforementioned DWP online search system.
In some cases, all that was missing was the relevant postcode. However this
problem was easily overcome by following the above procedure.
Jobcentres and jobcentre plus with the same postcode were assigned to the
same UBO code, i.e. The Jobcentre was dropped. The spreadsheet provided
by the DWP contained Social Security Office (SSO) locations. Since these of-
fices are exclusively for the receipt of benefits and have no job related function,
we decide to drop this information from the data. Specialist Disability Ser-
vices centres were also dropped. After conditioning on post 01/01/1996 data,
there were 963 Unemployment Benefit Office code-location matches in the data.
Appendix D
Constructing a Regional Level
Dataset
D.1 Introduction
Cameron & Trivedi (2005) highlight the importance of controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity at lower levels of aggregation when attempting to identify
causal relationships in applied econometrics. ”[It is important to control for
confounding factors which arise] when the individual contributions of different
regressors..to the variation in the variable of interest cannot be separated (see
Cameron & Trivedi 2005, pg.8).” A common approach widely used is to con-
trol for these confounding factors using fixed effects. This approach essentially
parameterizes the nature of unobserved heterogeneity to be a shift parameter.
This parametrisation may itself drive the results, if incorrectly specified. Since
fixed effects removes any time varying macroeconomic effects, changes in local
labour demand conditions are not controlled for in models which explicitly take
into account the regional context via regional dummies only1.
There is a growing popularity of this approach to modelling economic inter-
actions, and the recent availability of geographical products tailored for use in
1Control for time varying factors is possible by interacting the fixed effect with time
dummies, however this approach is quite restrictive.
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the field of Economics has fueled this. However, the level of geographical detail
at which many of these studies are conducted - using full postcode information
- means that much the data used is not publicly available. Publicly available
economic data tends to be more commonly available in grouped form, at the
Local Authority level of aggregation and higher. The individual administra-
tive data that is publicly available in the UK, e.g. the Joint Unemployment
& Vacancies Operating System, contains residential location information that
is censored to the postcode district level of aggregation. These restrictions
introduce numerous issues with linking publicly available data at various lev-
els of aggregation, due to the fact that these sub-regional classifications are
not necessarily contiguous2. This issue is not faced when using full postcode
information.
The strategies implemented in this paper develop a one-to-one link between
the postcode district- & higher levels of aggregation, allowing researchers to link
publicly available datasets together from varying sources. This approach also
provides added explanatory power, as it allows one to highlights the regional
disparities driving the overall regional effect. Ultimately, the goal of this project
is to provide new insights for Regional Policy.
The database covers the period 1995 to 2007, with variable availability
varying depending on source (see the appendix in Ball 2009 for more informa-
tion). Coverage is restricted to Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland).
Regional identifiers available include: Local Authority; Travel-to-Work Area;
and Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) level 3 (NUTS3)
levels of aggregation. The dataset includes information pertaining to socio-
demographic and institutional features, regional labour market performance,
as well as supply and demand conditions. An example of the application of
2Regional boundaries may also change over time, an issue which we do not deal with in
this study.
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this resource is provided in chapter 5, whilst appendix C explains how the
individual-level data was linked to the regional-level data set. Regional-level
indicators were sourced from various providers with some key variables being
self-constructed. Given the complexity of this procedure, this article describes
this in detail.
D.2 Level of Aggregation of Interest & Main Data
Sources.
The aggregation levels of interest to us are:
• Local Authority
• Travel to work areas (TTWA)
• Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) level 3
The first question faced is at which level of aggregation the variables of
interest are most relevant. Since the aim is to capture regional characteristics
one is presented with the challenge of defining self-contained regional labour
markets (Petrongolo 2001). TTWA’s are the closest approximation, however
there is a systematic lack of data at this level of aggregation. Thus data is
collected at the lowest level of aggregation (local authority and NUTS3). This
provides the flexibility to redefine geographical areas, aggregating up to the
level of interest.
D.3 Linking the Regional levels
The Local Authority Unitary Authority (LAUA) classification represents the
lowest aggregation level of interest in the data. After encountering many issues
with the merging process, like regions disappearing, the procedure was revised
as follows.
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Postcode Grid The starting point was to create a grid containing observations
for every Local Authority (LAUA) in Great Britain for every possible time
period (year-quarter-month). This was initially constructed over the period
1995 to 2007. This complete grid was then used as a blueprint onto which all
the other data was merged.
D.3.1 National Statistics Postcode Directory.
The map between the postcode- and the regional-level is established in the
NSPD. This provides a complete mapping of the UK geographies, from the
full postcode to the national level. The advantage of using postcode districts
instead of full postcode information is that there is relatively less variation in
postcode district classifications over the observation period3. Non-geographical
postcode data in the NSPD was dropped. These relate to postboxes and are
used by direct mailing companies for re-routing mail (NSPD 2007).
An indicator was created, highlighting whether a postcode was live or
terminated during the observation window. Over the period 01/01/1996 to
31/12/2005, roughly 20% of the full postcodes in the NSPD were terminated
(see Table D.1). I did not drop terminated postcodes, as they are relevant
for the merging scheme during the periods in which they were live. The full
postcode coverage of the NSPD is detailed in Table D.2.
Table D.1: Number of live and terminated full postcode observations
in the NSPD after conditioning on 01/01/1996 and drop-
ping Northern Ireland.
live Freq. Percent Cum.
terminated 427,383 19.98 19.98
live 1,711,536 80.02 100.00
Total 2,138,919 100.00
3Looking at the NSPD full postcode data, there are some postcodes that were introduced
after the beginning of 1996 and were subsequently terminated before November 2007.
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Table D.2: Distribution of observations in the NSPD, by country.
live Freq. Percent Cum.
ctry Freq. Percent Cum.
Channel Islands 6,498 0.30 0.30
England 1,841,028 84.03 84.33
Isle of Man 5,485 0.25 84.58
Northern Ireland 51,979 2.37 86.95
Scotland 167,804 7.66 94.61
Wales 118,104 5.39 100.00
Total 2,190,898 100.00
D.3.2 Overlapping Regions Problem
I am restricted to using postcode districts as regional identifiers, due to the
ONS’s censoring of full postcode information in most publicly available data
sets. This introduces an Overlapping Regions issue, removing the one-to-one
link between the postcode district and regional-levels, as postcode districts may
fall into more than one Local Authority and one Local Authority may contain
more than one postcode district4. This issue is not present at the full postcode
level. There is also a lack of concordance between the Local Authority and level
1 Local Administrative Units (LAU1) ,former NUTS4, regional classifications
in Scotland. In order to get around these issues, merging schemes are developed
which allowed me to define a one-to-one link between postcode districts and
the higher levels of aggregation of interest. This scheme also established a link
across regions. The procedure is detailed below.
D.3.3 Distribution of observations:
In order to establish a one-to-one link between the relevant levels of aggrega-
tion, the first piece of information we wanted was to know was how many unique
regions that postcode district falls into5. As a first step, a variable indicating
how many unique postcode districts fall into each Local Authority/ NUTS3/
4This issue is present for the other levels of aggregation of interest as well. See Figure ??
for an illustration of the overlapping regions problem.
5See Table D.23
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Local Authority Region 1
Local Authority Region 2
Postcode Districts
Postcode Districts
Postcode Districts
Full Postcodes
Figure D.1: The Overlapping Regions problem. - Squares represent
postcode districts, and dots represent full postcodes.
LAU1 was generated in the NSPD. Since a many-to-many link exists between
the different levels of aggregation, this identifier was generated by first collaps-
ing the data of interest by the ”postcode district-higher level of aggregation”
link, generating the identifier, and then merging this information to the NSPD.
Table D.23 illustrates that most postcode districts in Great Britain fall into
2 or 3 higher aggregation levels. This pattern is the same when full postcodes
are taken into account. Table D.24 illustrates the distribution of full postcodes
falling into a postcode district that falls into T higher aggregation levels of
interest. Most full postcodes in Great Britain seem to fall into postcode districts
that fall into 1 to 4 higher aggregation levels. This is true at the local authority
level and remains the case when aggregating up to the NUTS3 level.
An indicator, Uniq1, was generated to indicate the number of unique post-
code districts falling into a higher aggregation level. The average Local Author-
ity in Great Britain overlaps roughly 18 postcode districts. In case of level 1
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Local Administrative Units (former NUTS4) this figure is roughly 17, whereas,
on average, NUTS3 regions overlap 46 postcode districts. See Table D.3 for
summary statistics of this indicator.
Table D.3: Distribution of UniqN: The number of unique postcode
districts falling into higher aggregation levels of interest:
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Uniq1 5366 18.018 13.295 2 87
Uniq3 5382 16.588 9.342 2 57
Uniq2 4131 46.339 24.465 3 109
Uniq1 # of unique postcode districts falling into Local Authorities.
Uniq2 # of unique postcode districts falling into NUTS3 regions.
Uniq3 # of unique postcode districts falling into level 1 Local Administrative Units (for-
mer NUTS4).
D.3.4 Merging Schemes
Two merging schemes were developed:
Scheme 1:
Higher levels of aggregation are ranked in terms of the number of
postcode districts falling into them. Assign the postcode district
in question to the area (local authority; NUTS3/4[lau1]) in which
it falls that has the least number of postcode districts falling into
it. The idea behind this is that areas with less postcode districts
falling into them may contain a greater proportion of the district
in question. Random assignment is implemented, in the event of a
tie.
Scheme 2:
Assign the postcode district in question to the area (local authority;
NUTS3/4[lau1]) in which it falls the most, based on the full post-
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code information in the NSPD. This algorithm creates a ranking of
higher aggregation levels, in terms of the number of full postcodes
within a postcode district that fall into each region. A postcode dis-
trict is assigned to the area which ranks the highest on this scale.
Random assignment is implemented, in the event of a tie.
Table D.4: Merging Scheme 1: Assignment of level 1 Local Adminis-
trative Units (LAU: former NUTS4):
pcd2 LAU LAU Uniq3 Ctry Assigned Assigned
Area LAU LAU Area
AB25 UKM1001 Aberdeen City 17 179 UKM1001 Aberdeen City
AB3 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB30 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM2101 Angus
AB30 UKM2101 Angus 14 179 UKM2101 Angus
AB31 UKM1001 Aberdeen City 17 179 UKM1001 Aberdeen City
AB31 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1001 Aberdeen City
AB32 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB33 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB34 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB35 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB36 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB37 UKM4202 Badenoch & Strath-
spey
9 179 UKM4203 West Moray
AB37 UKM4203 West Moray 7 179 UKM4203 West Moray
AB38 UKM1003 North East Moray 11 179 UKM4203 West Moray
AB38 UKM4203 West Moray 7 179 UKM4203 West Moray
AB39 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB4 UKM1003 North East Moray 11 179 UKM1003 North East Moray
AB41 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
AB42 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire 32 179 UKM1002 Aberdeenshire
Merging Scheme 1: Table D.4 illustrates an example of the assignment of
postcode districts to the Local Administrative Units Level 1 (LAU1) level of
aggregation. In addition to the lack of a one-to-one link between the postcode
district and the local authority level, the other problem faced was establishing a
link between the Local Authority level and the NUTS3 level of aggregation. A
one-to-one link between the local authority level and level 1 Local Administra-
tive Units (former NUTS4) exists in the case of England & Wales, however this
is not the case for Scotland. By establishing a one-to-one link between postcode
districts and higher aggregation levels, this also establishes a one-to-one link
across regional classifications.
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Looking at Table D.4, postcode district AB31 falls both into Aberdeen City
and Aberdeenshire level 1 Local Administrative Units. However, 32 postcode
districts fall into Aberdeenshire, whereas only 17 fall into Aberdeen City. Based
on this information, merging scheme 1 assigns AB31 to Aberdeen City. Due
to the first merging scheme no being based on full postcode information, this
scheme has a bias towards assigning postcode districts at the boundary of the
Local Authority/level 1 Local Administrative Unit(former NUTS4)/NUTS3
region to the smallest region in which it falls, regardless of the actual proportion
of the postcode district that actually falls into that region. In the case of Local
Authorities, larger regions with more postcode districts falling into them will
tend to lose postcode districts on their boundaries to smaller neighbouring
Local Authorities.
Table D.23 illustrate that the large majority of Local Authorities in Great
Britain are a mixture of postcode districts falling into one to three unique Local
Authorities with a significant proportion falling into just one (55%). This is
also the case with other aggregation levels of interest, rising to 71% in the case
of level 1 Local Administrative Units. This suggests this merging scheme may
be vary in accuracy across these aggregation levels, given that the extent of
regional overlap differs.
Merging Scheme 2: Given the problem of Overlapping Regions, the second
merging scheme developed aims to assign postcode districts to the higher ag-
gregation level into which they mostly fall. Table D.5 illustrates a simplified
version of how merging scheme 2 operates. The first question to be addressed
would be into which Local Authority does postcode district NG9 mostly fall.
Step 1 generates uniQ1 for each postcode district, an indicator for the num-
ber of unique full postcodes falling into each Local Authority that said postcode
district falls into. Then, for each postcode district, Step two sorts these Lo-
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Table D.5: Merging Scheme 2: Example of assignment of postcode
districts to Local Authorities:
Full Postcode Local Author-
ity (LAUA)
Postcode Dis-
trict
uniQ1 VAR1 Assigned
LAUA
NG9 1BB 00QA NG9 3 3 00QA
NG9 2BC 00QA NG9 3 3 00QA
NG9 1SG 00QB NG9 1 3 00QA
NG9 2CD 00QA NG9 3 3 00QA
uniQ1: # of full postcodes in postcode district NG9 that fall into Local
Authority 00QA.
cal Authorities by this newly generated indicator, thus ranking them in terms
of the number of full postcodes falling into them. This approach is a simple
weighting scheme which is based on the premise that full postcodes are evenly
dispersed across a postcode district, i.e. giving equal weight to each full post-
code and not taking its population density into account. This allows us to
make the further assumption that if more full postcodes within a postcode dis-
trict fall into Local Authority A rather than B, then the postcode district in
question mostly falls into former Local Authority. Steps 4 & 5 are based on
this assumption. One issue with this scheme is that full postcode which overlap
Local Authorities will be treated as falling into both Local Authorities making
full postcode-based boundaries fuzzy.
D.4 Regional Identifiers In The Data
D.4.1 Levels of Aggregation in the regional data:
Travel-to-Work Areas
The goal is to attempt to capture exogenous variation between regional en-
tities. Given this aim, Unitary Authority & Local Authority Districts could
not be considered self-contained labour markets due to the impact of inward
& outward commuting (Office for National Statistics 2008b) . Using residence-
based denominators, e.g. ILO unemployment counts as a proportion of the
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residence-based (mid-year) working-age population, & local job density esti-
mates, is likely to paint a more accurate picture of the local labour market
(Office for National Statistics 2008b). However, the use of work-based denom-
inators will bias downward estimates in an area with net in-commuting. The
opposite is true in the analogous case (Office for National Statistics 2008b).
To highlight this issue, consider calculation of the ILO unemployment rate for
region j (Uj):
Uj =
∑n
i Uij∑n
i Eij +
∑n
i Uij
where i = number of individuals residing in region j.
The unemployed residing in an area are likely to have very different charac-
teristics to those working in the same area, especially at longer unemployment
durations6. The degree of this mismatch is likely to increase due the impact
of commuting. in the case of net inward commuting, this will inflate the fig-
ure for the number of employees in an area, causing the overall statistic to
be under-estimated (Thomas 1997; 1998; 2005). This statistic is only suitable
for larger areas, in which the impact of commuting is reduced to a minimum.
Travel-to-Work Areas (TTWAs) were introduced as areas which approximate
self-contained labour markets, however, they are not without their problems.
The criterion on which TTWAs are defined is that: at least 75% of the
resident economically active population actually work in the area, and that
of everyone working in the area, at least 75% actually live in the area (Office
for National Statistics 2008a). The resulting pattern is that, although the
definitive minimum working population in a TTWA is 3,500, many are much
larger - indeed, the whole of London and surrounding area forms one TTWA.
A trend-reduction in the number of TTWAs can be observed, as the trend in
more and longer distance commuting increases: in 1991 there were 314 TTWAs
6The distinction between structural versus frictional unemployment is likely to be impor-
tant in this case.
D. Constructing a Regional Level Dataset XXV
and in 1981, 334. As TTWAs become larger, on the one hand, they become
more representative of self-contained labour markets, however, they also be-
come increasingly inappropriate as units for the measurement of unemployment
as unemployment is a local phenomenon and large area statistics tend to give
a distort view of the unemployment problem by smoothing out concentrations
(Thomas 1997). Despite these drawbacks, we include regional identifiers at
this level of aggregation as this measure provides the closest approximation
available to self-contained labour markets (Petrongolo 2001).
The link between the Local Authority level and Travel-To-Work Area level
of aggregation is established in the National Statistics Postcode Directory.
Again, this is not a 1-to-1 link. This link was established using information
from GeoConvert (UKBORDERS). This information tells us the proportion
of a local authority that falls into a TTWA. Using this information, merging
scheme 2 was implemented in order to establish a one-to-one link.
Alternative indicators in the data include NUTS3 regions as well as the 1999
Unitary Authorities and Local Authority Districts (UALAD99) classification
of regions.
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D.5 The Regional Data.
D.5.1 Self-constructed variables:
University Indicator:
Information on Higher Education institution locations was sourced from the
Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA)7. Using this information insti-
tutional data was matched to the relevant postcode districts. Unfortunately,
the HESA only hold data on the location of Higher Education Institutions’
administrative centres, rather than the location of campuses. See Figure D.2
for the distribution of 167 Administrative Centres across Great Britain.
Figure D.2: University Present?. Created using ‘spmaps’ (Pisati
2007).
7Information on the location of the 167 institutions in the UK is available at
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/component/option,com heicontacts/Itemid87/
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Ports/Airports Indicator:
Data for this indicator was sourced from the port directory available from the
Association of Port Health Authorities website (Association of Port Health Au-
thorities 2007). Three versions of this indicator were developed: two separate
port and airport indicators, as well as an indicator grouping ports and airports,
at the Local Authority & NUTS3 level of aggregation. Three Royal Navy Ports
were dropped from the data, however Great British ports for commercial use
were retained. The distribution of ports and airports in Great Britain is shown
in Figures D.3a & D.3b. A list of UK airports can be found from the Royal
Aeronautical Society’s website (Royal Aeronautical Society 2005). This list
was used to check for consistency of the existing data.
(a) Port in Local Authority?(b) Airport in Local Authority?
Figure D.3: GB Ports & Airports. Created using ‘spmaps’ (Pisati
2007).
D. Constructing a Regional Level Dataset XXVIII
Urban/Rural Indicator:
Two versions of this indicator were initially sourced: One from the National
Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and one from the Department of Envi-
ronment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). A third measure was constructed,
which combined these two measures.
1: NSPD version: For England and Wales this population density-based in-
dicator was sourced from the 21st of July 2004 release of the National Statistics
Rural & Urban Classification of Output Areas (NSPD 2007), and thus not valid
for higher levels of aggregation which may include a mixture of rural & urban
output areas based on the definitions used. See Table D.20 Column 1 for a
breakdown of this output-based classification for England & Wales. For Scot-
land, areas with < 3000 inhabitants are defined as rural (NSPD 2007). The
distribution of this variable at the Local Authority level is shown in Figure
D.4a. The DEFRA methodology as the benchmark against which other Local
Authority-level Urban/Rural definitions should be measured.
2: DEFRA version: The DEFRA Rural-Urban indicator8 was introduced in
2005 and covers the England local authority geography only. See Table D.19
Column 2 for a breakdown of this output-based classification. The distribution
of this variable is shown in Figure D.4b.
3: Constructed Measure: The additional constructed measure joins the 2
approaches, using the DEFRA methodology for England. This implies some
8 For more information see http://www.defra.gov.uk/rural/ruralstats/rural-
definition.htm
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(a) NSPD (b) DEFRA
Figure D.4: How Urban is a Local Authority? Created using ‘spmaps’
(Pisati 2007).
measurement error for Scotland & Wales, an issue acknowledged and an issue
for which robustness checks were constructed using alternative indicators9.
URBAN/RURAL INDICATOR ISSUES
Table D.6 presents the overall UK statistics from the different approaches. We
define ‘howurban’ as the sum of urban output areas as a proportion of the
total number of output areas in a Local Authority. The Output Area-based
Urban/Rural measure, from the NSPD, paints a distorted picture of how urban
the UK geography is. This is more evident when broken down by country.
The Urban/Rural classification based on the DEFRA methodology, defines
60% of local authorities in England as Urban, whereas the NSPD-based mea-
sure - based on output area classifications, defines 77% of local authorities
in England as Urban (see Figure D.4 for the distribution of these variables).
9Similar strategies can be easily implemented using the threshold-based indicators devel-
oped in the subsequent section as a substitute for the NSPD-base measure.
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Table D.6: Comparison between the different approaches: how urban;
NSPD & DEFRA Urban/Rural classifications for Scot-
land, England & Wales.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
howurban 2363433 .7646 .261 0 1
Urban(NSPD) 2363433 .740 .439 0 1
Urban(DEFRA) 2020682 .601 .490 0 1
howurban: sum urban output areas/number output areas
Urban (NSPD): Statistic calculated at Output Area level
Urban (DEFRA): Statistic calculated at Local Authority level
Table D.7: Comparison of how urban Local Authorities in Scotland,
England & Wales are.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
England
howurban 2020682 .787 .250 0 1
Scotland
howurban 210984 .642 .299 0 .995
Wales
howurban 131767 .640 .279 .112 .972
howurban: sum urban output areas/number output areas
As well documented on the DEFRA website (DEFRA 2007), local authorities
borders may encapsulate a mixture of urban and rural output areas. Thus,
aggregating this data to the local authority level presents us with an issue.
DEFRA developed their methodology due to these concerns, however, it
only covers England. Table D.20 highlights the differences in the methodolo-
gies. The statistics in table D.6 show that, on average over Great Britain,
76.5% of output areas falling into a local authority are classified as Urban.
This figure varies markedly across Great Britain. When we break this down
by country, this figure is 78.7% in England, 64.2% for Scotland & 64.0% for
Wales.
Table D.8: Comparison of how urban Local Authorities in Scotland,
England & Wales are.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
England
Urban 2020682 .770 .421 0 1
UrbanDefra 2020682 .601 .490 0 1
Scotland
Urban 210984 .530 .499 0 1
Wales
Urban 131767 .612 .487 0 1
howurban: sum urban output areas/number output areas
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On average, the output area-based NSPD methodology classifies 74% of
output areas in Great Britain as urban. As stated, the DEFRA local authority-
based measure classifies 60% of English Local Authorities as urban. This ag-
gregate figure masks the variation in this NSPD-based indicator across Great
Britain. The statistics in Table D.8 demonstrate that the highest proportion of
Urban areas lie in England (77%) with 61% of output areas classified as Urban
in Wales. This number is as low as 53% in Scotland. This is the benchmark
against which more aggregated statistics should be measured, when considering
Great Britain as a whole.
0
5
10
15
20
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Proportion of urban output areas within a Local Authority.
Indicator source: NSPD
How urban is a Local Authority?
Figure D.5: How Urban is a Local Authority?
Figure D.5 illustrates the overall distribution of the ‘howurban’ variable de-
tailed in Table D.7. This distribution is skewed to the right at 1, with a long left
tail and a relatively isolated mass point at zero. Based on this information, the
idea was to look at the proportion of urban Output Areas falling into a Local
Authority in order to decide how to classify a Local Authority (Urban/Rural).
This information is captured by the ‘howurban’ variable. The same idea was
implemented in the case of Accessibility. Since we already have a reliable indi-
cator for England at the Local Authority-level (DEFRA methodology), we only
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need to conduct this exercise for Scotland and Wales. We develop thresholds
above which a Local Authority is classified as Urban. These thresholds are
defined in Tables D.9 & D.10.
Table D.9: Local Authority Urban/Rural Indicator: Scotland &
Wales
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Scotland & Wales
>50% 342751 0.671 0.470 0 1
>60% 342751 0.643 0.479 0 1
>70% 342751 0.507 0.500 0 1
>80% 342751 0.415 0.493 0 1
>90% 342751 0.235 0.424 0 1
Proportion of Output Areas in Local Authority that are NSPD Urban
Table D.10: Local Authority Urban/Rural Indicator: Scotland &
Wales
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Scotland:
>50% 210984 0.667 0.471 0 1
>60% 210984 0.643 0.479 0 1
>70% 210984 0.487 0.500 0 1
>80% 210984 0.441 0.497 0 1
>90% 210984 0.302 0.459 0 1
Wales:
>50% 131767 0.677 0.468 0 1
>60% 131767 0.641 0.480 0 1
>70% 131767 0.537 0.499 0 1
>80% 131767 0.373 0.484 0 1
>90% 131767 0.128 0.334 0 1
Proportion of Output Areas in Local Authority that are NSPD Urban
Remoteness/Accessibility:
England & Wales In this case the population density of the surrounding area
was used as a measure of whether a local authority was accessible or remote
in the case of England and Wales10. See Table D.21 for how this indicator was
constructed.
Scotland Driving distance to the nearest large settlement (>10000 inhabi-
tants) is used as a proxy in the case of Scotland. Areas more than 30 minutes
driving distance from an urban centre of >10000 residents were classified as
rural. See Table D.21 for how this indicator was constructed.
10The NSPD defines this indicator at the Output area level of aggregation, which suggests
that aggregation issues could be present when aggregating to Local Authority level. The
accessibility of Output Areas is based on their surrounding geography, ”whether the wider
surrounding area of a given output area is sparsely populated or less sparsely populated
(NSPD 2007, pp.17)”.
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Accessibility Indicator Issues
It was felt that the Accessibility indicator did not give enough variation to
accord with intuition about the UK geography. Alternative measures of this
indicator were adopted, using an approach similar to that used for the Ur-
ban/Rural indicator. The sum of accessible Output Areas as a proportion of
the number of Output Areas (OAs) within a Local Authority (LA) was used as
a measure of how accessible Great British Local Authorities are. This measure
was based on the National Statistics Postcode Directory data. The distribution
of this indicator is detailed in Table D.11.
Table D.11: How Accessible? (% Urban Output Areas within a Local
Authority : Great Britain
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
England.
How Accessible? 2020682 0.983 0.080 0.034 1
Scotland.
How Accessible? 210984 0.858 0.213 0 0.998
Wales.
How Accessible? 131767 0.860 0.255 0.190 1
NB. How Accessible?:
∑
(Accessible Output Areas/# Output Areas).
The summary statistics in Table D.11 raise concerns about our original
definition of Accessibility. On the one hand this definition may be erroneous,
whilst on the other, it may be that Local Authorities across Great Britain are
truly very Accessible. More variation in this measure would be more desirable,
thus alternative definitions were constructed.
Table D.12: Thresholds Accessibility Criterion: Great Britain
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
>50% 2430314 0.951 0.216 0 1
>60% 2430314 0.947 0.223 0 1
>70% 2430314 0.935 0.247 0 1
>80% 2430314 0.905 0.293 0 1
>90% 2430314 0.891 0.312 0 1
Alternative definitions of Accessibility were constructed using differing ac-
cessibility criteria. Five thresholds were initially established: >50%; >60%;
>70%; >80%; and >90%. Summary statistics for these thresholds are detailed
for Great Britain in Table D.12, as well as by country in Table D.13. Table
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D.12 highlights the lack of large variation in this statistic at the aggregate
level. Whilst there is not a lot of variation in these summary statistics for Eng-
land (only 3.7% difference between the >50% & >90% criterion), they varied
markedly in the case of Scotland & Wales. There is a 27.4% difference between
the >50% & >90% criterion in Scotland, whereas the difference between the
>50% & >90% criterion in Wales is 9.9%.
Table D.13: Thresholds for Accessibility Criterion: Country-level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
England:
>50% 2020682 0.992 0.090 0 1
>60% 2020682 0.990 0.097 0 1
>70% 2020682 0.982 0.133 0 1
>80% 2020682 0.965 0.183 0 1
>90% 2020682 0.955 0.207 0 1
Scotland:
>50% 210984 0.921 0.270 0 1
>60% 210984 0.921 0.270 0 1
>70% 210984 0.855 0.352 0 1
>80% 210984 0.712 0.453 0 1
>90% 210984 0.647 0.478 0 1
Wales:
>50% 131767 0.852 0.355 0 1
>60% 131767 0.810 0.392 0 1
>70% 131767 0.810 0.392 0 1
>80% 131767 0.753 0.431 0 1
>90% 131767 0.753 0.431 0 1
Stricter criterion were also implemented, using the following thresholds:
>95%; >96%; >97%; >98%; and >99% (see Table D.14). Again, for England
the summary statistics did not vary much when conditioned on these tougher
hurdles. There is only a 2.3% difference between the >95% & >99% measures,
with 92.3% of at least 99% of the Output Areas falling into English Local Au-
thorities being classified by the NSPD as Accessible according to our measure.
Furthermore,this measure did not vary much for Wales (A 3.1% difference be-
tween the >95% & >99% measures). This measure seems quite stable at high
thresholds for England & Wales, suggesting that Local Authorities classified as
urban at high moments of the distribution of these indicators possess similar
characteristics in terms of the number of urban OAs falling into them.
There is not a lot of variation at the top of the distribution in England.
In the case of Scotland, we see a very large variation in this indicator when
using these strict accessibility criterion. There is a 60.7% difference between the
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>95% & >99% measure. The difference between the >95% & >96% thresholds
is 0%, whilst the difference between the >96% & >97% thresholds is 4.6%.
These differences increase exponentially. The difference between the >97% &
>98% thresholds is 17.4%, whilst the difference between the >98% & >99%
thresholds is 29.5%! These observations suggest that the overall distribution
in Figure D.5 is mostly driven by England which accords with intuition.
Table D.14: Strict Accessibility Criterion: Country-level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
England:
>95% 2020682 0.946 0.226 0 1
>96% 2020682 0.936 0.244 0 1
>97% 2020682 0.931 0.254 0 1
>98% 2020682 0.929 0.256 0 1
>99% 2020682 0.923 0.266 0 1
Scotland:
>95% 210984 0.608 0.488 0 1
>96% 210984 0.608 0.488 0 1
>97% 210984 0.562 0.496 0 1
>98% 210984 0.388 0.487 0 1
>99% 210984 0.093 0.290 0 1
Wales:
>95% 131767 0.717 0.450 0 1
>96% 131767 0.717 0.450 0 1
>97% 131767 0.686 0.464 0 1
>98% 131767 0.686 0.464 0 1
>99% 131767 0.686 0.464 0 1
D.5.2 Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)
Background.
The Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey dates back to 1992q1, and in-
cludes roughly 100 variables covering the following subjects: employment by
age group; employees; self-employed; economic activity; employment by indus-
trial sector; ethnic minority economic activity; persons in full-time education;
qualifications; job-related training (Government 2008). For confidentiality rea-
sons, local area data available on the UK Data Archive website at the Local
Authority Unitary Authority (LAUA) level of aggregation has been suppressed
by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) (Government 2008). This restricted
one to the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey as a widely available
source of information.
The local area data available via the UK Data Archive’s standard end user
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license is formatted according to the Local Area District (LAD) classification.
Since the existing dataset has been constructed according to the Local Au-
thority & Unitary Authority (LAUA) classification, the first challenge was to
develop a concordance between the LAD and LAUA methodologies. This was
not very obvious given the lack of clear documentation, or a concordance ta-
ble. The LFS estimates for LADs are based on 1981 boundaries, implying that
boundary changes since 1991 will not be accounted for in the data (Labour
Force Survey 2006).
The quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a representative survey based
on some 60,000 households (Government 2008), with a single LFS quarter rep-
resenting roughly 150,000 individuals. However, when interest is in small pop-
ulation sub-groups, or smaller areas, the quarterly LFS is fairly limited as a
source of reliable estimates given the small sample sizes (Labour Force Survey
2003). The LFS documentation suggests that an average of a larger sample over
a longer period will improve the accuracy of estimates as well as smoothing out
seasonal variation (Labour Force Survey 2003).
Given the small sample size at lower levels of aggregation, the LFS adopts
the following rules:
• the base population for each area is rounded to the nearest thousand; and
• any proportion based on an estimate of less than 10,000 is suppressed(Labour
Force Survey 2003).
These rules imply that the data pertaining to the City of London & Isle
of Scilly Local Authorities are generally suppressed - censored at zero - in
the published data. In the case of the City of London, many sample sizes
are considered too small to provide reliable estimates; In the case of the Isle
of Scilly, this geography is not sampled due to its remote location and small
population. Furthermore, since the LFS is assumed a representative sample,
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individual responses are weighted to reflect the distributions of the relevant
aggregate statistics. If less than 2 individuals replied to the survey in an area,
this information is considered disclosive and dropped for confidentiality reasons
(Government Statistical Service 1999). This is likely to be an issue the less
disaggregate the level of analysis.
The quarterly LFS is a survey, and thus subject to issues like Non-Response
which affect survey accuracy. Given the rotating nature of the QLFS, following
individuals for 5 quarters, it is also subject to sampling variability implying that
comparability over time is affected. Since interest lies in broad band regional
characteristics, these issues are less of a concern.
Concordance between Local Area Data Classifications.
During the major Local Government reorganisation during the 1990s, single-
tier unitary authorities were established in urban areas, with responsibility
for all areas of local government. The existing 2-tier system of counties and
non-metropolitan districts, established in the 70s, remained for the rest of
the country. The result is a mixture of single-tier and two-tier administrative
structures at the local level. This phase of restructuring occurred between 1995
and 1998 (see National Statistics 2004). In April 1996 the counties of Avon,
Cleveland, and Humberside, their districts, and the district of York City were
abolished, and 13 unitary authorities were created in their place. In 1997 13
further unitary authorities were established, and 19 in 1998, making a total
of 46 unitary authorities in England, in addition to the existing London and
Metropolitan boroughs, which already had unitary powers. For full details of
these changes, see Office for National Statistics (1999).
Given these changes in local area classifications, more than one concordance
system was needed to link the regional identifiers over the time period of in-
terest. The concordance system developed is detailed in Ball & Wilke (2009).
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One system was established for the 1996q1-1998q4 data and another for the
1999q1+ data. After 1999q1, 13 extra unitary authorities were introduced into
the data implying a discontinuity with respects to these regional classifications.
Where possible, these were matched to previous years by district name11.
The match between the post-1998 local area geography and the LAUA clas-
sification is an improvement over the pre-1999 geography. The matching scheme
developed (see Ball & Wilke 2009) was applied to the UK Data Archive Local
Area LFS, period: 1996q1 - 2006q1. This resulted in roughly 408 Local Author-
ity matches, which varied across the years. Before 1998q4 there were 378 Local
Authority matches, as it seems that the newly introduced Unitary Authorities
were not accounted for in the pre-1999 waves of the quarterly survey.
Harmonization of the Waves
Small variable name changes over the waves of the Local Area QLFS led to
the implementation of a standard system for variable labelling. Furthermore,
there were cases in which regional names or codes were missing. Given the
concordance system developed, this was a simple case of imputing the missing
value. In other instances, districts wrongly coded. For example, in 1998q1
Norwich and North Norfolk we assigned each other’s district codes instead
of their own. This was a fairly arbitrary task, given the information in our
concordance tables. In order to minimise problems when it came to matching
the waves, a template of all possible local area regions was merged to all waves
of interest.
The pre-1999 waves include occupational information according to the 1990
Standard Occupational Classification, whereas the post-1998 occupation data
is only available according to the 2000 methodology (SOC2000). Given an in-
11Matching by district name would imply some inaccuracies in this procedure pertaining to
Local Authority Districts that were split to form a Unitary Authority and a Local Authority.
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herent lack of comparability(Beerten et al. 2001), an attempt to match the two
methodologies is not advised as the composition of 1-digit occupational groups
has changed and detailed occupational data is unavailable. These composi-
tional changes are within broadband occupational groups. However, a weak
concordance is developed between the SOC90 and SOC2000 for the purposes
of linking the pre- and post-1999q1 waves (see Table D.22). Regardless, this
issue does not affect the analysis in Ball & Wilke (2009) given the time period
under observation: 1999q1 - 2005q4.
New variables introduced over period: Figure D.6 illustrates the data struc-
ture aimed for. In this form, the raw Local Area QLFS presents one with 122
unique variables over the period of interest, 5 labels and 107 unique left hand
side variables.
Figure D.6: Data Structure of the QLFS.
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The number of variables did not change between 1996q1 & 1998q4, and there
was no large changes in the magnitudes of the variables over these quarters.
Since no labels and codes were provided between 1996q1 & 1997q4, it was
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assumed that the variable labels didn’t change over this period. In order to
ease the merging process, it was desirable for all periods to have the same
formatting, layout, variables & variable names.
Table D.15: New variables
Time period # Vars. New Regressors Introduced
1996q1 - 1998q4 106
1999q1 - 2001q1 107 ea18trt4 “pers. econ. active aged 18-retirement with nvq 4 or
above”
ea18trt3 “pers. econ. active aged 18-retirement with nvq 3 or
above”
2001q2 - 2002q2 108 ea18trt “persons economically active aged 18-retirement”
NB. alempuo “all in employment working in unskilled occu-
pations”, systematically missing from 2002q2 onwards.
2002q3 109
2004q4 107
2005q1 - 2006q1 109
The waves from 1996q1 to 1998q4 contained 102 variables: 2 labels (uk;
ualad) and 104 regressors. The Local Authority (LAUA) was matched in us-
ing the concordance table developed (see Ball & Wilke 2009 for details). An
additional column was also added, indicating the quarter in which the wave oc-
curred. Columns were added for the following variables, not included in these
waves: ea18trt4 (persons economically active aged 18 to retirement, with NVQ
level 3+) and ea18trt (persons economically active aged 18 to retirement, with
NVQ level 4+) which were both introduced in 1999q1; and ea18trt (persons
economically active aged 18 to retirement) which was introduced in 2001q2. In
total this gave 112 variables.
The waves from 1999q1 to 2001q1 contained 107 variables: 1 label (uk) and
106 regressors. The Local Area District (pre-1996 geography) codes, and Local
Authority (LAUA) codes and area names, were matched in using the developed
concordance scheme. An additional column was also added, indicating the
quarter in which the wave occurred. An additional Column was added for the
following variable, not included in these waves: ea18trt (persons economically
active aged 18-retirement, with NVQ level 4+) which were both introduced in
1999q1; and ea18trt (persons economically active aged 18-retirement) which
was introduced in 2001q2. In total this gave 112 variables.
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The waves from 2001q2 to 2002q2 contained 108 variables: 1 label (uk) and
107 regressors. The ’person33’ variable was renamed to ’ea18trt’ as they had
the same definition. The Local Area District (pre-1996 geography) codes, and
Local Authority (LAUA) codes and area names, were matched in using the
concordance scheme developed (see Ball & Wilke 2009 for more detais). An
additional column was also added, indicating the quarter in which the wave
occurred. In total this gave 112 variables.
The 2002q4 wave contained 107 variables: 1 label (uk) and 106 regres-
sors. The Local Area District (pre-1996 geography) codes, and Local Authority
(LAUA) codes and area names, were matched in using the concordance scheme
developed (see Ball & Wilke 2009 for more detais). An additional column
was also added, indicating the quarter in which the wave occurred. The vari-
able indicating the number of workers in the ’Unskilled’ occupational category,
‘alempuo’, was missing from the dataset for this wave. This variable was added
with values set to missing. Since this variable was present but contained miss-
ing values from 2001q2 to 2006q1, this increased confidence that this strategy
was appropriate for the 2002q4 wave. In total this gave 112 variables.
2002q3 and the waves from 2003q1 to 2006q1 contained 109 variables: 2
labels (uk; code/ualad) and 107 regressors. The Local Area District (pre-
1996 geography) codes, and Local Authority (LAUA) codes and area names,
were matched in using the aforementioned concordance scheme. An additional
column was also added, indicating the quarter in which the wave occurred. In
total this gave 112 variables.
Matching waves
Identifiers used:
• uk - Local Area Districts (pre-1996 geography).
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• ualad - Local Area District codes (pre-1996 geography).
• area - Local Authority Areas (UKLADGB).
• laua - Local Authority Unitary Authority codes.
• quarter - Quarter in which the wave occured.
Given this common imposed underlying structure, it was a simple case of
converting the 1996q1 to 2006q1 waves from wide to long format, and then
stacking the datasets on top of each other using the ’append’ command in
Stata 10.0.
Variable Selection
Table D.16 indicates the quality of the variables utilised. This indicator is
calculated as the total number of missing observations as a fraction of the total
number of observations. Breakdowns of the ILO unemployment rate by age are
of some concern, as their quality is quite low. When compared to the NOMIS
versions of these variables, available from the quarterly labour force survey
(4 quarter averages), these statistics are relatively favourable. Before these
variables were used, an imputation strategy was implemented that replaced
missing values with the values in the preceding quarter. This approach is valid
if one assumes that these observations are randomly missing. However, it is
hard to justify this approach in the cases where the % of missing values was
high (Greater than 5%: (see Cameron & Trivedi 2005, chap. 26)).
The variables in Table D.16 are relevant as base variables for the construc-
tion of other indicators. The indicators constructed include: The fraction of
New Deal Starters in the eligible population. This indicator was constructed
for targets of the 18-24 as well as the 25-49 programmes. Two definitions of
the numerator were used for this variable:
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Table D.16: Quality of Variables in the Local Area QLFS (1995q1-
2006q1)
1999q1-2005q4 1995q1-2006q1
Variable Obs % Missing Obs % Missing
ethmin 16368 0.222 11424 0.209
pworkage 16368 0.003 11424 0.003
resph16 16368 0.003 11424 0.003
alemmani 16368 0.006 11424 0.006
inemp16 16368 0.003 11424 0.003
alemanso 16368 0.004 11424 0.004
alemproo 16368 0.008 11424 0.007
alemptoc 16368 0.006 11424 0.005
alemasoc 16368 0.006 11424 0.006
alemstoc 16368 0.006 11424 0.006
ilo16t19 16368 0.325 11424 0.336
ilo20t24 16368 0.429 11424 0.461
ilo25t34 16368 0.323 11424 0.362
ilo35t49 16368 0.25 11424 0.28
ilou16 16368 0.035 11424 0.042
• 18-24 ILO unemployed population (residence-based).
• 18-24 Claimant Count (Claiming for  6 months).
Using definition 1 is likely to bias downwards results as not all ILO unem-
ployed are eligible. Eligibility requires receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)
for 6 months (McVicar & Podivinsky 2003). Furthermore, the Claimant Count-
based denominator is relatively more attractive given that it is not affected by
missing values and the low quality of the ILO-based alternative.
Lack of an average years of schooling indicator led to the use Skill Intensity
as a proxy. This occupation-based indicator was defined as the fraction of peo-
ple in the working population working in the following occupations: Managers
& Senior Officials; Professionals; Associated Professionals & Technical; Admin.
& Secretarial; & Skilled Trades.
Other indicators developed from the Local Area QLFS include: manufac-
turing industry employement as a proportion of total employment; the fraction
of the working population with qualifications at NVQ level 3 and over; the
fraction of the working population with qualifications at NVQ level 4 and over;
and the fraction of Ethnic Minorities in the total population (aged 16+).
The initial motive for using the Local Area QLFS was to capture ILO un-
employment. Four rates were constructed: the fraction of ILO unemployed in
the total population (mid-year estimate from NOMIS); the fraction of total
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working-age population (mid-year estimate from NOMIS); the fraction of all
aged 16+ (QLFS Local Area data); and the fraction of all working-age popu-
lation (QLFS Local Area data).
Imputation Strategy
Imputation makes sense if it is reasonable to assume that the missing observa-
tions are missing at random. However, it is hard to justify this approach in the
cases where the % of missing values was high (Greater than 5%: (see Cameron
& Trivedi 2005, chap. 26)).
Table D.17 highlights the underlying data problems for the City of London
local authority. This extract suggests that variables ‘ilo16t19’ is systematically
0, possibly due to low number of respondents, and can be assumed to be zero.
However, the pattern of missing values for the other variables in Table D.17
suggest a case of missing values.
Table D.17: Imputation issues: Local Area Quarterly Labour Force
Survey
Code Area month resph16 inemp16 pworkage ilo16t19 ilo20t24
00AA City of Lon-
don
2004q3 9763 5894 6586 0 0
00AA City of Lon-
don
2004q4 7151 3423 4115 0 0
00AA City of Lon-
don
2005q1 9486 3697 6543 0 697
00AA City of Lon-
don
2005q2 11809 5493 8113 0 875
00AA City of Lon-
don
2005q3 9329 4576 5377 0 0
00AA City of Lon-
don
2005q4 11066 4877 6430 0 0
00AA City of Lon-
don
2006q1 8838 3960 5477 0 0
In Table D.17 variable ‘ilo20t24’ seems to be missing for 2004q3 to 2004q4
& 2005q3 to 2006q1 in City of London Local Authority. However, a change
in magnitude from zero doesn’t seem very realistic given its value of 875 in
2005q2. This is also the case with the variables in Table D.18 for Rochdale
Local Authority. It is well documented that data for the City of London and
Isle of Scilly are affected by small sample sizes. This implies that censoring
of the data for these sub-regions for confidentiality reasons will be common.
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However, it is hard to see how this is the case in the above illustrated cases. The
pattern is the same throughout the dataset. This issue is not well documented,
since the documentation provided refers to the quarterly labour force survey
and the annual local area QLFS which are both going to have larger sample
sizes and thus higher thresholds (in terms of number of individual responses
required to avoid data censorship).
Communications with the LFS helpdesk, as well as ONS, have so far come
to the conclusion that the ”0” values in the LAQLFS are actually zero. How-
ever, this is hard to believe in some cases and thus the issue is still being
pursued. One example of an issue variable would be ethnic minority counts in
Local Authorities. It may be that the high level of entries coded as zero (and
subsequently treated as missing under the initial methodology) are truly zero,
given relatively the thin spread of ethnic minorities across the UK. The current
implementation of the dataset treats these zero values as missing and imputes
accordingly (replacing missing values with the value in the preceding period).
Table D.18: Imputation issues: Local Area Quarterly Labour Force
Survey
Code Area month resph16 inemp16 pworkage ilo16t19 ilo20t24
00BQ Rochdale 1997q4 168279 97545 133421 415 1475
00BQ Rochdale 1998q1 172178 100473 137632 843 0
00BQ Rochdale 1998q2 168914 94965 135611 2777 1460
00BQ Rochdale 1998q3 173521 103829 141716 950 1463
00BQ Rochdale 1998q4 167991 102250 133746 480 0
00BQ Rochdale 1999q1 164732 99468 130745 849 485
00BQ Rochdale 1999q2 161366 91266 125380 1196 481
Linking the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey
The matched Local Area QLFS waves were matched to the existing Local
Authority-level regional dataset, on a monthly basis. In order to achieve this,
the matched waves were merged with a grid containing all possible Local Au-
thorities on a yearly, quarterly, and monthly basis. This merger resulted in
quarterly LFS waves being repeated for the relevant months within the 4 month
interval.
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D.5.3 Data construction and definitions
Table D.19: NSPD Urban/Rural classification for Scotland.
No. NSPD Area
Classification
Definition
1 Large Urban
Area:
Population > 125,000
2 Other Urban
Area:
Population 10,000-125,000
3 Accessible Small
Town:
Population 3,000-10,000, <= 30 minutes
drive to settlement of 10,000+
4 Remote Small
Town:
Population 3,000-10,000, 30-60 minutes drive
to settlement of 10,000+
5 Very Remote
Small Town:
Population 3,000-10,000, > 60 minutes drive
to settlement of 10,000+
6 Accessible Rural: Population < 3,000, <= 30 minutes drive to
settlement of 10,000+
7 Remote Rural: Population < 3,000, 30-60 minutes drive to
settlement of 10,000+
8 Very Remote Ru-
ral:
Population < 3,000, > 60 minutes drive to
settlement of 10,000+
Classification: 1,2 = Urban; 3-8 = Rural;
Source: National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD)
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Table D.20: Comparison between the NSPD and DEFRA Ur-
ban/Rural classifications for England.
No. NSPD Classifi-
cation: (Eng-
land/Wales)
No. DEFRA Classification (England)
1 Urban (Sparse)
population >
10,000
1 Major Urban: population > 100,000 or 50%
of population in urban areas with population
> 750,000.
2 Urban (Less
Sparse) > 10,000
2 Large Urban: population > 500,000 or 50%
of population in one of 17 urban areas with
population between 250,000 & 750,000.
3 Town (Less
Sparse)
3 Other Urban: population < 37,000 or < 26%
of population in rural settlements & larger
market towns.
4 Town (Sparse) 4 Significant Rural: population > 37,000 or
> 26% of population in rural settlements &
larger market towns.
5 Village (Less
Sparse)
5 Rural-50: population ≥ 50% but < 80% of
population in rural settlements & larger mar-
ket towns.
6 Village (Sparse) 6 Rural-80: population ≥ 80% of population
in rural settlements & larger market towns.
7 Dispersed: ham-
lets & isolated
dwellings (Less
Sparse)
8 Dispersed: ham-
lets & iso-
lated dwellings
(Sparse)
NSPD Classification: 1,2 = Urban; 3,4,5,6,7,8 = Rural
DEFRA Classification: 1,2,3 = Urban; 4,5,6 = Rural;
Source: Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),
www.defra.org.uk
National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD)
Table D.21: Comparison between the England/Wales & Scottish Ac-
cessibility indicators.
No. England & Wales No. Scotland
1 Urban (Sparse) population > 10,000 1 Large Urban Area: Population > 125,000
2 Urban (Less Sparse) > 10,000 2 Other Urban Area: Population 10,000-
125,000
3 Town (Less Sparse) 3 Accessible Small Town: Population 3,000-
10,000, <= 30 minutes drive to settlement
of 10,000+
4 Town (Sparse) 4 Remote Small Town: Population 3,000-
10,000, 30-60 minutes drive to settlement of
10,000+
5 Village (Less Sparse) 5 Very Remote Small Town: Population 3,000-
10,000, > 60 minutes drive to settlement of
10,000+
6 Village (Sparse) 6 Accessible Rural: Population < 3,000, <=
30 minutes drive to settlement of 10,000+
7 Dispersed: hamlets & isolated dwellings
(Less Sparse)
7 Remote Rural: Population < 3,000, 30-60
minutes drive to settlement of 10,000+
8 Dispersed: hamlets & isolated dwellings
(Sparse)
8 Very Remote Rural: Population < 3,000, >
60 minutes drive to settlement of 10,000+
England/Wales Classification: 1,2,3,5,7 = accessible; 4,6,8 = remote
Scotland Classification: 1,2,3,6 = accessible; 4,5,7,8 = remote
Source: National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD)
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Table D.22: Weak Concordance Between SOC90 and SOC2000
1998q4- 1999q1+
alemanad all in employment working
as managers & administra-
tors
alemanso All in emp. working as
managers & senior officials
alemproo all in employment working
in professional occupations
alemproo All in employment working
in professional occupations
alemptoc all in employment working
in assoc. prof. & tech. oc-
cup.
alemptoc All in employment working
assoc. prof. & technical
occs.
alemcloc all in employment working
in clerical occupations
alemasoc All in emp. working in ad-
min and secretarial occu-
pations
alemcroc all in employment working
in craft related occup.
alemstoc All in employment working
in skilled trades occups.
alemppo all in employment work-
ing in personal & protec-
tive occup.
alempso All in employment working
in personal service occups.
alemseoc all in employment working
in selling occup.
alemsoc All in employment working
in sales customer serv occs
alempmo all in employment working
as plant & machine opera-
tors
alempmo All in employment working
as plant & machine opera-
tors
alempoo all in employment working
in other occupations
alempoo All in employment working
in other occupations
alemuno all in employment working
in unskilled occupations
alempuo All in Employment work-
ing in Unskilled Occupa-
tions
Table D.23: The number of unique regions that a postcode district
falls into:
reg1 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 2,953 55.03 55.03
2 1,596 29.74 84.77
3 627 11.68 96.46
4 155 2.89 99.35
5 30 0.56 99.91
6 4 0.07 99.98
7 1 0.02 100.00
Total 5,366 100.00
reg2 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 2,953 71.48 71.48
2 993 24.04 95.52
3 173 4.19 99.71
4 11 0.27 99.98
5 1 0.02 100.00
Total 4,131 100.00
reg3 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 2,953 54.87 54.87
2 1,606 29.84 84.71
3 632 11.74 96.45
4 156 2.90 99.35
5 30 0.56 99.91
6 4 0.07 99.98
7 1 0.02 100.00
reg1 # of unique Local Authorities that a postcode district falls into.
reg2 # of unique NUTS3 regions that a postcode district falls into.
reg3 # of unique level 1 Local Administrative Units (former NUTS4) that a postcode
district falls into.
Format- uniqNT where:
N == 1,2,3 (identifying the case above)
T == Number of interest.
Reg#: the number of unique regions that the postcode district falls into.
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Table D.24: Distribution of postcodes that fall into a postcode district
that falls into T higher aggregation levels of interest:
uniq1 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 753,579 35.23 35.23
2 773,898 36.18 71.41
3 434,552 20.32 91.73
4 140,759 6.58 98.31
5 29,870 1.40 99.71
6 4,624 0.22 99.92
7 1,637 0.08 100.00
Total 2,138,919 100.00
uniq2 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 1,276,065 59.66 59.66
2 703,105 32.87 92.53
3 146,493 6.85 99.38
4 12,569 0.59 99.97
5 687 0.03 100.00
Total 2,138,919 100.00
uniq3 Freq. Percent Cum.
1 750,715 35.10 35.10
2 774,167 36.19 71.29
3 436,530 20.41 91.70
4 141,376 6.61 98.31
5 29,870 1.40 99.71
6 4,624 0.22 99.92
7 1,637 0.08 100.00
Total 2,138,919 100.00
uniq1 # of full postcodes that fall into a postcode district that falls into T Local Author-
ities.
uniq2 # of full postcodes that fall into a postcode district that falls into T NUTS3 regions.
uniq3 # of full postcodes that fall into a postcode district that falls into T level 1 Local
Administrative Units (former NUTS4).
Format- uniqNT where:
N == 1,2,3 (identifying the case above)
T == Number of interest.
Appendix E
Chapter 5: Constructing
Continuous Work-Life Histories.
An Alternative Approach
The current release of the BHPS covers 18 waves of the survey, from 1991/1992
to 2008/2009. Socio-Economic data available at the individual & household
level. The BHPS provides an annual nationally representative sample of 5000+
household and over 10000 individual-level observations per wave (BHPS User
Guide, v.3). Retrospective job history information is collected for the 12
months prior to the current wave interview. In addition, the survey contains
information on complete work-life histories since leaving further education.
Each wave contains a household identifier and an individual identifier, iden-
tifying the position of the individual in question within the household. These
two identifiers link information at the individual and household level within
each wave, however, they cannot be used to link information across waves.
This is due to the fact that household composition changes over time, and an
individual’s position within the household is prone to change as well (BHPS
User Guide, v.3). A unique personal identifier (pid) is also supplied, which
can be used for linking information across waves. In order to achieve this, the
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cross-wave link file is provided. This file contains the response status and iden-
tifiers for all known sample members in each wave. In addition time invariant
information can be matched in by pid using a cross-wave data file. Retrospec-
tive continuous labour market history, from first exit from full time education,
is collected at waves two and job history at wave three1. I construct the data
set by stacking all the relevant work-life information on top of each other in
chronological order, from when the individual first left full time education. Full
data preparation steps are detailed in subsequent sections. Systematic issues,
e.g. recall bias, as well as survey design changes, are explicitly taken into ac-
count.
Before conditioning the sample, there were 3516 males directly interviewed
in 1991 who were between 16 and 58. After dropping problematic cases (miss-
ing wage information) this figure dropped to 3,444. The sample is restricted
to individuals continuously present in the BHPS for at least two waves since
1991, that gave full interviews at each wave (excluding proxy respondents &
telephone interviews). In addition to minimising non-random ‘sample attrition
bias’, this ensures that observed earnings losses are purely due to wage and
hour changes (Ruhm 1991). One aim of this study is to control for individu-
als’ full work-life histories since leaving full-time education. Respondents not
present at wave 2 will lack of both retrospective job and labour market status
information. Furthermore, individuals present at wave 2 but not 3 will lack
information about the reason for leaving previous job if their current labour
market status at wave 1 lasted more than 12 months (Halpin 1997). If the sam-
ple is restricted to include only individuals that were continuously present for
over the full observation window of interest, 1991 to 1997, then this results in a
1Where ‘job’ is defined as a continuous spell of employment, ignoring intra-firm move-
ments, and job characteristics refer to the start of each spell.
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sample of 1656 males. Whilst this simplifies the calculation of previous labour
market status, and ensures that all these individuals were interviewed at Wave
2 & Wave 32, it severely limits sample size. This also assumes that attrition is
random and not systematically related with Xit. It is also debateable whether
the Original Sample Members (OSM) are a random sample of the population,
given that responding to survey is not a legal requirement. Out of the 3,444
men directly interviewed at Wave 1, 2,140 were continuously present in the
sample for at least 2 waves. This figure drops to 1,842 when those ever in self-
employment is exclude, making up the sub-sample in the wage analysis. One
way to test the impact of this conditioning is to allow individuals to enter and
exit the sample, provided that they give full interview responses for at least two
consecutive waves and are part of the OSM, taking first differences to control
for time-invariant ability bias. If individuals are allowed free entry and exit
from the sample without the OSM restriction (the majority of OSM contribute
to the BLIFEMST file (see Halpin 1997, Table 3)), then pre-1.9.1990 informa-
tion will not exist for those that were not interviewed at the key data collection
dates (1992,1993) without further restrictions. Furthermore, the calculation of
previous labour market status is complicated due to sample attrition.
In the main analysis, current labour force status is restricted to exclude
self-employment. This common approach is done due to difficulties in recording
hours of work for self-employed individuals (Arulampalam 2001), the majority
of which are unable to provide their usual hours of work in the BHPS data
(restricting the analysis to exclude anyone ever reporting themselves as self-
employed at survey interview implies a sample of 1850 individuals at wave 1).
Labour market status during the past 12 months is not conditioned to exclude
2They will all have detailed restrospective information pertaining to the pre-1.9.1990
period, thus allowing for the control of industry experience.
E. Chapter 5: Constructing Continuous Work-Life Histories. An Alternative
Approach LIII
self-employment as this not possible for Wave 1 due to lack of information.
However from Wave 2 this information is available in the job history informa-
tion due to a change of labelling for the relevant variable3. To avoid issues
regarding the retirement decision, individuals in the sample are restricted to
be between the ages of 16 and 58 at the time of the first interview4. Individuals
are then followed until they turn 65, the standard retirement age. The BHPS
interview field work starts on the first of September, usually taking until De-
cember, but with a cut off of around April. Attempts to trace house movers
and convert initial refusals mean that interview may appear in the data as hav-
ing taken place in the following year, however in most cases this is within the
first 3 months (BHPS User Manual, v.3). There are a few cases where there
were still interviews taking place after April, but before September. The later
the interview takes place the greater the potential for overlap of the multiple
data sources in the BHPS (Paull 2002). Data preparation steps may be more
important in these cases, especially if inconsistencies arise between survey date
and retrospective information.
The labour market history (JOBHIST) file includes job history since the
first of September in the previous year. In order to follow individuals’ labour
market histories, current and job history status codes are used. In the individ-
ual response file (INDRESP) this refers to labour market status at the time of
interview, which is not fixed5. New job history entries are not requested for
individuals that have not changed job since the first of September of the previ-
ous year (BHPS User Guide: p.52). Time-invariant information is imputed for
3Arulampalam (2001) explicitly states that in her paper: “...previous labour market status
of employment includes self-employment (Arulampalam 2001, pp. F593).”
4Arulampalam (2001) restricts this to be between 16 & 58 in the published paper, but
between 16 & 55 in the working paper.
5Interviews usually take place between September and December, but could still be open
until April of the following year (ref. BHPS Manual).
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spells in which this was missing, as well as job-related information that is only
asked at the beginning of an employment spell (ignoring intra-firm movements,
given how the job definition used).
Individuals are asked about their complete labour market histories since
they first left full-time education. There are 2 files relevant for the first seven
waves, data for which was collected at the second and third waves respectively.
These files hold retrospective work-life history information including labour
market status and spell beginning and end dates. Dates are recorded to the
nearest month, however, season codes were used in the case where an individ-
ual could not recall the precise month (BHPS Manual, pp. 62). I adopt the
same convention as that used by the BHPS: winter is coded January, spring
as April, summer as July, and autumn as October. In addition, if an individ-
ual supplied the year that they started/ended a spell, but couldn’t remember
the month, then we assumed that this was July. This rule is relevant for the
pre.1.9.90 lifetime history data only, where recall issues are more likely to arise.
In the lifetime history data, if start and end month are missing (coded
‘don’t know’) and the year is known, the length of the labour market spell is
imputed by the data providers to the nearest year and entered in daily format6.
Length is set to missing in cases where the spell started and ended in the same
year and the start and/or end months are entered as seasonal codes or aren’t
supplied. See Table E.1 for an example of an individual that supplied pre-
1.9.90 lifetime history data but could not remember the start or end months of
any spells except the penultimate record. In these cases spell length (cjsten)
is imputed according to the procedure detailed above. The second and forth
6If day is unknown this is treated as 1, and in the case of month this is treated as July
(See BHPS User Manual for further details).
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records supplied by this individual illustrate the point raised about imputation
of the length of labour market spell. Since the start and end date are unknown,
the first spell is assumed to last 16 years (365.25*16=5844).
Table E.1: Example of individual that could not remember start and
end month in pre-1.9.90 data.
wave jbstat jhstat spell start
month
interview
month
spell
end
month
start
month
start
year
end
month
end
year
Spell
length
0 Emp d/k 72 d/k 88 5844
0 Emp d/k 88 d/k 88 missing
0 Emp d/k 88 d/k 89 365
0 Emp d/k 89 d/k 89 missing
0 Emp d/k 89 d/k 90 365
0 Emp 1990m2 feb 90 n/a n/a 1339
1 Emp Same
emp.
1989m2 1991m9 1991m3 feb march
1 Emp 1991m3 1991m9 march 211
2 Emp 1991m3 1992m10 march 584
3 Emp 1990m2 1993m10 feb 1349
Months in the pre-1.9.90 data entered as d/k (don’t know) are imputed as July. Spells with zero duration are
assumed to have lasted at least one month. Raw data illustrated. Spell length unavailable in JOBHIST records.
Whereas the retrospective data collected at the third wave refers exclusively
to continuous employment spells with separate employers, the information col-
lected at the second wave is more extensive and covers more labour market
states. Granted, as stated in the reference manual, more effort has been made
to ensure that the data collected at the third wave is consistent with the infor-
mation in the main dataset. It should be noted, however, that the definition
of a job spell is slightly different to that in the main dataset. In the third wave
retrospective data, an employment spell refers to a continuous spell with an
individual employer, excluding intra-employer job movements. This contrasts
with the main data, where a a new spell is created when an individual gets
a promotion with the same employer (BHPS Manual, pp. 68). Furthermore,
employment spells collected at wave two refer to continuous spells in separate
labour market state. This implies that inter-employer job-to-job transitions
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will not be captured if using this retrospective data source.
E.0.4 Treatment of Promotions (intra-firm movements)
The definition of a job in this study is taken to be a continuous spell with a
separate employer. This definition is consistent with that used in the bulk of
the existing literature (Farber 1999). If promotions are not treated as the start
of a new labour market spell, then the raw ‘cjsten’ measure provided in the
BHPS cannot be used without some alterations (Mare´ 2006). In calculating
this measure, the creators of the BHPS treated promotions as the start of a
new labour market spell in the post-1.9.90 data. If occupation-specific human
capital is of interest, a more accurate measure may take into account intra-firm
movements. In the context of firm-specific human capital, promotions should
be not be treated as the beginning of a labour market spell7.
E.0.5 Overlapping Labour Market History Information
Individuals’ labour market histories are prone to overlap due to the timing of
interviews in the BHPS varying over the period of the survey. In order to deal
with this issue, the start and end dates of the spells can be used. The JOB-
HIST data refers to changes in labour market status that occurred since the
first of September in the previous year. The simplest approach would be to
assume that spells that started or ended before the previous interview month
were reported in the previous interview. However, dealing with this issue accu-
rately is not as simple as this due to the potential overlapping of information
7Inconsistencies in the promotions measure are identified in the data. This can be expected
given its self-reported nature. If an individual reports a promotion and this is to a different
employer, then we do not consider this a promotion in the usual sense. These moves are
relabelled as moves to a better job.
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Figure E.1: BHPS Data Structure: Time line showing data collection
points and data source coverage.
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Job history (JOBHIST) file is a retrospective data source, covering the last
12 months (since the first of September of the previous year). Individual re-
sponse (INDRESP) file is a snapshot of labour market activity at interview
date. JOBHIST data only collected if labour market status changed in the
last 12 months. For an alternative illustration of the overlap (Halpin 1997, see
Figure 1).
in the JOBHIST file and the INDRESP file. Figure E.1 illustrates this issue.
JOBHIST data is ‘always’ collected from the first of September of the previous
year, whereas the interview date is not set. Simply dropping JOBHIST infor-
mation about spells starting before the previous interview date would result in
the loss of information about the exit reason if this spell was employment and
it ended within the last 12 months. Table E.2 provides more detail relevant to
this point, as the JOBHIST data collected includes job changes that would be
lost if this information was simply dropped without copying over the informa-
tion to the other records pertaining to that labour market spell. Furthermore,
rules need to be adopted in the event of inconsistencies between the interview
date and retrospective data sources.
If an individual reports that they were in a non-employment labour market
status they are asked what date that spell began in order to derive the ‘cjsten’.
Due to changes in the sequence of questioning as the BHPS has developed,
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Table E.2: Raw data pertaining to Original Sample Member
(OSM).
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy spell
start
month
interview
month
spell
end
month
same
spell?
1 OLF OLF N/A 1990m6 1991m2
1 Emp. 1991m2 1991m10
2 Emp. 1990m2 1992m10 <
3 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Better
Job
1990m2 1993m6 <
3 Emp. 1993m6 1993m10 <<
4 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Dismissed/
Sacked
1993m7 1994m8 <<
4 Emp. 1994m8 1994m11
5 Emp. 1994m7 1995m11
6 Emp. 1993m9 1996m9 <<<
7 Emp. Diff.
emp.
College/
Uni.
1993m9 1996m9 <<<
7 Emp. Diff.
emp.
College/
Uni.
1996m9 1997m2
7 Emp. Diff.
emp.
College/
Uni.
1997m2 1997m9
7 Emp. 1997m9 1997m10
internal inconsistencies may arise in the underlying data. An individual may
report themselves as being self-employed or unemployed, when their current
(self-defined/subjective) labour market status is initially requested. However,
due to the branching nature of the BHPS, the way an individual responds to
initial questioning affects whether variables collected later in the survey are
available, e.g. job and workplace characteristics. This information can be used
to determine whether the self-defined labour market status is accurate 8. The
longitudinal nature of the BHPS implies that if an individual could not remem-
ber the start date of an ongoing spell, they may recall it at a later date if spell
status changes. Table E.3 illustrates an example of an individual that could
not remember the start date of the ‘out of the labour force’ spell reported at
Wave 1, but remembered this information at the next interview date. In this
case one would copy the start date of the spell to the previous incidences of
that spell.
8See the BHPS user manual for more detail on this feature of the data.
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Table E.3: Extract of the raw data, pertaining to sample
member.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy spell
start
month
interview
month
spell
end
month
Recall
issue
1 OLF ? 1991m10 <<
2 OLF OLF N/A 1974m4 1992m11 1992m6 <<
2 U U N/A 1992m6 1992m11 1992m7
2 E Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1992m7 1992m11 1992m8
2 U U N/A 1992m8 1992m11 1992m10
2 E Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1992m10 1992m11 1992m11
2 U 1992m11 1992m11
The use of interview date observations implies that short spells of employment
will not be captured in the data. This is likely to be of significance for frequent
job movers in the post-1.9.90 data. Table E.4 illustrates an example of an indi-
vidual in the raw data who will not be in the Wage equation as they reported
themselves in Employment only once in the INDRESP file, although they were
actually in employment over the sample period five times. A positive real wage
is only observed for individuals who report themselves in employment at cur-
rent interview date (INDRESP file). For employment spells in the JOBHIST
file, a positive real wage is unobserved, unless one imputes ‘usual hours worked’
using the interview date records.
E.0.6 Pre 1.9.1990 Lifetime History Data
Before attempting to use the retrospective pre-1.9.1990 labour market history
data collected in the BHPS, an important technicality needs to be taken into
account. Labour market status history is collected from all individuals at wave
2, provided they are not still in full-time education9. Although all individu-
9As Mare (2006) highlights, this condition does not seem to be consistently applied by
interviewers.
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Table E.4: Survey date labour market status underreports intra-
survey date dynamics.
wave jbstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Source: Positive
Wage
Ob-
served?
1 OLF 1991m10 INDRESP
2 OLF N/A 1974m4 1992m6 JOBHIST
2 UnemployedN/A 1992m6 1992m7 JOBHIST
2 Employed Temp.
Job
1992m7 1992m8 JOBHIST
2 UnemployedN/A 1992m8 1992m10 JOBHIST
2 Employed Temp.
Job
1992m10 1992m11 JOBHIST
2 Unemployed 1992m11 1992m11 INDRESP
3 Employed Temp.
Job
1992m7 1992m10 JOBHIST
3 Employed Temp.
Job
1992m10 1992m11 JOBHIST
3 Unemployed 1992m11 1993m11 INDRESP
4 Unemployed 1994m10 INDRESP
5 OLF N/A 1989m10 1995m8 JOBHIST
5 Unemployed 1995m7 1996m1 INDRESP
6 OLF N/A 1993m9 1995m10 JOBHIST
6 Unemployed 1995m11 1996m9 INDRESP
7 UnemployedN/A 1995m12 1996m12 JOBHIST
7 Employed 1996m12 1997m9 INDRESP<<<<
als present at Wave 2 contribute a BLIFEMST record, only those present at
both Waves 2 & 3 contribute a CLIFEJOB record (ref. Halpin (1997) ‘Unified
BHPS work-life histories’, pp. 20). This contribution is further conditioned
on whether the interviewee has had a previous job lasting for at least 1 month
before the interview date employment spell, given that they are in employment
at wave 3 (Mare´ 2006). Those in their first job since leaving full-time edu-
cation do not contribute to the CLIFEJOB file. Thus the data collected at
Wave 3 cannot be considered an alternative overlapping source of information
on retrospective labour market spells. If one drops retrospective employment
information collected at Wave 2, this results in the loss of all retrospective
employment information if an individual was only interviewed at Wave 1 & 2.
This will also be the case if an individual was interviewed at wave 2 & 3, was
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in their first job since leaving full-time education, and they spent more than a
month in non-employment prior to the first job.
One potential strategy, taking into account whether an individual is in
their first job, is to assume that retrospective employment information is du-
plicated if an individual was continuously present in the survey for at least
3 Waves. Given this criteria, employment information collected at Wave 2
could be dropped. If this condition is not met, the retrospective employment
information collected at Wave 2 could be used. This artifact, although not ex-
plicitly documented in Arulampalam (2001), may explain why the author only
controls for previous full-time experience (given that she states that she uses
both the BLIFEMST and CLIFEJOB data sources). However, this strategy
is not implemented in this study given that roughly half of the CLIFEJOB
spells conflict with the BLIFEMST records. The retrospective information col-
lected at Wave 2 does not allow one to control for pre-1.9.1990 industry-specific
experience as the Wave 3 CLIFEJOB data allows. Furthermore, “reason for
leaving previous job” will be missing for individuals that did not contribute to
the CLIFEJOB file. However, it is likely that the industry-specific information
in the retrospective CLIFEJOB file will be inconsistent with that collected in
the current BHPS as it refers to the start of a spell with a single employer and
ignores subsequent intra-firm movements. The current BHPS data can refer to
separate job spells with the same employer, so information may change if an
individual changes job or workplace with the same employer.
The BLIFEMST data: This captures all continuous labour market spells
since leaving full-time education, that lasted more than one month. Labour
market spells ongoing at interview date, as well as spells that began on or after
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1.9.90 are dropped as an initial step. I do not drop ongoing spells that started
before 1.9.90 as in this case they are relevant for the rule-based approach.
The CLIFEJOB data: In theory “employment status spell number” permits
one to link the BLIFEMST data with that collected at wave 3 as it points to
the relevant spell in the sequence of labour market states collected at wave 210.
However, this indicator will be coded zero in some instances, cases where the
two data sources cannot be accurately linked. At the beginning of the wave
3 interview respondents that contributed to the BLIFEMST data are given a
chance to confirm the accuracy of the lifetime history data collected at wave
2 (Mare´ 2006)11. If it is deemed accurate then the BLIFEMST file is used as
a basis for collecting the CLIFEJOB data. In this case the two files are easily
linkable. If the BLIFEMST data is deemed inaccurate then the CLIFEJOB
data is collected, but “employment status spell number” is coded zero. In this
case inconsistencies between the wave 2 & 3 lifetime history datasets are likely
to arise. Some of these inconsistencies may be impossible to resolve without
further assumptions. Lifetime job history spells that began after 1.9.90 are
dropped as an initial step. Furthermore, entries that refer to the present job
reported at wave 3 are dropped regardless of whether they started before or
after 1.9.90.
E.0.7 Rules-based Approach
In constructing the dataset, a rules-based approach is adopted to ensure con-
sistency of the data. Three labour market states considered are Employment,
10In cases where “employment status spell number” is available, the BLIFEMST record
captures a continuous periods in employment (potentially with seperate employers) whereas
the CLIFEJOB data details continuous job spells with separate employers.
11Due to the dataset construction, all individuals present at wave 3 will have contibuted
to the wave 2 data.
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Unemployment & Out of the Labour Force (OLF). The OECD definition of
the ‘currently inactive population’ is used to classify labour market states as
‘Out of the Labour Force’12. This definition implies that it is possible for an
individual to experience two consecutive OLF spells if the underlying labour
market state is different. I do not merge these consecutive OLF spells, but take
this into account when constructing indicators of interest.
Interviews that are recorded as having taken place before September in any
year as assumed to have taken place in the subsequent year but are still treated
as coming from the reported wave, e.g. Wave 1 interviews started in September
1991, so interviews in that wave reported as having taken place before Septem-
ber are assumed to have taken place in 1992. This implies that the gap between
interview dates will vary since interview date is taken as the reference point13.
Furthermore, if interview month is recorded as missing in the INDRESP file, I
assume it took place in September.
The first step is to put all the spells in chronological order. Since a glob-
ally consistent job spell number is provided in the current BHPS, this is a
straightforward task in the post-1.9.1990 data. If one wants to combine the
Wave 2 and 3 retrospective lifetime history files, this is not as straightforward.
Inconsistencies exist between the two pre-1.9.1990 data sources due to their
retrospective nature and different collection points (see Section E.0.6). Spell
start and/or end month is missing for a significant proportion of labour market
spells due to interviewees not being able to recall this information at all. In
12The OECD classifies the following individuals as inactive: attending an educational
institution; performing household duties; retiring on pension or capital income; other reasons,
including disability or impairment (OECD 2004).
13Borland et al. (2002) use the first of September as their fixed reference point, however
this information is collected retrospectively and likely to suffer from issues detailed in this
section.
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general, this phenomenon is more common the further back into time an in-
dividual has to remember, more notably for frequent job changers Paull (2002).
Various methods exist to deal with pre 1.9.90 information (See Mare´ (2006)
for a detailed survey). If one is just interested in previous labour market states
then the BLIFEMST can suffice (although the Wave 2 file may be subject
to more error than the Wave 3 information). Since in principle the CLIFE-
JOB data details job held within each continuous employment spell in the
BLIFEMST file, job data can be merged in where possible. In general, an
identifier consistent with the sequence of spells in the BLIFEMST file is avail-
able for roughly half of the CLIFEJOB (clejsfn). This is only possible for
individuals present at Wave 2 & 3 and who weren’t in their first employment
spell at wave 3 and weren’t still in full-time education at wave 2, prerequisites
for contribution to the CLIFEJOB file. The approach adopted to establish this
link by combining the BLIFEMST AND CLIFEJOB files and then applying
Rule X (see Figure E.2). Halpin (1997) created a file merging month-by-month
job and labour market status records from the CLIFEJOB and BLIFEMST
files using a set of rules common in some aspects to the approach adopted
herein. Once the data is in chronological order, the following rules are adopted
in order to harmonise the data and address inconsistencies.
Lifetime history data: If a respondent indicates that they can’t remember
spell start and/or end month, this is imputed as July in both lifetime history
files. Given the chronological ordering, spells are also assumed to start in the
same month that the previous spell ended. This operation is initially only
conducted on the BLIFEMST file. Once the CLIFEJOB file has been merged
in, Rule X is adopted to deal with any inconsistencies. Once Rule X has been
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applied, any chronological spells from the CLIFEJOB file are assumed to have
began when the last one ended.
Rules were adopted for dealing with retrospective lifetime history data that
overlaps with the current BHPS. Before implementing these rules the following
“mantra” was decided upon: Trust current information over retrospec-
tive data, and trust retrospective data from the JOBHIST file over
that collected from the Wave 2/3 lifetime history files. This assump-
tion is essentially equivalent to the common approach in the literature of giving
preference to information reported closest to the event of interest (Halpin 1997;
Upward 1999; Paull 2002; Dustmann & Pereira 2008, see), however, treatment
of the overlapping information varies.
Upward (1999) drops individuals who recorded negative spell lengths. In
this study these spells are not dropped as the rules-based approach takes deals
with this issue by assuming that these spells began when the last spell ended14.
All these cases in the data arise when an individual reported a spell that started
and ended in the same year and the start and/or end date was a season code.
Inconsistencies in the season coding mean that if a spell ended in November it
could end up in the data as January of that same year (winter season code is
assigned to January by the BHPS). Dealing with this issue is not a straight-
forward task. Mare´ (2006) details various approaches taken in the literature.
Application of the assumption that the spell started when the last one ended
to the merged work-life histories file seems to deal with most of these cases.
See Mare´ (2006) Table 10 for alternative approaches taken to deal with this is-
sue. Work-life history information is dropped if start or end dates are coded as
14For the few of cases where this approach did not remove this issue, spell length was set
to missing.
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missing. This may lead to an underestimation of the impact of experience, espe-
cially in cases where we drop significant pre-1990 employment periods, however
impact of this assumption is assumed small (how many cases affected?).
The key assumptions distinguishing the different approaches:
1. Treatment of intra-firm movements.
2. Defining previous labour market status.
3. Time period: 1991-1997; 1991-200(1);
Assumptions affecting all approaches:
1. Sample selection - “Continuously present” definition.
2. Job status definition.
3. Manipulation of pre-1.9.90 data: - e.g. Dropping all spells that ended
before 1.1.1980, as well as those that began after 1.9.90 when the main
BHPS starts collecting data.
The BHPS contains various data sources, collected at differing points and cov-
ering different periods. Merging these different data sources results in overlap
and inconsistencies, which are dealt with using a rules-based approach.
The treatment of intra-firm movements depends on the phenomenon one
aims to capture. Neal (1995) is an example of a seminal paper addressing
the importance of industry-specific human capital in establishing the relation-
ship between pre-displacement tenure and post-displacement earnings. Parent
(1999; 2000) addresses returns to tenure in the context of industry-specific
human capital. Gibbons & Waldman (2004) investigate task-specific human
capital, a novel approach viz-a-viz the existing literature. With regards to
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firm-specific human capital, continuous spells with separate employers are of
interest (Farber 1999). Given the “job spell” definition used in this study, con-
tinuous spells with separate employers are of interest. However, if the interest
is in occupation-specific human capital, then each job held should be taken into
consideration (Sullivan 2008).
Previous labour market status is impacted by the treatment of intra-firm
movements. How one categorises an individual as ‘continuously present’ is
likely to be key, alternative definitions of which are implemented as a robust-
ness check. Using an alternative strategy which follows Original Sample Mem-
bers (OSM) until they leave the sample, provides a larger sample size than the
methodology, implemented in some studies like Halpin (1997) and Dustmann
& Pereira (2008), which essentially only includes individuals that are continu-
ously present over the observation window.
A summary of the rules-based approach (main rules) is given below:
RULE 1: - Drop JOBHIST spells that ended on or before the first of Septem-
ber of the previous year.
RULE 2: - If the spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file started before the last
spell in the lifetime history files, drop the lifetime history record.
RULE 3: - If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the first spell in
the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended after it, but job status is the same,
assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime history entry. This rule is
only implemented for non-employment spells.
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MODIFIED RULE 3: - If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the
first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended after or when it ENDED,
but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime
history entry. This rule is only implemented in the case of employment spells
originating from the CLIFEJOB file.
RULE 4: - If the last spell in the lifetime history file started before the first
spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file, keep & assume that it ended when the
first entry in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file began15
RULE 5: - Rule 3 from Upward (1999). This rule states that if a spell from
the JOBHIST record starts before the previous interview date, it should be the
same spell as recorded in last year’s INDRESP record. If the status of this spell
is the same as the status in the previous wave, copy across the history status
value and jhstpy and then drop the information from JOBHIST. The values of
history status and jhstpy should be copied across to the first occurence of that
spell (Upward 1999).
E.0.8 Application of Rules-Based Approach to pre-1.9.90
Retrospective Data.
The CLIFEJOB and BLIFEMST files are combined to form continuous job
histories since leaving full-time education. Inconsistencies between the CLIFE-
JOB and BLIFEMST files arise due to their retrospective nature, and the
fact that they were collected a year apart. The approach adopted to establish
this link was by overlaying CLIFEJOB file on the BLIFEMST, linking the job
information to employment spells where possible, overriding the BLIFEMST
information with that from the CLIFEJOB file. The data was then sorted into
15This is essentially Rule 2 in Upward (1999).
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Figure E.2: Illustration of Rule X (that CLIFEJOB dominates
BLIFEMST) applied to fictitious data set combining pre-
1.9.90 lifetime labour market history data.
time
E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E
U U U U U U U U U U U U U U
OLF OLF OLF OLF OLF OLF OLF
Start of CLIFEJOB employment
spell overides end of BLIFEMST
unemployment spell.
End of CLIFEJOB employment
spell overides start of BLIFEMST
OLF spell.
This is essentially a brute force approach. More sophisticated approaches
have been adopted in the literature on work-life histories (see Mare,2006 for a
survey of these contributions). The BLIFEMST & CLIFEJOB files are
combined, retaining the information in the CLIFEJOB file in the case of
matches and inconsistencies.
chronological order using the start, end year, and spell sequencing information
which was always available. Rule X (see Figure E.2) was then applied to the
resulting data set. Halpin (1997) created a file merging month-by-month job
and labour market status records from the CLIFEJOB and BLIFEMST files
using a set of rules common in some aspects to the approach adopted herein.
Once the data is in chronological order, the following rules are adopted in order
to harmonise the data and address inconsistencies.
Cases in the lifetime history which started and ended before school leaving
age are dropped (40 person year observations), keeping those that started be-
fore and ended after this point16. Two formulations of the lifetime history are
16If the first spell in the lifetime history file was employment and this started on or after
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drawn on, one which includes all information since the individual in question
left full-time education, the other which which truncates lifetime history spell
end date at 1.1.1980 (keeping spells which started before and ended after this
date). The motive for conditioning the lifetime history data to exclude labour
market spells that ended before the first of January 1980 is the likelihood of
higher incidence of recall bias for earlier spells17. Spells which began before
this date, and ended after it, are included in the analysis when this formula-
tion is adopted. Spell length for spells starting and ending in the same year,
where start and/or end month is recorded as a season code, is treated as miss-
ing. Where start date could not be imputed from adjacent spells, employment
spells are dropped if an individual failed to report the month/year a spell be-
gan18. Furthermore, if month is missing in the pre-1.9.90 data then this is
assumed to be July.
After encountering numerous difficulties, inconsistencies between the CLIFE-
JOB and BLIFEMST data are minimised by basing the pre-1.9.90 data on the
latter file. This is a similar approach to that adopted by Halpin (1997) when
merging these two data sources. Mare´ (2006) relies on the dating sequence in
the BLIFEMST file when merging the two retrospective data sources (step i,
pp. 77). Since the BLIFEMST file contains a chronological record of continuous
labour market spells since first leaving full-time education, missing date infor-
mation can be easily imputed using information from adjacent spells19. Halpin
further education leaving age (feend), replace school leaving age with further education leav-
ing age (in practise I generate a new indicator). This rule is also applied to post-1.9.90 data.
If the first spell in lifetime history was employment the length of the last spell is assumed to
have been the 12*(age that spell began - 5) where 5 is the assumed school starting age. This
affects 1801 person-year observations, the majority of which are in the pre-1.9.90 data.
17The degree of imputation required in the construction of retrospective spells starting and
ending in earlier time periods increases the further into the past one looks. This information
is used to gauge previous labour market status and reason for leaving previous job.
18This step is only carried out on the combined job and employment status history files.
This affects 45 out of the 15980 spells in the combined file.
19In order for our rules to work, spell start date is required in the lifetime history file. The
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(1997) implements a rule, applied to the JOBHIST records, that overrides the
start date with the end date of the previous spell. If an individual indicates
that the labour market information BLIFEMST record is correct20 then as-
suming that individuals have not reported this information erroneously, their
employment spells are split into separate jobs using the CLIFEJOB data. If
inconsistencies still arise then they are dealt with using Rule X, detailed below.
Rule X: In the case of inconsistencies between the BLIFEMST and CLIFEJOB
file, these inconsistencies are dealt with by the assumption that the CLIFEJOB
spell start and end dates override the BLIFEMST entries. This overlap will be
with non-employment spells, and will have the effect of reducing the reported
period in non-employment pre-1.9.90. See Figure E.2 for an illustration of this
rule.
E.0.9 Application of Rules-Based Approach to Current Data.
Figure E.1 illustrates the extent of overlap in the current BHPS. The job history
(JOBHIST) file, only collected if job status changed in the last ˜12 months,
contains retrospective data from the first of September of the previous year.
The individual response file (INDRESP) contains a snapshot of what the indi-
vidual was doing at the time of interview. Since the JOBHIST file is collected
retrospectively, inconsistencies can arise between this and the information col-
lected at interview date. An example is what (Ju¨rges 2007) refers to as a “false
majority of cases with missing start or end date information are due to individuals not being
able to recall the month of a spell starting. Consistent with our general approach missing
months are assumed to be July. 45 person-year observations are dropped where spell start
date could not be imputated from the adjacent spell information or using the BHPS-supplied
spell length indicator. These were cases where spell start year was missing as well as month.
Consistent with BHPS methodology, records which started and ended in a month entered as
a season code have spell lengths coded as missing.
2049% of cases where highlighted as being correct in the full CLIFEJOB file (Mare´ 2006).
This figure is % amongst the Original Sample Members (OSM) used in this analysis.
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negative” result: where an individual fails to report themselves as being in un-
employment at a particular date when asked about it retrospectively, although
they reported themselves in that state at the date of occurrence Ju¨rges (2007).
A rules-based approach is adopted in order to deal with this and other system-
atic issues in the data.
1. The first step is to drop JOBHIST spells that ended on or before the first
of September of the previous year. These spells are assumed to already be in
the data. See Table E.5 for an example of spells that this rule would drop.
In this case, there are two spells reported at wave 6 which this individual has
already been reported at wave 5. These spells are dropped according to Rule 1.
Table E.5: An individual Rule 1 will affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Jobhist
start
month
5 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Other 1991m9 1995m9 1994m9
5 Unemp. Unemp. N/A 1995m9 1995m9 1994m9
5 Emp. 1995m9 1995m11 1994m9
6 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Other 1991m9 1995m9 1995m9
6 Unemp. Unemp. N/A 1995m9 1995m9 1995m9
6 Emp. Same
emp.
Better
Job
1995m9 1995m10 1995m9
6 Emp. Same
emp.
Better
Job
1995m10 1996m5 1995m9
6 Emp. 1996m5 1996m10 1995m9
Rule 1: Drop JOBHIST spells that ended on or before the first of September of the previous year.
Rules implemented to deal with pre-1.9.90 retrospective data col-
lected at wave 2 (BLIFEMST) and wave 3 (CLIFEJOB):
2. If the first spell in INDRESP/JOBHIST file started before last
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spell in life time hist. files (CLIFEJOB/BLIFEMST), drop lifehist.
This rule is the same as the rule implemented by Halpin to join the BLIFEMST
lifetime history to the post-1.9.90 BHPS data (see Halpin 1997, pp.14). See
Table E.6 for an example of why I implement this rule. The first spell in the
INDRESP file refers to a spell of employment. Since current labour market
status is trusted over retrospective information, the start date of the spell at
wave 1 1983m2 is assumed to be correct. Thus the last entry in the pre-1.9.90
data is dropped. In this case inconsistencies between the pre- and post-1.9.90
data are evident, however due to our mantra these differences are assumed to
be attributable to recall bias.
Table E.6: An individual that Rule 2 will affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Emp. Missing 1980m10 1984m1 1187
0 Unemp. 1984m1 1990m7 2374
1 Emp. 1983m2 1991m10 3174
2 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Redundant 1990m7 1992m5
2 Unemp. 1992m5 1992m9 130
Rule 2: If the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file started before the last spell in the lifetime history files,
drop the lifetime history record.
Table E.7 is an example of an individual who reported themselves as being in
employment in the last spell of the pre-1.9.90 data. In this case, the spell is
duplicated later in the pre-1.9.90 data when the employment spell ended at
wave 3. Rule 2 would drop the last record in the lifetime history.
Retrospective data is dropped, if it overlaps exactly with the first wave in-
formation in terms of labour market status and start month. This is also done
in cases where the pre-1.9.90 data overlapped with wave 1 data in terms of end
month and labour market status, but start month missing at wave 1. In these
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Table E.7: An individual that Rule 2 will affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Unemployed 1988m8 1989m1 152
0 Employed Dismissed/
Sacked
1989m1 1993m8 1674
1 Employed 1988m10 1991m10 1123
2 Employed 1991m8 1992m10 455
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Dismissed/
Sacked
1989m1 1993m8
3 Unemployed 1993m9 1993m10 51
Rule 2: If the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file started before the last spell in the lifetime history files,
drop the lifetime history record.
case, start month, and reason for leaving job (in the case of CLIFEJOB spells)
is copied over from the historic record to the wave 1 spell and the lifetime his-
tory spell is dropped.
3a. RULE 3. If the last spell in lifetime history file stared before the
first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended after it began,
but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the
lifetime history entry.
Table E.8 illustrates an example of this rule in action. This Individual started
working with their employer in January 1970 and retired in December 199221.
The pre-1.9.90 record comes from the CLIFEJOB file. The first entry at Wave
1 refers to a job with the same employer that started in 1981m6, with previ-
ous jobs with the employer not captured in the current BHPS. Since the wave
3 pre-1.9.90 employment spell data refers to continuous spells with separate
employers, any intra-firm movements before the job held at wave 1 will not be
captured in the BHPS data using this approach. In this case it seems appropri-
ate to assume that this individual experienced an intra-firm movement in June
1981. If intra-firm movements are being taken into account, then the reason
21 Slight recall error is evident in this example, as the individual reported the end date as
January in the current BHPS but December 1992 in the retrospective file.
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for the previous spell ending at wave 1 would be coded as missing.
Table E.8: Application to employment spells: An individual that Rule
3 would affect if implemented indiscriminately.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Employed Retirement 1970m1 1992m12 8370
1 Employed 1981m6 1991m9 3761
2 Employed 1988m10 1992m10 1484
3 Employed Same
emp.
Retirement 1988m10 1993m9 1993m1
3 Self emp. 1993m1 1993m9 256
Rule 3: If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended
after it, but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime history entry. This rule is
only implemented for non-employment spells.
Rule 3 cannot be implemented indiscriminately: if individuals entered a spell
end dates erroneously, so that there is marginal overlap with the JOBHIST/INDRESP
file, this rule will assume that the lifetime history entry is the same spell even
if they are actually different. Furthermore, the source of the pre-1.9.90 data
needs to be taken into account, given that the two retrospective lifetime his-
tory files capture different phenomena. Rule 3 is not implemented in the case
of pre-1.9.90 employment spells, regardless of their source. This decision was
made due to the problem of marginal overlap caused by recall bias with respect
to start and end dates. A modified version of Rule 3 is implemented in the
case of pre-1.9.90 employment spells. An example of marginal overlap, due to
recall error is highlighted in Table E.9. If rule 3 were indiscriminately imple-
mented in the case of employment spells, this would drop over 900 person-year
observations. This issue is further exemplified in Figure E.3.
APPLICATION OF RULE 3 TO NON-EMPLOYMENT SPELLS:
Relative to the treatment of spells of employment, application of this rule to
non-employment spells seems fairly uncontroversial. In the example presented
in Table E.10, the last spell in the pre-1.9.90 data and the first spell at wave 1
E. Chapter 5: Constructing Continuous Work-Life Histories. An Alternative
Approach LXXVI
Table E.9: Marginal overlap due to recall bias: An individual that
Rule 3 would affect if implemented indiscriminately.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Employed Promoted 1982m6 1988m5 2161
0 Employed Better
Job
1988m5 1989m11 547
1 Employed Diff.
emp.
Better
Job
1989m5 1991m11 1990m11
1 Self emp. 1990m11 1991m11 367
2 Self emp. 1992m11 1100
Rule 3: If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended
after it, but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime history entry. This rule is
only implemented for non-employment spells.
are assumed to be the same spell.
Table E.10: Application to non-employment spells: An individual
Rule 3 would affect
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Emp. Temp.
Job
1989m7 1990m7 365
0 Unemp. 1990m7 1991m4 273
1 Unemp. Unemp. N/A 1990m8 1991m11 1991m2
1 Emp. 1991m2 1991m11 291
2 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Redundant 1991m4 1992m11 1992m4
2 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Redundant 1992m4 1992m11 1992m9
2 Unemp. 1992m9 1992m11 85
Rule 3: If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended
after it, but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime history entry. This rule is
only implemented for non-employment spells.
Figure E.3 highlights how overlapping information from the pre- and post-
1.9.90 BHPS are dealt with. Given the mantra it is easier to deal with spell
3 and 2. These two data sources are treated as referring to the same spell of
employment. In this case, the start month of employment spell 3 seems to have
been reported with some error (see modified rule 5). However, if one were pre-
sented with spell 1 and 2, it would be harder to tell whether these refer to the
same spell. Since spell 1 originates from the retrospective lifetime history file,
this overlap is assumed to be recall error with respect to spell end dates. Spell
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Figure E.3: Illustration of issue of marginal overlap in the data, viz.-
a-viz. the pre-1.9.90 and first wave data.
time
1st Sept. 1990: Start of
Wave 1 JOBHIST file.
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1.
2.
3.
Oct. 1991: Wave 1
interview.
Spell 1 and 3 originate from the pre-1.9.90 files (CLIFEJOB), whereas spell 2
is from the wave 1 INDRESP record. Where wave 1 spell start date was
missing, this was imputed using ‘cjsten’. In 28 cases, cjsten was missing so
these spells were assumed to have started on 1.9.1990.
1 is assumed to have ended when spell 2 began, given that we give priority to
information recorded closer to the date of occurrence.
3b. MODIFIED RULE 3: If last spell in lifetime history file stared
before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file and ended after
or when it ENDED, but job status is the same, assume they are the
same spell. Drop the lifetime history entry. This rule is only imple-
mented in the case of employment spells originating from the CLIFEJOB file.
Table E.11 is an example of this rule in action. The last entry in the pre-1.9.90
data is sourced from the CLIFEJOB file. In this case one can be sure that the
first entry at wave 1 is a job spell within the continuous employer spell recorded
in the lifetime history file. It is certain that the first employment spell at wave
1 is part of the continuous employment spell recorded in the last entry at wave 0.
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Table E.11: Modified Rule 3: An individual this rule would affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Emp. Health 1984m1 1986m7 821
0 Emp. Redundant 1987m7 1992m9 1887
1 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Better
Job
1987m8 1991m9 1990m9
1 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Health 1990m9 1991m9 1990m11
1 Unemp. Unemp. N/A 1990m11 1991m9 1991m8
1 Emp. Diff.
emp.
Better
Job
1991m8 1991m9 1991m9
1 Emp. 1991m9 1991m9 4
Modified Rule 3: If last spell in lifetime history file stared before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST file
and ended after or when it ENDED, but job status is the same, assume they are the same spell. Drop the lifetime
history entry. This rule is only implemented in the case of employment spells originating from the CLIFEJOB file.
A further modified version of rule 3 is applied to spells reported at wave 1
with no beginning date supplied, and cjsten missing so beginning data could
not be imputed.
3c. If no beginning date supplied at wave 1 but the previous spell
at wave 0 is present, job status is the same, and the wave 0 record
spell ended at or after the wave 1 interview date, then these records
are assumed to be the same spell.
Table E.12 provides an example of this rule applied to a continuous em-
ployment spell. Wave 1 interview date is used in this instance as start date is
missing and cannot be imputed.
3d. This further modified rule is also implemented in the case of spells recorded
at wave 1 with no end date, i.e. ongoing at interview date. In these cases in-
terview date is also used instead of spell end date. Again, there the issue of
marginal overlap due to recall bias is encountered. The example in Table E.13
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Table E.12: Modified Rule 3c: An individual this rule would affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy start
month
Interview
month
end
month
cjsten
0 Emp. Redundant 1983m3 1983m5 60
0 Emp. N/A 1983m5 1993m9 3804
1 Emp. 1991m10
2 Emp. 1983m5 1992m9 3438
3 Emp. 1991m5 1993m10 885
Alternative Modified Rule 3c: If no beginning date supplied at wave 1 but the previous spell at wave 0 is present,
job status is the same, and the wave 0 record spell ended at or after the wave 1 interview date, then these records
are assumed to be the same spell.
highlights this issue22. There is no impact of rule on non-employment spells,
where this rule is less controversial.
Table E.13: Modified Rule 3d: An individual this rule would affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
cjsten
0 Emp. Better
Job
1980m7 1983m7 1004
0 Emp. Better
Job
1983m4 1989m2 2130
1 Emp. 1989m1 1991m10 1001
2 Emp. 1989m2 1992m9 1312
Alternative Modified Rule 3d: If no end date supplied at wave 1 but the previous spell at wave 0 is present, job
status is the same, and the wave 0 record spell ended at or after the wave 1 interview date, then these records are
assumed to be the same spell.
4. If last spell in pre-1.9.90 file started before the first spell in the INDRESP/JOBHIST
file, keep the lifetime history entry and assume that it ended when first entry
in INDRESP/JOBHIST file began. This rule is implemented since we trust
the JOBHIST information over the lifetime history, and the interview date
information (INDRESP) over JOBHIST. Employment spells originating from
the BLIFEMST file that overlap with the first wave of the BHPS will all be
truncated at the first wave start date23. This affects Original Sample Members
22 Whilst the two retrospective pre-1.9.90 employment spells are both taken from the
CLIFEJOB file, there is a mismatch between the end date of the first spell and start date of
the following spell. This mismatch is caused because the end date of the first spell is entered
as a season code (summer) and not a specific date. In the application of Rule X, the last
spell in the pre-1.9.90 data would be assumed to have began when the previous record ended.
This rule is only implemented after spells are in chronological order, in the case of adjacent
spells from the CLIFEJOB file.
23It is important to note whether these spells refer to the first employment spell at wave
E. Chapter 5: Constructing Continuous Work-Life Histories. An Alternative
Approach LXXX
that contributed to the survey at wave 2, but were not continuously present
for at least 3 waves since 1991.
If an individual was continuously present in the survey for at least 3 waves, but
their last employment spell in the pre-1.9.90 data came from the BLIFEMST
file and this was ongoing at wave 2 interview date, I assume that this is part
of the same job spell reported at wave 3 interview. I copy over the start date
to the first spell at wave 1, dropping the pre 1.9.90 job spell. This accounts for
the fact that individuals who were in their first jobs at wave 3 interview are
not asked for the job history. This affect 198 person-year observations.
Duplicate entries also dropped from the lifetime history data, if they over-
lap in terms of start and end date as well as job status. CLIFEJOB data is
trusted over BLIFEMST data, in the case of overlap.
5. Application of modification of Upward(1999) rule 3.
This rule states that if a spell from the JOBHIST record starts before the
previous interview date, it should be the same spell as recorded in last year’s
INDRESP record. If the status of this spell is the same as the status in the
previous wave, copy across the history status value, reason for leaving job, and
then drop the information from JOBHIST. The values of history status and
jhstpy should be copied across to the first occurrence of that spell (Upward
1999). This rule is implemented in this study using the following procedure
(NB. This rule is not implemented for first wave, given the previous rules).
5a. If the labour market status reported in the individual response file started
3 interview date. If so then the last BLIFEMST employment record can be assumed to be
part of the same continuous employment spell the individual was in at wave 3, in which case
no CLIFEJOB information will be collected.
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before the last record in the job history, then assume that this is due to recall
bias and drop JOBHIST entry.
5b. If a JOBHIST spell started before previous interview month \&
job status is different, assume that this individual forgot what they
were doing. Drop this information (assumed recall bias).
This rule controls for what Ju¨rges (2007) refers to as a “false negative” result:
where an individual fails to report themselves as being in unemployment at
a particular date when asked about it retrospectively, although they reported
themselves in that state at the date of occurrence (Ju¨rges 2007). The example
in Table E.14 illustrates how this rule deals with this inconsistency in the data.
The temporary job recorded in the wave 3 job history file will be dropped under
the assumption that current labour market status is always correct, although
in this case there is only marginal overlap of the reported spells.
Table E.14: Application of Rule 5a: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
1 Self emp. 1985m1 1991m10 1990m9
2 Self emp. 1992m9 1991m10
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1992m8 1993m9 1993m3 1992m9
3 Unemployed 1993m3 1993m9 1992m9
Rule 5b. If a JOBHIST spell started before previous interview month \& job status is different, assume that this
individual forgot what they were doing. Drop this information (assumed recall bias).
Table E.15 illustrate this rule working as per our priors. The employment spell
reported in the wave 4 job history seems to be a duplicate of the employment
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spell recorded at wave 3. There seems to be recall error with respects to the
end date of this spell. By this rule, the highlighted record will be dropped.
Table E.15: Application of Rule 5b: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1991m6 1993m9 1993m1 1992m10
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1993m1 1993m9 1993m8 1992m10
3 Unemployed 1993m9 1993m9 1992m10
4 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1993m1 1994m10 1994m1 1993m9
4 UnemployedUnemployedN/A 1994m1 1994m10 1994m4 1993m9
4 Employed 1994m4 1994m10 1993m9
Rule 5b. If a JOBHIST spell started before previous interview month \& job status is different, assume that this
individual forgot what they were doing. Drop this information (assumed recall bias).
5c. If a JOBHIST spell ended before the previous interview month,
assume this is a duplicate entry. Drop the job history record. See
Table E.16 for a case that this rule would affect.
Table E.16: Application of Rule 5c: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy spell
start
month
interview
month
spell
end
month
previous
inter-
view
month
4 Employed 1994m9 1994m11 1993m10
5 Employed Same
emp.
Promoted 1995m11 1995m10 1994m11
5 Employed 1995m10 1995m11 1994m11
6 Employed Same
emp.
Promoted 1996m11 1995m10 1995m11
6 Employed 1995m10 1996m11 1995m11
Rule 5c. If a JOBHIST spell ended before the previous interview month, assume this is a duplicate entry. Drop the
job history record.
5d. If JOBHIST job status is same as reported in the INDRESP
file, and spell started before previous interview month, assume that
the two records are from same spell. Copy reason for leaving labour
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market state back to the first instance of that state. Table E.17 is ex-
ample of a case that this rule would affect. Since these rules are implemented
incrementally, these cases are affected by the implementation of previous rules.
Table E.17: Application of Rule 5d: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Dismissed/
Sacked
1987m9 1993m10 1993m1 1992m12
3 Unemployed 1993m1 1993m10 1992m12
4 UnemployedUnemployedN/A 1993m1 1994m10 1994m2 1993m10
4 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1994m2 1994m10 1994m4 1993m10
4 Unemployed 1994m4 1994m10 1993m10
5 UnemployedUnemployedN/A 1994m8 1995m10 1994m11 1994m10
Rule 5d. If JOBHIST job status is same as reported in the INDRESP file, and spell started before previous interview
month, assume that the two records are from same spell. Copy reason for leaving labour market state back to the
first instance of that state.
5e. If the job status of the first record in job history file is different
to that which was recorded at the last INDRESP interview, and the
record began after previous interview month, then keep this as a new
spell and assume that it started the month of the previous interview.
See table E.18 for an illustration of a case that this rule will affect.
Table E.18: Application of Rule 5e: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
3 Self emp. 1993m9 1993m10 1993m10 1992m10
4 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1994m1 1995m1 1994m7 1993m10
4 Self emp. N/A 1994m8 1995m1 1995m1 1993m10
5 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1995m2 1996m1 1995m6 1995m1
Rule 5e. If the job status of the first record in job history file is different to that which was recorded at the last
INDRESP interview, and the record began after previous interview month, then keep this as a new spell and assume
that it started the month of the previous interview.
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Rule 5e is also implemented in cases where job status changed from one IN-
DRESP interview to another but, after the implementation of the preceding
rules, we have conflicting - or missing - information about when this job change
occurred. This could be the result of the choice of job status definition, or our
rules, decomposing what was reported as a continuous employment spell into
two separate labour market experiences. It may also be the case that an indi-
vidual reported themselves as being in a different labour market state from one
wave to the next, but they did not provide any information in the JOBHIST file
for whatever reason. Whatever the case, in this event the end date is assumed
to be the same month that the interview occurred24. This imputation is likely
to exacerbate what is termed in the literature as the “seam problem” (Halpin
1997; Paull 2002), “the tendency for reported changes in status to bunch in the
period immediately after an interview (Paull 2002, pp. 3)”. An example of an
individual affected by this rule is presented in Table E.19. End dates at wave
4 and 5 have been already been imputed in this instance.
Table E.19: Application of Rule 5e: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
3 Employed 1992m2 1993m10 1992m10
4 Employed 1992m2 1994m11 1994m11 1993m10
5 Self emp. N/A 1995m10 1995m10 1994m11
6 Employed 1992m2 1996m9 1995m10
Rule 5e. If the job status of the first record in job history file is different to that which was recorded at the last
INDRESP interview, and the record began after previous interview month, then keep this as a new spell and assume
that it started the month of the previous interview.
Table E.20 is an example of an individual with no job history entries, but three
24 This assumption was made to reduce the margin for error. It could be assumed that the
change happened in the following month, however, given that the underlying data is in daily
format this assumption would increase the average margin for error to two months instead
of one.
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labour market status changes in the data. In order to gauge when each spell
began, the previous spell is assumed to have ended the month of the previous
interview. In the case of employment spells, ‘reason for leaving job’ is set to
missing at the seam. For non-employment spells this is set to ‘not applicable’.
Table E.20: Application of Rule 5e: An individual this rule would
affect.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
3 OLF N/A 1993m10 1993m10 1992m10
4 Unemployed N/A 1994m9 1994m9 1993m10
5 OLF 1995m10 1994m9
6 OLF N/A 1996m11 1996m11 1995m10
7 Unemployed 1997m9 1996m11
Rule 5e. If the job status of the first record in job history file is different to that which was recorded at the last
INDRESP interview, and the record began after previous interview month, then keep this as a new spell and assume
that it started the month of the previous interview.
For subsequent spells in the JOBHIST file, if start and end dates are missing
they are imputed using the chronological ordering of the data, i.e. assuming
that a spell started when the previous spell ended. Spell start date informa-
tion is copied over to subsequent records of the same spell, either taking into
account intra-firm movements or ignoring them. If labour market status is
different, the last spell in the JOBHIST file is assumed to have ended in the
same month as the spell recorded in the INDRESP file started25. In the initial
implementation we ignore intra-firm movements due to our definition of what
a job is. ‘Reason for leaving job’ (jhstpy) is copied over to the first instance of
that labour market state. Table E.21 presents an example of an individual in
the data after the rules-based approach has been implemented.
25There are a few cases where job status changed but start date of subsequent spell in the
INDRESP file is missing. To make this rule operational, spell start date is imputed using
the length of current spell (cjsten) indicator provided by the BHPS. As stated previously,
this assumes that missing day was 1 and missing month was July. Cases where spell start
year is missing are assumed to have begun when the last spell in the JOBHIST file ended.
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Table E.21: An example of an individual in the data after the rules-
based approach has been implemented.
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpycurr Start
month
Interview
month
End
month
Previous
inter-
view
month
0 Employed Promoted 1987m3 1988m2
1 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1988m2 1991m12 1991m2 1990m9
1 Employed Diff.
emp.
Redundant 1991m2 1991m12 1991m6 1990m9
1 Employed Diff.
emp.
Better
Job
1991m6 1991m12 1991m8 1990m9
1 Employed Redundant 1991m8 1991m12 1990m9
2 Employed Redundant 1991m8 1992m10 1991m12
3 Employed Diff.
emp.
Redundant 1991m8 1993m10 1993m9 1992m10
3 Self emp. N/A 1993m9 1993m10 1993m10 1992m10
4 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1993m10 1995m1 1994m8 1993m10
4 Self emp. N/A 1994m8 1995m1 1995m1 1993m10
5 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1995m1 1996m1 1995m6 1995m1
5 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1995m6 1996m1 1995m10 1995m1
5 Employed Diff.
emp.
Temp.
Job
1995m10 1996m1 1995m12 1995m1
5 Self emp. 1995m12 1996m1 1995m1
6 Self emp. 1995m12 1996m9 1996m1
7 Self emp. 1995m12 1997m10 1996m9
Individuals who still have not left full-time education for the first time are
dropped from the sample. There are 96 individuals at wave 1 who provided full
interviews and had not left full-time education for the first time. The sample
is also conditioned to exclude individuals who have not left full-time education
permanently. Intra-firm movements are dropped, reason for leaving job as well
as spell end dates are copied to the first occurrence of the spell in question.
The data is collapsed leaving just one observation per spell. This collapsed
data is used to construct spell-varying indicators, e.g. Previous labour market
status and job characteristics only asked at the beginning of a job spell. The
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resulting file is merged with the pre-collapsed information, by spell sequence.
E.1 Linking in other information.
Time-varying regional-level information is matched in by household identifier.
This identifier allows Local Authority and Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA) of
residence to be identified. A one-to-one link between these geographical en-
tities does not exist. See chapter D for how a one-to-one link between the
Local Authority and TTWA levels was established. A similar approach to
Upward (1999) was employed to link in both time-varying, spell-varying and
time-invariant individual-level information from the BHPS. Chapter 5 can be
consulted for further detail.
Appendix F
Chapter 5: Data Descriptives
Table F.1: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE INCLUDING
WITH REDUCED SAMPLE EXCLUDING SELF-
EMPLOYED (PAIRWISE T-TESTS FOR EQUAL-
ITY OF MEANS)
Cont. Pres. ≥ 2 Waves Cont. Pres. ≥ 2 Waves(§)
All Excl.
†
t-test t prob All Excl.
†
t-test t prob
Personal Characteristics
Age < 25 0.214 0.213 0.108 0.914 0.189 0.181 0.666 0.505
Age 25 - 29 0.152 0.155 -0.303 0.762 0.15 0.155 -0.36 0.719
Age 30 - 34 0.152 0.154 -0.155 0.877 0.157 0.16 -0.236 0.813
Age 35 - 39 0.126 0.124 0.183 0.854 0.13 0.131 -0.053 0.958
Age 40 - 44 0.131 0.129 0.175 0.861 0.137 0.136 0.12 0.904
Age > 45 0.225 0.225 0.003 0.998 0.236 0.238 -0.156 0.876
white 0.964 0.963 0.163 0.87 0.967 0.966 0.141 0.888
married1 0.682 0.682 0.037 0.971 0.704 0.709 -0.288 0.773
spouseempl d 0.509 0.514 -0.262 0.794 0.541 0.546 -0.325 0.745
children 0.371 0.365 0.41 0.682 0.375 0.373 0.085 0.933
children*married 0.365 0.359 0.392 0.695 0.369 0.368 0.061 0.951
School Type Attended
Grammar School 0.139 0.135 0.366 0.714 0.14 0.14 -0.016 0.987
Private School 0.06 0.057 0.423 0.672 0.058 0.057 0.182 0.856
Technical 0.079 0.073 0.723 0.469 0.071 0.066 0.521 0.602
Highest Qualification
Degree 0.12 0.122 -0.171 0.864 0.123 0.126 -0.336 0.737
Other Higher 0.22 0.214 0.398 0.691 0.227 0.223 0.328 0.743
A’ Levels 0.158 0.154 0.355 0.723 0.151 0.149 0.189 0.85
O’ Levels 0.223 0.226 -0.229 0.819 0.223 0.222 0.068 0.945
Apprenticeship 0.03 0.029 0.187 0.852 0.03 0.029 0.25 0.802
Other 0.074 0.077 -0.363 0.716 0.073 0.073 -0.029 0.977
Housing Tenure
Owned 0.102 0.104 -0.168 0.867 0.106 0.105 0.073 0.942
Mortgage 0.681 0.683 -0.171 0.864 0.706 0.707 -0.028 0.978
Council tenant 0.103 0.106 -0.247 0.805 0.091 0.093 -0.25 0.802
Housing Association 0.018 0.017 0.348 0.728 0.017 0.017 -0.037 0.971
Disabled 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.996 0.01 0.01 0.071 0.943
Health limits type of work 0.064 0.062 0.207 0.836 0.058 0.06 -0.21 0.833
TTWA Unemployment Rate 0.093 0.093 0.109 0.913 0.092 0.092 0.127 0.899
Total 2140 1731 1842 1589
§ Excluding missing real wage observations.
† - Excluding: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Somer-
set; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire;
Bridgend; Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North
Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South Lanarkshire.
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Table F.2: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE INCLUDING
WITH REDUCED SAMPLE EXCLUDING SELF-
EMPLOYED & PROBLEMATIC REGIONS
(PAIRWISE T-TESTS FOR EQUALITY OF
MEANS)
Cont. Pres. ≥ 2 Waves Cont. Pres. ≥ 2 Waves(§)
All Excl.
†
t-test t prob All Excl.
†
t-test t prob
Personal Characteristics
Age < 25 0.213 0.211 0.142 0.887 0.181 0.176 0.34 0.734
Age 25 - 29 0.155 0.154 0.078 0.937 0.155 0.154 0.041 0.967
Age 30 - 34 0.154 0.155 -0.11 0.913 0.16 0.16 -0.04 0.968
Age 35 - 39 0.124 0.12 0.359 0.719 0.131 0.127 0.341 0.733
Age 40 - 44 0.129 0.132 -0.209 0.834 0.136 0.14 -0.29 0.772
Age > 45 0.225 0.228 -0.223 0.823 0.238 0.243 -0.338 0.736
white 0.963 0.96 0.439 0.661 0.966 0.964 0.303 0.762
married1 0.682 0.679 0.185 0.853 0.709 0.708 0.06 0.952
spouseempl d 0.514 0.509 0.229 0.819 0.546 0.545 0.073 0.942
children 0.365 0.364 0.093 0.926 0.373 0.373 0.011 0.991
children*married 0.359 0.356 0.166 0.869 0.368 0.367 0.073 0.942
School Type Attended
Grammar School 0.135 0.142 -0.531 0.595 0.14 0.147 -0.582 0.56
Private School 0.057 0.058 -0.112 0.911 0.057 0.058 -0.194 0.846
Technical 0.073 0.074 -0.171 0.864 0.066 0.067 -0.074 0.941
Highest Qualification
Degree 0.122 0.127 -0.433 0.665 0.126 0.131 -0.378 0.705
Other Higher 0.214 0.212 0.164 0.87 0.223 0.221 0.113 0.91
A’ Levels 0.154 0.152 0.207 0.836 0.149 0.148 0.078 0.938
O’ Levels 0.226 0.227 -0.014 0.989 0.222 0.222 0.023 0.982
Apprenticeship 0.029 0.026 0.501 0.616 0.029 0.025 0.598 0.55
Other 0.077 0.078 -0.05 0.96 0.073 0.072 0.089 0.929
Housing Tenure
Owned 0.104 0.108 -0.37 0.711 0.105 0.111 -0.467 0.641
Mortgage 0.683 0.685 -0.09 0.929 0.707 0.708 -0.096 0.924
Council tenant 0.106 0.097 0.824 0.41 0.093 0.084 0.896 0.37
Housing Association 0.017 0.018 -0.17 0.865 0.017 0.018 -0.135 0.893
Disabled 0.012 0.014 -0.467 0.641 0.01 0.012 -0.372 0.71
Health limits type of work 0.062 0.068 -0.641 0.521 0.06 0.065 -0.601 0.548
TTWA Unemployment Rate 0.093 0.093 -0.031 0.975 0.092 0.092 -0.145 0.885
Total 1731 1425 1589 1303
§ Excluding missing real wage observations.
† - Excluding: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Somer-
set; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire;
Bridgend; Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North
Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South Lanarkshire.
Table F.3: Current Employer Tenure, by previous labour
market status. 1991-1997,Unrestricted (full
sample).
Previous Status (unrestricted)
Employer Tenure Employed Unemployed OLF Total
<1 year 631 348 95 1074
1-2 years 519 241 92 852
2-3 years 462 166 86 714
3-4 years 423 124 73 620
4-5 years 357 104 68 529
5-10 years 1448 347 261 2056
>10 years 2032 376 880 3288
Previous labour market states: Employment/Self-Employment; Unemployment; OLF
(Out of the Labour Force).
Table F.4: Current Employer Tenure, by previous labour
market status: 1991-1997, Only last 5 years
matters (full sample).
Previous Status (unrestricted)
Employer Tenure Employed Unemployed OLF Total
$¡$1 year 631 348 95 1074
1-2 years 519 241 92 852
2-3 years 462 166 86 714
3-4 years 423 124 73 620
4-5 years 357 104 68 529
5-10 years 2041 9 6 2056
$¿$10 years 3288 0 0 3288
Previous labour market states: Employment/Self-Employment; Unemployment; OLF
(Out of the Labour Force).
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Table F.5: Male sub-sample by previous labour market sta-
tus, 1991-2001.
Unrestricted. Restricted.
PREV STAT: EMP. NON-EMP. EMP. NON-EMP.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Personal Characteristics
Age < 25 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.32
Age 25 - 29 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15
Age 30 - 34 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10
Age 35 - 39 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10
Age 40 - 44 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.08
Age > 45 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.24
white 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
married1 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.68 0.79 0.79 0.53 0.55
spouseempl d 0.62 0.62 0.49 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.39 0.41
children 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.26 0.26
School Type Attended
Grammar School 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11
Private School 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
Technical 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10
Highest Qualification
Degree 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17
Other Higher 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.24
A’ Levels 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.17
O’ Levels 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
Other 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Apprenticeship 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Housing Tenure
Owned 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17
Mortgage 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.56 0.57
Council tenant 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.11
Housing Association 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
Health limits type of work 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10
Disabled 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Workplace Characteristics
Public Sector 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Public Services 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.16
Charity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Other Sector 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Sector Missing 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Workplace Size
50 - 99 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13
100 - 199 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.11
> 200 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.27 0.26
Workplace Union Presence 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.34 0.35
Union Member 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.15 0.15
Current job is part-time 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.15
Contract
Current job is temporary 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.22
Occupation
Skilled Non-Manual 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.26
Unskilled Manual 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.25
Non-manual 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30
Professional/ Managerial 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.15
Cumulative Employment Experi-
ence
271.54 273.41 218.66 222.62 267.35 269.45 175.51 175.91
Current Spell Length (months) 111.39 110.45 121.39 124.93 131.08 131.94 22.81 23.05
Industry
Energy & Water Supplies 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
Extraction of Metals, etc. Manufac-
ture of Metals
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02
Metal goods, engineering & Vehi-
cles
0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.12
Other Manufacturing 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14
Construction 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Distribution, Hotels & Catering,
Repairs
0.13 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.21
Transport & Communications 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07
Banking, Finance, etc. 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13
Other Services 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23
Deflated Real Wage (jbhrs) 10.69 10.72 9.38 9.37 10.76 10.76 7.19 7.21
New Deflated Real Wage 1 (jbhrs +
jbotpd)
10.07 10.13 8.81 8.82 10.14 10.17 6.72 6.74
New Deflated Real Wage 2 (jbhrs +
1.5*jbotpd)
9.87 10.14 8.64 8.70 9.93 10.14 6.61 6.72
Usual hours worked 39.78 39.84 37.47 37.52 39.51 39.55 35.96 36.03
Usual paid overtime hours 3.22 3.17 2.76 2.74 3.15 3.09 2.56 2.58
TTWA Unemployment Rate 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Total 9350 7185 4877 3947 12095 9460 2141 1672
Unrestricted version considers full labour market history since leaving full-time education. Restricted ver-
sion only considers disruptions which occured in the last 5 years of labour market history when constructing
previous labour market history. Specification [2], [4], [6] & [8] are from the sample used in the Wage analysis
which excludes the problematic regions defined in Table ??.
F. Chapter 5: Data Descriptives XCI
Table F.6: Reason for leaving previous job by previous status, 1991-
1997.
Reason for leaving previous job
Prev. Status Unrestricted Prev. Status Restricted
Prev. EMP Prev. NON-EMP Prev. EMP Prev. NON-EMP
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
Redundancy 797 12.30 735 21.0 1,032 12.4 501 30.36
Sacked/ Dismissed 78 1.20 93 2.66 105 1.25 66 4.0
Temporary Job Ended 170 2.62 202 5.78 225 2.70 147 8.91
Voluntary Quit 4,245 6.54 256 7.32 4,383 52.54 118 7.15
Missing 714 10.99 200 5.72 736 8.82 178 10.79
Other Reason 490 7.55 420 1.20 664 7.94 246 14.91
Not Applicable 0 0.00 1,591 45.50 1,197 14.35 394 23.88
Total 6494 3497 8342 1650
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date.
Table F.7: Reason for leaving previous job, 1991-2001.
Year missing na voluntary
quit
redundantsacked/
dis-
missed
temp.
job
ended
other Total
1991 0.130 0.197 0.349 0.143 0.020 0.039 0.120 2147
1992 0.144 0.163 0.342 0.162 0.022 0.043 0.125 2147
1993 0.088 0.146 0.367 0.181 0.022 0.049 0.147 1878
1994 0.088 0.131 0.369 0.180 0.025 0.049 0.157 1741
1995 0.088 0.123 0.382 0.174 0.025 0.044 0.165 1608
1996 0.082 0.114 0.380 0.174 0.023 0.048 0.179 1549
1997 0.080 0.106 0.382 0.174 0.018 0.053 0.188 1493
1998 0.078 0.099 0.380 0.172 0.021 0.055 0.195 1428
1999 0.077 0.092 0.383 0.169 0.021 0.052 0.207 1374
2000 0.074 0.087 0.383 0.167 0.020 0.050 0.220 1327
2001 0.077 0.086 0.376 0.163 0.018 0.048 0.232 1256
Total 1707 2297 6637 3022 387 853 3045 17948
Figures are percentages of Wave, not reason, total.
Appendix G
Chapter 5: Sensitivity Analysis
G.1 F/T (Higher) Education as a separate labour
market state.
As a sensitivity check, rather than treating full-time education as “Out of the
Labour Force”, I treat full-time (higher) education as a productive investment
in human capital. Thus the impact of unemployment and inactivity is assessed
relative to a base group which includes employment and full-time education.
Table G.1: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, 1991-1997: Individual-level observed
heterogeneity, F/T (Higher) Education as a
separate labour market state, Previous Status
unrestricted.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 1.155** 1.113** 1.129** 1.104**
(0.150) (0.149) (0.122) (0.122)
Tenure in current employment.
base is <1 year.
1-2 years 0.019 0.042** 0.021* 0.036**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
2-3 years 0.020 0.035** 0.033** 0.036**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
3-4 years 0.037** 0.063** 0.058** 0.069**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
4-5 years 0.055** 0.077** 0.071** 0.085**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
5-10 years 0.059** 0.080** 0.078** 0.092**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017)
10 years + 0.122** 0.141** 0.116** 0.129**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
Previous labour market status.
Inactivity -0.059 -0.059
(0.048) (0.040)
Unemployment -0.077** -0.093**
(0.028) (0.023)
Time since interruption (ref. Previous Employment)
Unemployment.
Continued on next page
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Table G.1 – continued from previous page
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
< 1 year -0.041 -0.069**
(0.033) (0.027)
1-2 years -0.100** -0.109**
(0.032) (0.028)
2-3 years -0.104** -0.094**
(0.041) (0.033)
3-4 years -0.098** -0.090**
(0.043) (0.034)
4 years + -0.106** -0.114**
(0.040) (0.034)
Inactivity.
< 1 year 0.013 -0.021
(0.059) (0.051)
1-2 years -0.092* -0.088*
(0.054) (0.048)
2-3 years -0.004 0.010
(0.070) (0.061)
3-4 years -0.169** -0.113**
(0.062) (0.055)
4 years + -0.127* -0.088
(0.077) (0.056)
N 7666 7666 10912 10912
LL 1403 1417 1438 1446
R¯2 0.365 0.367 0.511 0.512
RMS error 0.203 0.202 0.213 0.213
AIC -2652.290 -2664.199 -2703.298 -2704.725
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of
control variables: Current tenure, cumulative experience, age dummies, time dummies,
a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour
market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract,
part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type,
regional dummies and industry dummies. Correction for selectivity interacted with time
dummies also included.
Full results are available from the author on request.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The average effect of an unemployment spell seems to be robust to classi-
fying full-time education as a separate (productive) labour market state, how-
ever the impact of previous inactivity becomes insignificant in all specifications.
This result is corroborated in the both the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 samples,
including controls for length of previous interruption and unemployment in-
cidence. Although evidence of a persistent impact of previous unemployment
on future wage growth is evident in both samples, the penalty associated with
inactivity is much more variable.
Table G.2: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male
Sub-Sample: Individual-level observed hetero-
geneity, F/T (Higher) Education as a separate
labour market state, Previous Status unre-
stricted.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Reason for leaving job§.
Redundant -0.062 -0.064**
Continued on next page
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Table G.2 – continued from previous page
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(0.039) (0.029)
Previous Status (ref. Previous Employment.
Unemployment -0.085** -0.051 -0.124** -0.091** -0.077** -0.134**
(0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030)
Inactivity 0.013 -0.032 -0.050 -0.025 0.024 -0.077*
(0.066) (0.088) (0.052) (0.049) (0.071) (0.045)
Reason for leaving job by previous labour market status (ref. previous employment/no interruption).
prev unemp redundant1 0.086 0.072
(0.066) (0.054)
prev unemp redundant 45p1 -0.064 -0.076
(0.055) (0.048)
prev olf redundant1 -0.196 -0.055
(0.140) (0.102)
prev olf redundant 45p1 0.231 0.186
(0.222) (0.214)
Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.
prev unemp duration 6to12mnth1a -0.094* -0.062
(0.049) (0.039)
prev unemp duration 12p1a -0.025 -0.020
(0.073) (0.053)
prev olf duration 6to12mnth1a -0.077 -0.194**
(0.116) (0.092)
prev olf duration 12p1a -0.014 -0.077
(0.116) (0.092)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
Unemployment
oneplus ue spell -0.070 -0.056
(0.060) (0.047)
prev unemp oneplus ue1 0.099* 0.091**
(0.057) (0.044)
prev unemp oneplus olf1 0.132 0.070
(0.093) (0.081)
Out of the Labour Force
oneplus olf spell 0.088 0.075
(0.105) (0.081)
prev olf oneplus ue1 0.003 0.039
(0.151) (0.102)
prev olf oneplus olf1 -0.050 0.042
(0.129) (0.100)
N 7666 7666 7666 10912 10912 10912
LL 1427 1409 1416 1462 1450 1454
R¯2 0.368 0.366 0.367 0.513 0.512 0.512
RMS error 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.213 0.213 0.213
AIC -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011
(combined sample); 8751 (females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies,
a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour market experience
dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector,
firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction
for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
See Section ?? for the full results.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Self-Employment
The general robustness of the results in the main analysis is further reflected
when the self-employed are included in the analysis and this treated as a sepa-
rate previous labour market state. However, the penalty associated with previ-
ous self-employment is only temporary in nature. Moreover, the general story
is invariant to restricting the sample to the Original Sample Members (under
the assumption that attrition is random) although the penalty associated with
previous inactivity is less robust.
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Table G.3: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, Self-Employment, unrestricted previ-
ous status interacted with Local Authority
Unemployment level.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
constant 0.956** 0.916** 0.961** 0.948**
(0.172) (0.174) (0.115) (0.115)
Tenure in current employment.
base is <1 year.
1-2 years 0.013 0.032** 0.015 0.026**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
2-3 years 0.014 0.020 0.026** 0.025**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
3-4 years 0.039** 0.055** 0.058** 0.065**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014)
4-5 years 0.052** 0.061** 0.069** 0.070**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
5-10 years 0.055** 0.064** 0.081** 0.083**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017)
10 years + 0.109** 0.118** 0.109** 0.112**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021)
Previous labour market status (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
Inactivity -0.077* -0.088**
(0.045) (0.035)
Unemployment -0.096** -0.100**
(0.026) (0.021)
Self-Employment -0.065 0.008
(0.045) (0.032)
Time since interruption (ref. Previous Employment/ Full-time education
Unemployment.
< 1 year -0.073** -0.085**
(0.030) (0.024)
1-2 years -0.122** -0.115**
(0.030) (0.026)
2-3 years -0.116** -0.105**
(0.038) (0.029)
3-4 years -0.109** -0.100**
(0.039) (0.030)
4 years + -0.108** -0.119**
(0.037) (0.031)
Inactivity.
< 1 year -0.008 -0.066
(0.056) (0.047)
1-2 years -0.119** -0.115**
(0.054) (0.044)
2-3 years -0.054 -0.036
(0.068) (0.052)
3-4 years -0.205** -0.159**
(0.060) (0.051)
4 years + -0.128* -0.100**
(0.068) (0.049)
Self-Employment.
< 1 year -0.191** -0.121**
(0.068) (0.059)
1-2 years -0.069 -0.004
(0.047) (0.036)
2-3 years 0.013 0.025
(0.050) (0.042)
3-4 years -0.015 0.006
(0.048) (0.041)
4 years + 0.012 0.108**
(0.062) (0.053)
N 9245 9245 13295 13295
LL 1525 1547 1345 1367
R¯2 0.356 0.358 0.500 0.501
RMS error 0.206 0.206 0.219 0.219
AIC -2894.480 -2913.032 -2516.168 -2535.829
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011 (combined sample); 8751
(females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first
since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract,
part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/
Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
See Section ?? for the full results.
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Table G.4: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, Self-Employment, unrestricted previ-
ous status interacted with Local Authority
Unemployment level.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Reason for leaving job§.
redundant -0.052 -0.051**
(0.036) (0.026)
Previous labour market status (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
Unemployment
prev u1 -0.104** -0.080** -0.141** -0.088** -0.088** -0.146**
(0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Inactivity
prev inactivity1 0.026 -0.083 -0.047 -0.034 -0.022 -0.067*
(0.063) (0.095) (0.048) (0.043) (0.065) (0.040)
Self-Employment
prev semp1 -0.079 -0.163 -0.055 -0.002 -0.019 0.005
(0.057) (0.117) (0.051) (0.044) (0.083) (0.038)
Previous labour market status by reason for leaving previous job (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
Unemployment
Redundant
prev unemp redundant1 0.069 0.042
(0.060) (0.046)
prev unemp redundant 45p1 -0.057 -0.080*
(0.051) (0.045)
Inactivity
Redundant
prev olf redundant1 -0.322* -0.136
(0.172) (0.110)
prev olf redundant 45p1 0.309 0.289*
(0.213) (0.165)
Self-Employment
Redundant
prev semp redundant1 -0.034 0.044
(0.135) (0.103)
prev semp redundant 45p1 -0.097 -0.098
(0.138) (0.120)
Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.
prev unemp duration 6to12mnth1a -0.096** -0.073**
(0.045) (0.035)
prev unemp duration 12p1a 0.030 0.020
(0.064) (0.048)
prev olf duration 6to12mnth1a -0.096 -0.191**
(0.124) (0.083)
prev olf duration 12p1a 0.071 -0.034
(0.116) (0.079)
prev semp duration 6to12mnth1a 0.192 0.073
(0.136) (0.098)
prev semp duration 12p1a 0.097 0.021
(0.124) (0.090)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
Unemployment
oneplus ue spell -0.110** -0.076*
(0.055) (0.043)
prev unemp oneplus ue1 0.101* 0.092**
(0.054) (0.041)
prev olf oneplus ue1 -0.216 -0.033
(0.202) (0.097)
prev semp oneplus ue1 0.054 0.054
(0.105) (0.072)
N 9245 9245 9245 13295 13295 13295
LL 1569 1541 1550 1385 1365 1365
R¯2 0.361 0.358 0.359 0.503 0.501 0.501
RMS error 0.205 0.206 0.206 0.219 0.219 0.219
AIC -3.0e+03 -2.9e+03 -2.9e+03 -2.6e+03 -2.5e+03 -2.5e+03
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011 (combined sample); 8751
(females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first
since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract,
part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/
Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
See Section ?? for the full results.
Continuously Present Definition
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Table G.5: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, Continuously Present (random attri-
tion), unrestricted previous status interacted
with Local Authority Unemployment level.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
constant 1.265** 1.205** 1.236** 1.207**
(0.129) (0.131) (0.119) (0.120)
Tenure in current employment.
base is <1 year.
1-2 years 0.024** 0.042** 0.026** 0.036**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
2-3 years 0.021 0.035** 0.045** 0.050**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014)
3-4 years 0.038** 0.055** 0.056** 0.060**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015)
4-5 years 0.051** 0.072** 0.070** 0.082**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
5-10 years 0.058** 0.077** 0.076** 0.087**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
10 years + 0.112** 0.130** 0.107** 0.119**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023)
Previous labour market status (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
prev inactivity1 -0.118** -0.077*
(0.048) (0.039)
prev u1 -0.100** -0.094**
(0.027) (0.022)
Time since interruption (ref. Previous Employment
Unemployment
< 1 year -0.069** -0.076**
(0.029) (0.024)
1-2 years -0.118** -0.105**
(0.031) (0.028)
2-3 years -0.126** -0.102**
(0.039) (0.030)
3-4 years -0.117** -0.083**
(0.041) (0.033)
4 years + -0.131** -0.113**
(0.040) (0.035)
Inactivity
< 1 year -0.067 -0.054
(0.058) (0.051)
1-2 years -0.137** -0.089**
(0.055) (0.045)
2-3 years -0.094 -0.040
(0.064) (0.057)
3-4 years -0.166** -0.087*
(0.059) (0.049)
4 years + -0.174** -0.104**
(0.059) (0.048)
N 6703 6703 8983 8983
LL 2262 2270 2374 2378
R¯2 0.421 0.422 0.579 0.579
RMS error 0.174 0.174 0.187 0.187
AIC -4369.596 -4369.464 -4575.624 -4568.140
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011 (combined sample); 8751
(females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first
since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract,
part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/
Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
See Section ?? for the full results.
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Table G.6: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample, Continuously Present (random attri-
tion), unrestricted previous status interacted
with Local Authority Unemployment level.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Reason for leaving job§.
redundant -0.078** -0.063**
(0.036) (0.030)
Previous labour market status (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
Unemployment
prev u1 -0.130** -0.079** -0.163** -0.086** -0.084** -0.132**
(0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.030)
Inactivity
prev inactivity1 -0.098 -0.073 -0.143** -0.071 0.045 -0.118**
(0.062) (0.089) (0.054) (0.048) (0.066) (0.047)
Previous labour market status by reason for leaving previous job (ref. Employment/ Full-time education).
Unemployment
Redundant
prev unemp redundant1 0.133** 0.044
(0.063) (0.055)
prev unemp redundant 45p1 -0.046 -0.043
(0.052) (0.045)
Inactivity
Redundant
prev olf redundant1 -0.068 0.021
(0.132) (0.108)
prev olf redundant 45p1 0.184 0.101
(0.233) (0.244)
Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.
prev unemp duration 6to12mnth1a -0.071 -0.018
(0.046) (0.038)
prev unemp duration 12p1a -0.034 -0.045
(0.064) (0.052)
prev olf duration 6to12mnth1a -0.062 -0.230**
(0.116) (0.090)
prev olf duration 12p1a -0.066 -0.148*
(0.113) (0.080)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
Unemployment
oneplus ue spell -0.103* -0.074
(0.054) (0.048)
prev unemp oneplus ue1 0.134** 0.094**
(0.053) (0.045)
prev olf oneplus ue1 0.148 0.071
(0.104) (0.093)
N 6703 6703 6703 8983 8983 8983
LL 2282 2266 2283 2390 2391 2388
R¯2 0.424 0.422 0.425 0.580 0.580 0.580
RMS error 0.173 0.174 0.173 0.186 0.186 0.186
AIC -4.4e+03 -4.4e+03 -4.4e+03 -4.6e+03 -4.6e+03 -4.6e+03
† Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median.
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011 (combined sample); 8751
(females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the first
since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract,
part-time job, employment sector, firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/
Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
Significance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: for regional dummy results see Figure 4.1(Cox model B only)
See Section ?? for the full results.
G.2 Labour market history considered
The existing literature differs in the labour market history considered when
constructing key indicators of interest. In this section I test the robustness of
the main results to the assumption that only the last five years of labour market
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history matter for current wage profiles (I do not treat full-time education as
a separate state in this analysis).
Table G.7: Current Employer Tenure, by previous labour
market status: Only last 5 years matters (§).
Previous Status (unrestricted)
Employer Tenure Employed Unemployed OLF Total
<1 year 549 295 79 923
1-2 years 449 200 86 735
2-3 years 395 140 75 610
3-4 years 357 104 62 523
4-5 years 290 88 58 436
5-10 years 1681 8 5 1694
>10 years 2745 0 0 2745
Previous labour market states: Employment/Self-Employment; Unemployment; OLF
(Out of the Labour Force).
§ - Excluding: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire;
North Somerset; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Con-
way; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire;
East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South Lanark-
shire.
In the restricted approach only the last five years was considered when
constructing the previous labour market status variable as well as key indica-
tors. If a previous non-employment spell occurred more than five years ago,
it is ignored and previous status is set to employment. The rationale for this
is that, if faced with retrospective information for the last five years only, as
is the case with the Displaced Workers’ Survey in the US, then this strategy
would seem appropriate as it makes the analysis more comparable to studies
face with this restriction. Another way to look at it would be a test for the
hypothesis that spells which happened more than five years ago do not matter
for current wage growth. A common approach in the literature is to restrict
attention to labour market history over the last 5/6 years. The indicator used
in Table G.7 closely reflects the pattern of cjsten-based tenure indicator used in
Arulampalam (2001), Table 2. Differences can be attributed to Arulampalam
(2001) using the self-reported spell length variable (“cjsten” - reported in days)
instead of a direct measure of length of time in the current labour market state.
The self-reported indicator is likely to suffer from substantial measurement er-
ror due to recall bias. However, based on model performance (AIC criterion) I
adopt the indicator in Table 5.1 in the main analysis.
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Table G.8: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample: Individual-level observed heterogene-
ity, Previous Status last 5 years only.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4]
constant 1.156** 1.141** 1.131** 1.133**
(0.151) (0.153) (0.121) (0.122)
Tenure in current employment.
base is <1 year.
1-2 years 0.020 0.036** 0.022** 0.032**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
2-3 years 0.022 0.029* 0.034** 0.031**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
3-4 years 0.039** 0.049** 0.060** 0.057**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
4-5 years 0.058** 0.065** 0.073** 0.073**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
5-10 years 0.049** 0.054** 0.064** 0.065**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
10 years + 0.114** 0.119** 0.105** 0.105**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
Previous labour market status.
Inactivity -0.056 -0.056*
(0.037) (0.033)
Unemployment -0.055** -0.063**
(0.024) (0.019)
Time since interruption (ref. Previous Employment
Unemployment.
<1 year -0.035 -0.059**
(0.031) (0.025)
1-2 years -0.079** -0.087**
(0.029) (0.026)
2-3 years -0.074** -0.063**
(0.037) (0.029)
3-4 years -0.055 -0.046*
(0.036) (0.027)
4 years + -0.055 -0.058*
(0.045) (0.033)
Inactivity.
<1 year -0.037 -0.058
(0.058) (0.049)
1-2 years -0.082 -0.089*
(0.053) (0.047)
2-3 years -0.017 -0.008
(0.055) (0.049)
3-4 years -0.080* -0.054
(0.042) (0.040)
4 years + -0.066 -0.060
(0.053) (0.051)
N 7666 7666 10912 10912
LL 1398 1402 1422 1426
R¯2 0.364 0.364 0.510 0.510
RMS error 0.203 0.203 0.213 0.213
AIC -2642.862 -2634.511 -2671.591 -2663.862
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of
person-years: 16011 (combined sample); 8751 (females); 7440 (males). Full set of con-
trol variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the
first since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital sta-
tus, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, firm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/
Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
See Section ?? for the full results.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
G.2.1 1991-1997 vs. 1992-2001
Table G.8 restricts previous labour market status to the last five years. This
specification investigates whether this restriction has a sizable impact on the
existing results. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggest that this
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specification does not perform as well as a specification which considers previous
labour market status since leaving full-time education.
Whereas the specification which considered all information since leaving
full-time education found the average wage penalty associated with a previous
spell out of the labour force to be 11.6%, the impact of coming into the current
employment spell via an OLF spell that occurred within the last five years is
estimated to be substantially lower at 5.6%. However, for the 1991 to 1997
period, the impact of previous inactivity is no longer economically significant
at conventional levels. In comparison, experiencing a spell of unemployment in
the last five years carries forward to a 5.5% wage penalty in the subsequent job,
significant at the 5% level. Specification [2], Table G.8 shows how wages recover
on the current job. The long-term wage penalty due to previous unemployment
is not robust to the retrospective window considered. In this specification,
coming into the current employment spell via a spell of unemployment carries
an insignificant wage penalty of 3.5% in the first year of employment. This
penalty increases to 7.9% in the second year and 7.4% in the third year, both
significant at the 5% level. However after 4 years the 5.5% long-run penalty that
remains, relative to individuals who came into their current employment spell
via a direct job-to-job transition, is poorly measured. Furthermore, the OLF
category is imprecisely measured which is likely due to heterogeneity within
this labour market state.
One would expect that disruptions that happened further in the past would
have less of an impact on current incomes than those that happened recently.
However, this result could be explained due to it being measured relative to
the baseline group of individuals that never experienced an interruption over
the period of investigation. If the wage penalty due to displacement is only
temporary then one could expect fast catchup of wages of the displaced and
baseline groups. However, if the penalty is persistent then the gap in earnings
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would remain and could possibly even increase over time.
Table G.9: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-
Sample: Individual-level observed heterogene-
ity, Previous Status last 5 years only.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Reason for leaving job§.
Redundant -0.017 -0.037**
(0.023) (0.019)
Previous Status (ref. Previous Employment.
Unemployment -0.069* -0.043 -0.073** -0.061** -0.052** -0.079**
(0.036) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020)
Inactivity -0.017 -0.074 -0.061 -0.024 0.028 -0.065
(0.042) (0.075) (0.046) (0.038) (0.068) (0.043)
Reason for leaving job by previous labour market status (ref. previous employment/no interruption).
prev unemp redundant3 0.051 0.036
(0.053) (0.044)
prev unemp redundant 45p3 -0.030 -0.049
(0.053) (0.046)
prev olf redundant3 -0.209 -0.080
(0.128) (0.089)
prev olf redundant 45p3 0.242 0.164
(0.233) (0.169)
Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.
prev unemp duration 6to12mnth3a -0.071 -0.052
(0.044) (0.035)
prev unemp duration 12p3a 0.022 -0.006
(0.058) (0.044)
prev olf duration 6to12mnth3a 0.020 -0.135
(0.107) (0.092)
prev olf duration 12p3a 0.027 -0.104
(0.093) (0.082)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
Unemployment
oneplus ue spell -0.016 -0.021
(0.048) (0.039)
prev unemp oneplus ue3 0.060 0.085*
(0.057) (0.046)
prev unemp oneplus olf3 0.234** 0.090
(0.105) (0.090)
Out of the Labour Force
oneplus olf spell 0.086 0.103
(0.100) (0.074)
prev olf oneplus ue3 -0.163 0.037
(0.106) (0.102)
prev olf oneplus olf3 0.047 -0.007
(0.073) (0.066)
N 7666 7666 7666 10912 10912 10912
LL 1415 1402 1413 1444 1430 1437
R¯2 0.366 0.365 0.366 0.511 0.510 0.511
RMS error 0.202 0.203 0.202 0.213 0.213 0.213
AIC -2656.406 -2642.975 -2660.522 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Number of person-years: 16011
(combined sample); 8751 (females); 7440 (males). Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies,
a dummy for men whose current job if the first since leaving full time education, labour market experience
dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/fixed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector,
firm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction
for selectivity interacted with time dummies also included.
See Section ?? for the full results.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The general story seems fairly robust even to previous labour market status
definition once reason for leaving previous job is controlled for, although the
magnitude of the coefficients is reduced (Table G.9). Furthermore, whilst the
long-run penalty is insignificant at conventional levels in the 1991-1997 sample,
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once the time period is extended there is no strong evidence of recovery of
earnings in the case of unemployment (Table G.8).
Appendix H
Chapter 5: Variable Definitions &
Construction.
H.0.2 Key Variable Definitions
In order to ensure precision in the variable construction, the sequence of ques-
tioning in the survey needs to be taken into account. The branching nature
of the BHPS means that the way an interviewee responds to questions ear-
lier in the survey will affect the availability of information collected later on.
Following the questionnaire, the interviewer initially establishes whether the
interviewee would define themselves as employed or self-employed. In the next
stage, the interviewer asks for the interviewee’s “current status”, which appears
in the individual response file. The interviewer then checks to see if reported
status is the same as at the last interview, if not then their job history is re-
quested for the last 12 months. A serious attempt to record a complete and
accurate picture of this, with pay slips referred to when necessary (see BHPS
Questionnaires for more information).
Real Wage Calculated by dividing an individual’s gross monthly pay (in-
cluding overtime, bonuses, etc. before tax deductions, national insurance or
pensions contributions, union dues, etc.) by 4.33 times the number of hours
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usually worked plus 1.5 times usual paid overtime hours (under the assumption
that overtime is paid at 1.5 times the usual hourly rate). Overtime payment
is only available in the BHPS from 1999. Inline with Arulampalam (2001),
this series is deflated using the Retail Price Index (RPI) and reported in 1991
prices. Since spell start and end dates are recorded to the nearest month, the
September version of the monthly RPI - available from the Office for National
Statistics - is used. The version used includes mortgage payments as well as
indirect taxes in the RPI series. Non-positive values of usual hours worked are
coded as missing. Non-positive values of paid overtime hours are coded as 0
in the calculation of wages in cases where both paid (jbotpd) and usual (jbot)
overtime hours worked were coded as not applicable. All other non-positive
cases are coded as missing. Extreme values for normal weekly hours, and for
normal paid overtime hours. These are truncated at 90 hours for normal hours,
and 30 paid overtime hours. Real wages less than 0.5 and more than 100 pounds
per hour were dropped as outliers.
Current (INDRESP file) Labour Market Status The literature has high-
lighted the importance of reporting error with regards to labour market status,
which can generate spurious transitions between labour market states (Poterba
& Summers 1986). With this in mind, ‘current labour market status’ is condi-
tioned on the sequence of questions in the BHPS survey. Due to the branching
nature of the BHPS, internal inconsistencies may arise in the data (see Taylor
et al. 2010, vol. 3, pp. A3-16). An individual may initially report themselves to
be unemployed, but later on it transpires that they actually have a job and they
provide this information. This inconsistency is likely to arise due to the survey
design, as current labour market status refers to what an individual considers
to be their main activity. For example, an interviewee may be registered as
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unemployed and thus consider their main activity to be unemployment, even
though they have a job (Jobseeker’s Allowance rules permit individuals to work
less than 16 hours a week but still claim unemployment benefits). In order to
deal with this, two variables “jbhas” (whether an individual did paid work in
the last week) and “jboff” (whether an individual did not work last week, but
has a job) were used.
For reference, the first question in the current employment section asks the
following question: “Can I just check, did you do any paid work last week -
that is in the seven days ending last Sunday - either as an employee or self
employed?” This is stored as “jbhas”. If the individual currently has a job,
then they are asked about the type of employment contract that they have
(permanent, seasonal/temp, fixed period). If the individual does not currently
have a job, then they are asked: Even though you weren’t working did you
have a job that you were away from last week? This is stored as “jboff”. See
BHPS questionnaires for more detail.
Previous Labour Market Status For spells ongoing at the first wave in-
terview which lasted more than a year, previous labour market status is not
collected at Wave 1. This information is calculated using the job history in-
formation in the JOBHIST file as well as the pre-1.9.1990 retrospective data
collected from first leaving full-time education at Waves 2 & 3. Two versions
of previous labour market status are developed, one which does not restrict
how far back into the past it looks, i.e. since leaving full-time education, and
another that restricts this to up to 5 years in the past. Kunze (2002) allows
the effect of previous labour market status to vary up to 6 years into the past,
although the study is based on administrative event history information from
tax records of the German IABS sub-sample. Due to lack of retrospective data,
(Gregory & Jukes 2001) restrict the impact of unemployment to to have an ef-
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fect on wages up to two years prior to the event. Studies based on the DWS
are restricted to 5/6 years of retrospective information (Farber 1999). Thus job
displacements occurring more than 5/6 years years ago will not be captured in
the DWS, with these individuals being assigned to the control group of non-
displaced workers. This distinction is likely to be of significance for individuals
with long employment spells due to a good initial match, if promotions are
not considered as the start of a new spell. One would expect previous non-
employment to be less significant the longer is job tenure, and consequently
when using a previous labour market status indicator which does not restrict
how far into the past one looks. The assumption that only the last the last 5
years matters is the implicit assumption that studies using surveys which only
provide limited retrospective data, like the DWS, are making. These studies
are also limited by lack of a direct measure of General Experience. Previous
status since leaving full-time education is used in the main analysis, given its
superiority based on statistical grounds (information criterion).
Leave Marker This indicator groups reasons for ending previous job (‘jhstpy’[job-
1]). This indicator defines the following groups: voluntary quit (move to a
better job); redundant; sacked/dismissed; temp. job ended; other (retirement;
health; baby; children/homecare; care other; other). I was unable to identify
how Arulampalam (2001) defines separation types when generating Table 5 in
her study. McLaughlin (1991) defines ‘quits’ as changes to better or different
jobs; ‘layoffs’ as dismissals and redundancies; and ‘other reasons’ to include
termination of contract, bad health, retirement, pregnancy, family care, na-
tional service and full time education. The definition of the ‘other’ group is
consistent with McLaughlin’s (1991) methodology but excludes termination of
contract as this can be identified in the BHPS (McLaughlin 1991). Following
Arulampalam (2001) I create separate groups for individuals that were ‘made
H. Chapter 5: Variable Definitions & Construction. CVIII
redundant’, ‘sacked/dismissed’, ‘temporary job ended’ and those with ‘missing’
reasons. In this study’s case, since we include individuals without wave 3 job
history, the incidence of missing values for this indicator is not negligible.
General Human Capital/ Job Market Experience Different methods have
been used in the literature to proxy job market experience. In the Mince-
rian earnings function, experience is taken to represent cumulative tenure, or
in the original formulation: years since leaving school (Chiswick 2003). How-
ever, some studies have proxied experience with age [experience + schooling +
5/6], controlling for years of schooling (for example Addison & Portugal 1989;
Jacobson et al. 1993; Houle & van Audenrode 1995) or potential experience:
age - [years of schooling - school starting age (5/6)]/ full-time education leav-
ing age (Gangl 2006). This approach is usually taken due to underlying data
limitations implying a lack of information about full employment biographies
(Gangl 2006). Others have used cumulative employment tenure, subtracting
non-employment tenure from total tenure, years of employment since 18 (An-
tonji & Shakotko, 1987) or summing up all employment spells post full-time
education (Dustmann & Pereira 2008). Arulumpalam (2001) uses cumulative
full-time employment tenure. Using full-time employment tenure imposes the
assumption that employees enter part-time jobs on flat wage-tenure profiles, a
testable assumption. (Gregory & Jukes 2001) proxy general experience by sub-
tracting months of claimant unemployment in the ( UK Joint Unemployment
& Vancancies Operating System, JUVOS) from years of employment (from
the National Earnings Survey, NES). To control for endogeneity Dustmann
& Meghir (2005) adopt a control function approach to estimating experience,
the residuals of which are used as controls for experience in a standard wage
equation formulation. As highlighted in section 2.2.3, the way one defines expe-
rience is likely to have an impact on the results, given the increased sensitivity
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to omitted variable bias and measurement error.
Information on the length of time spent in each labour market state is re-
quired in order to calculate this indicator directly. “Length of time in current
labour market spell” (cjsten) is collected at each INDRESP interview. An ad-
ditional indicator is developed using the start, end and interview dates in order
to calculate the spell length (once spells are in chronological order). Both in-
dicators could be used in this analysis; however there is reason to believe that
the spell length indicator is likely to be more accurate than the BHPS supplied
cjsten measure. Table H.1, which refers to an individual in the raw uncondi-
tional data, highlights the potential for recall error in the survey data. The
reported starting date of the wave 1 employment spell varies across the waves
although the individual was continuously employed, in the same spell, until
wave 5. At wave 2 the spell start date seems to be erroneously reported, whilst
at wave 5 the start date reported in the JOBHIST entry suggests that the
individual subsequently ignored the two months that they spent in unemploy-
ment from 1982m7 to 1982m9. This pattern is an empirical regularity in the
data, due to the prevalence of recall error in the BHPS (Mare´ 2006), and thus
the use of the raw cjsten measure to calculate experience indicators is likely to
produce biased estimates of the impact of general experience on wages in the
illustrated case. This is likely to be further exacerbated if a spell ends between
interview dates as only the spell length recorded at interview is captured by
the indicator. Furthermore, cjsten refers to the current labour market spell
at interview. This implies that short spells experienced over the previous 12
months will not be captured when using cjsten as a basis for constructing the
experience indicator. The self-constructed spell length indicator is more likely
to better capture these short-run dynamics.
The self-defined spell length indicator is chosen in favour of the BHPS-
supplied measure as is likely to be more accurate due to strategies implemented
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Table H.1: Data Inconsistency Example, one individual, raw uncon-
ditional data
wave jbstat jhstat jhstpy Spell
Start
Month
Interview
Month
Spell
End
Month
cjsten
0 Emp Redundant1959m11 1981m11 3168
0 Emp Redundant1981m11 1982m7 96
0 Unemp 1982m7 1982m9 60
1 Emp 1982m9 1991m11 3358
2 Emp 1990m5 1992m9 869
3 Emp 1982m10 1993m9 4011
4 Emp 1982m9 1994m9 4393
5 Emp/
Self-
Emp
Retired 1981m9 1995m7
5 Retired 1995m7 1995m9 60
6 Retired 1996m9 423
7 Retired 1997m9 789
to minimise recall error. General employment experience is calculated by cumu-
lating length of time in employment since first leaving full time education using
the self-constructed spell length indicator. General employment experience is
calculated by cumulating length of time in employment since first leaving full
time education using the self-constructed spell length indicator1. Employment
spells in the wave 0 data are the easiest to deal with, as each record refers to
separate spells with the a different employer (wave 3 data) or length of time
in continuous employment (wave 2 data). Potential experience (age - school
leaving age, where school leaving age is taken to be age first left full-time edu-
cation) is used as a robustness check, as well as a test for the appropriateness
of this indicator as a proxy for General Human Capital2
Specific Human Capital/ Current Employer Tenure Length of time with
current employer (tenure) is used to proxy specific human capital. Tenure is en-
dogenous as it can be viewed as a sequence of non-quit decisions (Farber 1999).
Furthermore, the returns to tenure can be interpreted as the returns to both
1Although (Arulampalam 2001) states that a BHPS-supplied indicator of spell length was
used in the study, “[the] tenure variable used is the current employer tenure as recorded at
the interview (Arulampalam 2001, pp. F593)”, Professor Arulampalam’s SPSS code does
not include steps for the construction of the general experience, indicating that this was
supplied pre-constructed by the Essex Institute for Social & Economic Research (ISER).
The advantage of the self-constructed measure is a lower incidence of missing values.
2This indicator has been widely used in the literature, however mostly due to limitations
in the underlying data implying a lack of full employment biographies.
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match and firm-specific human capital. No attempt is made to differentiate
between these potential sources.
H.0.3 Urban/Rural & Accessibility Indicators
The methodology used to classify these indicators is consistent with that used
in chapter 4, detailed in appendix chap:p1LinkedDataset. For further details,
please see these sections of the thesis.
H.0.4 Unemployment/Vacancies ratio
The Unemployment to Vacancies ratio is constructed using Notified vacan-
cies (inflow) and the Claimant Count for the period 1991 - 2001. Outlier
observations (>99 percentile) are dropped in the construction of this indica-
tor. Recording of vacancy postings was suspended from May 2001 onwards
by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) under guidance of the Department
of Work and Pensions (DWP). This suspension in the series was due to sig-
nificant distortions in the series introduced by changes in vacancy notification
methodology, e.g. Substantial process changes that took place with the in-
troduction of telephone call centre and later internet filing of vacancies also
need taking into account (Bentley 2005). This reporting was resumed in May
2002, however, changes in vacancy notification and handling methods hamper
comparability of this series over time. Although (Bentley 2005) states that the
historic series (pre-suspension) is available on NOMIS (www.nomisweb.co.uk),
there is a two year gap in headline statistics and a one year gap if one aggregates
occupation/industry-level data.
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I.1 Further Descriptives
Table I.1: Industrial Skill Composition (Census 2001 - based).
Highest Qualifications Level (Census 2001 - based)
No qualifications: No academic, vocational or professional qualifications.
Level 1: 1+ ’O’ levels/CSE/GCSE (any grade), NVQ level 1, Founda-
tion GNVQ.
Level 2: 5+ ’O’ levels, 5+ CSEs (grade 1), 5+ GCSEs (grade A - C),
School Certificate, 1+ ’A’ levels/’AS’ levels, NVQ level 2, In-
termediate GNVQ or equivalents.
Level 3: 2+ ’A’ levels, 4+ ’AS’ levels, Higher School Certificate, NVQ
level 3, Advanced GNVQ or equivalents.
Level 4/5: First degree, Higher Degree, NVQ levels 4 - 5, HNC, HND,
Qualified Teacher Status, Qualified Medical Doctor, Qualified
Dentist, Qualified Nurse, Midwife, Health Visitor or equiva-
lents.
Other qualifications/level
unknown:
Other qualifications (e.g. City and Guilds, RSA/OCR,
BTEC/Edexcel), Other Professional Qualifications.
SIC92 Sections Qualifictation Index†
England
F. Construction: 0.169432
A, B. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing : 0.188137
G. Wholesale and retail trade, repairs : 0.239862
H. Hotels and restaurants : 0.260218
I. Transport, storage and communications : 0.298577
C, D, E. Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity, gas and
water supply :
0.318857
O, P, Q. Other¶ : 0.562674
L. Public administration and defence, social security¶ : 0.668772
J. Financial intermediation¶ : 0.777015
N. Health and social work¶ : 0.868222
K. Real estate, renting and business activities¶ : 0.935312
M. Education¶ : 1.683318
Wales
F. Construction : 0.167373
A, B. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing : 0.171054
G. Wholesale and retail trade, repairs : 0.192753
I. Transport, storage and communications : 0.203045
H. Hotels and restaurants : 0.217952
C, D, E. Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and electricity, gas and
water supply :
0.263324
O, P, Q. Other¶ : 0.48415
J. Financial intermediation¶ : 0.547211
L. Public administration and defence, social security¶ : 0.644476
K. Real estate, renting and business activities¶ : 0.675296
N. Health and social work¶ : 0.792586
M. Education¶ : 1.836414
NB. Scotland values assumed to be the same as those for Wales.
† Qualifications index used to rank industries (employment counts, all people): (3,4/5)/(No Quals,1,2,Other/Unknown).
¶ Skilled Occupations. Defining “Other” category as unskilled had no impact on rankings.
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Table I.2: Broad-banded Occupational Skill Intensity (Census 2001 -
based).
Highest Qualifications Level (Census 2001 - based)
SOC90 1-digit groups Qualifictation Index†
England
2. Professional Occupations : 4.864
3. Associate Professional and Technical Occupations : 1.172
1. Managers and Senior Officials : 0.724
ALL PEOPLE : 0.394
4. Administrative and Secretarial Occupations : 0.390
6. Personal Service Occupations : 0.284
7. Sales and Customer Service Occupations : 0.264
Never worked or occupation not coded : 0.167
9. Elementary Occupations : 0.141
5. Skilled Trades Occupations : 0.137
8. Process, Plant and Machine Operatives : 0.092
Wales
2. Professional Occupations : 5.042
3. Associate Professional and Technical Occupations : 1.126
1. Managers and Senior Officials : 0.542
4. Administrative and Secretarial Occupations : 0.381
ALL PEOPLE : 0.325
7. Sales and Customer Service Occupations : 0.242
6. Personal Service Occupations : 0.238
Never worked or occupation not coded : 0.151
5. Skilled Trades Occupations : 0.142
9. Elementary Occupations : 0.134
8. Process, Plant and Machine Operatives : 0.083
NB. Scotland values assumed to be the same as those for Wales.
† Qualifications index used to rank occupations (employment counts, all people): (3,4/5)/(No Quals,1,2,Other/Unknown).
NB. Group definitions the same as in Table I.1.
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Table I.3: Current Labour Market Status: ISCO2008-Based. Males
vs. Females, Annual Discrete-Choice Data, 1991 - 2008.
Males Females
LSKEMP SKEMP NON-EMP LSKEMP SKEMP NON-EMP
Variable Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Mean
(S.D)
Age
30 - 45 0.375 (0.484) 0.452 (0.498) 0.207 (0.405) 0.391 (0.488) 0.426 (0.495) 0.344 (0.475)
45 + 0.316 (0.465) 0.34 (0.474) 0.496 (0.5) 0.334 (0.472) 0.346 (0.476) 0.394 (0.489)
School Type Attended
Grammar No Fee 0.053 (0.225) 0.174 (0.379) 0.069 (0.254) 0.084 (0.277) 0.174 (0.379) 0.099 (0.299)
Private 0.029 (0.168) 0.082 (0.275) 0.037 (0.188) 0.028 (0.166) 0.073 (0.261) 0.047 (0.211)
Technical 0.068 (0.251) 0.103 (0.305) 0.115 (0.319) 0.086 (0.28) 0.104 (0.305) 0.103 (0.304)
Highest Academic Qualifications
Degree 0.044 (0.205) 0.308 (0.462) 0.061 (0.239) 0.041 (0.199) 0.258 (0.438) 0.056 (0.229)
Other Higher 0.302 (0.459) 0.35 (0.477) 0.173 (0.378) 0.223 (0.416) 0.331 (0.471) 0.162 (0.368)
A Levels 0.15 (0.357) 0.121 (0.327) 0.122 (0.327) 0.141 (0.348) 0.097 (0.296) 0.107 (0.31)
O Levels 0.222 (0.416) 0.129 (0.335) 0.167 (0.373) 0.269 (0.444) 0.191 (0.393) 0.219 (0.413)
Vocational Training
Yes 0.397 (0.489) 0.402 (0.49) 0.288 (0.453) 0.333 (0.471) 0.466 (0.499) 0.269 (0.444)
Individual Characteristics
White 0.962 (0.191) 0.955 (0.208) 0.936 (0.244) 0.961 (0.194) 0.961 (0.194) 0.931 (0.254)
MarriedXCohabiting 0.685 (0.464) 0.771 (0.42) 0.555 (0.497) 0.724 (0.447) 0.742 (0.438) 0.685 (0.464)
Children 0.326 (0.469) 0.379 (0.485) 0.223 (0.416) 0.403 (0.491) 0.35 (0.477) 0.517 (0.5)
ChildrenXMarriedXCohab.0.322 (0.467) 0.373 (0.484) 0.212 (0.408) 0.341 (0.474) 0.3 (0.458) 0.389 (0.487)
Employed Spouse 0.523 (0.499) 0.618 (0.486) 0.217 (0.412) 0.646 (0.478) 0.674 (0.469) 0.472 (0.499)
Health Limits 0.086 (0.281) 0.06 (0.237) 0.444 (0.497) 0.093 (0.29) 0.082 (0.274) 0.291 (0.454)
Disabled 0.012 (0.107) 0.006 (0.076) 0.152 (0.359) 0.006 (0.079) 0.005 (0.073) 0.058 (0.234)
Housing Tenure
Owned Outright 0.149 (0.356) 0.14 (0.347) 0.193 (0.395) 0.152 (0.359) 0.146 (0.354) 0.193 (0.395)
Mortgage 0.626 (0.484) 0.734 (0.442) 0.273 (0.446) 0.598 (0.49) 0.722 (0.448) 0.374 (0.484)
Council 0.107 (0.309) 0.028 (0.165) 0.345 (0.475) 0.137 (0.344) 0.034 (0.182) 0.271 (0.444)
Housing Assoc. 0.037 (0.189) 0.015 (0.121) 0.075 (0.264) 0.042 (0.199) 0.017 (0.129) 0.073 (0.26)
Work-Related Training in last 12 months (+ part-time courses)
Yes 0.278 (0.448) 0.387 (0.487) 0.052 (0.222) 0.262 (0.44) 0.413 (0.492) 0.058 (0.233)
Potential Experience
Pot. Experience 20.8 (13.0) 20.3 (11.2) 24.8 (16.4) 21.5 (12.8) 20.2 (11.4) 23.0 (13.7)
X 30 - 45 1.564 (2.091) 1.831 (2.103) 0.883 (1.777) 1.655 (2.142) 1.728 (2.089) 1.413 (2.02)
X 45 + 2.363 (3.539) 2.409 (3.416) 4.037 (4.161) 2.464 (3.535) 2.455 (3.427) 3.036 (3.829)
Regional Characteristics
Urban 0.627 (0.484) 0.614 (0.487) 0.685 (0.465) 0.62 (0.485) 0.639 (0.48) 0.665 (0.472)
Accessible 0.958 (0.201) 0.974 (0.158) 0.971 (0.167) 0.959 (0.198) 0.97 (0.17) 0.97 (0.17)
University (in TTWA) 0.729 (0.444) 0.745 (0.436) 0.71 (0.454) 0.723 (0.448) 0.752 (0.432) 0.733 (0.442)
Skill Intensity -0.169
(0.904)
0.08 (0.951) -0.269
(0.932)
-0.134
(0.916)
0.063 (0.942) -0.167
(0.934)
Local Business Cycle Effects
Labour Market Tight-
ness (V/U)
-0.086 (0.92) -0.088
(0.919)
-0.197
(0.823)
-0.123
(0.859)
-0.094
(0.907)
-0.178
(0.843)
Industrial Skill Compo-
sition
-0.009
(0.949)
0.16 (1.001) -0.043
(0.955)
0.023 (0.975) 0.188 (0.993) 0.01 (0.967)
Previous Labour Market Status
LSKEMPxMATCH 0.333 (0.471) 0.014 (0.118) 0.083 (0.276) 0.416 (0.493) 0.017 (0.128) 0.068 (0.251)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial)
XBusServ XLowV/U 0.044 (0.206) 0.003 (0.053) 0.016 (0.126) 0.067 (0.249) 0.003 (0.052) 0.014 (0.116)
XBusServ XHighV/U 0.072 (0.259) 0.022 (0.146) 0.017 (0.129) 0.136 (0.342) 0.038 (0.191) 0.025 (0.155)
XPubServ XLowV/U 0.017 (0.129) 0.001 (0.026) 0.005 (0.071) 0.063 (0.243) 0.002 (0.039) 0.01 (0.099)
XPubServ XHighV/U 0.034 (0.181) 0.001 (0.03) 0.004 (0.064) 0.106 (0.308) 0.003 (0.058) 0.011 (0.103)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.182 (0.386) 0.008 (0.086) 0.037 (0.19) 0.177 (0.382) 0.008 (0.091) 0.024 (0.152)
XPart Time Contract 0.011 (0.106) 0 (0.012) 0.008 (0.09) 0.212 (0.408) 0.005 (0.072) 0.034 (0.18)
LSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.459 (0.498) 0.029 (0.167) 0.076 (0.264) 0.359 (0.48) 0.025 (0.156) 0.047 (0.211)
LSKEMPxOVQUALxJobSatisfaction
X“Genuinely
Overqual.”
0.098 (0.298) 0.006 (0.075) 0.01 (0.102) 0.056 (0.231) 0.005 (0.067) 0.008 (0.09)
X“Apparently
Overqual.”
0.361 (0.48) 0.023 (0.15) 0.065 (0.247) 0.303 (0.459) 0.021 (0.142) 0.038 (0.192)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial)
XBusServ XLowV/U 0.03 (0.17) 0.004 (0.062) 0.011 (0.105) 0.025 (0.157) 0.003 (0.054) 0.006 (0.076)
XBusServ XHighV/U 0.128 (0.334) 0.009 (0.094) 0.02 (0.139) 0.117 (0.321) 0.009 (0.095) 0.017 (0.127)
XPubServ XLowV/U 0.025 (0.155) 0.001 (0.035) 0.005 (0.071) 0.041 (0.199) 0.002 (0.044) 0.005 (0.068)
XPubServ XHighV/U 0.071 (0.257) 0.004 (0.062) 0.009 (0.094) 0.129 (0.335) 0.007 (0.085) 0.011 (0.104)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.285 (0.451) 0.017 (0.129) 0.043 (0.202) 0.153 (0.36) 0.012 (0.111) 0.017 (0.13)
XPart Time Contract 0.023 (0.149) 0.002 (0.039) 0.008 (0.09) 0.156 (0.363) 0.007 (0.084) 0.022 (0.148)
HSKEMPxOVQUAL 0.011 (0.106) 0.253 (0.435) 0.026 (0.16) 0.011 (0.103) 0.225 (0.417) 0.016 (0.127)
HSKEMPxOVQUALxJobSatisfaction
X“Genuinely
Overqual.”
0.003 (0.051) 0.042 (0.201) 0.005 (0.073) 0.002 (0.047) 0.033 (0.178) 0.003 (0.051)
X“Apparently
Overqual.”
0.009 (0.093) 0.211 (0.408) 0.021 (0.143) 0.008 (0.091) 0.192 (0.394) 0.014 (0.117)
x Previous Industry (ref. Commercial/Industrial)
XBusServ XLowV/U 0.001 (0.032) 0.031 (0.175) 0.005 (0.071) 0.002 (0.042) 0.021 (0.143) 0.002 (0.042)
XBusServ XHighV/U 0.003 (0.05) 0.095 (0.293) 0.007 (0.081) 0.004 (0.064) 0.067 (0.251) 0.006 (0.075)
XPubServ XLowV/U 0.001 (0.025) 0.011 (0.103) 0.001 (0.032) 0 (0.014) 0.019 (0.137) 0.001 (0.037)
XPubServ XHighV/U 0.002 (0.04) 0.037 (0.19) 0.004 (0.061) 0.002 (0.043) 0.082 (0.274) 0.004 (0.065)
XFirm Size: 50+ 0.007 (0.086) 0.163 (0.369) 0.014 (0.119) 0.006 (0.075) 0.127 (0.333) 0.008 (0.089)
XPart Time Contract 0 (0.018) 0.011 (0.104) 0.002 (0.043) 0.002 (0.047) 0.049 (0.216) 0.006 (0.075)
NON-EMP 0.181 (0.385) 0.12 (0.325) 0.752 (0.432) 0.197 (0.398) 0.132 (0.339) 0.821 (0.383)
